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Kitabı oku: «Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812. Volume 1»

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PREFACE

The present work concludes the series of "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," as originally framed in the conception of the author. In the previous volumes he has had the inspiring consciousness of regarding his subject as a positive and commanding element in the history of the world. In the War of 1812, also, the effect is real and dread enough; but to his own country, to the United States, as a matter of national experience, the lesson is rather that of the influence of a negative quantity upon national history. The phrase scarcely lends itself to use as a title; but it represents the truth which the author has endeavored to set forth, though recognizing clearly that the victories on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain do illustrate, in a distinguished manner, his principal thesis, the controlling influence upon events of naval power, even when transferred to an inland body of fresh water. The lesson there, however, was the same as in the larger fields of war heretofore treated. Not by rambling operations, or naval duels, are wars decided, but by force massed, and handled in skilful combination. It matters not that the particular force be small. The art of war is the same throughout; and may be illustrated as really, though less conspicuously, by a flotilla as by an armada; by a corporal's guard, or the three units of the Horatii, as by a host of a hundred thousand.

The interest of the War of 1812, to Americans, has commonly been felt to lie in the brilliant evidence of high professional tone and efficiency reached by their navy, as shown by the single-ship actions, and by the two decisive victories achieved by little squadrons upon the lakes. Without in the least overlooking the permanent value of such examples and such traditions, to the nation, and to the military service which they illustrate, it nevertheless appears to the writer that the effect may be even harmful to the people at large, if it be permitted to conceal the deeply mortifying condition to which the country was reduced by parsimony in preparation, or to obscure the lessons thence to be drawn for practical application now. It is perhaps useless to quarrel with the tendency of mankind to turn its eyes from disagreeable subjects, and to dwell complacently upon those which minister to self-content. We mostly read the newspapers in which we find our views reflected, and dispense ourselves easily with the less pleasing occupation of seeing them roughly disputed; but a writer on a subject of national importance may not thus exempt himself from the unpleasant features of his task.

The author has thought it also essential to precede his work by a somewhat full exposition of the train of causes, which through a long series of years led to the war. It may seem at first far-fetched to go back to 1651 for the origins of the War of 1812; but without such preliminary consideration it is impossible to understand, or to make due allowance for, the course of Great Britain. It will be found, however, that the treatment of the earlier period is brief, and only sufficient for a clear comprehension of the five years of intense international strain preceding the final rupture; years the full narrative of which is indispensable to appreciating the grounds and development of the quarrel,—to realize what they fought each other for.

That much of Great Britain's action was unjustifiable, and at times even monstrous, regarded in itself alone, must be admitted; but we shall ill comprehend the necessity of preparation for war, if we neglect to note the pressure of emergency, of deadly peril, upon a state, or if we fail to recognize that traditional habits of thought constitute with nations, as with individuals, a compulsive moral force which an opponent can control only by the display of adequate physical power. Such to the British people was the conviction of their right and need to compel the service of their native seamen, wherever found on the high seas. The conclusion of the writer is, that at a very early stage of the French Revolutionary Wars the United States should have obeyed Washington's warnings to prepare for war, and to build a navy; and that, thus prepared, instead of placing reliance upon a system of commercial restrictions, war should have been declared not later than 1807, when the news of Jena, and of Great Britain's refusal to relinquish her practice of impressing from American ships, became known almost coincidently. But this conclusion is perfectly compatible with a recognition of the desperate character of the strife that Great Britain was waging; that she could not disengage herself from it, Napoleon being what he was; and that the methods which she pursued did cause the Emperor's downfall, and her own deliverance, although they were invasions of just rights, to which the United States should not have submitted.

If war is always avoidable, consistently with due resistance to evil, then war is always unjustifiable; but if it is possible that two nations, or two political entities, like the North and South in the American Civil War, find the question between them one which neither can yield without sacrificing conscientious conviction, or national welfare, or the interests of posterity, of which each generation in its day is the trustee, then war is not justifiable only; it is imperative. In these days of glorified arbitration it cannot be affirmed too distinctly that bodies of men—nations—have convictions binding on their consciences, as well as interests which are vital in character; and that nations, no more than individuals, may surrender conscience to another's keeping. Still less may they rightfully pre-engage so to do. Nor is this conclusion invalidated by a triumph of the unjust in war. Subjugation to wrong is not acquiescence in wrong. A beaten nation is not necessarily a disgraced nation; but the nation or man is disgraced who shirks an obligation to defend right.

From 1803 to 1814 Great Britain was at war with Napoleon, without intermission; until 1805 single handed, thenceforth till 1812 mostly without other allies than the incoherent and disorganized mass of the Spanish insurgents. After Austerlitz, as Pitt said, the map of Europe became useless to indicate distribution of political power. Thenceforth it showed a continent politically consolidated, organized and driven by Napoleon's sole energy, with one aim, to crush Great Britain; and the Continent of Europe then meant the civilized world, politically and militarily. How desperate the strife, the author in a previous work has striven fully to explain, and does not intend here to repeat. In it Great Britain laid her hand to any weapon she could find, to save national life and independence. To justify all her measures at the bar of conventional law, narrowly construed, is impossible. Had she attempted to square herself to it she would have been overwhelmed; as the United States, had it adhered rigidly to its Constitution, must have foregone the purchase of the territories beyond the Mississippi. The measures which overthrew Napoleon grievously injured the United States; by international law grievously wronged her also. Should she have acquiesced? If not, war was inevitable. Great Britain could not be expected to submit to destruction for another's benefit.

The author has been indebted to the Officers of the Public Records Office in London, to those of the Canadian Archives, and to the Bureau of Historical Research of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, for kind and essential assistance in consulting papers. He owes also an expression of personal obligation to the Marquis of Londonderry for permission to use some of the Castlereagh correspondence, bearing on the peace negotiations, which was not included in the extensive published Memoirs and Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh; and to Mr. Charles W. Stewart, the Librarian of the United States Navy Department, for inexhaustible patience in searching for, or verifying, data and references, needed to make the work complete on the naval side.

A.T. MAHAN.

September, 1905.

CHAPTER I
COLONIAL CONDITIONS

The head waters of the stream of events which led to the War of 1812, between the United States and Great Britain, must be sought far back in the history of Europe, in the principles governing commercial, colonial, and naval policy, accepted almost universally prior to the French Revolution. It is true that, before that tremendous epoch was reached, a far-reaching contribution to the approaching change in men's ideas on most matters touching mercantile intercourse, and the true relations of man to man, of nation to nation, had been made by the publication, in 1776, of Adam Smith's "Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations;" but, as is the case with most marked advances in the realm of thought, the light thus kindled, though finding reflection here and there among a few broader intellects, was unable to penetrate at once the dense surface of prejudice and conservatism with which the received maxims of generations had incrusted the general mind. Against such obstruction even the most popular of statesmen—as the younger Pitt soon after this became—cannot prevail at once; and, before time permitted the British people at large to reach that wider comprehension of issues, whereby alone radical change is made possible, there set in an era of reaction consequent upon the French Revolution, the excesses of which involved in one universal discredit all the more liberal ideas that were leavening the leaders of mankind.

The two principal immediate causes of the War of 1812 were the impressment of seamen from American merchant ships, upon the high seas, to serve in the British Navy, and the interference with the carrying trade of the United States by the naval power of Great Britain. For a long time this interference was confined by the British Ministry to methods which they thought themselves able to defend—as they did the practice of impressment—upon the ground of rights, prescriptive and established, natural or belligerent; although the American Government contended that in several specific measures no such right existed,—that the action was illegal as well as oppressive. As the war with Napoleon increased in intensity, however, the exigencies of the struggle induced the British cabinet to formulate and enforce against neutrals a restriction of trade which it confessed to be without sanction in law, and justified only upon the plea of necessary retaliation, imposed by the unwarrantable course of the French Emperor. These later proceedings, known historically as the Orders in Council,1 by their enormity dwarfed all previous causes of complaint, and with the question of impressment constituted the vital and irreconcilable body of dissent which dragged the two states into armed collision. Undoubtedly, other matters of difficulty arose from time to time, and were productive of dispute; but either they were of comparatively trivial importance, easily settled by ordinary diplomatic methods, or there was not at bottom any vital difference as to principle, but only as to the method of adjustment. For instance, in the flagrant and unpardonable outrage of taking men by force from the United States frigate "Chesapeake," the British Government, although permitted by the American to spin out discussion over a period of four years, did not pretend to sustain the act itself; the act, that is, of searching a neutral ship of war. Whatever the motive of the Ministry in postponing redress, their pretexts turned upon points of detail, accessory to the main transaction, or upon the subsequent course of the United States Government, which showed conscious weakness by taking hasty, pettish half-measures; instead of abstaining from immediate action, and instructing its minister to present an ultimatum, if satisfaction were shirked.

In the two causes of the war which have been specified, the difference was fundamental. Whichever was right, the question at stake was in each case one of principle, and of necessity. Great Britain never claimed to impress American seamen; but she did assert that her native-born subjects could never change their allegiance, that she had an inalienable right to their service, and to seize them wherever found, except within foreign territory. From an admitted premise, that the open sea is common to all nations, she deduced a common jurisdiction, in virtue of which she arrested her vagrant seamen. This argument of right was reinforced by a paramount necessity. In a life and death struggle with an implacable enemy, Great Britain with difficulty could keep her fleet manned at all; even with indifferent material. The deterioration in quality of her ships' companies was notorious; and it was notorious also that numerous British seamen sought employment in American merchant ships, hoping there to find refuge from the protracted confinement of a now dreary maritime war. Resort to impressment was not merely the act of a high-handed Government, but the demand of both parties in the state, coerced by the sentiment of the people, whose will is ultimately irresistible. No ministry could hope to retain power if it surrendered the claim to take seamen found under a neutral flag. This fact was thoroughly established in a long discussion with United States plenipotentiaries, five years before the war broke out.

On the other hand, the United States maintained that on the sea common the only jurisdiction over a ship was that of its own nation. She could not admit that American vessels there should be searched, for other purposes than those conceded to the belligerent by international law; that is, in order to determine the nature of the voyage, to ascertain whether, by destination, by cargo, or by persons carried, the obligations of neutrality were being infringed. If there was reasonable cause for suspicion, the vessel, by accepted law and precedent, might be sent to a port of the belligerent, where the question was adjudicated by legal process; but the actual captor could not decide it on the spot. On the contrary, he was bound, to the utmost possible, to preserve from molestation everything on board the seized vessel; in order that, if cleared, the owner might undergo no damage beyond the detention. So deliberate a course was not suited to the summary methods of impressment, nor to the urgent needs of the British Navy. The boarding officer, who had no authority to take away a bale of goods, decided then and there whether a man was subject to impressment, and carried him off at once, if he so willed.

It is to the credit of the American Government under Jefferson, that, though weak in its methods of seeking redress, it went straight back of the individual sufferer, and rested its case unswervingly on the broad principle.2 That impressment, thus practised, swept in American seamen, was an incident only, although it grievously aggravated the injury. Whatever the native allegiance of individuals on board any vessel on the open ocean, their rights were not to be regulated by the municipal law of the belligerent, but by that of the nation to which the ship belonged, of whose territory she was constructively a part, and whose flag therefore was dishonored, if acquiescence were yielded to an infringement of personal liberty, except as conceded by obligations of treaty, or by the general law of nations. Within British waters, the United States suffered no wrong by the impressment of British subjects—the enforcement of local municipal law—on board American vessels; and although it was suggested that such visits should not be made, and that an arriving crew should be considered to have the nationality of their ship, this concession, if granted, would have been a friendly limitation by Great Britain of her own municipal jurisdiction. It therefore could not be urged upon the British Government by a nation which took its stand resolutely upon the supremacy of its own municipal rights, on board its merchant shipping on the high seas.

It is to be noted, furthermore, that the voice of the people in the United States, the pressure of influence upon the Government, was not as unanimous as that exerted upon the British Ministry. The feeling of the country was divided; and, while none denied the grievous wrong done when an American was impressed, a class, strong at least in intellectual power, limited its demands to precautions against such mistakes and to redress when they occurred. The British claim to search, with the object of impressing British subjects, was considered by these men to be valid. Thus Gouverneur Morris, who on a semi-official visit to London in 1790 had had occasion to remonstrate upon the impressment of Americans in British ports, and who, as a pamphleteer, had taken strong ground against the measures of the British Government injurious to American commerce, wrote as follows in 1808 about the practice of seizing British subjects in American ships: "That we, the people of America, should engage in ruinous warfare to support a rash opinion, that foreign sailors in our merchant ships are to be protected against the power of their sovereign, is downright madness." "Why not," he wrote again in 1813, while the war was raging, "waiving flippant debate, lay down the broad principle of national right, on which Great Britain takes her native seamen from our merchant ships? Let those who deny the right pay, suffer, and fight, to compel an abandonment of the claim. Men of sound mind will see, and men of sound principle will acknowledge, its existence." In his opinion, there was but one consistent course to be pursued by those who favored the war with Great Britain, which was to insist that she should, without compensation, surrender her claim. "If that ground be taken," he wrote, "the war [on our part] will be confessedly, as it is now impliedly, unjust."3 Morris was a man honorably distinguished in our troubled national history—a member of the Congress of the Revolution and of the Constitutional Convention, a trained lawyer, a practised financier, and an experienced diplomatist; one who throughout his public life stood high in the estimation of Washington, with whom he was in constant official and personal correspondence. It is to be added that those to whom he wrote were evidently in sympathy with his opinions.

So again Representative Gaston, of North Carolina, a member of the same political party as Morris, speaking from his seat in the House in February, 1814,4 maintained the British doctrine of inalienable allegiance. "Naturalization granted in another country has no effect whatever to destroy the original primary allegiance." Even Administration speakers did not deny this, but they maintained that the native allegiance could be enforced only within its territorial limits, not on the high seas. While perfectly firm and explicit as to the defence of American seamen,—even to the point of war, if needful,—Gaston spoke of the British practice as a right. "If you cannot by substitute obtain an abandonment of the right, or practice, to search our vessels, regulate it so as to prevent its abuse; waiving for the present, not relinquishing, your objections to it." He expressed sympathy, too, for the desperate straits in which Great Britain found herself. "At a time when her floating bulwarks were her whole safeguard against slavery, she could not view without alarm and resentment the warriors who should have manned those bulwarks pursuing a more gainful occupation in American vessels. Our merchant ships were crowded with British seamen, most of them deserters from their ships of war, and all furnished with fraudulent protections to prove them Americans. To us they were not necessary." On the contrary, "they ate the bread and bid down the wages of native seamen, whom it was our first duty to foster and encourage." This competition with native seamen was one of the pleas likewise of the New England opposition, too much of which was obstinately and reprehensibly factious. "Many thousands of British seamen," said Governor Strong of Massachusetts, in addressing the Legislature, May 28, 1813, "deserted that service for a more safe and lucrative employment in ours." Had they not, "the high price for that species of labor would soon have induced a sufficient number of Americans to become seamen. It appears, therefore, that British seamen have been patronized at the expense of our own; and should Great Britain now consent to relinquish the right of taking her own subjects, it would be no advantage to our native seamen; it would only tend to reduce their wages by increasing the numbers of that class of men."5 Gaston further said, that North Carolina, though not a commercial state, had many native seamen; but, "at the moment war was declared, though inquiry was made, I could not hear of a single native seaman detained by British impressment."

It is desirable, especially in these days, when everything is to be arbitrated, that men should recognize both sides of this question, and realize how impossible it was for either party to acquiesce in any other authority than their own deciding between them. "As I never had a doubt," said Morris, "so I thought it a duty to express my conviction that British ministers would not, dared not, submit to mediation a question of essential right."6 "The way to peace is open and clear," he said the following year. "Let the right of search and impressment be acknowledged as maxims of public law."7

These expressions, uttered in the freedom of private correspondence, show a profound comprehension of the constraint under which the British Government and people both lay. It was impossible, at such a moment of extreme national peril, to depart from political convictions engendered by the uniform success of a policy followed consistently for a hundred and fifty years. For Great Britain, the time had long since passed into a dim distance, when the national appreciation of the sea to her welfare was that of mere defence, as voiced by Shakespeare:

 
England, hedged in with the main,
That water-walled bulwark, still secure
And confident from foreign purposes.8
 
 
This little world,
This precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house
Against the envy of less happier lands.9
 

By the middle of the seventeenth century, the perception of Great Britain's essential need to predominate upon the sea had dawned upon men's minds, and thence had passed from a vague national consciousness to a clearly defined national line of action, adopted first through a recognition of existing conditions of inferiority, but after these had ceased pursued without any change of spirit, and with no important changes of detail. This policy was formulated in a series of measures, comprehensively known as the Navigation Acts, the first of which was passed in 1651, during Cromwell's Protectorate. In 1660, immediately after the Restoration, it was reaffirmed in most essential features, and thenceforward continued to and beyond the times of which we are writing. In form a policy of sweeping protection, for the development of a particular British industry,—the carrying trade,—it was soon recognized that, in substance, its success had laid the foundations of a naval strength equally indispensable to the country. Upon this ground it was approved even by Adam Smith, although in direct opposition to the general spirit of his then novel doctrine. While exposing its fallacies as a commercial measure, he said it exemplified one of two cases in which protective legislation was to be justified. "The defence of Great Britain, for example, depends very much upon the number of its sailors and shipping. The Act of Navigation therefore very properly endeavors to give the sailors and shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country.... It is not impossible that some of the regulations of this famous Act may have proceeded from national animosity. They are as wise, however, as though they had all been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom.... The Act is not favorable to foreign commerce, nor to the opulence which can arise from that; but defence is of much more importance than opulence. The Act of Navigation is perhaps the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England."10 It became a dominant prepossession of British statesmen, even among Smith's converts, in the conduct of foreign relations, that the military power of the state lay in the vast resources of native seamen, employed in its merchant ships. Even the wealth returned to the country, by the monopoly of the imperial markets, and by the nearly exclusive possession of the carrying trade, which was insured to British commerce by the elaborate regulations of the Act, was thought of less moment. "Every commercial consideration has been repeatedly urged," wrote John Adams, the first United States Minister to Great Britain, "but to no effect; seamen, the Navy, and power to strike an awful blow to an enemy at the first outbreak of war, are the ideas which prevail."11 This object, and this process, are familiar to us in these later days under the term "mobilization;" the military value of which, if rapidly effected, is well understood.

