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Kitabı oku: «Thirty Years' View (Vol. II of 2)», sayfa 63
"A caucus dictatorship has been set up in Congress, which, not satisfied with ruling that body to the extinguishment of individual freedom of opinion, seeks to control the President in his proper sphere of duty, denounces him before you for refusing to surrender his independence and his conscience to its decree, and proposes, through subversion of the fundamental provisions and principles of the constitution, to usurp the command of the government. It is a question, therefore, in fact, not of legislative measures, but of revolution. What is the visible, and the only professed, origin of these extraordinary movements? The whig party in Congress have been extremely desirous to cause a law to be enacted at the late session, incorporating a national bank. Encountering, in the veto of the President, a constitutional obstacle to the enactment of such a law at the late session, a certain portion of the whig party, represented by the caucus dictatorship, proceeds then, in the beginning, to denounce the President. Will you concur in this denunciation of the President?"
This was the accusation, first hinted at by Mr. Rives in the Senate, afterwards obscurely intimated in Mr. Webster's letter to the two Massachusetts senators; and now broadly stated by Mr. Cushing; without, however, naming the imputed dictator; which was, in fact, unnecessary. Every body knew that Mr. Clay was the person intended; with what justice, not to repeat proofs already given, let the single fact answer, that these caucus meetings (for such there were) were all subsequent to Mr. Tyler's change on the bank question! and in consequence of it! and solely with a view to get him back! and that by conciliation until after the second veto. In this thrust at Mr. Clay Mr. Cushing was acting in the interest of Mr. Webster's feelings as well as those of Tyler; for since 1832 Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster had not been amicable, and barely kept in civil relations by friends, who had frequently to interpose to prevent, or compose outbreaks; and even to make in the Senate formal annunciation of reconciliation effected between them. But the design required Mr. Clay to be made the cause of the rejection of the bank bills; and also required him to be crippled as the leader of the anti-administration whigs. In this view Mr. Cushing resumes:
"When Lord Grenville broke up the whig party of England, in 1807, by the unseasonable pressure of some great question, and its consequent loss, 'Why,' said Sheridan, 'did they not put it off as Fox did? I have heard of men running their heads against a wall; but this is the first time I ever heard of men building a wall, and squaring it, and clamping it, for the express purpose of knocking out their brains against it.' This bon mot of Sheridan's will apply to the whig party in Congress, if, on account of the failure of the bank bill at the late session, they secede from the administration, and set up as a Tertium Quid in the government, neither administration nor opposition."
Having presented this spectacle of their brains beaten out against a wall of their own raising, if the whig party should follow Mr. Clay into opposition to the Tyler-Webster administration, Mr. Cushing took the party on another tack – that of the bird in the hand, which is worth two in the bush; and softly commences with them on the profit of using the presidential power while they had it:
"Is it wise for the whig party to throw away the actuality of power for the current four years? If so, for what object? For some contingent possibility four years hence? If so, what one? Is the contingent possibility of advancing to power four years hence any one particular man in its ranks, whoever he may be, and however eminently deserving, a sufficient object to induce the whig party to abdicate the power which itself as a body possesses now?"
And changing again, and from seduction to terror, he presents to them, as the most appalling of all calamities, the possible election of a democratic President at the next election through the deplorable divisions of the whig party.
"If so, will its abdication of power now tend to promote that object? Is it not, on the contrary, the very means to make sure the success of some candidate of the democratic party?"
Proceeding to the direct defence of the President, he then boldly absolves him from any violation of faith in rejecting the two bank bills. Thus:
"In refusing to sign those bills, then, he violated no engagement, and committed no act of perfidy in the sense of a forfeited pledge."
And advancing from exculpation to applause, he makes it an act of conscience in Mr. Tyler in refusing to sign them, and places him under the imperious command of a triple power – conscience, constitution, oath; without the faculty of doing otherwise than he did.
"But, in this particular, the President, as an upright man, could do no otherwise than he did. He conscientiously disapproved those bills. And the constitution, which he was sworn to obey, commands him, expressly and peremptorily commands him, if he do not approve of any bill presented to him for his signature, to return it to the House of Congress in which it originated. 'If he approve he shall sign it: if not, he SHALL return it,' are the words of the constitution. Would you as conscientious men yourselves, forbid the President of the United States to have a conscience?"
