Kitabı oku: «A Constitution of the People and How to Achieve It», sayfa 7

“Look a shoot is sprouting from

the white stone

Sprouting from an ancient hand a

dark face

From it a white flower has painfully

budded and grown

And from its hidden nest a bird

has already flown

Into the lonely ring of someone’s

gleaming dream”

- Mak Dizdar, The Stone Sleeper 1

2. “Look a shoot is sprouting”: measuring culture

The refrain is as common to Bosnia and its neighbours as it is to the well-established democracies of Western Europe such as Britain: ‘I am not interested in politics,’ ‘nothing will change if I vote’, or ‘politicians only care about themselves.’2 What causes an individual to determine that their own political participation has no value or that their engagement will be met with indifference by those that represent them is one of most complex and perplexing aspects of democratic government. In theory, people are able to engage—by law, practice or convention—and are capable of engaging—by having the time, money and inclination to do so—those that make political decisions on their behalf. In practice, however, people who have that ability or capability choose not to engage.

It is in the context of increasing political apathy, in both developed and developing democracies, that it is particularly interesting to consider falling political engagement in Bosnia. While political apathy is problematic for any democratic government it is far more problematic for countries with new democratic constitutions which are seen to be in transition.3 The project of democratisation itself can be fundamentally undermined.

This book seeks to identify whether the explanation for political apathy, or more accurately political resignation, in Bosnia since the independence of the country from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY”) is connected to political culture.

 Is political apathy in the case of Bosnia a result of non-participation in politics, as one marker of political culture? There are two corollaries to that question.If political culture is to blame, then how is relatively higher political participation in its close neighbours, which share a great deal in common with Bosnia, explained? (Assuming participation is better in neighbouring countries).If political culture is not an adequate explanation, then what causal variables explain higher political apathy in Bosnia in comparison with its neighbours? (Assuming apathy is worse in Bosnia than it is in neighbouring countries).

 Critically, if political culture in Bosnia is ‘as good’ or ‘as bad’ as Britain’s political culture, what does that mean for the process of creating or amending constitutions? If Bosnia and Britain both have good political cultures then there may be some synergies between, and common approaches to, the process of constitutional design in both countries.

This book’s claim is that political culture, in so far as it is a product of historical circumstances, cannot be the main cause of political apathy in Bosnia. If historical circumstances explained the development of a non-participant orientation, then surely those same circumstances must manifest themselves in other former Yugoslav countries. Unless, that is, we adopt the idea of exceptionalism with respect to Bosnia, or the other former Yugoslav countries. The reason that political culture is often attributed to be the cause of all of Bosnia’s ills is because it is convenient to blame something as nebulous as culture rather than search for the root causes.4

A far more nuanced narrative is required for Bosnia. To the extent that non-participation in politics is to blame it is because the constitutional structure and the economic market created largely by the international community after the war have helped create an environment that has inhibited, and continues to hinder, participation. Academics, international politicians and pundits that blame political culture have misidentified the variables that cause political apathy. The root causes of political apathy are the same root causes engendering an indifferent and non-participant orientation. The root cause is the constitutional structure; apathy and non-participation are manifestations of one another. And the cycle is, of course, vicious. Precisely because there is a belief that nothing can be done, nothing is done.

In the case of Bosnia, the precipitant danger is that a set of circumstances may present themselves that galvanise all the discontents, troubles and grievances of the people into a push against an incumbent government. If that happens, it could fundamentally call into question the legitimacy of the entire democratic project set up under Dayton. This may be a particular risk if we identify a groundswell of opinion that suggests that the population harbours latent political participation; the capacity for future political engagement or involvement (which will be explained later in this Chapter).5 With the various revolutionary ‘Arab Springs’, starting in December 2010 in Tunisia and escalating from 2011 across the Arab world, Bosnia also saw rioting in areas where all three constituent peoples form majorities.6 Common to them all was a deep and accumulated frustration with the State institutions and the entrenched political elites which run them (Judah 2014). Those riots have died down, but the underlying issues remain unresolved. What are the alternatives that could be tentatively suggested for Bosnia? What can we learn from the Croatian experience and what is required for people to engage?