In this light, and in the light of the preceding experience of a hundred and fifty years, we must regard the course of the British Ministry through that period, extremely critical to both nations, which began when our War of Independence ended, and issued in the War of 1812. We in this day are continually told to look back to our fathers of the Revolutionary period, to follow their precepts, to confine ourselves to the lines of their policy. Let us then either justify the British ministries of Pitt and his successors, in their obstinate adherence to the traditions they had received, or let us admit that even ancestral piety may be carried too far, and that venerable maxims must be brought to the test of existing conditions.

The general movement of maritime intercourse between countries is commonly considered under two principal heads: Commerce and Navigation. The first applies to the interchange of commodities, however effected; the second, to their transportation from port to port. A nation may have a large commerce, of export and import, carried in foreign vessels, and possess little shipping of its own. This is at present the condition of the United States; and once, in far gone days, it was in great measure that of England. In such case there is a defect of navigation, consequent upon which there will be a deficiency of native seamen; of seamen attached to the country and its interests, by ties of birth or habit. For maritime war such a state will have but small resources of adaptable naval force; a condition dangerous in proportion to its dependence upon control of the sea. Therefore the attention of British statesmen, during the period in which the Navigation Act flourished, fastened more and more upon the necessity of maintaining the navigation of the kingdom, as distinguished from its commerce. Subsidiary to the movement of commerce, there is a third factor, relatively stationary, the consideration of which is probably less familiar now than it was to the contemporaries of the Navigation Act, to whom it was known under the name entrepôt. This term was applied to those commercial centres—in this connection maritime centres—where goods accumulate on their way to market; where they are handled, stored, or transshipped. All these processes involve expenditure, which inures to the profit of the port, and of the nation; the effect being the exact equivalent of the local gains of a railroad centre of the present day. It was a dominant object with statesmen of the earlier period to draw such accumulations of traffic to their own ports, or nations; to force trade, by ingenious legislation, or even by direct coercion, to bring its materials to their own shores, and there to yield to them the advantages of the entrepôt. Thus the preamble to one of the series of Navigation Acts states, as a direct object, the "making this Kingdom a staple12 [emporium], not only of the commodities of our plantations, but also of the commodities of other countries, and places, for the supply of the plantations."13 An instructive example of such indirect effort was the institution of free ports; ports which, by exemption from heavy customary tolls, or by the admission of foreign ships or goods, not permitted entrance to other national harbors, invited the merchant to collect in them, from surrounding regions, the constituents of his cargoes. On the other hand, the Colonial System, which began to assume importance at the time of the Navigation Act, afforded abundant opportunity for the compulsion of trade. Colonies being part of the mother country, and yet transoceanic with reference to her, maritime commerce between them and foreign communities could by direct legislation be obliged first to seek the parent state, which thus was made the distributing centre for both their exports and imports.

For nearly three centuries before the decisive measures taken by the Parliament of the Commonwealth, the development and increase of English shipping, by regulation of English trade, had been recognized as a desirable object by many English rulers. The impulse had taken shape in various enactments, giving to English vessels privileges, exclusive or qualified, in the import or export carriage of the kingdom; and it will readily be understood that the matter appeared of even more pressing importance, when the Navy depended upon the merchant service for ships, as well as for men; when the war fleets of the nation were composed of impressed ships, as well as manned by impressed sailors. These various laws had been tentative in character. Both firmness of purpose and continuity of effort were lacking to them; due doubtless to the comparative weakness of the nation in the scale of European states up to the seventeenth century. During the reigns of the first two Stuarts, this weakness was emphasized by internal dissensions; but the appreciation of the necessity for some radical remedy to the decay of English naval power remained and increased. To this conviction the ship-money of Charles the First bears its testimony; but it was left to Cromwell and his associates to formulate the legislation, upon which, for two centuries to come, the kingdom was thought to depend, alike for the growth of its merchant shipping and for the maintenance of the navy. All that preceded has interest chiefly as showing the origin and growth of an enduring national conviction, with which the United States came into collision immediately after achieving independence.

Under the Navigation Act, and throughout the colonial period, the transatlantic colonies of Great Britain had grown steadily; developing a commercial individuality of their own, depending in each upon local conditions. The variety of these, with the consequent variety of occupations and products, and the distance separating all from the mother country, had contributed to develop among them a certain degree of mutual dependence, and consequent exchange; the outcome of which was a commercial system interior to the group as a whole, and distinct from the relations to Great Britain borne by them individually and collectively. There was a large and important intercolonial commerce,38 consistent with the letter of the Navigation Act, as well as a trade with Great Britain; and although each of these exerted an influence upon the other, it was indirect and circuitous. The two were largely separate in fact, as well as in idea; and the interchange between the various colonies was more than double that with the mother country. It drew in British as well as American seamen, and was considered thus to entail the disadvantage that, unless America were the scene of war, the crews there were out of reach of impressment; that measure being too crude and unsystematic to reach effectively so distant a source of supply. Curiously enough, also, by an act passed in the reign of Queen Anne, seamen born in the American colonies were exempted from impressment.39 "During the late Civil War (of American Independence) it has been found difficult sufficiently to man our fleet, from the seamen insisting that, since they had been born in America, they could not be pressed to serve in the British navy."40 In these conditions, and especially in the difficulty of distinguishing the place of birth by the language spoken, is seen the foreshadowing of the troubles attending the practice of Impressment, after the United States had become a separate nation.

The British American colonies were divided by geographical conditions into two primary groups: those of the West India Islands, and those of the Continent. The common use of the latter term, in the thought and speech of the day, is indicated by the comprehensive adjective "Continental," familiarly applied to the Congress, troops, currency, and other attributes of sovereignty, assumed by the revolted colonies after their declaration of independence. Each group had special commercial characteristics—in itself, and relatively to Great Britain. The islands, whatever their minor differences of detail, or their mutual jealousies, or even their remoteness from one another,—Jamaica being a thousand miles from her eastern sisters,—were essentially a homogeneous body. Similarity of latitude and climate induced similarity of social and economical conditions; notably in the dependence on slave labor, upon which the industrial fabric rested. Their products, among which sugar and coffee were the most important, were such as Europe did not yield; it was therefore to their advantage to expend labor upon these wholly, and to depend upon external sources for supplies of all kinds, including food. Their exports, being directed by the Navigation Act almost entirely upon Great Britain, were, in connection with Virginia tobacco, the most lucrative of the "enumerated" articles which rendered tribute to the entrepôt monopoly of the mother country. It was in this respect particularly, as furnishing imports to be handled and re-exported, that the islands were valuable to the home merchants. To the welfare of the body politic they contributed by their support of the carrying trade; for the cargoes, being bulky, required much tonnage, and the entire traffic was confined to British ships, manned three-fourths by British seamen. As a market also the islands were of consequence; all their supplies coming, by law, either from or through Great Britain, or from the continental colonies. Intercourse with foreign states was prohibited, and that with foreign colonies allowed only under rare and disabling conditions. But although the West Indies thus maintained a large part of the mother country's export trade, the smallness of their population, and the simple necessities of the slaves, who formed the great majority of the inhabitants, rendered them as British customers much inferior to the continental colonies; and this disparity was continually increasing, for the continent was growing rapidly in numbers, wealth, and requirements. In the five years 1744-48, the exports from Great Britain to the two quarters were nearly equal; but a decade later the continent took double the amount that the islands demanded. The figures quoted for the period 1754-58 are: to the West Indies, £3,765,000; to North America, £7,410,000.41 In the five years ending 1774 the West Indies received £6,748,095; the thirteen continental colonies, £13,660,180.42

Imports from the continent also supported the carrying trade of Great Britain, but not to an extent proportionate to those from the islands; for many of the continental colonies were themselves large carriers. The imports to them, being manufactured articles, less bulky than the exports of the islands, also required less tonnage. The most marked single difference between the West India communities and those of the continent was that the latter, being distributed on a nearly north and south line, with consequent great divergences of climate and products, were essentially not homogeneous. What one had, another had not. Such differences involve of course divergence of interests, with consequent contentions and jealousies, the influence of which was felt most painfully prior to the better Union of 1789, and never can wholly cease to act; but, on the other hand, it tends also to promote exchange of offices, where need and facility of transport combine to make such exchange beneficial to both. That the intercourse between the continental colonies required a tonnage equal to that employed between them and the West Indies,—testified by the return of 1770 before quoted,43—shows the existence of conditions destined inevitably to draw them together. The recognition of such mutual dependence, when once attained, furthers the practice of mutual concession for the purpose of combined action. Consequently, in the protracted struggle between the centripetal and centrifugal forces in North America, the former prevailed, though not till after long and painful wavering.

While thus differing greatly among themselves in the nature of their productions, and in their consequent wants, the continental colonists as a whole had one common characteristic. Recent occupants of a new, unimproved, and generally fertile country, they turned necessarily to the cultivation of the soil as the most remunerative form of activity, while for manufactured articles they depended mainly upon external supplies, the furnishing of which Great Britain reserved to herself. For these reasons they afforded the great market which they were to her, and which by dint of habit and of interest they long continued to be. But, while thus generally agricultural by force of circumstances, the particular outward destinations of their surplus products varied. Those of the southern colonies, from Maryland to Georgia, were classed as "enumerated," and, with the exception of the rice of South Carolina and Georgia, partially indulged as before mentioned, must be directed upon Great Britain. Tobacco, cotton, indigo, pitch, tar, turpentine, and spars of all kinds for ships, were specifically named, and constituted much the larger part of the exports of those colonies. These were carried also chiefly by British vessels, and not by colonial. The case was otherwise in the middle colonies, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and in Connecticut and Rhode Island of the eastern group. They were exporters of provisions,—of grain, flour, and meat, the latter both as live stock and salted; of horses also. As the policy of the day protected the British farmer, these articles were not required to be sent to Great Britain; on the contrary, grain was not allowed admission except in times of scarcity, determined by the price of wheat in the London market. The West Indies, therefore, were the market of the middle colonies; the shortness of the voyage, and the comparatively good weather, after a little southing had been gained, giving a decisive advantage over European dealers in the transportation of live animals. Flour also, because it kept badly in the tropics, required constant carriage of new supplies from sources near at hand. Along with provisions the continental vessels took materials for building and cooperage, both essential to the industry of the islands,—to the housing of the inhabitants, and to the transport of their sugar, rum, and molasses. In short, so great was the dependence of the islands upon this trade, that a well-informed planter of the time quotes with approval the remark of "a very competent judge," that, "if the continent had been wholly in foreign hands, and England wholly precluded from intercourse with it, it is very doubtful whether we should now have possessed a single acre in the West Indies."44

Now this traffic, while open to all British shipping, was very largely in the hands of the colonists, who built ships decidedly cheaper than could be done in England, and could distribute their tonnage in vessels too small to brave the Atlantic safely, but, from their numbers and size, fitted to scatter to the numerous small ports of distribution, which the badness of internal communications rendered advantageous for purposes of supply. A committee of the Privy Council of Great Britain, constituted soon after the independence of the United States to investigate the conditions of West India trade, reported that immediately before the revolt the carriage between the islands and the continent had occupied 1610 voyages, in vessels aggregating 115,634 tons, navigated by 9718 men. These transported what was then considered "the vast" American cargo, of £500,000 outward and £400,000 inward. But the ominous feature from the point of view of the Navigation Act was that this was carried almost wholly in American bottoms.45 In short, not to speak of an extensive practice of smuggling, facilitated by a coast line too long and indented to be effectually watched,—mention of which abounds in contemporary annals,46—a very valuable part of the British carrying trade was in the hands of the middle colonists, whose activity, however, did not stop even there; for, not only did they deal with foreign West Indies,47 but the cheapness of their vessels, owing to the abundance of the materials, permitted them to be used also to advantage in a direct trade with southern Europe, their native products being for the most part "not enumerated." As early as 1731, Pennsylvania employed eight thousand tons of shipping, while the New England colonies at the same time owned forty thousand tons, distributed in six hundred vessels, manned by six thousand seamen.

The New Englanders, like their countrymen farther south, were mostly farmers; but the more rugged soil and severer climate gave them little or no surplus for export. For gain by traffic, for material for exchange, they therefore turned to the sea, and became the great carriers of America, as well as its great fishers. An English authority, writing of the years immediately preceding the War of Independence, states that most of the seamen sailing out of the southern ports were British; from the middle colonies, half British and half American; but in the New England shipping he admits three-fourths were natives.48 This tendency of British seamen to take employment in colonial ships is worthy of note, as foreshadowing the impressment difficulties of a later day. These, like most of the disagreements which led to the War of 1812, had their origin in ante-revolutionary conditions. For example, Commodore Palliser, an officer of mark, commanding the Newfoundland station in 1767, reported to the Admiralty the "cruel custom," long practised by commanders of fishing ships, of leaving many men on the desert coast of Newfoundland, when the season was over, whereby "these men were obliged to sell themselves to the colonists, or piratically run off with vessels, which they carry to the continent of America. By these practices the Newfoundland fishery, supposed to be one of the most valuable nurseries for seamen,49 has long been an annual drain."50 In the two years, 1764-65, he estimates that 2,500 seamen thus went to the colonies; in the next two years, 400. The difference was probably due to the former period being immediately after a war, the effects of which it reflected.

The general conditions of 1731 remained thirty years later, simply having become magnified as the colonies grew in wealth and population. In 1770 twenty-two thousand tons of shipping were annually built by the continental colonists. They even built ships for Great Britain; and this indulgence, for so it was considered, was viewed jealously by a class of well-informed men, intelligent, but fully imbued with the ideas of the Navigation Act, convinced that the carrying trade was the corner-stone of the British Navy, and realizing that where ships were cheaply built they could be cheaply sailed, even if they paid higher wages. It is true, and should be sedulously remembered, especially now in the United States, that the strength of a merchant shipping lies in its men even more than in its ships; and therefore that the policy of a country which wishes a merchant marine should be to allow its ships to be purchased where they most cheaply can, in order that the owner may be able to spend more on his crew, and the nation consequently to keep more seamen under its flag. But in 1770 the relative conditions placed Great Britain under serious disadvantages towards America in the matter of ship-building; for the heavy drafts upon her native oak had caused the price to rise materially, and even the forests of continental Europe felt the strain, while the colonies had scarcely begun to touch their resources. In 1775, more than one-third of the foreign trade of Great Britain was carried in American-built ships; the respective tonnage being, British-built, 605,545; American, 373,618.51

British merchants and ship-owners knew also that the colonial carriers were not ardent adherents of the Navigation Act, but conducted their operations in conformity with it only when compelled.52 They traded with the foreigner as readily as with the British subject; and, what was quite unpardonable in the ideas of that time, after selling a cargo in a West Indian port, instead of reloading there, they would take the hard cash of the island to a French neighbor, buying of him molasses to be made into rum at home. In this commercial shrewdness the danger was not so much in the local loss, or in the single transaction, for in the commercial supremacy of England the money was pretty sure to find its way back to the old country. The sting was that the sharp commercial instinct, roving from port to port, with a keen scent for freight and for bargains, maintained a close rivalry for the carrying trade, which was doubly severe from the natural advantages of the shipping and the natural aptitudes of the ship-owners. Already the economical attention of the New Englanders to the details of their shipping business had been noted, and had earned for them the name of the Dutchmen of North America; an epithet than which there was then none more ominous to British ears, and especially where with the carrying trade was associated the twin idea of a nursery of seamen for the British Navy.

A fair appreciation of the facts and relations, summarized in the preceding pages from an infinitude of details, is necessary to a correct view of the origin and course of the misunderstandings and disagreements which finally led to the War of 1812. In 1783, the restoration of peace and the acknowledgment of the independence of the former colonies removed from commerce the restrictions incident to hostilities, and replaced in full action, essentially unchanged, the natural conditions which had guided the course of trade in colonial days. The old country, retaining all the prepossessions associated with the now venerable and venerated Navigation Act, saw herself confronted with the revival of a commercial system, a commercial independence, of which she had before been jealous, and which could no longer be controlled by political dependence. It was to be feared that supplying the British West Indies would increase American shipping, and that British seamen would more and more escape into it, with consequent loss to British navigation, both in tonnage and men, and discouragement to British maritime industries. Hence, by the ideas of the time, was to be apprehended weakness for war, unless some effective check could be devised.

What would have been the issue of these anxieties, and of the measures to which they gave rise, had not the French Revolution intervened to aggravate the distresses of Great Britain, and to constrain her to violent methods, is bootless to discuss. It remains true that, both before and during the conflict with the French Republic and Empire, the general character of her actions, to which the United States took exception, was determined by the conditions and ideas that have been stated, and can be understood only through reference to them. No sooner had peace been signed, in 1783, than disagreements sprang up again from the old roots of colonial systems and ideals. To these essentially was due the detailed sequence of events which, influenced by such traditions of opinion and policy as have been indicated, brought on the War of 1812, which has not inaptly been styled the second War of Independence. Madison, who was contemporary with the entire controversy, and officially connected with it from 1801 to the end of the war, first as Secretary of State, and later as President, justly summed up his experience of the whole in these words: "To have shrunk from resistance, under such circumstances, would have acknowledged that, on the element which forms three-fourths of the globe which we inhabit, and where all independent nations have equal and common rights, the American People were not an independent people, but colonists and vassals. With such an alternative war was chosen."53 The second war was closely related to the first in fact, though separated by a generation in time.