Acquittal of the President of all hand in the initiation of the second bill, is the next task of Mr. Cushing, and he boldly essays it.
"The President, it is charged, trifled with one or more of the retiring secretaries. Of what occurred at cabinet meetings, the public knows and can know nothing. But, as to the main point, whether he initiated the fiscal corporation bill. This idea is incompatible with the dates and facts above stated, which show that the consideration of a new bill was forced on the President by members of Congress. It is, also, incompatible with the fact that, on Tuesday, the 17th of August, as it is said by the Secretary of War, the President expressed to him doubt as to any bill."
Now what happened in these cabinet meetings is well known to the public from the concurrent statement of three of the secretaries, and from presidential declarations to members of Congress, and these statements cover the main point of the initiation of the second bill by the President himself; and that not on the 18th, but the 16th of August, and not only to his cabinet but to Mr. Stuart of Virginia the same evening; and that it was two days afterwards that the two members of Congress called upon him (Messrs. Sergeant and Berrien), not to force him to take a bill, but to be forced by him to run his own bill through in three days. Demurring to the idea that the President could be forced by members of Congress to adopt an obnoxious bill, the brief statement is, that it is not true. The same is to be said of the quoted remark of the Secretary at War, Mr. Bell, that the President expressed to him a doubt whether he would sign any bank bill – leaving out the astonishment of the Secretary at that declaration, who had been requested by the President the day before to furnish facts in favor of the bill; and who came to deliver a statement of these facts thus prepared, and in great haste, upon request; and when brought, received with indifference! and a doubt expressed whether he would sign any bill. Far from proving that the President had a consistent doubt upon the subject, which is the object of the mutilated quotation from Mr. Bell – it proves just the contrary! proves that the President was for the bill, and began it himself, on the 16th; and was laying an anchor to windward for its rejection on the 17th! having changed during the night.
The retirement of all the cabinet ministers but one, and that for such reasons as they gave, is treated by Mr. Cushing as a thing of no signification, and of no consequence to any body but themselves. He calls it a common fact which has happened under many administrations, and of no permanent consequence, provided good successors are appointed. All that is right enough where secretaries retire for personal reasons, such as are often seen; but when they retire because they impeach the President of great moral delinquency, and refuse to remain with him on that account, the state of the case is altered. He and they are public officers; and officers at the head of the government; and their public conduct is matter of national concern; and the people have a right to inquire and to know the public conduct of public men. The fact that Mr. Webster remained is considered as overbalancing the withdrawal of all the others; and is thus noticed by Mr. Cushing:
"And that, whilst those gentlemen have retired, yet the Secretary of State, in whose patriotism and ability you have more immediate cause to confide, has declared that he knows no sufficient cause for such separation, and continues to co-operate cordially with the President in the discharge of the duties of that station which he fills with so much honor to himself and advantage to the country."
Certainly it was a circumstance of high moment to Mr. Tyler that one of his cabinet remained with him. It was something in such a general withdrawing, and for such reasons as were given, and was considered a great sacrifice on the part of Mr. Webster at the time. As such it was well remembered a short time afterwards, when Mr. Webster, having answered the purposes for which he was retained, was compelled to follow the example of his old colleagues. The address of Mr. Cushing goes on to show itself, in terms, to be an answer to the address of the whig party – saying:
"Yet an address has gone forth from a portion of the members of Congress, purporting to be the unanimous act of a meeting of THE whigs of Congress, which, besides arraigning the President on various allegations of fact and surmises not fact, recommends such radical changes of the constitution."
The address itself of the whig party is treated as the work of Mr. Clay – as an emanation of that caucus dictatorship in Congress of which he was always the embodied idea. He says:
"Those changes, if effected, would concentrate the chief powers of government in the hands of that of which this document (the whig address) itself is an emanation, namely a caucus dictatorship of Congress."