In the case of Britain, the challenge is that the country is currently going through a period of rapid constitutional change. As outlined in Chapter 1, the present constitutional settlement is under unprecedented strain. As the figures set out below show, Britain has grappled with increasing apathy and decreasing participation, as much as Bosnia. The question is whether the changes that are taking place will do anything to address this and, indeed, whether they are legitimate when viewed in the context of the interests and beliefs of the wider public.

There are a number of related questions for both Bosnia and Britain. What is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ political culture and how can it have an impact on constitutional design? Why might it be important that both countries cultivate and pay heed to ‘good’ political culture? How might constitutional design impact culture? In order to address these issues, a deeper understanding of the political cultures in the two countries is necessary.

2.1 Political culture in theory

The “political culture” of a given society has long been framed as the context in which the potential for constitutional reform can be understood (Welzel and Inglehart 2008, 131).7 In their classic study of the concept, Almond and Verba, define political culture as the set of “specifically political orientations—attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and the attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” ([1963] 1989, 12). Political culture is not dissimilar to the way in which one might refer to an economic culture or a religious culture. That conception of political culture may be supplemented by the idea that political culture can be the product of complex historical experiences that create norms of behaviour in society.

The literature on political culture asserts that certain mass attitudes are conducive to democracy. That societies with certain characteristics and views are more likely to be successful in establishing and sustaining democratic institutions (Welzel and Inglehart 2008, 131). This thesis has been taken further in countries deemed to have a “poor” or “bad” political culture such as Bosnia.

In Bosnia, some scholars have concluded that certain mass attitudes are not conducive to democratic structures which means that there is a limit on the democratic reforms that are possible. For example, a report by the European Stability Initiative concluded:

“At the heart of the Bosnian governance problem […] lies the lack of engagement by Bosnian citizens and interest groups in the practice of government […] public institutions which are not subject to constant pressure from citizens exerted through the democratic process will not respond to the needs of the public effectively” (European Stability Initiative 2004, 48).

Such views, however, are hard to sustain when one considers that political culture is not a fixed variable but one that is highly dynamic and constantly in flux. Political culture is and will be. Political culture influences political outcomes. But the political context is constantly reshaping and influencing the supposed culture of which the context is supposedly a product. Data shows that a wide variety of factors can influence the propensity of a population to engage with political institutions, including socioeconomic conditions, which are created or maintained by the institutions themselves (Welzel and Inglehart 2005, 150).

This idea of political culture, as a non-fixed variable, serves as the basis for analysis of civic attitudes and behaviour towards democratic institutions within Bosnia and Britain, including the way in which the institutions might themselves autonomously impact political culture. As a critique of existing work explaining political participation in Bosnia, this book attempts to challenge the commonly held assumption that poor political culture is the bane of Bosnia’s political life and the root cause of the political apathy seen in the country since independence. Political apathy, which in reality in Bosnia is resignation, is not synonymous with poor culture.

In Britain, differing views on the “health” of its political culture have been put forward in relation to the willingness of the populace to engage in the democratic process, particularly in recent years as commentators have “blamed” the outcome of the EU referendum on mass disengagement with the political system (Curtice 2016). This book aims to interrogate common assumptions about Britain’s political culture and examine what this tells us about the potential for constitutional reform.

In addition to outlining key markers for political culture of Britain and Bosnia and giving a broad commentary on the respective political cultures of the two countries, this book will compare, systematically, Bosnian culture with its close neighbour, Croatia. Clearly there are considerable differences between Bosnia and Britain impacting on political culture and political participation rates. Given the shared histories of Bosnia and Croatia, the comparison allows us to ascertain to what extent, if at all, Bosnia genuinely has a politically apathetic populace, by drawing out the similarities and differences (if any) with its culturally and geographically close neighbour.