CHAPTER II
FROM INDEPENDENCE TO JAY'S TREATY, 1794

The colonial connection between Great Britain and the thirteen communities which became the original States of the American Union was brought to a formal conclusion in 1776, by their Declaration of Independence. Substantially, however, it had already terminated in 1774. This year was marked by the passage of the Boston Port Bill, with its accessory measures, by the British Parliament, and likewise by the renewal, in the several colonies, of the retaliatory non-importation agreements of 1765. The fundamental theory of the eighteenth century concerning the relations between a mother country and her colonies, that of reciprocal exclusive benefit, had thus in practice yielded to one of mutual injury; to coercion and deprivation on the one side, and to passive resistance on the other. On September 5 the representatives of twelve colonies assembled in Philadelphia; Georgia alone sending no delegates, but pledging herself in anticipation to accept the decisions taken by the others. One of the first acts of this Congress of the Continental Colonies was to indorse the resolutions by which Massachusetts had placed herself in an attitude of contingent rebellion against the Crown, and to pledge their support to her in case of a resort to arms. These several steps were decisive and irrevocable, except by an unqualified abandonment, by one party or the other, of the principles which underlay and dictated them. The die was cast. To use words attributed to George the Third, "the colonies must now either submit or triumph."

The period which here began, viewed in the aggregate of the national life of the United States, was one of wavering transition and uncertain issue in matters political and commercial. Its ending, in these two particulars, is marked by two conspicuous events: the adoption of the Constitution and the Commercial Treaty with Great Britain. The formation of the Federal Government, 1788-90, gave to the Union a political stability it had hitherto lacked, removing elements of weakness and dissensions, and of consequent impotence in foreign relations; the manifestation of which since the acknowledgment of independence had justified alike the hopes of enemies and the forebodings of friends. Settled conditions being thus established at home, with institutions competent to regulate a national commerce, internal and external, as well as to bring the people as a whole into fixed relations with foreign communities, there was laid the foundations of a swelling prosperity to which the several parts of the country jointly contributed. The effects of these changes were soon shown in a growing readiness on the part of other nations to enter into formal compacts with us. Of this, the treaty negotiated by John Jay with Great Britain, in 1794, is the most noteworthy instance; partly because it terminated one long series of bickerings with our most dangerous neighbor, chiefly because the commercial power of the state with which it was contracted had reached a greater eminence, and exercised wider international effect, than any the modern world had then seen.

Whatever the merits of the treaty otherwise, therefore, the willingness of Great Britain to enter into it at all gave it an epochal significance. Since independence, commercial intercourse between the two peoples had rested on the strong compelling force of natural conditions and reciprocal convenience, the true foundation, doubtless, of all useful relations; but its regulation had been by municipal ordinance of either state, changeable at will, not by mutual agreement binding on both for a prescribed period. Since the separation, this condition had seemed preferable to Great Britain, which, as late as 1790, had evaded overtures towards a commercial arrangement.54 Her consenting now to modify her position was an implicit admission that in trade, as in political existence, the former mother country recognized at last the independence of her offspring. The latter, however, was again to learn that independence, to be actual, must rest on something stronger than words, and surer than the acquiescence of others. This was to be the lesson of the years between 1794 and 1815, administered to us not only by the preponderant navy of Great Britain, but by the petty piratical fleets of the Barbary powers.

From the Boston Port Bill to Jay's Treaty was therefore a period of transition from entire colonial dependence, under complete regulation of all commercial intercourse by the mother country, to that of national commercial power, self-regulative and efficient, through the adoption of the Constitution. Upon this followed international influence, the growing importance of which Great Britain finally recognized by formal concessions, hitherto refused or evaded. During these years the policy of her government was undergoing a process of adjustment, conditioned on the one hand by the still vigorous traditional prejudices associated with the administration of dependencies, and on the other by the radical change in political relations between her remaining colonies in America and the new states which had broken from the colonial bond. This change was the more embarrassing, because the natural connection of specific mutual usefulness remained, although the tie of a common allegiance had been loosed. The old order was yielding to the new, but the process was signalized by the usual slowness of men to accept events in their full significance. Hitherto, all the western hemisphere had been under a colonial system of complete monopoly by mother countries, and had been generally excluded from direct communication with Europe, except the respective parent states. In the comprehensive provisions of the British Navigation Act, America was associated with Asia and Africa. Now had arisen there an independent state, in political standing identical with those of Europe, yet having towards colonial America geographical and commercial relations very different from theirs. Consequently there was novelty and difficulty in the question, What intercourse with the remaining British dominions, and especially with the American colonies, should be permitted to the new nation? Notwithstanding the breach lately made, it continued a controlling aim with the British people, and of the government as determined by popular pressure, to restore the supremacy of British trade, by the subjection of America, independent as well as colonial, to the welfare of British commerce. Notably this was to be so as regards the one dominant interest called Navigation, under which term was comprised everything relating to shipping,—ship-building, seafaring men, and the carrying trade. Independence had deprived Great Britain of the right she formerly had to manipulate the course of the export and import trade of the now United States. It remained to try whether there did not exist, nevertheless, the ability effectually to control it to the advantage of British navigation, as above defined. "Our remaining colonies on the Continent, and the West India Islands," it was argued, "with the favorable state of English manufactures, may still give us almost exclusively the trade of America;" provided these circumstances were suitably utilized, and their advantages rigorously enforced, where power to do so still remained, as it did in the West Indies.

Although by far the stronger and more flourishing part of her colonial dominions had been wrested from Great Britain, there yet remained to her upon the continent, in Canada and the adjacent provinces, a domain great in area, and in the West India Islands another of great productiveness. Whatever wisdom had been learned as regards the political treatment of colonies, the views as to the nature of their economical utility to the mother country, and their consequent commercial regulation, had undergone no enlargement, but rather had been intensified in narrowness and rigor by the loss of so valuable a part of the whole. No counteractive effect to this prepossession was to be found in contemporary opinion in Europe. The French Revolution itself, subversive as it was of received views in many respects, was at the first characterized rather by an exaggeration of the traditional exclusive policy of the eighteenth century relating to colonies, shipping, and commerce. In America, the unsettled commercial and financial conditions which succeeded the peace, the divergence of interests between the several new states, the feebleness of the confederate government, its incompetency to deal assuredly with external questions, and lack of all power to regulate commerce, inspired a conviction in Great Britain that the continent could not offer strong, continued resistance to commercial aggression, carried on under the peaceful form of municipal regulation. It was generally thought that the new states could never unite, but instead would drift farther apart.

The belief was perfectly reasonable; a gift of prophecy only could have foretold the happy result, of which many of the most prominent Americans for some time despaired. "It will not be an easy matter," wrote Lord Sheffield,55 "to bring the American States to act as a nation; they are not to be feared as such by us. It must be a long time before they can engage, or will concur, in any material expense.... We might as reasonably dread the effects of combinations among the German as among the American states, and deprecate the resolves of the Diet, as those of Congress." "No treaty can be made that will be binding on the whole of them." "A decided cast has been given to public opinion here," wrote John Adams from London, in November, 1785, "by two presumptions. One is, that the American states are not, and cannot, be united."56 Two years later Washington wrote: "The situation of the General Government, if it can be called a government, is shaken to its foundation, and liable to be overturned at every blast. In a word, it is at an end.... The primary cause of all our disorders lies in the different state governments, and in the tenacity of that power which underlies the whole of their systems. Independent sovereignty is so ardently contended for." "At present, under our existing form of confederation, it would be idle to think of making commercial regulations on our part. One state passes a prohibitory law respecting one article; another state opens wide the avenue for its admission. One assembly makes a system, another assembly unmakes it."57

Under such conditions it was natural that a majority of Englishmen should see power and profit for Great Britain in availing herself of the weakness of her late colonists, to enforce upon them a commercial dependence as useful as the political dependence which had passed away. Were this realized, she would enjoy the emoluments of the land without the expense of its protection. This gospel was preached at once to willing ears, and found acceptance; not by the strength of its arguments, for these, though plausible, were clearly inferior in weight to the facts copiously adduced by those familiar with conditions, but through the prejudices which the then generation had received from the three or four preceding it. The policy being adopted, the instrument at hand for enforcing it was the relation of colonies to mother countries, as then universally maintained by the governments of the day. The United States, like other independent nations, was to be excluded wholly from carrying trade with the British colonies, and as far as possible from sending them supplies. It was urged that Canada, and the adjacent British dominions, encouraged by this reservation of the West India market for their produce, would prove adequate to furnishing the provisions and lumber previously derived from the old continental colonies. The prosperity once enjoyed by the latter would be transferred, and there would be reconstituted the system of commercial intercourse, interior to the empire, which previously had commanded general admiration. The new states, acting commercially as separated communities, could oppose no successful rivalry to this combination, and would revert to isolated commercial dependence; tributary to the financial supremacy of Great Britain, as they recently had been to her political power. In debt to her for money, and drawing from her manufactures, returns for both would compel their exports to her ports chiefly, whence distribution would be, as of old, in the hands of British middlemen and navigators. Just escaped from the fetters of the carrying trade and entrepôt regulations, the twin monopolies in which consisted the value of a colonial empire, it was proposed to reduce them again under bondage by means for which the West India Islands furnished the leverage; for "the trade carried on by Great Britain with the countries now become the United States was, and still is, so connected with the trade carried on to the remaining British colonies in America, and the British islands in the West Indies, that it is impossible to form a true judgment of the past and present of the first, without taking a comprehensive view of all, as they are connected with, and influence, each other."58

The committee recognized that exclusion from the carrying trade of the British West Indies was in some degree compensated to the American carrier, by the permission given by the Government of France for vessels not exceeding sixty tons to trade with her colonies, actually much greater producers, and therefore larger customers. Santo Domingo in particular, in the period following the American war, had enjoyed a heyday of prosperity, far eclipsing that of all the British islands together. This was due partly to natural advantages, and partly to social conditions,—the planters being generally resident, which the British were not; but cheaper supplies through free intercourse with the American continent also counted for much. From the French West Indies there entered the United States in 1790, 101,417 tons of shipping, of which only 3,925 were French.102 From the British Islands there came 90,375, but of these all but 4,057 were British.103 Returning, the exports from the United States to the two were respectively, $3,284,656 and $2,077,757.104 The flattering testimony borne by these figures to the meagreness of French navigation, in the particular quarter, needed doubtless to be qualified by reference to their home trade from the West Indies, borne in French ships. This amounted in 1788 to 296,435 tons from Santo Domingo alone;105 whereas the British trade from all their islands employed but 133,736.106 This, however, was the sole great carrying trade of France; to the United States she sent from her home ports less than 13,000 tons.

It was the opinion of the British committee that the privilege conceded to American shipping in the French islands was so contrary to established colonial policy as to be of doubtful continuance. Still, in concluding its report with a summary of American commercial conditions, which it deemed were in a declining way, it took occasion to utter a warning, based upon these relations of America with the foreign colonies. In case of a commercial treaty, "Should it be proposed to treat on maritime regulations, any article allowing the ships of the United States to protect the property of the enemies of Great Britain in time of war" (that is, the flag to cover the goods), "should on no account be admitted. It would be more dangerous to concede this privilege to the United States than to any other foreign country. From their situation, the ships of these states would be able to cover the whole trade of France and Spain with their islands and colonies, in America and the West Indies, whenever Great Britain shall be engaged with either of those Powers; and the navy of Great Britain would, in such case, be deprived of the means of distressing the enemy, by destroying his commerce and thereby diminishing his resources." It is well to note in these words the contemporary recognition of the importance of the position of the United States; of the value of the colonial trade; of the bearing of commerce destruction on war, by "diminishing the resources" of an enemy; and of the opportunity of the United States, "from their situation," to cover the carriage of colonial produce to Europe; for upon these several points turned much of the troubles, which by their accumulation caused mutual exasperation, and established an antagonism that inevitably lent itself to the war spirit when occasion arose. The specific warning of the committee was doubtless elicited by the terms of the then recent British commercial treaty with France, in 1786, by which the two nations had agreed that, in case of war to which one was a party, the vessels of the other might freely carry all kinds of goods, the property of any person or nation, except contraband. Such a concession could be made safely to France,—was in fact perfectly one-sided in favoring Great Britain; but to America it would open unprecedented opportunity.

To the state of things so far described came the French Revolution; already begun, indeed, when the committee sat, but the course of which could not yet be foreseen. Its coincidence with the formation of the new government of the United States is well to be remembered; for the two events, by their tendencies, worked together to promote the antagonism between the United States and Great Britain, which was already latent in the navigation system of the one and the maritime aptitudes of the other. Washington, the first American President, was inaugurated in March, 1789; in May, the States General of France met. In February, 1793, the French Republic declared war against Great Britain, and in March Washington entered on his second term. In the intervening four years the British Government had persisted in maintaining the exclusion of American carrying trade from her colonial ports. During the same period the great French colony Santo Domingo had undergone a social convulsion, which ended in the wreck of its entire industrial system by the disappearance of slavery, and with it of all white government. The huge sugar and coffee product of the island vanished as a commercial factor, and with it the greater part of the colonial carriage of supplies, which had indemnified American shippers and agriculturists for their exclusion from British ports. Of 167,399 American tonnage entering American ports from the West Indies in 1790, 101,417 had been from French islands.

The removal of so formidable a competitor as Santo Domingo of course inured to the advantage of the British sugar and coffee planter, who was thus more able to bear the burden laid upon him to maintain the navigation of the empire, by paying a heavy percentage on his supplies. This, however, was not the only change in conditions affecting commerce and navigation. By 1793 it had become evident that Canada, Nova Scotia, and their neighbors, could not fill the place in an imperial system which it had been hoped they would take, as producers of lumber and food stuffs. This increased the relative importance of the West India Islands to the empire, just when the rise in price of sugar and coffee made it more desirable to develop their production. Should war come, the same reason would make it expedient to extend by conquest British productive territory in the Caribbean, and at the same time to cut off the supplies of such enemy's possessions as could not be subdued; thus crippling them, and removing their competition by force, as that of Santo Domingo had been by industrial ruin. These considerations tended further to fasten the interest of Great Britain upon this whole region, as particularly conducive to her navigation system. That cheapening supplies would stimulate production, to meet the favorable market and growing demands of the world, had been shown by the object-lesson of the French colonies; though as yet the example had not been followed.

At this time also Great Britain had to recognize her growing dependence upon the sea, because her home territory had ceased to be self-sufficing. Her agriculture was becoming inadequate to feeding her people, in whose livelihood manufactures and commerce were playing an increasing part. Both these, as well as food from abroad, required the command of the sea, in war as in peace, to import raw materials and export finished products; and control of the sea required increase of naval resources, proportioned to the growing commercial movement. According to the ideas of the age, the colonial monopoly was the surest means to this. It was therefore urgent to resort to measures which should develop the colonies; and the question was inevitable whether reserving to British navigation the trade by which they were supplied was not more than compensated by the diminished production, with its effect in lessening the cargoes employing shipping for the homeward voyage.

Thus things were when war broke out. The two objects, or motives, which have been indicated, came then at once into play. The conquest of the French West Indies, a perfectly legitimate move, was speedily undertaken; and meanwhile orders passing the bounds of recognized international law were issued, to suppress, by capture, their intercourse with the United States, alike in import and export. The blow of course fell upon American shipping, by which this traffic was almost wholly maintained. This was the beginning of a long series of arbitrary measures, dictated by a policy uniform in principle, though often modified by dictates of momentary expediency. It lasted for years in its various manifestations, the narration of which belongs to subsequent chapters. Complementary to this was the effort to develop production in British colonies, by extending to them the neutral carriage denied to their enemies. This was effected by allowing direct trade between them and the United States to American vessels of not over seventy tons; a limit substantially the same as that before imposed by France, and designed to prevent their surreptitiously conveying the cargoes to Europe, to the injury of British monopoly of the continental supply, effected by the entrepôt system, and doubly valuable since the failure of French products.

This concession to American navigation, despite the previous opposition, had become possible to Pitt, partly because its advisability had been demonstrated and the opportunity recognized; partly, also, because the immense increase of the active navy, caused by the war, created a demand for seamen, which by impressment told heavily upon the merchant navigation of the kingdom, fostered for this very purpose. To meet this emergency, it was clearly politic to devolve the supply of the British West Indies upon neutral carriers, who would enjoy an immunity from capture denied to merchant ships of a belligerent, as well as relieve British navigation of a function which it had never adequately fulfilled. The measure was in strict accord with the usual practice of remitting in war the requirement of the Navigation Act, that three-fourths of all crews should be British subjects; by which means a large number of native seamen became at once released to the navy. To throw open a reserved trade to foreign ships, and a reserved employment to foreign seamen, are evidently only different applications of the one principle, viz.: to draw upon foreign aid, in a crisis to which the national navigation was unequal.

Correlative to these measures, defensive in character, was the determination that the enemy should be deprived of these benefits; that, so far as international law could be stretched, neutral ships should not help him as they were encouraged to help the British. The welfare of the empire also demanded that native seamen should not be allowed to escape their liability to impressment, by serving in neutral vessels. The lawless measures taken to insure these two objects were the causes avowed by the United States in 1812 for declaring war. The impressment of American seamen, however, although numerous instances had already occurred, had not yet made upon the national consciousness an impression at all proportionate to the magnitude of the wrong; and the instructions given to Jay,107 as special envoy in 1794, while covering many points at issue, does not mention this, which eventually overtopped all others.