This defence by Mr. Cushing, the letters of Mr. Webster, and all the writers in the interests of Mr. Tyler himself, signified nothing against the concurrent statements of the retiring senators, and the confirmatory statements of many members of Congress. The whig party recoiled from him. Instead of that "whig President, whig Congress, and whig people," formed into a unit, with the vision of which Mr. Webster had been induced to remain when his colleagues retired – instead of this unity, there was soon found diversity enough. The whig party remained with Mr. Clay; the whig Secretary of State returned to Massachusetts, inquiring, "where am I to go?" The whig defender of Mr. Tyler went to China, clothed with a mission; and returning, found that greatest calamity, the election of a democratic President, to be a fixed fact; and being so fixed, he joined it, and got another commission thereby: while Mr. Tyler himself, who was to have been the Roman cement of this whig unity, continued his march to the democratic camp – arrived there – knocked at the gate – asked to be let in: and was refused. The national democratic Baltimore convention would not recognize him.
CHAPTER LXXXVI.
THE DANISH SOUND DUES
This subject was brought to the attention of the President at this extra session of Congress by a report from the Secretary of State, and by the President communicated to Congress along with his message. He did not seem to call for legislative action, as the subject was diplomatic, and relations were established between the countries, and the remedy proposed for the evil stated was simply one of negotiation. The origin and history of these dues, and the claims and acquiescences on which they rest, are so clearly and concisely set forth by Mr. Webster, and the amelioration he proposed so natural and easy for the United States, and the subject now acquiring an increasing interest with us, that I draw upon his report for nearly all that is necessary to be said of it in this chapter; and which is enough for the general reader. The report says:
"The right of Denmark to levy these dues is asserted on the ground of ancient usage, coming down from the period when that power had possession of both shores of the Belt and Sound. However questionable the right or uncertain its origin, it has been recognised by European governments, in several treaties with Denmark, some of whom entered into it at as early a period as the fourteenth century; and inasmuch as our treaty with that power contains a clause putting us on the same footing in this respect as other the most favored nations, it has been acquiesced in, or rather has not been denied by us. The treaty of 1645, between Denmark and Holland, to which a tariff of the principal articles then known in commerce, with a rule of measurement and a fixed rate of duty, was appended, together with a subsequent one between the same parties in 1701, amendatory and explanatory of the former, has been generally considered as the basis of all subsequent treaties, and among them of our own, concluded in 1826, and limited to continue ten years from its date, and further until the end of one year, after notice by either party of an intention to terminate it, and which is still in force.
"Treaties have also been concluded with Denmark, by Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Russia, Prussia and Brazil, by which, with one or two exceptions in their favor, they are placed on the same footing as the United States. There has recently been a general movement on the part of the northern powers of Europe, with regard to the subject of these Sound dues, and which seems to afford to this government a favorable opportunity, in conjunction with them, for exerting itself to obtain some such alteration or modification of existing regulations as shall conduce to the freedom and extension of our commerce, or at least to relieve it from some of the burdens now imposed, which, owing to the nature of our trade, operate, in many instances, very unequally and unjustly on it in comparison with that of other nations.
"The ancient tariff of 1645, by which the payment of these dues was regulated, has never been revised, and by means of the various changes which have taken place in commerce since that period, and of the alteration in price in many articles therein included, chiefly in consequence of the settlement of America, and the introduction of her products, into general commerce, it has become quite inapplicable. It is presumed to have been the intention of the framers of that tariff to fix a duty of about one per centum ad valorem upon the articles therein enumerated, but the change in value of many of those commodities, and the absence of any corresponding change in the duty, has, in many instances, increased the ad valorem from one per centum to three, four, and even seven; and this, generally, upon those articles which form the chief exports of the United States, of South America, and the West India Islands: such as the articles of cotton, rice, raw sugar, tobacco, rum, Campeachy wood, &c. On all articles not enumerated in this ancient tariff it is stipulated by the treaty of 1701 that the 'privileged nations,' or those who have treaties with Denmark, shall pay an ad valorem of one per cent.; but the value of these articles being fixed by some rules known only to the Danish government, or at least unknown to us, this duty appears uncertain and fluctuating, and its estimate is very much left to the arbitrary discretion of the custom house officers at Elsinore.