The rationale for comparing political culture in Croatia and Bosnia is threefold. First, having two comparator States with shared history and norms allows us to challenge path dependent explanations of why democratic participation in Bosnia is allegedly so much worse than in its neighbouring State, Croatia. Second, given the different paths Croatia and Bosnia have taken following the armed conflicts in the 1990s and the relative political success of Croatia (as it is now an EU member State) the comparison is immensely useful in analysing variations, if any, in political culture. Third, moving away from anecdotal evidence (and an exclusive focus on post-war Bosnia) to using time series statistical data—pre-war and post-war—from two neighbouring countries is a helpful way to comprehensively and comparatively measure two features of culture: (i) long-term political participation as a marker of political culture versus short-term political apathy; (ii) the root causes of political division in Bosnia by eliminating irrelevant variables such as a belief in a long-term non-participant orientation among the people rather than its actual existence.

The comparison between the Bosnia and Croatia is, therefore, helpful to challenge the commonly held assumption that current non-participation in politics is an insurmountable impediment to political life in Bosnia rather than the autonomous impact of its imposed constitutional structures. The statistical analysis discussed shortly in this Chapter will seek to demonstrate that political participation in Bosnia is as, or more, favourable than in Croatia. That is notwithstanding that trust in institutions continues to fall in Bosnia as it was falling in Croatia under President Franjo Tuđman who was Croatia’s first post-communist leader and its only war-time leader. Addressing the issue of participation then allows a more meaningful comparison between the processes of constitutional reform and amendment in Britain and Bosnia respectively to resolve any doubt about whether political culture in Bosnia is conducive to democratic practices and processes. By contrast, the latter is almost a given in Britain.

A myriad of contemporary literature and scholarship focuses on the importance of political culture for democratic practice. The very idea of liberal democracy, quite aside from a simple electoral democracy, is “based on mass voice in self-governance [and] therefore depends on social preconditions such as the wide distribution of participatory resources and a trusting, tolerant public that prizes free choice” (Welzel and Inglehart 2008, 126).

The literature on political culture is rich and varied and the typology for analysing participation in a country dauntingly disparate. Approaches taken by scholars to conceptualising political culture can be divided into the following categories: (a) value based models that use people’s self-expression values across time and focus on the essential value preconditions for liberal democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Hakansson and Sjoholm 2007; Welzel and Inglehart 2008; Kuntz 2011); (b) social capital models that focus on how social interaction between people leads to greater trust, reciprocity and participatory habits (Putnam 1993);8 (c) more complicated modernisation and post-modernisation hypotheses which suggest that the absence of material need in communities propels people into the democratic arena—that view is countered by theories that suggest democracy first ‘happens’ as a pre-condition and is then subsequently sustained by socio-economic development (Lipset 1959; Inglehart 1997; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001); and (d) alternative or ‘new politics’ hypotheses which assert that less formal associational behaviour in the civil (non-political) sphere can have important potential consequences for conventional political practice (Ekman and Amna 2009; Ekman 2009).

Value-based models maintain that democratic politics requires more than just democratic institutions. In The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba dispense with the idea that electoral participation is the sole measure of political participation. The effectiveness of democratic government, which is by definition participatory, depends essentially on an allegiant political culture (a civic culture) that is also participatory in nature (Almond and Verba [1963] 1989, 26). Crucially, however, ‘parochial’ or ‘subject’ orientations in society that are non-political in nature—such as a limited interest in politics and little appetite for dissent—are important for a balanced political culture. Where the parochial or subject culture is predominant then democratic institutions will find it difficult to be legitimate. Conversely, if there is no parochial or subject culture at all then populations will become completely unruly and will never accept any decision by authorities as legitimate. In Bosnia, therefore, if the culture is largely one of deference and disinterest then it should have an impact on democratic institutions (following Almond and Verba).

Social capital models focus extensively on why political culture is a key explanatory variable to good political government and political participation. Putnam (1993, 167) explains why the North of Italy has a far better regional government than the South. The key variable is not wealth, but the civic community of the North characterized by horizontal, rather than hierarchical, networks embodying values of solidarity, civic-engagement, cooperation and honesty—“social capital” in short. Social capital refers to “features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam 1993). Voluntary cooperation is easier in a society with an inherited supply of social capital, in the form of networks of reciprocity and civic engagement. Acknowledging the usual problems of collective action (such as the tragedy of the commons, credible threats, and prisoner’s dilemma) Putnam outlines that institutions can reduce the transactions costs of co-operative behaviour. But why do collaborative institutions work in some places and fail to work in others? Putnam links this difference to the civic community: there is a conducive political culture in the North but not in the South. Cross-sectional data showed that, due to the political culture, the North of Italy puts new institutions to better use in four ways: civic engagement; political equality; solidarity, trust and tolerance; and social structures of cooperation. His statistical inferences show that all the regions with high institutional performance and high scores on the civic community index are from the centre-North. Happiness, concludes Putnam, “is living in a civic community” (1993, 113).