CHAPTER III
FROM JAY'S TREATY TO THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL

1794-1807

While there were many matters in dispute between the two countries, the particular occasion of Jay's mission to London in 1794 was the measures injurious to the commerce of the United States, taken by the British Government on the outbreak of war with France, in 1793. Neutrals are certain to suffer, directly and indirectly, from every war, and especially in maritime wars; for then the great common of all nations is involved, under conditions and regulations which by general consent legalize interference, suspension, and arrest of neutral voyages, when conflicting with acknowledged belligerent rights, or under reasonable suspicion of such conflict. It was held in the United States that in the treatment of American ships Great Britain had transcended international law, and abused belligerent privilege, by forced construction in two particulars. First, in June, 1793, she sent into her own ports American vessels bound to France with provisions, on the ground that under existing circumstance these were contraband of war. She did indeed buy the cargoes, and pay the freight, thus reducing the loss to the shipper; but he was deprived of the surplus profit arising from extraordinary demand in France, and it was claimed besides that the procedure was illegal. Secondly, in November of the same year, the British Government directed the seizure of "all ships laden with goods the produce of any colony belonging to France, or carrying provisions or other supplies for the use of any such colony." Neutrals were thus forbidden either to go to, or to sail from, any French colony for purposes of commercial intercourse. For the injuries suffered under these measures Jay was to seek compensation.

The first order raised only a question of contraband, of frequent recurrence in all hostilities. It did not affect the issues which led to the War of 1812, and therefore need not here be further considered. But the second turned purely on the question of the intercourse of neutrals with the colonies of belligerents, and rested upon those received opinions concerning the relations of colonies to mother countries, which have been related in the previous chapters. The British Government founded the justification of its action upon a precedent established by its own Admiralty courts, which, though not strictly new, was recent, dating back only to the Seven Years' War, 1756-63, whence it had received the name of the Rule of 1756. At that time, in the world of European civilization, all the principal maritime communities were either mother countries or colonies. A colonial system was the appendage of every maritime state; and among all there obtained the invariable rule, the formulation of which by Montesquieu has been already quoted, that "commercial monopoly is the leading principle of colonial intercourse," from which foreign states were rigorously excluded. Dealing with such a recognized international relation, at a period when colonial production had reached unprecedented proportions, the British courts had laid down the principle that a trade which a nation in time of peace forbade to foreigners could not be extended to them, if neutrals, in time of war, at the will and for the convenience of the belligerent; because by such employment they were "in effect incorporated in the enemy's navigation, having adopted his commerce and character, and identified themselves with his interests and purposes."108

During the next great maritime war, that of American Independence, the United States were involved as belligerents, and the only maritime neutrals were Holland and the Baltic States. These drew together in a league known historically as the Armed Neutrality of 1780, in opposition to certain British interpretations of the rights of neutrals and belligerents; but in their formulated demands that of open trade with the colonies of belligerents does not appear, although there is found one closely cognate to it,—an asserted right to coasting trade, from port to port, of a country at war. The Rule of 1756 therefore remained, in 1793, a definition of international maritime law laid down by British courts, but not elsewhere accepted; and it rested upon a logical deduction from a system of colonial administration universal at that period. The logical deduction may be stated thus. The mother country, for its own benefit, reserves to itself both the inward and outward trade; the products of the colony, and the supplying of it with necessaries. The carriage of these commodities is also confined to its own ships. Colonial commerce and navigation are thus each a national monopoly. To open to neutrals the navigation, the carriage of products and supplies, in time of war, is a war measure simply, designed to preserve a benefit endangered by the other belligerent. As a war measure, it tends to support the financial and naval strength of the nation employing it; and therefore, to an opponent whose naval power is capable of destroying that element of strength, the stepping in of a neutral to cover it is clearly an injury. The neutral so doing commits an unfriendly act, partial between the two combatants; because it aids the one in a proceeding, the origin and object of which are purely belligerent.

When the United States in 1776 entered the family of nations, she came without colonies, but in the war attendant upon her liberation she had no rights as a neutral. In the interval of peace, between 1783 and 1793, she had endeavored, as has been seen, to establish between herself and the Caribbean region those conditions of open navigation which were indicated as natural by the geographical relations of the two and their several products. This had been refused by Great Britain; but France had conceded it on a restricted scale, plainly contrived, by the limitation of sixty tons on the size of vessels engaged, to counteract any attempt at direct carriage from the islands to Europe, which was not permitted. Under these circumstances the United States was brought into collision with the Rule of 1756, for the first time, by the Order in Council of November 6, 1793. A people without colonies, and with a rapidly growing navigation, could have no sympathy with a system, coextensive with Europe, which monopolized the carriage of colonial products. The immediate attitude assumed was one of antagonism; and the wrong as felt was the greater, because the direct intercourse between the United States and the then great French colonies was not incidental to war, but had been established in peace. In principle, the Rule rested for its validity upon an exception made in war, for the purposes of war.

The British Government in fact had overlooked that the Rule had originated in European conditions; and, if applicable at all to the new transatlantic state, it could only be if conditions were the same, or equivalent. Till now, by universal usage, trade from colonies had been only to the mother country; the appearance of an American state with no colonies introduced two factors hitherto non-existent. Here was a people not identified with a general system of colonial exclusiveness; and also, from their geographical situation, it was possible for a European government to permit them to trade with its colonies, without serious trespass on the privileges reserved to the mother country. The monopoly of the latter consisted not only in the commerce and carrying trade of the colony, but in the entrepôt; that is, in the receipt and storage of the colonial produce, and its distribution to less favored European communities,—the profit, in short, of the middleman, or broker. France had recognized, though but partially, this difference of conditions, and in somewhat grudging manner had opened her West Indian ports to American vessels, for intercourse with their own country. This trade, being permitted in peace, did not come under the British Rule; therefore by its own principle the seizures under it were unlawful. Accordingly, on January 8, 1794, the order was revoked, and the application limited to vessels bound from the West Indies direct to Europe.

This further Order in Council preserved the principle of the Rule of 1756, but it removed the cause of a great number of the seizures which had afflicted American shipping. There were nevertheless, among these, some cases of vessels bound direct to France from French colonies, laden with colonial produce; one of which was the first presented to Jay on his arrival in London. In writing to the Secretary of State he says, "It unfortunately happens that this is not among the strongest of the cases;" and in a return made three years later to Congress, of losses recovered under the treaty, this vessel's name does not appear. In the opinion of counsel, submitted to Jay, it was unlikely that the case would be reversed on appeal, because it unequivocally fell under the Rule.109 It is therefore to be inferred that this principle, the operation of which was revived so disastrously in 1805, was not surrendered by the British Government in 1794. In fact, in the discussions between Mr. Jay and the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, there seems to have been on both sides a disposition to avoid pronouncements upon points of abstract right. It remained the constant policy of British negotiators, throughout this thorny period, to seek modes of temporary arrangement, which should obviate immediate causes of complaint; leaving principles untouched, to be asserted, if desirable, at a more favorable moment. This was quite contrary to the wishes of the United States Government, which repeatedly intimated to Jay that in the case of the Rule of 1756 it desired to settle the question of principle, which it denied. To this it had attached several other topics touching maritime neutral rights, such as the flag covering the cargo, and matters of contraband.110

Jay apparently satisfied himself, by his interviews and observation of public feeling in England, that at the moment it was vain for a country without a navy to expect from Great Britain any surrender of right, as interpreted by her jurists; that the most to be accomplished was the adoption of measures which should as far as possible extend the immediate scope of American commerce, and remove its present injuries, presenting withal a probability of future further concessions. In his letter transmitting the treaty, he wrote: "That Britain, at this period, and involved in war, should not admit principles which would impeach the propriety of her conduct in seizing provisions bound to France, and enemy's property on board neutral vessels, does not appear to me extraordinary. The articles, as they now stand, secure compensation for seizures, and leave us at liberty to decide whether they were made in such cases as to be warranted by the existing law of nations."111 The italics are Jay's, and the expression is obscure; but it seems to imply that, while either nation, in their respective claims for damages, would be bound by the decision of the commissioners provided for their settlement by the treaty, it would preserve the right to its own opinion as to whether the decision was in accordance with admitted law, binding in the future. In short, acceptance of the Rule of 1756 would not be affected by the findings upon the claims. If adverse to Great Britain, she could still assert the Rule in times to come, if expedient; if against the United States, she likewise, while submitting, reserved the right of protest, with or without arms, against its renewed enforcement.

"As to the principles we contend for," continued Jay, "you will find them saved in the conclusion of the twelfth article, from which it will appear that we still adhere to them." This conclusion specifies that after the termination of a certain period, during which Great Britain would open to American vessels the carrying trade between her West India Islands and the United States, there should be further negotiation, looking to the extension of mutual intercourse; "and the said parties will then endeavor to agree whether, in any, and what, cases neutral vessels shall protect enemy's property; and in what cases provisions and other articles, not generally contraband, may become such. But in the meantime, their conduct towards each other in these respects shall be regulated by the articles hereinafter inserted on those subjects."112 The treaty therefore was a temporary arrangement, to meet temporary difficulties, and involved no surrender of principle on either side. Although the Rule of 1756 is not mentioned, it evidently shared the same fate as the other American propositions looking to the settlement of principles; the more so that subsequent articles admitted, not only the undoubted rule that the neutral flag did not cover enemy's goods, but also the vehemently disputed claim that naval stores and provisions were, or might be, contraband of war. Further evidence of the understanding of Great Britain in this matter is afforded by a letter of the law adviser of the Crown, transmitted in 1801 by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Mr. King, then United States Minister. "The direct trade between the mother country and its colonies has not during this present war been recognized as legal, either by his Majesty's Government or by his tribunals."113

It is to be inferred that the Administration and the Senate, while possibly thinking Jay too yielding as a negotiator, reached the conclusion that his estimate of British feeling, formed upon the spot, was correct as to the degree of concession then to be obtained. At all events, the treaty, which provided for mixed commissions to adjudicate upon the numerous seizures made under the British orders, and, under certain conditions, admitted American vessels to branches of British trade previously closed to them, was ratified with the exception of the twelfth article. This conferred on Americans the privilege, long and urgently desired, of direct trade between their own country and the British West Indies on the same terms as British ships, though in vessels of limited size. Greatly desired as this permission had been, it came coupled with the condition, not only that cargoes from the islands should be landed in the United States alone, but also, while the concession lasted, American vessels should not carry "molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton" from the United States to any part of the world. By strict construction, this would prevent re-exporting the produce of French or other foreign colonies; a traffic, the extent of which during this war may be conceived by the returns for a single year, 1796, when United States shipping carried to Europe thirty-five million pounds of sugar and sixty-two million pounds of coffee, products of the Caribbean region. This article was rejected by the Senate, and the treaty ratified without it; but the coveted privilege was continued by British executive order, the regulations in the matter being suspended on account of the war, and the trade opened to American as well as British ships. Ostensibly a favor, not resting on the obligations of treaty, but on the precarious ground of the Government's will, its continuance was assured under the circumstances of the time by its practical utility to Great Britain; for the trade of that country, and its vital importance in the prevailing wars, were developing at a rate which outstripped its own tonnage. The numbers of native seamen were likewise inadequate, through the heavy demands of the Navy for men. The concurrence of neutrals was imperative. Under the conditions it was no slight advantage to have the islands supplied and the American market retained, by the services of American vessels, leaving to British the monopoly of direct carrying between the colonies and Europe.

Although vexations to neutrals incident to a state of war continued subsequent to this treaty, they turned upon points of construction and practice rather than upon principle. Negotiation was continuous; and in September, 1800, towards the close of Adams's administration, Mr. John Marshall, then Secretary of State, summed up existing complaints of commercial injury under three heads,—definitions of contraband, methods of blockade, and the unjust decisions of Vice-Admiralty Courts; coupled with the absence of penalty to cruisers making unwarranted captures, which emboldened them to seize on any ground, because certain to escape punishment. But no formal pronouncement further injurious to United States commerce was made by the British Government during this war, which ended in October, 1801, to be renewed eighteen months later. On the contrary, the progress of events in the West Indies, by its favorable effect upon British commerce, assisted Pitt in taking the more liberal measures to which by conviction he was always inclined. The destruction of Haiti as a French colony, and to a great degree as a producer of sugar and coffee, by eliminating one principal source of the world's supply, raised values throughout the remaining Caribbean; while the capture of almost all the French and Dutch possessions threw their commerce and navigation into the hands of Great Britain. In this swelling prosperity the British planter, the British carrier, and the British merchant at home all shared, and so bore without apparent grudging the issuance of an Order, in January, 1798, which extended to European neutrals the concession, made in 1795 to the United States, of carrying West Indian produce direct from the islands to their own country, or to Great Britain; not, however, to a hostile port, or to any other neutral territory than their own.

Although this Order in no way altered the existing status of the United States, it was embraced in a list of British measures affecting commerce,114 transmitted to Congress in 1808. From the American standpoint this was accurate; for the extension to neutrals to carry to their own country, and to no other, continued the exclusion of the United States from a direct traffic between the belligerent colonies and Europe, which she had steadily asserted to be her right, but which the Rule of 1756 denied. The utmost the United States had obtained was the restitution of privileges enjoyed by them as colonists of Great Britain, in trading with the British West Indies; and this under circumstances of delay and bargain which showed clearly that the temporary convenience of Great Britain was alone consulted. No admission had been made on the point of right, as maintained by America. On the contrary, the Order of 1798 was at pains to state as its motive no change of principle, but "consideration of the present state of the commerce of Great Britain, as well as of that of neutral countries," which makes it "expedient."115

This was a final and absolute rejection of Madison's doctrine, that merchant vessels on the high seas were under the jurisdiction only of their own country. Asserted right was arrayed directly and unequivocally against asserted right. Negotiation on that subject was closed, and to diplomacy was left no further resort, save arms, or submission to continued injury and insult. The British commissioners did indeed submit a project,162 in place of that of the United States, rejected by their Government. By this it was provided that thereafter the captain of a cruiser who should impress an American citizen should be liable to heavy penalties, to be enacted by law; but as the preamble to this proposition read, "Whereas it is not lawful for a belligerent to impress or carry off, from on board a neutral, seafaring persons who are not the subjects of the belligerent," there was admitted implicitly the right to impress those who were such subjects, the precise point at issue. The Americans therefore pronounced it wholly inadmissible, and repeated that no project could be adopted "which did not allow our ships to protect their crews."

The provision made indispensable by the United States having thus failed of adoption, the question arose whether the negotiation should cease. The British expressed an earnest desire that it should not, and as a means thereto communicated the most positive assurances from their Government that "instructions have been given, and will be repeated and enforced, for the observance of the greatest caution in the impressing of British seamen; that the strictest care shall be taken to preserve the citizens of the United States from molestation or injury; and that prompt redress shall be afforded upon any representation of injury."163 To this assurance the American commissioners attached more value as a safeguard for the future than past experience warranted; but in London they were able to feel, more accurately than an official in Washington, the extent and complexity of the British problem, both in actual fact and in public feeling. They knew, too, the anxious wish of the President for an accommodation on other matters; so they decided to proceed with their discussions, having first explicitly stated that they were acting on their own judgment.164 Consequently, whatever instrument might result from their joint labors would be liable to rejection at home, because of the failure of the impressment demand.

The discussions thus renewed terminated in a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, signed by the four negotiators, December 31, 1806. Into the details of this instrument it is unnecessary to go, as it never became operative. Jefferson persisted in refusing approval to any formal convention which did not provide the required stipulation against impressment. He was dissatisfied also with particular details connected with the other arrangements. All these matters were set forth at great length in a letter165 of May 20, 1807, from Mr. Madison to the American commissioners; in which they were instructed to reopen negotiations on the basis of the treaty submitted, endeavoring to effect the changes specified. The danger to Great Britain from American commercial restriction was fully expounded, as an argument to compel compliance with the demands; the whole concluding with the characteristic remark that, "as long as negotiation can be honorably protracted, it is a resource to be preferred, under existing circumstances, to the peremptory alternative of improper concessions or inevitable collisions." In other words, the United States Government did not mean to fight, and that was all Great Britain needed to know. That she would suffer from the closure of the American market was indisputable; but, being assured of transatlantic peace, there were other circumstances of high import, political as well as commercial, which rendered yielding more inexpedient to her than a commercial war.

At the end of March, 1807, within three months of the signature at London, the British Ministry fell, and the disciples of Pitt returned to power. Mr. Canning became Foreign Secretary. Circumstances were then changing rapidly on the continent of Europe, and by the time Madison's letter reached England a very serious event had modified also the relations of the United States to Great Britain. This was the attack upon the United States frigate "Chesapeake" by a British ship of war, upon the high seas, and the removal of four of her crew, claimed as deserters from the British Navy. Unofficial information of this transaction reached England July 25, just one day after Monroe and Pinkney had addressed to Canning a letter communicating their instructions to reopen negotiations, and stating the changes deemed desirable in the treaty submitted. The intervention of the "Chesapeake" affair, to a contingent adjustment of which all other matters had been postponed, delayed to October 22 the reply of the British Minister.166 In this, after a preamble of "distinct protest against a practice, altogether unusual in the political transactions of states, by which the American Government assumes to itself the privilege of revising and altering agreements concluded and signed on its behalf by its agents duly authorized for that purpose," Canning thus announced the decision of the Cabinet: "The proposal of the President of the United States for proceeding to negotiate anew, upon the basis of a treaty already solemnly concluded and signed, is a proposal wholly inadmissible. And his Majesty has therefore no option, under the present circumstances of this transaction, but to acquiesce in the refusal of the President of the United States to ratify the treaty signed on December 31, 1806." The settlement of the "Chesapeake" business having already been transferred to Washington, by the appointment of a special British envoy, this rejection of further consideration of the treaty closed all matters pending between the two governments, except those appertaining to the usual duties of a legation, and Monroe's mission ended. A fortnight later he sailed for the United States. His place as regularly accredited Minister to the British Court was taken by Pinkney, through whom were conducted the subsequent important discussions, which arose from the marked extension given immediately afterwards by France and Great Britain to their several policies for the forcible restriction of neutral trade.

