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CHAPTER CXLVI

How we discover, on our return to Tezcuco, that a conspiracy had been set on foot by the men of Narvaez's troops to murder Cortes, and all who were of his party; of the author of this conspiracy, his punishment; and of other matters.

During our absence a conspiracy had been set on foot by a most intimate friend of the governor of Cuba, named Antonio de Villafaña, a native either of Zamora or Toro, in conjunction with others of Narvaez's troops, whose names, for honour's sake, I will refrain from mentioning here. The object of this conspiracy was to murder Cortes on his return, which was to be done in the following manner.

The conspirators designed handing over a letter to Cortes while he sat at dinner with his officers and other soldiers, which was to be securely fastened and sealed, purporting to come from his father, with a vessel that had just arrived from Spain. While he was occupied in the perusal of this letter, he and the whole of the officers and soldiers who sat at table with him, and offered any resistance, were to be poignarded to death.

All this being settled, it pleased the Almighty that the conspirators should also let two other distinguished officers into the secret, whose names, however, I must likewise repress. Both these officers had accompanied us on our recent expedition around the lake, and one of these officers, after Cortes should have been killed, was to be appointed one of the new captain-generals. In the same manner the other chief appointments, besides all our property and horses, had already been disposed of by the conspirators. The Almighty, however, in his mercy, prevented this horrible deed from being carried into effect, the consequences of which would have been continual divisions, the inevitable loss of New Spain, and the total destruction of our troops. The whole of this conspiracy was discovered to Cortes by one of our soldiers a couple of days after his return to Tezcuco, and he had thus sufficient time to adopt active measures for suppressing it before it spread further. The honest man who made the discovery to him assured him also that there were several men of rank among the conspirators.

Cortes, after he had handsomely rewarded this man, communicated the whole affair, under the seal of secrecy, to the officers Alvarado, Oli, Lugo, Sandoval, Tapia, and myself; also to the two alcaldes for the year, and to all those in whom he could place confidence. He then ordered us to arm ourselves without any further delay, and he then proceeded with us to the quarters of Antonio de Villafaña.

On entering his apartment we found him in conversation with several of the conspirators, and the four alguacils who accompanied us immediately arrested him. The rest instantly took to flight, but Cortes had many of them seized. Villafaña being thus in our power, Cortes thrust his hand into that officer's bosom, and drew forth a paper, containing the whole plan of the conspirators, to which all their names were attached. Cortes, on perusing this paper, found the names of several men of importance among the list of conspirators; and being desirous of saving them from dishonour, he afterwards gave out that Villafaña had swallowed the paper, and that he had not read it himself, nor even so much as seen it.

A criminal suit was now instituted against Villafaña, when he, with several others who were implicated in it, made a full confession of the whole matter. Cortes, the two alcaldes, and the quartermaster Oli, who formed the court-martial, then pronounced Villafaña guilty, and sentenced him to be hung; and, after he had confessed to father Juan Diaz, he was executed in front of his own quarters.

Here Cortes allowed the matter to rest, though several of the conspirators were kept in close confinement, and in order to frighten them appearances were made as if they likewise would have to share a similar fate with Villafaña. Our general, however, was desirous of saving their names from dishonour; to which may be added, that this was not exactly the time to go to the utmost severity of the law.

From that moment our general had a body guard, consisting of the captain Antonio de Quiñones, a native of Zamora, and twelve trustworthy men, who were to be near his person both night and day. In the same way he likewise requested the rest of us in whom he could place confidence to watch over the safety of his person. He never, however, evinced any animosity in his subsequent behaviour towards the other conspirators, though he took care to be particularly upon his guard against them.20

After this miserable affair was ended, notice was given that the prisoners we had made in our expedition round the lake were to be brought in to be marked within the space of two days. In order not to waste many words on the subject, for the third time I will merely state that our men were even more shamefully cheated on this occasion than on the former. First the emperor's fifths were deducted, then those of Cortes, and after him our chief officers committed their piracies. If, therefore, any of us had an Indian female who was handsome or strong of limb, we certainly took her to be marked with the iron, but stole her away the night following, and took care not to show her again until some considerable time had elapsed; so that numbers of our slaves were never marked at all, and yet we employed them as our naborias.

CHAPTER CXLVII

How Cortes issues orders to the inhabitants of all the townships in the neighbourhood of Tezcuco which were allied with us, to furnish us with arrows and copper points for the same, and what further took place at our head-quarters.