"It has been, by some of the public writers in Denmark, contended that goods of privileged nations, carried in the vessels of unprivileged nations, should not be entitled to the limitation of one per centum ad valorem, but should be taxed one and a quarter per centum, the amount levied on the goods of unprivileged nations; and, also, that this limitation should be confined to the direct trade, so that vessels coming from or bound to the ports of a nation not in treaty with Denmark should pay on their cargoes the additional quarter per cent.
"These questions, although the former is not of so much consequence to us, who are our own carriers, are still in connection with each other, of sufficient importance to render a decision upon them, and a final understanding, extremely desirable. These Sound dues are, moreover, in addition to the port charges of light money, pass-money, &c., which are quite equal to the rates charged at other places, and the payment of which, together with the Sound dues, often causes to vessels considerable delay at Elsinore.
"The port charges, which are usual among all nations to whose ports vessels resort, are unobjectionable, except that, as in this case, they are mere consequences of the imposition of the Sound dues, following, necessarily, upon the compulsory delay at Elsinore of vessels bound up and down the Sound with cargoes, with no intention of making any importation into any port of Denmark, and having no other occasion for delay at Elsinore than that which arises from the necessity of paying the Sound dues, and, in so doing, involuntarily subjecting themselves to these other demands. These port duties would appear to have some reason in them, because of the equivalent; while, in fact, they are made requisite, with the exception, perhaps, of the expense of lights, by the delay necessary for the payment of the Sound dues.
"The amount of our commerce with Denmark, direct, is inconsiderable, compared with that of our transactions with Russia, Sweden, and the ports of Prussia, and the Germanic association on the Baltic; but the sum annually paid to that government in Sound dues, and the consequent port charges by our vessels alone, is estimated at something over one hundred thousand dollars. The greater proportion of this amount is paid by the articles of cotton, sugar, tobacco, and rice; the first and last of these paying a duty of about three per cent. ad valorem, reckoning their value at the places whence they come.
"By a list published at Elsinore, in 1840, it appears that between April and November of that year, seventy-two American vessels, comparatively a small number, lowered their topsails before the castle of Cronberg. These were all bound up the Sound to ports on the Baltic, with cargoes composed in part of the above-named products, upon which alone, according to the tariff, was paid a sum exceeding forty thousand dollars for these dues. Having disposed of these cargoes, they returned laden with the usual productions of the countries on the Baltic, on which, in like manner, were paid duties on going out through the Sound, again acknowledging the tribute by an inconvenient and sometimes hazardous ceremony. The whole amount thus paid within a period of eight months on inward and outward bound cargoes, by vessels of the United States, none of which were bound for, or intended to stop at, any port in Denmark, except compulsorily at Elsinore, for the purpose of complying with these exactions, must have exceeded the large sum above named."
This is the burden, and the history of it which Mr. Webster so succinctly presents. The peaceful means of negotiation are recommended to obtain the benefit of all the reductions in these dues which should be granted to other nations; and this natural and simple course is brought before the President in terms of brief and persuasive propriety.
"I have, therefore, thought proper to bring this subject before you at this time, and to go into these general statements in relation to it, which might be carried more into detail, and substantiated by documents now at the department, to the end that, if you should deem it expedient, instructions may be given to the representative of the United States at Denmark to enter into friendly negotiations with that government, with a view of securing to the commerce of the United States a full participation in any reduction of these duties, or the benefits resulting from any new arrangements respecting them which may be granted to the commerce of other states."
This is the view of an American statesman. No quarrelling, or wrangling with Denmark, always our friend: no resistance to duties which all Europe pays, and were paying not only before we had existence as a nation, but before the continent on which we live had been discovered: no setting ourselves up for the liberators of the Baltic Sea: no putting ourselves in the front of a contest in which other nations have more interest than ourselves. It is not even recommended that we should join a congress of European ministers to solicit, or to force, a reduction or abolition of these duties; and the policy of engaging in no entangling alliances, is well maintained in that abstinence from associated negotiation. The Baltic is a European sea. Great powers live upon its shores: other great powers near its entrance: and all Europe nearer to it than ourselves. The dues collected at Elsinore present a European question which should be settled by European powers, all that we can ask being (what Denmark has always accorded) the advantage of being placed on the footing of the most favored nation. We might solicit a further reduction of the dues on the articles of which we are the chief carriers to that sea – cotton, rice, tobacco, raw sugar; but solicit separately without becoming parties to a general arrangement, and thereby making ourselves one of its guarantees. Negotiate separately, asking at the same time to be continued on the footing of the most favored nation. This report and recommendation of Mr. Webster is a gem in our State papers – the statement of the case condensed to its essence, the recommendation such as becomes our geographical position and our policy; the style perspicuous, and even elegant in its simplicity.