Those who have followed the course of the successive events traced in this chapter, and marked their accelerating momentum, will be prepared for the more extreme and startling occurrences which soon after ensued as a matter of inevitable development. They will be able also to understand how naturally the phrase, "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights," grew out of these various transactions, as the expression of the demands and grievances which finally drove the United States into hostilities; and will comprehend in what sense these terms were used, and what the wrongs against which they severally protested. "Free Trade" had no relation of opposition to a system of protection to home industries, an idea hardly as yet formulated to consciousness, except by a few advanced economists. It meant the trade of a nation carried on according to its own free will, relieved from fetters forcibly imposed by a foreign yoke, in which, under the circumstances of the time, the resurrection of colonial bondage was fairly to be discerned. "Sailors' Rights" expressed not only the right of the American seaman to personal liberty of action,—in theory not contested, but in practice continually violated by the British,—but the right of all seamen under the American flag to its protection in the voluntary engagements which they were then fulfilling. It voiced the sufferings of the individual; the personal side of an injury, the reverse of which was the disgrace of the nation responsible for his security.

It was afterwards charged against the administrations of Jefferson and Madison, under which these events ran their course to their culmination in war, that impressment was not a cause of the break between the two countries, but was adduced subsequently to swell the array of injuries, in which the later Orders in Council were the real determinative factor. The drift of this argument was, that the Repeal of the Orders, made almost simultaneously with the American Declaration of War, and known in the United States two months later, should have terminated hostilities. The British Government, in an elaborate vindication of its general course, published in January, 1813, stated that, "in a manifesto, accompanying their declaration of hostilities, in addition to the former complaints against the Orders in Council, a long list of grievances was brought forward; but none of them such as were ever before alleged by the American Government to be grounds for war." In America itself similar allegations were made by the party in opposition. The Maryland House of Delegates, in January, 1814, adopted a memorial, in which it was said that "The claim of impressment, which has been so much exaggerated, but which was never deemed of itself a substantive cause of war, has been heretofore considered susceptible of satisfactory arrangement in the judgment of both the commissioners, who were selected by the President then in office to conduct the negotiation with the English ministry in the year 1806."167 The words of the commissioners in their official letters of November 11, 1806,168 and April 22, 1807,169 certainly sustain this statement as to their opinion, which was again deliberately affirmed by Monroe in a justificatory review of their course, addressed to Madison in February, 1808,170 after his return. Gaston, speaking in the House in February, 1814, said: "Sir, the question of seamen was not a cause of this war. More than five years had passed over since an arrangement on this question, perfectly satisfactory to our ministers, [Monroe and Pinkney] had been made with Great Britain; but it pleased not the President, and was rejected. Yet, during the whole period that afterwards elapsed until the declaration of war, no second effort was made to adjust this cause of controversy."171

Gaston here is slightly in error as to fact, for the attack upon the "Chesapeake" was made by the Government the occasion for again demanding an abandonment of the practice of impressment from American merchant ships; but, accepting the statements otherwise, nothing more could be required of the Administration, so far as words went, than its insistence upon this relinquishment as a sine quâ non to any treaty. Its instructions to its ministers in 1806 had placed this demand first, not only in order, but in importance, coupling with it as indispensable only one other condition, the freedom of trade; the later and more extreme infringements of which were constituted by the Orders in Council of 1807. After protracted discussion, the American requirement as to impressment had been refused by Great Britain, deliberately, distinctly, and in the most positive manner; nor does it seem possible to concur with the opinion of our envoys that the stipulations offered by her representatives, while not sacrificing the British principle, did substantially and in practice secure the American demands. These could be satisfactorily covered only by the terms laid down by the Administration. Thereafter, any renewal of the subject must come from the other side; it was inconsistent with self-respect for the United States again to ask it, unless with arms in her hands. To make further advances in words would have been, not to negotiate, but to entreat. This, in substance, was the reply of the Government to its accusers at home, and it is irrefutable.

It is less easy—rather, it is impossible—to justify the Administration for refraining from adequate deeds, when the impotence of words had been fully and finally proved. In part, this was due to miscalculation, in itself difficult to pardon, from the somewhat sordid grounds and estimates of national feeling upon which it proceeded. The two successive presidents, and the party behind them, were satisfied that Great Britain, though standing avowedly and evidently upon grounds considered by her essential to national honor and national safety, could be compelled to yield by the menace of commercial embarrassment. That there was lacking in them the elevated instinct, which could recognize that they were in collision with something greater than a question of pecuniary profits, is in itself a condemnation; and their statesmanship was at fault in not appreciating that the enslaved conditions of the European continent had justly aroused in Great Britain an exaltation of spirit, which was prepared to undergo every extreme, in resistance to a like subjection, till exhaustion itself should cause her weapons to drop from her hands.

The resentment of the United States Government for the injuries done its people was righteous and proper. It was open to it to bear them under adequate protest, sympathizing with the evident embarrassments of the old cradle of the race; or, on the other hand, to do as she was doing, strain every nerve to compel the cessation of outrage. The Administration preferred to persist in its military and naval economies, putting forth but one-half of its power, by measures of mere commercial restriction. These impoverished its own people, and divided national sentiment, but proved incapable within reasonable time to reduce the resolution of the opponent. That that finally gave way when war was clearly imminent proves, not that commercial restriction alone was sufficient, but that coupled with military readiness it would have attained its end more surely, and sooner; consequently with less of national suffering, and no national ignominy.

Entire conviction of the justice and urgency of the American contentions, especially in the matter of impressment, and only to a less degree in that of the regulation of trade by foreign force, as impeaching national independence, is not enough to induce admiration for the course of American statesmanship at this time. The acuteness and technical accuracy of Madison's voluminous arguments make but more impressive the narrowness of outlook, which saw only the American point of view, and recognized only the force of legal precedent, at a time when the foundations of the civilized world were heaving. American interests doubtless were his sole concern; but what was practicable and necessary to support those interests depended upon a wide consideration and just appreciation of external conditions. That laws are silent amid the clash of arms, seems in his apprehension transformed to the conviction that at no time are they more noisy and compulsive. Upon this political obtuseness there fell a kind of poetical retribution, which gradually worked the Administration round to the position of substantially supporting Napoleon, when putting forth all his power to oppress the liberties of Spain, and of embarrassing Great Britain at the time when a people in insurrection against perfidy and outrage found in her their sole support. During these eventful five years, the history of which we are yet to trace, the bearing of successive British ministries towards the United States was usually uncompromising, often arrogant, sometimes insolent, hard even now to read with composure; but in the imminent danger of their country, during a period of complicated emergencies, they held, with cool heads, and with steady hands on the helm, a course taken in full understanding of world conditions, and with a substantially just forecast of the future. Among their presuppositions, in the period next to be treated, was that America might argue and threaten, but would not fight. There was here no miscalculation, for she did not fight till too late, and she fought wholly unprepared.

CHAPTER IV
FROM THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL TO WAR

1807-1812

When the treaty of December 31, 1806, was about to be signed, the British negotiators delivered to the Americans a paper, of the general character of which they had been forewarned, but which in precise terms then first came before them. Its origin was due to a pronouncement of the French Emperor, historically known as the Decree of Berlin, which was dated November 21, while the negotiations were in progress, but had become fully known only when they had reached a very advanced stage. The pretensions and policy set forth in the Decree were considered by the British Government to violate the rights of neutrals, with a specific and far-reaching purpose of thereby injuring Great Britain. It was claimed that acquiescence in such violations by the neutral, or submission to them, would be a concurrence in the hostile object of the enemy; in which case Great Britain might feel compelled to adopt measures retaliatory against France, through the same medium of neutral navigation. In such steps she might be fettered, should the present treaty take effect. In final ratification, therefore, the British Government would be guided by the action of the United States upon the Berlin Decree. Unless the Emperor abandoned his policy, or "the United States by its conduct or assurances will have given security to his Majesty that it will not submit to such innovations on the established system of maritime law, … his Majesty will not consider himself bound by the present signature of his commissioners to ratify the treaty, or precluded from adopting such measures as may seem necessary for counteracting the designs of his enemy."172 The American representatives transmitted this paper to Washington, with the simple observation that "we do not consider ourselves a party to it, or as having given it in any the slightest degree our sanction."173

The Berlin Decree was remarkable not only in scope and spirit, but in form. "It had excited in us apprehensions," wrote Madison to the United States minister in Paris, "which were repressed only by the inarticulate import of its articles, and the presumption that it would be executed in a sense not inconsistent with the respect due to the treaty between France and the United States." It bore, in fact, the impress of its author's mind, which, however replete with knowledge concerning conventional international law, defined in accordance with the momentary and often hasty impulses of his own will, and consequently often also with the obscurity attendant upon ill-digested ideas. The preamble recited various practices of Great Britain as subversive of international right; most of which were not so, but in accordance with long-standing usage and general prescription. The methods of blockade instituted by her were more exceptionable, and were given prominence, with evident reference to the Order of May 16, declaring the blockade of a long coast-line. It being evident, so ran the Emperor's reasoning, that the object of this abuse of blockade was to interrupt neutral commerce in favor of British, it followed that "whoever deals on the Continent in English merchandise favors that design, and becomes an accomplice." He therefore decreed, as a measure of just retaliation, "that the British Islands were thenceforward in a state of blockade; that all correspondence and commerce with them was prohibited; that trade in English merchandise was forbidden; and that all merchandise belonging to England, or" (even if neutral property) "proceeding from its manufactories and colonies, is lawful prize." No vessel coming directly from British dominions should be received in any port to which the Decree was applicable. The scope of its intended application was shown in the concluding command, that it should be communicated "to the Kings of Spain, of Naples, of Holland, of Etruria, and to our allies, whose subjects, like ours, are the victims of the injustice and barbarism of the English maritime laws."174

The phrasing of the edict was ambiguous, as Madison indicated. Notably, while neutral vessels having on board merchandise neutral in property, but British in origin, were to be seized when voluntarily entering a French port, it was not clear whether they were for the same reason to be arrested when found on the high seas; and there was equal failure to specify whether the proclaimed blockade authorized the capture of neutrals merely because bound to the British Isles, as was lawful if destined to a seaport effectively blockaded. Again, some of the proposed measures, such as refusal of admission to vessels or merchandise coming to French ports from British, were matters of purely local concern and municipal regulation; whereas the seizure of neutral property, because of English manufacture, was at least of doubtful right, if exercised within municipal limits, and certainly unlawful, if effected on the high seas. Whether such application was intended could not certainly be inferred from the text. The genius of the measure, as a whole, its inspiring motive and purpose, was revealed in the closing words of the preamble: "This decree shall be considered as the fundamental law of the Empire, until England has acknowledged that the rights of war are the same an land and on sea; that it [war] cannot be extended to any private property whatever; nor to persons who are not military; and until the right of blockade be restrained to fortified places, actually invested by competent forces." These words struck directly at measures of war resting upon long-standing usage, in which the strength of a maritime state such as Great Britain was vitally implicated.

The claim for private property possesses particular interest; for it involves a play upon words to the confusion of ideas, which from that time to this has vitiated the arguments upon which have been based a prominent feature of American policy. Private property at a standstill is one thing. It is the unproductive money in a stocking, hid in a closet. Property belonging to private individuals, but embarked in that process of transportation and exchange which we call commerce, is like money in circulation. It is the life-blood of national prosperity, upon which war depends; and as such is national in its employment, and only in ownership private. To stop such circulation is to sap national prosperity; and to sap prosperity, upon which war depends for its energy, is a measure as truly military as is killing the men whose arms maintain war in the field. Prohibition of commerce is enforced at will where an enemy's army holds a territory; if permitted, it is because it inures to the benefit of the conqueror, or at least from its restricted scope does not injure him. It will not be doubted that, should a prohibition on shore be disregarded, the offending property would be seized in punishment. The sea is the great scene of commerce. The property transported back and forth, circulating from state to state in exchanges, is one of the greatest factors in national wealth. The maritime nations have been, and are, the wealthy nations. To prohibit such commerce to an enemy is, and historically has been, a tremendous blow to his fighting power; never more conspicuously so than in the Napoleonic wars. But prohibition is a vain show, in war as it is in civil government, if not enforced by penalties; and the natural penalty against offending property is fine, extending even to confiscation in extreme cases. The seizure of enemy's merchant ships and goods, for violating the prohibition against their engaging in commerce, is what is commonly called the seizure of private property. Under the methods of the last two centuries, it has been in administration a process as regular, legally, as is libelling a ship for an action in damages; nor does it differ from it in principle. The point at issue really is not, "Is the property private?" but, "Is the method conducive to the purposes of war?" Property strictly private, on board ship, but not in process of commercial exchange, is for this reason never touched; and to do so is considered as disgraceful as a common theft.

Napoleon, as a ruler, was always poverty-stricken. For that reason he levied heavy contributions on conquered states, which it is needless to say were paid by private taxpayers; and for the same reason, by calling French ships and French goods "private property," he would compel for them the freedom of the sea, which the maritime preponderance of Great Britain denied them. He needed the revenue that commerce would bring in. So as to blockades. In denying the right to capture under a nominal blockade, unsupported by an effective force, he took the ground which the common-sense of nations had long before embodied in the common consent called international law. But he went farther. Blockade is very inconvenient to the blockaded, which was the rôle played by France. Along with the claim for "private property," he formulated the proposition that the right of blockade is restrained to fortified places; to which was afterwards added the corollary that the place must be invested by land as well as by sea. It is to be noticed that here also American policy showed a disposition to go astray, by denying the legitimacy of a purely commercial blockade; a tendency natural enough at that passing moment, when, as a weak nation, it was desired to restrict the rights of belligerents, but which in its results on the subsequent history of the country would have been ruinous. John Marshall, one of the greatest names in American jurisprudence, when Secretary of State in 1800, wrote to the minister in London:

On principle it might well be questioned whether this rule [of blockade] can be applied to a place not completely invested, by land as well as by sea. If we examine the reasoning on which is founded the right to intercept and confiscate supplies designed for a blockaded town, it will be difficult to resist the conviction that its extension to towns invested by sea only is an unjustifiable encroachment on the rights of neutrals. But it is not of this departure from principle (a departure which has received some sanction from practice) that we mean to complain.175

In 1810, the then Secretary of State enclosed to the American minister in London the letter from which this extract is taken, among other proofs of the positions maintained by the United States on the subject of blockade. The particular claim cited was not directly indorsed; but as its mention was unnecessary to the matter immediately in hand, we may safely regard its retention as indicative of the ideal of the Secretary, and of the President, Mr. Madison. In consequence, we find the minister, William Pinkney, in his letter of January 14, 1811, adducing Marshall's view to the British Foreign Secretary:

It is by no means clear that it may not fairly be contended, on principle and early usage, that a maritime blockade is incomplete, with regard to States at peace,176 unless the place which it would affect is invested by land, as well as by sea. The United States, however, have called for the recognition of no such rule. They appear to have contented themselves, etc.177

The error into which both these eminent statesmen fell is military in character, and proceeds from the same source as the agitation in favor of exempting so-called private property from capture. Both spring from the failure to recognize a function of the sea, vital to the maintenance of war by states which depend upon maritime commerce. To forbid the free use of the seas to enemy's merchant ships and material of commerce, differs in no wise in principle from shutting his ports to neutral vessels, as well as to his own, by blockade. Both are aimed at the enemy's sources of supply, at his communications; and the penalty inflicted by the laws of war in both cases is the same,—forfeiture of the offending property. With clear recognition of this military principle involved, and of the importance of sustaining it by Great Britain, British high officials repeatedly declared that the Berlin Decree was to be regarded, not chiefly in its methods, but in its object, or principle, which was to deprive Great Britain of her principal weapon. This purpose stood avowed in the words, "this decree shall be considered the fundamental law of the Empire until England has acknowledged," etc. British statesmen correctly paraphrased this, "has renounced the established foundations, admitted by all civilized nations, of her maritime rights and interests, upon which depend the most valuable rights and interests of the nation."178 The British authorities understood that, by relinquishing these rights, they would abandon in great measure the control of the sea, so far as useful to war. The United States have received their lesson in history. If the principle contended for by their representatives, Marshall and Pinkney, had been established as international law before 1861, there could have been no blockade of the Southern coast in the Civil War. The cotton of the Confederacy, innocent "private property," could have gone freely; the returns from it would have entered unimpeded; commerce, the source of national wealth, would have flourished in full vigor; supplies, except contraband, would have flowed unmolested; and all this at the price merely of killing some hundred thousands more men, with proportionate expenditure of money, in the effort to maintain the Union, which would probably have failed, to the immeasurable loss of both sections.

The British Government took some time to analyze the "inarticulate import" of the Berlin Decree. Hence, in the paper presented to Monroe and Pinkney, stress was laid upon the methods only, ignoring the object of compelling Great Britain to surrender her maritime rights. In the methods, however, instinct divined the true character of the plotted evil. There was to be formed, under military pressure, a vast political combination of states pledged to exclude British commerce from the markets of the Continent; a design which in execution received the name of the Continental System. The Decree being issued after the battle of Jena, upon the eve of the evident complete subjugation of Prussia, following that of Austria the year before, there was room to fear that the predominance of Napoleon on the Continent would compel in Europe universal compliance with these measures of exclusion. It so proved, in fact, in the course of 1807, leading to a commercial warfare of extraordinary rigor, the effects of which upon Europe have been discussed by the author in a previous work.179 Its influence upon the United States is now to be considered; for it was a prominent factor in the causes of the War of 1812.