Carlo Trigilia (1995), however, has pointed to the growth in associational activity in the South of Italy “in part political, but above all cultural, which is shaping new possibilities on the level of democratic growth and the positive use of civic resources” (Tarrow 1996, 392). In fact, 6400 cultural associations were found in the South, two thirds of which were created after 1980. Putnam fails to account for the growth of such activity and why it does not appear to correspond to improved political participation or governance. A salient criticism of Putnam is that his concept of civic engagement includes all manners of behaviour which may be far removed from influencing political behaviour. Not all civic engagement has consequences for politics (North 1991, 97-112). Ekman (2009, 4) rightly notes that to explain declining levels of civic engagement we need to be clear about what exactly is declining otherwise we stretch the concept to be completely meaningless.

Putnam (1993) also conveniently leaves out the successive ‘explosions’ as Tarrow (1996, 392) calls them in Northern Italian associational activity which are far removed from developing social capital—organised corruption, far-right separatist movements, mafia organisations and the “collapse of Marxist and Catholic subcultures with their assortment of mass organisations giving way to a party system whose entrenched structures have all but disappeared” (Ekman 2009, 4). Not all associational activity is ‘good’ activity towards the health of political institutions. Associations themselves can have conflicting objectives to those of other associations which can promote rivalry and possibly conflict (Walzer 1999, 89 and Walzer 1980). The democratising and anti-democratising impact of associational behaviour is important when analysing political participation in Bosnia and increasingly in Britain, as will be discussed further. The forging of associations presents an opportunity for participation, but that participation can be disastrously anti-system. They may serve to undermine rather than reinforce existing political and economic structures and institutions. That is particularly so when associations receive the patronage of narrow-minded, self-interested governing elites with little interest in deepening political engagement and democratisation.

No doubt, horizontal ties and the forming of associations can help counteract the effects of individualism and build trust among people through mutual assistance: all very valuable for democratising and developing participant political orientations. But such developments must not leave out the influence of governing elites and the systems and structures in which they operate (an issue considered further in Chapter 4). For Putnam, the State suffers as a result of poor political culture, but he does not appear to consider that the State itself may be the cause of poor political culture. Tarrow’s (1996) critique, very cogently elaborated by Skocpol (1996, 20-25), is that States, via political elites within institutions, can carry out autonomous actions with political and civil consequences.

Alexis de Tocqueville (1863, 121), described by Putnam as the ‘most relevant social theorist’ on this issue, believes the role played by civil associations is crucial in a democracy as “democracy… confines him [man] entirely within the solitudes of his own heart.” De Tocqueville believes democracy can be dangerous because it breeds individualism, where people are concerned only with themselves and leave society at large to itself, causing public life to be stifled and excluding large parts of society such as the poor. In contrast to this, civil society, and the forming of associations, helps to counteract the effects of individualism by addressing issues through voluntarily helping one another, rather than through compulsion by a governing class. The argument, however, that individualism is prone to be used by the governing class to enforce actions in the community can be also true of associations. In defence of de Tocqueville, though, Walzer (1996, 89) notes that “this is probably as close as we can come to that ‘friendship’ which Aristotle thought should characterise relations among members of the same political community” (See also, Walzer 1980). The democratising and anti-democratising impact of associational behaviour is important when analysing political participation in Bosnia and Croatia—they present an opportunity for participation, but that participation can be disastrously anti-system. That institutions and political elites can have such autonomous effect, both good and bad, is no clearer than in Bosnia. The autonomous impact of institutions is an issue further elaborated on in Chapter 4.