I borrow from the Boston Daily Advertiser (Mr. Hale the writer) a condensed and clear account of the success of Mr. Webster's just and wise recommendations on this subject:
"He recommended that 'friendly negotiations' be instituted with the Danish government, 'with a view to securing to the United States a full participation in any reduction of these duties, or the benefits resulting from any new arrangements respecting them, which may be granted to the commerce of other states.'
"This recommendation was doubtless adopted; for the concluding papers of the negotiation appear among the documents communicated to Congress. The Danish government made a complete revision of the ancient tariff, establishing new specific duties on all articles of commerce, with one or two exceptions, in which the one per cent. ad valorem duty was retained.
"The duties were not increased in any instance, and on many of the articles they were largely reduced; on some of them as large a discount as 83 per cent. was made, and a great number were reduced 50 per cent. Of the articles particularly mentioned by Mr. Webster as forming the bulk of the American commerce paying these duties, the duty on raw sugar was reduced from 9 stivers on 100 pounds to 5 stivers; on rice (in paddy) the duty was reduced from 15 stivers to 6 stivers. On some other articles of importance to American commerce the duties were reduced in a larger proportion; on some dyewoods the reduction was from 30 stivers to 8, and on others from 36 to 12, per thousand pounds; and on coffee the reduction was from 24 to 6 stivers per 100 pounds, thereby making it profitable to ship this article directly up the Baltic, instead of to Hamburgh, and thence by land across to Lubec, which had previously been done to avoid the Sound dues.
"It was also provided that no unnecessary formalities should be required from the vessels passing through the Sound. The lowering of top-sails, complained of by Mr. Webster, was dispensed with. We mention this circumstance because a recent article in the New York Tribune speaks of this formality as still required. It was abolished thirteen years ago. A number of other accommodations were also granted on the part of Denmark in modification of the harshness of former regulations. The time for the functionaries to attend at their offices was prolonged, and an evident disposition was manifested to make great abatements in the rigor of enforcing as well as in the amount of the tax.
"These concessions were regarded as eminently favorable, and as satisfactory to the United States. Mr. Webster cordially expressed this sentiment in a letter to Mr. Isaac Rand Jackson, then our Chargé d'Affaires for Denmark, bearing date June 25, 1842, and also in another letter, two days later, to Mr. Steen Billé, the Danish Chargé d'Affaires in the United States. In the former letter Mr. Webster praised Mr. Jackson's 'diligence and fidelity in discharging his duties in regard to this subject.'"
Greatly subordinate as the United States are geographically in this question, they are equally, and in fact, duly and proportionably so in interest. Their interest is in the ratio of their distance from the scene of the imposition; that is to say, as units are to hundreds, and hundreds to thousands. Taking a modern, and an average year for the number of vessels of different powers which passed this Sound and paid these duties – the year 1850 – and the respective proportions stand thus: English, 5,448 vessels; Norwegian, 2,553; Swedish, 1,982; Dutch, 1,900; Prussian, 2,391; Russian, 1,138; American, 106 – being about the one-fiftieth part of the English number, and about the one-twentieth part of the other powers. But that is not the way to measure the American interest. The European powers aggregately present one interest: the United States sole another: and in this point of view the proportion of vessels is as two hundred to one. The whole number of European vessels in a series of five years – 1849 to 1853 – varied from 17,563 to 21,586; the American vessels during the same years varying from 76 to 135. These figures show the small comparative interest of the United States in the reduction, or abolition of these dues – large enough to make the United States desirous of reduction or abolition – entirely too small to induce her to become the champion of Europe against Denmark: and, taken in connection with our geographical position, and our policy to avoid European entanglement, should be sufficient to stamp as Quixotic, and to qualify as mad, any such attempt.