CHAPTER V
THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

War being now immediately at hand, it is advisable, for the better appreciation of the course of events, the more accurate estimate of their historical and military value, to consider the relative conditions of the two opponents, the probable seats of warlike operations, and the methods which it was open to either to pursue.

Invasion of the British Islands, or of any transmarine possession of Great Britain—save Canada—was denied to the United States by the immeasurable inferiority of her navy. To cross the sea in force was impossible, even for short distances. For this reason, land operations were limited to the North American Continent. This fact, conjoined with the strong traditional desire, received from the old French wars and cherished in the War of Independence, to incorporate the Canadian colonies with the Union, determined an aggressive policy by the United States on the northern frontier. This was indeed the only distinctively offensive operation available to her upon the land; consequently it was imposed by reasons of both political and military expediency. On the other hand, the sea was open to American armed ships, though under certain very obvious restrictions; that is to say, subject to the primary difficulty of evading blockades of the coast, and of escaping subsequent capture by the very great number of British cruisers, which watched all seas where British commerce went and came, and most of the ports whence hostile ships might issue to prey upon it. The principal trammel which now rests upon the movements of vessels destined to cripple an enemy's commerce—the necessity to renew the motive power, coal, at frequent brief intervals—did not then exist. The wind, upon which motion depended, might at particular moments favor one of two antagonists relatively to the other; but in the long run it was substantially the same for all. In this respect all were on an equal footing; and the supply, if fickle at times, was practically inexhaustible. Barring accidents, vessels were able to keep the sea as long as their provisions and water lasted. This period may be reckoned as generally three months, while by watchful administration it might at times be protracted to six.

It is desirable to explain here what was, and is, the particular specific utility of operations directed toward the destruction of an enemy's commerce; what its bearing upon the issues of war; and how, also, it affects the relative interests of antagonists, unequally paired in the matter of sea power. Without attempting to determine precisely the relative importance of internal and external commerce, which varies with each country, and admitting that the length of transportation entails a distinct element of increased cost upon the articles transported, it is nevertheless safe to say that, to nations having free access to the sea, the export and import trade is a very large factor in national prosperity and comfort. At the very least, it increases by so much the aggregate of commercial transactions, while the ease and copiousness of water carriage go far to compensate for the increase of distance. Furthermore, the public revenue of maritime states is largely derived from duties on imports. Hence arises, therefore, a large source of wealth, of money; and money—ready money or substantial credit—is proverbially the sinews of war, as the War of 1812 was amply to demonstrate. Inconvertible assets, as business men know, are a very inefficacious form of wealth in tight times; and war is always a tight time for a country, a time in which its positive wealth, in the shape of every kind of produce, is of little use, unless by freedom of exchange it can be converted into cash for governmental expenses. To this sea-commerce greatly contributes, and the extreme embarrassment under which the United States as a nation labored in 1814 was mainly due to commercial exclusion from the sea. To attack the commerce of the enemy is therefore to cripple him, in the measure of success achieved, in the particular factor which is vital to the maintenance of war. Moreover, in the complicated conditions of mercantile activity no one branch can be seriously injured without involving others.

This may be called the financial and political effect of "commerce destroying," as the modern phrase runs. In military effect, it is strictly analogous to the impairing of an enemy's communications, of the line of supplies connecting an army with its base of operations, upon the maintenance of which the life of the army depends. Money, credit, is the life of war; lessen it, and vigor flags; destroy it, and resistance dies. No resource then remains except to "make war support war;" that is, to make the vanquished pay the bills for the maintenance of the army which has crushed him, or which is proceeding to crush whatever opposition is left alive. This, by the extraction of private money, and of supplies for the use of his troops, from the country in which he was fighting, was the method of Napoleon, than whom no man held more delicate views concerning the gross impropriety of capturing private property at sea, whither his power did not extend. Yet this, in effect, is simply another method of forcing the enemy to surrender a large part of his means, so weakening him, while transferring it to the victor for the better propagation of hostilities. The exaction of a pecuniary indemnity from the worsted party at the conclusion of a war, as is frequently done, differs from the seizure of property in transit afloat only in method, and as peace differs from war. In either case, money or money's worth is exacted; but when peace supervenes, the method of collection is left to the Government of the country, in pursuance of its powers of taxation, to distribute the burden among the people; whereas in war, the primary object being immediate injury to the enemy's fighting power, it is not only legitimate in principle, but particularly effective, to seek the disorganization of his financial system by a crushing attack upon one of its important factors, because effort thus is concentrated on a readily accessible, fundamental element of his general prosperity. That the loss falls directly on individuals, or a class, instead of upon the whole community, is but an incident of war, just as some men are killed and others not. Indirectly, but none the less surely, the whole community, and, what is more important, the organized government, are crippled; offensive powers impaired.

But while this is the absolute tendency of war against commerce, common to all cases, the relative value varies greatly with the countries having recourse to it. It is a species of hostilities easily extemporized by a great maritime nation; it therefore favors one whose policy is not to maintain a large naval establishment. It opens a field for a sea militia force, requiring little antecedent military training. Again, it is a logical military reply to commercial blockade, which is the most systematic, regularized, and extensive form of commerce-destruction known to war. Commercial blockade is not to be confounded with the military measure of confining a body of hostile ships of war to their harbor, by stationing before it a competent force. It is directed against merchant vessels, and is not a military operation in the narrowest sense, in that it does not necessarily involve fighting, nor propose the capture of the blockaded harbor. It is not usually directed against military ports, unless these happen to be also centres of commerce. Its object, which was the paramount function of the United States Navy during the Civil War, dealing probably the most decisive blow inflicted upon the Confederacy, is the destruction of commerce by closing the ports of egress and ingress. Incidental to that, all ships, neutrals included, attempting to enter or depart, after public notification through customary channels, are captured and confiscated as remorselessly as could be done by the most greedy privateer. Thus constituted, the operation receives far wider scope than commerce-destruction on the high seas; for this is confined to merchantmen of belligerents, while commercial blockade, by universal consent, subjects to capture neutrals who attempt to infringe it, because, by attempting to defeat the efforts of one belligerent, they make themselves parties to the war.

In fact, commercial blockade, though most effective as a military measure in broad results, is so distinctly commerce-destructive in essence, that those who censure the one form must logically proceed to denounce the other. This, as has been seen,391 Napoleon did; alleging in his Berlin Decree, in 1806, that war cannot be extended to any private property whatever, and that the right of blockade is restricted to fortified places, actually invested by competent forces. This he had the face to assert, at the very moment when he was compelling every vanquished state to extract, from the private means of its subjects, coin running up to hundreds of millions to replenish his military chest for further extension of hostilities. Had this dictum been accepted international law in 1861, the United States could not have closed the ports of the Confederacy, the commerce of which would have proceeded unmolested; and hostile measures being consequently directed against men's persons instead of their trade, victory, if accomplished at all, would have cost three lives for every two actually lost. It is apparent, immediately on statement, that against commerce-destruction by blockade, the recourse of the weaker maritime belligerent is commerce-destruction by cruisers on the high sea. Granting equal efficiency in the use of either measure, it is further plain that the latter is intrinsically far less efficacious. To cut off access to a city is much more certainly accomplished by holding the gates than by scouring the country in search of persons seeking to enter. Still, one can but do what one can. In 1861 to 1865, the Southern Confederacy, unable to shake off the death grip fastened on its throat, attempted counteraction by means of the "Alabama," "Sumter," and their less famous consorts, with what disastrous influence upon the navigation—the shipping—of the Union it is needless to insist. But while the shipping of the opposite belligerent was in this way not only crippled, but indirectly was swept from the seas, the Confederate cruisers, not being able to establish a blockade, could not prevent neutral vessels from carrying on the commerce of the Union. This consequently suffered no serious interruption; whereas the produce of the South, its inconvertible wealth—cotton chiefly—was practically useless to sustain the financial system and credit of the people. So, in 1812 and the two years following, the United States flooded the seas with privateers, producing an effect upon British commerce which, though inconclusive singly, doubtless co-operated powerfully with other motives to dispose the enemy to liberal terms of peace. It was the reply, and the only possible reply, to the commercial blockade, the grinding efficacy of which it will be a principal object of these pages to depict. The issue to us has been accurately characterized by Mr. Henry Adams, in the single word "Exhaustion."392

Both parties to the War of 1812 being conspicuously maritime in disposition and occupation, while separated by three thousand miles of ocean, the sea and its navigable approaches became necessarily the most extensive scene of operations. There being between them great inequality of organized naval strength and of pecuniary resources, they inevitably resorted, according to their respective force, to one or the other form of maritime hostilities against commerce which have been indicated. To this procedure combats on the high seas were merely incidental. Tradition, professional pride, and the combative spirit inherent in both peoples, compelled fighting when armed vessels of nearly equal strength met; but such contests, though wholly laudable from the naval standpoint, which under ordinary circumstances cannot afford to encourage retreat from an equal foe, were indecisive of general results, however meritorious in particular execution. They had no effect upon the issue, except so far as they inspired moral enthusiasm and confidence. Still more, in the sequel they have had a distinctly injurious effect upon national opinion in the United States. In the brilliant exhibition of enterprise, professional skill, and usual success, by its naval officers and seamen, the country has forgotten the precedent neglect of several administrations to constitute the navy as strong in proportion to the means of the country as it was excellent through the spirit and acquirements of its officers. Sight also has been lost of the actual conditions of repression, confinement, and isolation, enforced upon the maritime frontier during the greater part of the war, with the misery and mortification thence ensuing. It has been widely inferred that the maritime conditions in general were highly flattering to national pride, and that a future emergency could be confronted with the same supposed facility, and as little preparation, as the odds of 1812 are believed to have been encountered and overcome. This mental impression, this picture, is false throughout, alike in its grouping of incidents, in its disregard of proportion, and in its ignoring of facts. The truth of this assertion will appear in due course of this narrative, and it will be seen that, although relieved by many brilliant incidents, indicative of the real spirit and capacity of the nation, the record upon the whole is one of gloom, disaster, and governmental incompetence, resulting from lack of national preparation, due to the obstinate and blind prepossessions of the Government, and, in part, of the people.

This was so even upon the water, despite the great names—for great they were in measure of their opportunities—of Decatur, Hull, Perry, Macdonough, Morris, and a dozen others. On shore things were far worse; for while upon the water the country had as leaders men still in the young prime of life, who were both seamen and officers,—none of those just named were then over forty,—the army at the beginning had only elderly men, who, if they ever had been soldiers in any truer sense than young fighting men,—soldiers by training and understanding,—had long since disacquired whatever knowledge and habit of the profession they had gained in the War of Independence, then more than thirty years past. "As far as American movements are concerned," said one of Wellington's trusted officers, sent to report upon the subject of Canadian defence, "the campaign of 1812 is almost beneath criticism."393 Instructed American opinion must sorrowfully admit the truth of the comment. That of 1813 was not much better, although some younger men—Brown, Scott, Gaines, Macomb, Ripley—were beginning to show their mettle, and there had by then been placed at the head of the War Department a secretary who at least possessed a reasoned understanding of the principles of warfare. With every material military advantage, save the vital one of adequate preparation, it was found too late to prepare when war was already at hand; and after the old inefficients had been given a chance to demonstrate their incapacity, it was too late to utilize the young men.

Jefferson, with curious insanity of optimism, had once written, "We begin to broach the idea that we consider the whole Gulf Stream as of our waters, within which hostilities and cruising are to be frowned on for the present, and prohibited as soon as either consent or force will permit;"394 while at the same time, under an unbroken succession of maritime humiliations, he of purpose neglected all naval preparation save that of two hundred gunboats, which could not venture out of sight of land without putting their guns in the hold. With like blindness to the conditions to which his administration had reduced the nation, he now wrote: "The acquisition of Canada this year [1812], as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching."395 This would scarcely have been a misappreciation, had his care for the army and that of his successor given the country in 1812 an effective force of fifteen thousand regulars. Great Britain had but forty-five hundred in all Canada,396 from Quebec to St. Joseph's, near Mackinac; and the American resources in militia were to hers as ten to one. But Jefferson and Madison, with their Secretary of the Treasury, had reduced the national debt between 1801 and 1812 from $80,000,000 to $45,000,000, concerning which a Virginia Senator remarked: "This difference has never been felt by society. It has produced no effect upon the common intercourse among men. For my part, I should never have known of the reduction but for the annual Treasury Report."397 Something was learned about it, however, in the first year of the war, and the interest upon the savings was received at Detroit, on the Niagara frontier, in the Chesapeake and the Delaware.

The War of 1812 was very unpopular in certain sections of the United States and with certain parts of the community. By these, particular fault was found with the invasion of Canada. "You have declared war, it was said, for two principal alleged reasons: one, the general policy of the British Government, formulated in the successive Orders in Council, to the unjustifiable injury and violation of American commerce; the other, the impressment of seamen from American merchant ships. What have Canada and the Canadians to do with either? If war you must, carry on your war upon the ocean, the scene of your avowed wrongs, and the seat of your adversary's prosperity, and do not embroil these innocent regions and people in the common ruin which, without adequate cause, you are bringing upon your own countrymen, and upon the only nation that now upholds the freedom of mankind against that oppressor of our race, that incarnation of all despotism—Napoleon." So, not without some alloy of self-interest, the question presented itself to New England, and so New England presented it to the Government and the Southern part of the Union; partly as a matter of honest conviction, partly as an incident of the factiousness inherent in all political opposition, which makes a point wherever it can.

Logically, there may at first appear some reason in these arguments. We are bound to believe so, for we cannot entirely impeach the candor of our ancestors, who doubtless advanced them with some degree of conviction. The answer, of course, is, that when two nations go to war, all the citizens of one become internationally the enemies of the other. This is the accepted principle of International Law, a residuum of the concentrated wisdom of many generations of international legists. When war takes the place of peace, it annihilates all natural and conventional rights, all treaties and compacts, except those which appertain to the state of war itself. The warfare of modern civilization assures many rights to an enemy, by custom, by precedent, by compact; many treaties bear express stipulations that, should war arise between the parties, such and such methods of warfare are barred; but all these are merely guaranteed exceptions to the general rule that every individual of each nation is the enemy of those of the opposing belligerent.

Canada and the Canadians, being British subjects, became therefore, however involuntarily, the enemies of the United States, when the latter decided that the injuries received from Great Britain compelled recourse to the sword. Moreover, war, once determined, must be waged on the principles of war; and whatever greed of annexation may have entered into the motives of the Administration of the day, there can be no question that politically and militarily, as a war measure, the invasion of Canada was not only justifiable but imperative. "In case of war," wrote the United States Secretary of State, Monroe, a very few days398 before the declaration, "it might be necessary to invade Canada; not as an object of the war, but as a means to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion." War now is never waged for the sake of mere fighting, simply to see who is the better at killing people. The warfare of civilized nations is for the purpose of accomplishing an object, obtaining a concession of alleged right from an enemy who has proved implacable to argument. He is to be made to yield to force what he has refused to reason; and to do that, hold is laid upon what is his, either by taking actual possession, or by preventing his utilizing what he still may retain. An attachment is issued, so to say, or an injunction laid, according to circumstances; as men in law do to enforce payment of a debt, or abatement of an injury. If, in the attempt to do this, the other nation resists, as it probably will, then fighting ensues; but that fighting is only an incident of war. War, in substance, though not perhaps in form, began when the one nation resorted to force, quite irrespective of the resistance of the other.

Canada, conquered by the United States, would therefore have been a piece of British property attached; either in compensation for claims, or as an asset in the bargaining which precedes a treaty of peace. Its retention even, as a permanent possession, would have been justified by the law of war, if the military situation supported that course. This is a political consideration; militarily, the reasons were even stronger. To Americans the War of 1812 has worn the appearance of a maritime contest. This is both natural and just; for, as a matter of fact, not only were the maritime operations more pleasing to retrospect, but they also were as a whole, and on both sides, far more efficient, far more virile, than those on land. Under the relative conditions of the parties, however, it ought to have been a land war, because of the vastly superior advantages on shore possessed by the party declaring war; and such it would have been, doubtless, but for the amazing incompetency of most of the army leaders on both sides, after the fall of the British general, Brock, almost at the opening of hostilities. This incompetency, on the part of the United States, is directly attributable to the policy of Jefferson and Madison; for had proper attention and development been given to the army between 1801 and 1812, it could scarcely have failed that some indication of men's fitness or unfitness would have preceded and obviated the lamentable experience of the first two years, when every opportunity was favorable, only to be thrown away from lack of leadership. That even the defects of preparation, extreme and culpable as these were, could have been overcome, is evidenced by the history of the Lakes. The Governor General, Prevost, reported to the home government in July and August, 1812, that the British still had the naval superiority on Erie and Ontario;399 but this condition was reversed by the energy and capacity of the American commanders, Chauncey, Perry, and Macdonough, utilizing the undeniable superiority in available resources—mechanics and transportation—which their territory had over the Canadian, not for naval warfare only, but for land as well.

The general considerations that have been advanced are sufficient to indicate what should have been the general plan of the war on the part of the United States. Every war must be aggressive, or, to use the technical term, offensive, in military character; for unless you injure the enemy, if you confine yourself, as some of the grumblers of that day would have it, to simple defence against his efforts, obviously he has no inducement to yield your contention. Incidentally, however, vital interests must be defended, otherwise the power of offence falls with them. Every war, therefore, has both a defensive and an offensive side, and in an effective plan of campaign each must receive due attention. Now, in 1812, so far as general natural conditions went, the United States was relatively weak on the sea frontier, and strong on the side of Canada. The seaboard might, indeed, in the preceding ten years, have been given a development of force, by the creation of an adequate navy, which would have prevented war, by the obvious danger to British interests involved in hostilities. But this had not been done; and Jefferson, by his gunboat policy, building some two hundred of those vessels, worthless unless under cover of the land, proclaimed by act as by voice his adherence to a bare defensive. The sea frontier, therefore, became mainly a line of defence, the utility of which primarily was, or should have been, to maintain communication with the outside world; to support commerce, which in turn should sustain the financial potency that determines the issues of war.

The truth of this observation is shown by one single fact, which will receive recurrent mention from time to time in the narrative. Owing partly to the necessities of the British Government, and partly as a matter of favor extended to the New England States, on account of their antagonism to the war, the commercial blockade of the coast was for a long time—until April 25, 1814—limited to the part between Narragansett Bay and the boundary of Florida, then a Spanish colony. During this period, which Madison angrily called one of "invidious discrimination between different parts of the United States," New England was left open to neutral commerce, which the British, to supply their own wants, further encouraged by a system of licenses, exempting from capture the vessels engaged, even though American. Owing largely to this, though partly to the local development of manufactures caused by the previous policy of restriction upon foreign trade, which had diverted New England from maritime commerce to manufactures, that section became the distributing centre of the Union. In consequence, the remainder of the country was practically drained of specie, which set to the northward and eastward, the surplusage above strictly local needs finding its way to Canada, to ease the very severe necessities of the British military authorities there; for Great Britain, maintaining her own armies in the Spanish peninsula, and supporting in part the alliance against Napoleon on the Continent, could spare no coin to Canada. It could not go far south, because the coasting trade was destroyed by the enemy's fleets, and the South could not send forward its produce by land to obtain money in return. The deposits in Massachusetts banks increased from $2,671,619, in 1810, to $8,875,589, in 1814; while in the same years the specie held was respectively $1,561,034 and $6,393,718.400

It was a day of small things, relatively to present gigantic commercial enterprises; but an accumulation of cash in one quarter, coinciding with penury in another, proves defect in circulation consequent upon embarrassed communications. That flour in Boston sold for $12.00 the barrel, while at Baltimore and Richmond it stood at $6.50 and $4.50, tells the same tale of congestion and deficiency, due to interruption of water communication; the whole proving that, under the conditions of 1812, as the United States Government had allowed them to become, through failure to foster a navy by which alone coast defence in the true sense can be effected, the coast frontier was essentially the weak point. There Great Britain could put forth her enormous naval strength with the most sensible and widespread injury to American national power, as represented in the financial stability which constitutes the sinews of war. Men enough could be had; there were one hundred thousand registered seamen belonging to the country; but in the preceding ten years the frigate force had decreased from thirteen of that nominal rate to nine, while the only additions to the service, except gunboats, were two sloops of war, two brigs, and four schooners. The construction of ships of the line, for six of which provision had been made under the administration which expired in 1801, was abandoned immediately by its successor. There was no navy for defence.

Small vessels, under which denomination most frigates should be included, have their appropriate uses in a naval establishment, but in themselves are inadequate to the defence of a coast-line, in the true sense of the word "defence." It is one of the first elements of intelligent warfare that true defence consists in imposing upon the enemy a wholesome fear of yourself. "The best protection against the enemy's fire," said Farragut, "is a rapid fire from our own guns." "No scheme of defence," said Napoleon, "can be considered efficient that does not provide the means of attacking the enemy at an opportune moment. In the defence of a river, for instance," he continues, "you must not only be able to withstand its passage by the enemy, but must keep in your own hands means of crossing, so as to attack him, when occasion either offers, or can be contrived." In short, you must command either a bridge or a ford, and have a disposable force ready to utilize it by attack. The fact of such preparation fetters every movement of the enemy.

At its very outbreak the War of 1812 gave an illustration of the working of this principle. Tiny as was the United States Navy, the opening of hostilities found it concentrated in a body of several frigates, with one or two sloops of war, which put to sea together. The energies of Great Britain being then concentrated upon the navy of Napoleon, her available force at Halifax and Bermuda was small, and the frigates, of which it was almost wholly composed, were compelled to keep together; for, if they attempted to scatter, in order to watch several commercial ports, they were exposed to capture singly by this relatively numerous body of American cruisers. The narrow escape of the frigate "Constitution" from the British squadron at this moment, on her way from the Chesapeake to New York, which port she was unable to gain, exemplifies precisely the risk of dispersion that the British frigates did not dare to face while their enemy was believed to be at hand in concentrated force. They being compelled thus to remain together, the ports were left open; and the American merchant ships, of which a great number were then abroad, returned with comparative impunity, though certainly not entirely without losses.

CHAPTER VI
EARLY CRUISES AND ENGAGEMENTS: THE "CONSTITUTION" AND "GUERRIÈRE." HULL'S OPERATIONS AND SURRENDER

War was declared on June 18. On the 21st there was lying in the lower harbor of New York a division of five United States vessels under the command of Commodore John Rodgers. It consisted of three frigates, the "President" and "United States," rated of 44 guns, the "Congress" of 38, the ship-rigged sloop of war "Hornet" of 18, and the brig "Argus" of 16. This division, as it stood, was composed of two squadrons; that of Rodgers himself, and that of Commodore Stephen Decatur, the latter having assigned to him immediately the "United States," the "Congress," and the "Argus." There belonged also to Rodgers' particular squadron the "Essex," a frigate rated at 32 guns. Captain David Porter, one of the most distinguished names in American naval annals, commanded her then, and until her capture by a much superior force, nearly two years later; but at this moment she was undergoing repairs, a circumstance which prevented her from accompanying the other vessels, and materially affected her subsequent history.

It may be mentioned, as an indication of naval policy, that although Rodgers and Decatur each had more than one vessel under his control, neither was given the further privilege and distinction, frequent in such cases, of having a captain to command the particular ship on which he himself sailed. This, when done, introduces a very substantial change in the position of the officer affected. He is removed from being only first among several equals, and is advanced to a superiority of grade, in which he stands alone, with consequent enhancement of authority. Rodgers was captain of the "President" as well as commodore of the small body of vessels assigned to him; Decatur held the same relation to the frigate "United States," and to her consorts. Though apparently trivial, the circumstance is not insignificant; for it indicates clearly that, so far as the Navy Department then had any mind, it had not yet made it up as to whether it would send out its vessels as single cruisers, or combine them into divisions, for the one operation open to the United States Navy, namely, the destruction of the enemy's commerce. With divisions permanently constituted as such, propriety and effective action would have required the additional dignity for the officer in general charge, and they themselves doubtless would have asked for it; but for ships temporarily associated, and liable at any moment to be scattered, not only was the simple seniority of naval rank sufficient, but more would have been inexpedient. The commodores, now such only by courtesy and temporary circumstance, would suffer no derogation if deprived of ships other than their own; whereas the more extensive function, similarly curtailed, would become a mere empty show, a humiliation which no office, civil or military, can undergo without harm.

This indecision of the Department reflected the varying opinions of the higher officers of the service, which in turn but reproduced different schools of thought throughout all navies. Historically, as a military operation, for the injury of an enemy's commerce and the protection of one's own, it may be considered fairly demonstrated that vessels grouped do more effective work than the same number scattered. This is, of course, but to repeat the general military teaching of operations of all kinds. It is not the keeping of the several vessels side by side that constitutes the virtue of this disposition; it is the placing them under a single head, thereby insuring co-operation, however widely dispersed by their common chief under the emergency of successive moments. Like a fan that opens and shuts, vessels thus organically bound together possess the power of wide sweep, which insures exertion over a great field of ocean, and at the same time that of mutual support, because dependent upon and controlled from a common centre. Such is concentration, reasonably understood; not huddled together like a drove of cattle, but distributed with a regard to a common purpose, and linked together by the effectual energy of a single will.

There is, however, in the human mind an inveterate tendency to dispersion of effort, due apparently to the wish to do at once as many things as may be; a disposition also to take as many chances as possible in an apparent lottery, with the more hope that some one of them will come up successful. Not an aggregate big result, and one only, whether hit or miss, but a division of resources and powers which shall insure possible compensation in one direction for what is not gained, or may even be lost, in another. The Navy Department, when hostilities were imminent, addressed inquiries to several prominent officers as to the best means of employing the very small total force available. The question involved the direction of effort, as well as the method; but as regards the former of these, the general routes followed by British commerce, and the modes of protecting it, were so far understood as to leave not much room for differences of opinion.

Rodgers may have been unconsciously swayed by the natural bias of an officer whose seniority would insure him a division, if the single-cruiser policy did not prevail. Of the replies given, however, his certainly was the one most consonant with sound military views.418 Send a small squadron, of two or three frigates and a sloop, to cruise on the coast of the British Islands, and send the light cruisers to the West Indies; for, though he did not express it, in the gentle breezes and smooth seas of the tropics small cruisers have a much better chance to avoid capture by big ships than in the heavy gales of the North Atlantic. This much may be termed the distinctly offensive part of Rodgers' project. For the defensive, employ the remainder of the frigates, singly or in squadron, to guard our own seaboard; either directly, by remaining off the coast, or by taking position in the track of the trade between Great Britain and the St. Lawrence. Irrespective of direct captures there made, this course would contribute to protect the access to home ports, by drawing away the enemy's ships of war to cover their own threatened commerce. Alike in the size of his foreign squadron, and in the touch of uncertainty as to our own coasts, "singly or in squadron," Rodgers reflected the embarrassment of a man whose means are utterly inadequate to the work he wishes to do. One does not need to be a soldier or a seaman to comprehend the difficulty of making ends meet when there is not enough to go round.

Decatur and Bainbridge, whose written opinions are preserved, held views greatly modified from those of Rodgers, or even distinctly opposed to them. "The plan which appears to me best calculated for our little navy to annoy the trade of Great Britain," wrote Decatur,419 "would be to send them out distant from our own coast, singly, or not more than two frigates in company, without specific instructions; relying upon the enterprise of their officers. Two frigates cruising together would not be so easily traced by an enemy as a greater number; their movements would be infinitely more rapid; they would be sufficiently strong in most instances to attack a convoy, and the probability is they would not meet with a superior cruising force. If, however, they should meet a superior, and cannot avoid it, we would not have to regret the whole of our marine crushed at one blow." Bainbridge is yet more absolute. "I am anxious to see us all dispersed about various seas. If we are kept together in squadron, or lying in port, the whole are scarcely of more advantage than one ship. I wish all our public vessels here [Boston] were dispersed in various ports, for I apprehend it will draw speedily a numerous force of the enemy to blockade or attack."420 At the moment of writing this, Rodgers' squadron was in Boston, having returned from a cruise, and the "Constitution" also, immediately after her engagement with the "Guerrière."

It will be observed that, in spirit even more than in letter, Rodgers' leading conception is that of co-operation, combined action. First, he would have a Department general plan, embracing in a comprehensive scheme the entire navy and the ocean at large, in the British seas, West Indies, and North Atlantic; each contributing, by its particular action and impression, to forward the work of the others, and so of the whole. Secondly, he intimates, not obscurely, though cautiously, in each separate field the concerted action of several ships is better than their disconnected efforts. Decatur and Bainbridge, on the contrary, implicitly, and indeed explicitly, favor individual movement. They would reject even combination by the Department—"no specific instructions, rely upon the enterprise of the officers." Nor will they have a local supervision or control in any particular; two frigates at the most are to act together, singly even is preferable, and they shall roam the seas at will.

There can be little doubt as to which scheme is sounder in general principle. All military experience concurs in the general rule of co-operative action; and this means concentration, under the liberal definition before given—unity of purpose and subordination to a central control. General rules, however, must be intelligently applied to particular circumstances; and it will be found by considering the special circumstances of British commerce, under the war conditions of 1812, that Rodgers' plan was particularly suited to injure it. It is doubtless true that if merchant vessels were so dispersed over the globe, that rarely more than one would be visible at a time, one ship of war could take that one as well as a half-dozen could. But this was not the condition. British merchant ships were not permitted so to act. They were compelled to gather at certain centres, and thence, when enough had assembled, were despatched in large convoys, guarded by ships of war, in force proportioned to that disposable at the moment by the local admiral, and to the anticipated danger. Consequently, while isolated merchant ships were to be met, they were but the crumbs that fell from the table, except in the near vicinity of the British Islands themselves.

Such were the conditions while Great Britain had been at war with France alone; but the declaration of the United States led at once to increased stringency. All licenses to cross the Atlantic without convoy were at once revoked, and every colonial and naval commander lay under heavy responsibility to enforce the law of convoy. Insurance was forfeited by breach of its requirements; and in case of parting convoy, capture would at least hazard, if not invalidate, the policy. Under all this compulsion, concentrated merchant fleets and heavy guards became as far as possible the rule of action. With such conditions it was at once more difficult for a single ship of war to find, and when found to deal effectually with, a body of vessels which on the one hand was large, and yet occupied but a small space relatively to the great expanse of ocean over which the pursuer might roam fruitlessly, missing continually the one moving spot he sought. For such a purpose a well-handled squadron, scattering within signal-distance from each other, or to meet at a rendezvous, was more likely to find, and, having found, could by concerted action best overcome the guard and destroy the fleet.

On June 22, 1812, the Navy Department issued orders for Rodgers,421 which are interesting as showing its ideas of operations. The two squadrons then assembled under him were to go to sea, and there separate. He himself, with the frigates "President," "Essex," and "John Adams," sloop "Hornet," and the small brig "Nautilus," was to go to the Capes of the Chesapeake, and thence cruise eastwardly, off and on. Decatur's two frigates, with the "Argus," would cruise southwardly from New York. It was expected that the two would meet from time to time; and, should combined action be advisable, Rodgers had authority to unite them under his broad pendant for that purpose. The object of this movement was to protect the commerce of the country, which at this time was expected to be returning in great numbers from the Spanish peninsula; whither had been hurried every available ship, and every barrel of flour in store, as soon as the news of the approaching embargo of April 4 became public. "The great bulk of our returning commerce," wrote the secretary, "will make for the ports between the Chesapeake and our eastern extremities; and, in the protection to be afforded, such ports claim particular attention."

The obvious comment on this disposition is that protection to the incoming ships would be most completely afforded, not by the local presence of either of these squadrons, but by the absence of the enemy. This absence was best insured by beating him, if met; and in the then size of the British Halifax fleet it was possible that a detachment sent from it might be successfully engaged by the joint division, though not by either squadron singly. The other adequate alternative was to force the enemy to keep concentrated, and so to cover as small a part as might be of the homeward path of the scattered American trade. This also was best effected by uniting our own ships. Without exaggerating the danger to the American squadrons, needlessly exposed in detail by the Department's plan, the object in view would have been attained as surely, and at less risk, by keeping all the vessels together, even though they were retained between Boston Bay and the Capes of the Chesapeake for the local defence of commerce. In short, as was to be expected from the antecedents of the Government, the scheme was purely and narrowly defensive; there was not in it a trace of any comprehension of the principle that offence is the surest defence. The opening words of its letter defined the full measure of its understanding. "It has been judged expedient so to employ our public armed vessels, as to afford to our returning commerce all possible protection." It may be added, that to station on the very spot where the merchant vessels were flocking in return, divisions inferior to that which could be concentrated against them, was very bad strategy; drawing the enemy by a double motive to the place whence his absence was particularly desirable.

The better way was to influence British naval action by a distinct offensive step; by a movement of the combined divisions sufficiently obvious to inspire caution, but yet too vague to admit of precision of direction or definite pursuit. In accordance with the general ideas formulated in his letter, before quoted, Rodgers had already fixed upon a plan, which, if successful, would inflict a startling blow to British commerce and prestige, and at the same time would compel the enemy to concentrate, thus diminishing his menace to American shipping. It was known to him that a large convoy had sailed from Jamaica for England about May 20. The invariable course of such bodies was first to the north-northeast, parallel in a general sense to the Gulf Stream and American coast, until they had cleared the northeast trades and the belt of light and variable winds above them. Upon approaching forty degrees north latitude, they met in full force the rude west winds, as the Spanish navigators styled them, and before them bore away to the English Channel. That a month after their starting Rodgers should still have hoped to overtake them, gives a lively impression of the lumbering slowness of trade movement under convoy; but he counted also upon the far swifter joint speed of his few and well-found ships. To the effective fulfilment of his double object, defensive and offensive, however, he required more ships than his own squadron, and he held his course dependent upon Decatur joining him.422

On June 21 Decatur did join, and later in the same day arrived a Department order of June 18 with the Declaration of War. Within an hour the division of five ships was under way for sea. In consequence of this instant movement Rodgers did not receive the subsequent order of the Department, June 22, the purport of which has been explained and discussed. Standing off southeasterly from Sandy Hook, at 3 A.M. of June 23 was spoken an American brig, which four days before had seen the convoy steering east in latitude 36°, longitude 67°, or about three hundred miles from where the squadron then was. Canvas was crowded in pursuit, but three hours later was sighted in the northeast a large sail heading toward the squadron. The course of all the vessels was changed for her; but she, proving to be British,—the "Belvidera," rated 32, and smaller than any one of the American frigates,—speedily turned and took flight. Pursuit was continued all that day and until half an hour before midnight, the "President" leading as the fastest ship; but the British vessel, fighting for her life, and with the friendly port of Halifax under her lee, could resort to measures impossible to one whose plan of distant cruising required complete equipment, and full stores of provisions and water. Boats and spare spars and anchors were thrown overboard, and fourteen tons of drinking water pumped out. Thus lightened, after being within range of the "President's" guns for a couple of hours, the "Belvidera" drew gradually away, and succeeded in escaping, having received and inflicted considerable damage. In explanation of such a result between two antagonists of very unequal size, it must be remembered that a chasing ship of those days could not fire straight ahead; while in turning her side to bring the guns to bear, as the "President" several times did, she lost ground. The chased ship, on the other hand, from the form of the stern, could use four guns without deviating from her course.

After some little delay in repairing, the squadron resumed pursuit of the convoy. On June 29, and again on July 9, vessels were spoken which reported encountering it; the latter the evening before. Traces of its course also were thought to be found in quantities of cocoanut shell and orange peel, passed on one occasion; but, though the chase was continued to within twenty hours' sail of the English Channel, the convoy itself was never seen. To this disappointing result atmospheric conditions very largely contributed. From June 29, on the western edge of the Great Banks, until July 13, when the pursuit was abandoned, the weather was so thick that "at least six days out of seven" nothing was visible over five miles away, and for long periods the vessels could not even see one another at a distance of two hundred yards. The same surrounding lasted to the neighborhood of Madeira, for which the course was next shaped. After passing that island on June 21 return was made toward the United States by way of the Azores, which were sighted, and thence again to the Banks of Newfoundland and Cape Sable, reaching Boston August 31, after an absence of seventy days.

Although Rodgers's plan had completely failed in what may properly be called its purpose of offence, and he could report the capture of "only seven merchant vessels, and those not valuable," he congratulated himself with justice upon success on the defensive side.423 The full effect was produced, which he had anticipated from the mere fact of a strong American division being at large, but seen so near its own shores that nothing certain could be inferred as to its movements or intentions. The "Belvidera," having lost sight of it at midnight, could, upon her arrival in Halifax, give only the general information that it was at sea; and Captain Byron, who commanded her, thought with reason that the "President's" action warranted the conclusion that the anticipated hostilities had been begun. He therefore seized and brought in two or three American merchantmen; but the British admiral, Sawyer, thinking there might possibly be some mistake, like that of the meeting between the "President" and "Little Belt" a year before, directed their release.

A very few days later, definite intelligence of the declaration of war by the United States was received at Halifax. At that period, the American seas from the equator to Labrador were for administrative purposes divided by the British Admiralty into four commands: two in the West Indies, centring respectively at Jamaica and Barbados; one at Newfoundland; while the fourth, with its two chief naval bases of Halifax and Bermuda, lay over against the United States, and embraced the Atlantic coast-line in its field of operations. Admiral Sawyer now promptly despatched a squadron, consisting of one small ship of the line and three frigates, the "Shannon", 38, "Belvidera", 36, and "Æolus", 32, which sailed July 5. Four days later, off Nantucket, it was joined by the "Guerrière", 38, and July 14 arrived off Sandy Hook. There Captain Broke, of the "Shannon", who by seniority of rank commanded the whole force, "received the first intelligence of Rodgers' squadron having put to sea."424 As an American division of some character had been known to be out since the "Belvidera" met it, and as Rodgers on this particular day was within two days' sail of the English Channel, the entire ignorance of the enemy as to his whereabouts could not be more emphatically stated. The components of the British force were such that no two of them could justifiably venture to encounter his united command. Consequently, to remain together was imposed as a military necessity, and it so continued for some weeks. In fact, the first separation, that of the "Guerrière", though apparently necessary and safe, was followed immediately by a disaster.

Rodgers was therefore justified in his claim concerning his cruise. "It is truly unpleasant to be obliged to make a communication thus barren of benefit to our country. The only consolation I, individually, feel on the occasion is derived from knowing that our being at sea obliged the enemy to concentrate a considerable portion of his most active force, and thereby prevented his capturing an incalculable amount of American property that would otherwise have fallen a sacrifice." "My calculations were," he wrote on another occasion, "even if I did not succeed in destroying the convoy, that leaving the coast as we did would tend to distract the enemy, oblige him to concentrate a considerable portion of his active navy, and at the same time prevent his single cruisers from lying before any of our principal ports, from their not knowing to which, or at what moment, we might return."425 This was not only a perfectly sound military conception, gaining additional credit from the contrasted views of Decatur and Bainbridge, but it was applied successfully at the most critical moment of all wars, namely, when commerce is flocking home for safety, and under conditions particularly hazardous to the United States, owing to the unusually large number of vessels then out. "We have been so completely occupied in looking out for Commodore Rodgers' squadron," wrote an officer of the "Guerrière", "that we have taken very few prizes."426 President Madison in his annual message427 said: "Our trade, with little exception, has reached our ports, having been much favored in it by the course pursued by a squadron of our frigates under the command of Commodore Rodgers."

THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE OCEAN ACTIONS OF THE WAR OF 1812 AND THE MOVEMENTS OF THE SQUADRONS IN JULY AND AUGUST, 1812


Nor was it only the offensive action of the enemy against the United States' ports and commerce that was thus hampered. Unwonted defensive measures were forced upon him. Uncertainty as to Rodgers' position and intentions led Captain Broke, on July 29, to join a homeward-bound Jamaica fleet, under convoy of the frigate "Thalia", some two or three hundred miles to the southward and eastward of Halifax, and to accompany it with his division five hundred miles on its voyage. The place of this meeting shows that it was pre-arranged, and its distance from the American coast, five hundred miles away from New York, together with the length of the journey through which the additional guard was thought necessary, emphasize the effect of Rodgers' unknown situation upon the enemy's movements. The protection of their own trade carried this British division a thousand miles away from the coast it was to threaten. It is in such study of reciprocal action between enemies that the lessons of war are learned, and its principles established, in a manner to which the study of combats between single ships, however brilliant, affords no equivalent. The convoy that Broke thus accompanied has been curiously confused with the one of which Rodgers believed himself in pursuit;428 and the British naval historian James chuckles obviously over the blunder of the Yankee commodore, who returned to Boston "just six days after the 'Thalia', having brought home her charge in safety, had anchored in the Downs." Rodgers may have been wholly misinformed as to there being any Jamaica convoy on the way when he started; but as on July 29 he had passed Madeira on his way home, it is obvious that the convoy which Broke then joined south of Halifax could not be the one the American squadron believed itself to be pursuing across the Atlantic a month earlier.

Broke accompanied the merchant ships to the limits of the Halifax station. Then, on August 6, receiving intelligence of Rodgers having been seen on their homeward path, he directed the ship of the line, "Africa", to go with them as far as 45° W., and for them thence to follow latitude 52° N., instead of the usual more southerly route.429 After completing this duty the "Africa" was to return to Halifax, whither the "Guerrière", which needed repairs, was ordered at once. The remainder of the squadron returned off New York, where it was again reported on September 10. The movement of the convoy, and the "Guerrière's" need of refit, were linked events that brought about the first single-ship action of the war; to account for which fully the antecedent movements of her opponent must also be traced. At the time Rodgers sailed, the United States frigate "Constitution", 44, was lying at Annapolis, enlisting a crew. Fearing to be blockaded in Chesapeake Bay, a position almost hopeless, her captain, Hull, hurried to sea on July 12. July 17, the ship being then off Egg Harbor, New Jersey, some ten or fifteen miles from shore, bound to New York, Broke's vessels, which had then arrived from Halifax for the first time in the war, were sighted from the masthead, to the northward and inshore of the "Constitution". Captain Hull at first believed that this might be the squadron of Rodgers, of whose actual movements he had no knowledge, waiting for him to join in order to carry out commands of the Department. Two hours later, another sail was discovered to the northeast, off shore. The perils of an isolated ship, in the presence of a superior force of possible enemies, imposed caution, so Hull steered warily toward the single unknown. Attempting to exchange signals, he soon found that he neither could understand nor be understood. To persist on his course might surround him with foes, and accordingly, about 11 P.M., the ship was headed to the southeast and so continued during the night.

The next morning left no doubt as to the character of the strangers, among whom was the "Guerrière"; and there ensued a chase which, lasting from daylight of July 18th to near noon of the 20th, has become historical in the United States Navy, from the attendant difficulties and the imminent peril of the favorite ship endangered. Much of the pursuit being in calm, and on soundings, resort was had to towing by boats, and to dragging the ship ahead by means of light anchors dropped on the bottom. In a contest of this kind, the ability of a squadron to concentrate numbers on one or two ships, which can first approach and cripple the enemy, thus holding him till their consorts come up, gives an evident advantage over the single opponent. On the other hand, the towing boats of the pursuer, being toward the stern guns of the pursued, are the first objects on either side to come under fire, and are vulnerable to a much greater degree than the ships themselves. Under such conditions, accurate appreciation of advantages, and unremitting use of small opportunities, are apt to prove decisive. It was by such diligent and skilful exertion that the "Constitution" effected her escape from a position which for a time seemed desperate; but it should not escape attention that thus early in the war, before Great Britain had been able to re-enforce her American fleet, one of our frigates was unable to enter our principal seaport. "Finding the ship so far to the southward and eastward," reported Hull, "and the enemy's squadron stationed off New York, which would make it impossible to get in there, I determined to make for Boston, to receive your further orders."

On July 28 he writes from Boston that there were as yet no British cruisers in the Bay, nor off the New England coast; that great numbers of merchant vessels were daily arriving from Europe; and that he was warning them off the southern ports, advising that they should enter Boston. He reasoned that the enemy would now disperse, and probably send two frigates off the port. In this he under-estimated the deterrent effect of Rodgers' invisible command, but the apprehension hastened his own departure, and on August 2 he sailed again with the first fair wind. Running along the Maine coast to the Bay of Fundy, he thence went off Halifax; and meeting nothing there, in a three or four days' stay, moved to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, to intercept the trade of Canada and Nova Scotia. Here in the neighborhood of Cape Race some important captures were made, and on August 15 an American brig retaken, which gave information that Broke's squadron was not far away. This was probably a fairly correct report, as its returning course should have carried it near by a very few days before. Hull therefore determined to go to the southward, passing close to Bermuda, to cruise on the southern coast of the United States. In pursuance of this decision the "Constitution" had run some three hundred miles, when at 2 P.M. of August 19, being then nearly midway of the route over which Broke three weeks before had accompanied the convoy, a sail was sighted to the eastward, standing west. This proved to be the "Guerrière," on her return to Halifax, whither she was moving very leisurely, having traversed only two hundred miles in twelve days.

1.Order in Council was a general term applied to all orders touching affairs, internal as well as external, issued by the King in Council. The particular orders here in question, by their extraordinary character and wide application, came to have a kind of sole title to the expression in the diplomatic correspondence between the two countries.
2.Instructions of Madison, Secretary of State, to Monroe, Minister to Great Britain, January 5, 1804. Article I. American State Papers, vol. iii. p. 82.
3.Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, vol. ii. pp. 508, 546.
4.Annals of Congress. Thirteenth Congress, vol. ii. pp. 1563; 1555-1558.
5.Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 234. Author's italics.
6.Diary and Letters, vol. ii. p. 553.
7.Ibid., p. 560. Those unfamiliar with the subject should be cautioned that the expression "right of search" is confined here, not quite accurately, to searching for British subjects liable to impressment. This right the United States denied. The "right of search" to determine the nationality of the vessel, and the character of the voyage, was admitted to belligerents then, as it is now, by all neutrals.
8.King John, Act II. Scene 1.
9.King Richard II., Act II. Scene 1.
10.Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited by J.E. Thorold Rogers. Oxford, 1880, pp. 35-38. In a subsequent passage (p. 178), Smith seems disposed somewhat to qualify the positive assertion here quoted, on the ground that the Navigation Act had not had time to exert much effect, at the period when some of the most decisive successes over the Dutch were won. It is to be observed, however, that a vigorous military government, such as Cromwell's was, can assert itself in the fleet as well as in the army, creating an effective organization out of scanty materials, especially when at war with a commercial state of weak military constitution, like Holland. It was the story of Rome and Carthage repeated. Louis XIV. for a while accomplished the same. But under the laxity of a liberal popular government, which England increasingly enjoyed after the Restoration, naval power could be based securely only upon a strong, available, and permanent maritime element in the civil body politic; that is, on a mercantile marine.
  As regards the working of the Navigation Act to this end, whatever may be argued as to the economical expediency of protecting a particular industry, there is no possible doubt that such an industry can be built up, to huge proportions, by sagacious protection consistently enforced. The whole history of protection demonstrates this, and the Navigation Act did in its day. It created the British carrying trade, and in it provided for the Royal Navy an abundant and accessible reserve of raw material, capable of being rapidly manufactured into naval seamen in an hour of emergency.
11.Works of John Adams, vol. viii. pp. 389-390.
12.This primary meaning of the word "staple" seems to have disappeared from common use, in which it is now applied to the commercial articles, the concentration of which at a particular port made that port a "staple."
13.Bryan Edwards, West Indies, vol. ii. p. 448.
38.From an official statement, made public in 1784, it appears that in the year 1770 the total trade, inward and outward, of the colonies on the American Continent, amounted to 750,546 tons. Of this 32 per cent was coastwise, to other members of the group; 30 with the West Indies; 27 with Great Britain and Ireland; and 11 with Southern Europe. Bermuda and the Bahamas, inconsiderable as to trade, were returned among continental colonies by the Custom House.—Sheffield, Commerce of the American States, Table VII.
39.Chalmers, Opinions, p. 73.
40.Ibid., p. 18.
41.Macpherson, vol. iii. p. 317.
42.Report of Committee of Privy Council, Jan. 28, 1791, pp. 21-23.
43.Ante, p. 31 (note).
44.Bryan Edwards, West Indies, vol. ii. p. 486.
45.Chalmers, Opinions, p. 133.
46.See, for instance, the Colden Papers, Proceedings N.Y. Historical Society, 1877. There is in these much curious economical information of other kinds.
47.A comparison of the figures just quoted, as to the British West Indies, with Sheffield's Table VII., indicates that the trade of the Continent with the foreign islands about equalled that with the British. The trade with the French West Indies, "open or clandestine, was considerable, and wholly in American vessels."—Macpherson, vol. iii. p. 584.
48.Sheffield, Commerce of the American States, p. 108.
49.That is, for the navy.
50.Macpherson, Annals of Commerce, vol. iii. p. 472.
51.Macpherson, vol. iv. p. 11. The great West India cargo of 1772, an especial preserve of the Navigation Act, was carried to England in 679 ships, of which one-third were built in America.
52."The contraband trade carried on by plantation ships in defiance of the Act of Navigation was a subject of repeated complaint." "The laws of Navigation were nowhere disobeyed and contemned so openly as in New England. The people of Massachusetts Bay were from the first disposed to act as if independent of the mother country."—Reeves, pp. 54, 58. The particular quotations apply to the early days of the measure, 1662-3; but the complaint continued to the end. In 1764-5, "one of the great grievances in the American trade was, that great quantities of foreign molasses and syrups were clandestinely run on shore in the British Colonies."—p. 79.
53.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i. p. 82.
54.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i. p. 121.
55.Commerce of the American States (Edition February, 1784), pp. 198-199.
56.Works of John Adams, vol. viii. p. 290.
57.Washington's Correspondence, 1787, edited by W.C. Ford, vol. viii. pp. 159, 160, 254.
58.Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, Jan. 28, 1791, p. 20.
102.American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. x. p. 47.
103.Ibid., p. 45.
104.Ibid., p. 24.
105.Coxe, p. 171.
106.Committee's estimate; Report, p. 43.
107.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i. p. 472.
108.Wheaton's International Law, p. 753.
109.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i. p. 476.
110.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i. pp. 472-474.
111.Ibid., p. 503.
112.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i. p. 522.
113.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii. p. 491.
114.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 263.
115.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 265.
162.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 140.
163.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 140.
164.Ibid., p. 139.
165.Ibid., pp. 166-173.
166.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 198.
167.Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 377.
168.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 139.
169.Ibid., p. 161.
170.Ibid., p. 173.
171.Niles' Register, vol. v. Supplement, p. 102.
172.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 152.
173.Ibid., p. 147.
174.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 290.
175.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii. p. 488.
176.That is, as restrictive of neutral shipping.
177.American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 410.
178.Wellesley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Pinkney, Dec. 29, 1810; also, Feb. 11, 1811. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. pp. 409, 412. See also Sir Wm. Scott, in the Court of Admiralty, Ibid., p. 421.
179.Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, chaps. xvii., xviii.
391.Ante, p. 144.
392.Adams, History of the United States, vol. viii. chap. viii.
393.Sir J. Carmichael Smyth, Précis of Wars in Canada, p. 116.
394.To Monroe, May 4, 1806. Jefferson's Writings, Collected and Edited by P.L. Ford, vol. viii. p. 450.
395.Ibid., vol. vi. p. 75.
396.Kingsford's History of Canada, vol. viii. p. 183. The author is indebted to Major General Sir F. Maurice, and Major G. Le M. Gretton, of the British Army, for extracts from the official records, from which it appears that, excluding provincial corps, not to be accounted regulars, the British troops in Canada numbered in January, 1812, 3,952; in July, 5,004.
397.Giles, Annals of Congress, 1811-12, p. 51.
398.June 13, 1812. Works of James Monroe, vol. v. p. 207.
399.Prevost to Liverpool, July 15, 1812. Canadian Archives, Q. 118.
400.Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 195.
418.Captains' Letters, June 3, 1812. Navy Department MSS.
419.Ibid., June 8, 1812.
420.Captains' Letters, Sept. 2, 1812. Navy Department MSS.
421.Navy Department MSS.
422.Captains' Letters, J. Rodgers, Sept. 1, 1812. Navy Department MSS.
423.Letter of Sept. 1, 1812. Navy Department MSS.
424.James, Naval History (edition 1824), vol. v. p. 283.
425.Captains' Letters, Sept. 14, 1812. Navy Department MSS.
426.Naval Chronicle (British), vol. xxviii. p. 426.
427.Nov. 4, 1812.
428.Naval Chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. 159; James, vol. v. p. 274.
429.Sir J.B. Warren to Admiralty, Aug 24, 1812. Canadian Archives MSS. M. 389. 1, p. 147.
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