Our brigantines were now so far advanced towards completion, that they had merely to be rigged. For each brigantine a number of spare oars had been made in case of need. The canal in which these vessels were to be launched, and through which they were to be conveyed into the lake, was now also sufficiently deep and wide to swim these vessels.21 Cortes now, therefore, began to make active preparations for the siege of Mexico. He issued orders to all the townships which lay in the vicinity of Tezcuco, and were in alliance with us, for each of them to furnish him with 8000 copper points for our arrows, to be made after the model of our Spanish ones, of which some were sent them for that purpose. They were also to furnish an equal number of arrows, which were to be made from a wood particularly adapted for that use, and they received some of our Spanish arrows to work by. He allowed them eight days for the making and delivery of these; and indeed both the arrows and the copper points arrived at Tezcuco in the time specified. Our stock of these now consisted of 50,000 pieces, and the arrow points made by these people were even better than those we brought from Spain.

Cortes then ordered Pedro Barba, who commanded the crossbow-men to divide the arrows and copper points among his men, and see that every man fixed the points neatly to the arrows, and attached the feathers with strong glue. Every crossbow-man was also to furnish himself with two closely twisted cords for his bow; further to provide himself with a number of spare nuts for the bows, that if one should crack or fly off he might have another in readiness. The crossbow-men were also to exercise themselves in shooting at heaps of earth to ascertain the strength of their bows. Care was therefore taken that they should not want for Valencian strings to twist the cords of, for the vessel of Juan Burgos, which had recently arrived from Spain, had fortunately brought a good supply of these as well as of bows, powder, muskets and other arms, besides a quantity of horseshoes. In the same way our cavalry were ordered to equip themselves, have their horses fresh shod, and to exercise them daily in all manner of cavalry evolutions.

Cortes then sent word to the elder Xicotencatl, his two sons, and to Chichimeclatecl, informing them that we should leave Tezcuco after the feast of Corpus Christi, and begin the siege of Mexico. He therefore requested them to send him 20,000 warriors from their country, from Huexotzinco, and from Cholulla, who were now all in friendly alliance with each other. But it was unnecessary to inform the Tlascallans of our intentions, for they were always duly apprized beforehand by those of their countrymen who accompanied us in our expeditions and returned home with the booty they had made. The inhabitants of Tlalmanalco and Chalco were also requested to hold themselves in readiness to march out at a moment's notice. These and all our other allies were informed of the day when we proposed to commence operations against Mexico. From all sides we received the most friendly assurances of assistance, and that Cortes' orders would be punctually obeyed.

CHAPTER CXLVIII

How Cortes reviews the whole of his troops at Tezcuco; and of his further dispositions for conducting the siege of Mexico.

After Cortes had thus acquainted our allies with his designs against Mexico, he determined to review the whole of his troops, and selected for this purpose the second day of Easter. This review was held in the large square of Tezcuco, and our muster-roll gave the following numbers: Eighty-four horse; six hundred and fifty foot soldiers, of whom some were armed with swords and shields, and others with lances; one hundred and ninety-four crossbow-men and musketeers.

Out of these troops he selected the men who were to serve on the thirteen brigantines; each of which required twelve rowers and a captain, with twelve crossbow-men and musketeers. In this way the thirteen brigantines required two hundred and eighty men, who, with the additional number of artillerymen, amounted to three hundred and twenty-five. Next the cannon, with the necessary powder was distributed among them; and when all this was done, Cortes published the articles of war, which ran as follows:

First of all it was forbidden under a heavy penalty to blaspheme either against our Lord Jesus Christ, his blessed mother, the holy apostles, or against any of the saints in general.

Secondly, no one was to ill-use any of our allies, take anything from them, not even of the booty they might make, whether this consisted of gold, silver, jewels, or of anything else; for we were to bear in mind that they joined us in this war at our own particular request.

Thirdly, none of the men, either during day or night time, were to leave our head-quarters, whether to fetch provisions from any of the townships allied to us, or for any other purpose whatever. Any one found guilty of this would be severely punished.

Fourthly, every soldier was to supply himself with a sufficient number of arms and keep them in proper order; for we were to remember how well the Mexicans were provided with everything in the shape of weapons.

Fifthly, all gambling for horses or weapons was strictly forbidden.

Lastly, none of the men, whatever company they belonged to, were to lay themselves down to rest without being completely armed and were to keep their shoes on, to which an exception was merely granted in cases of urgent necessity when a person was severely wounded, or unable to do duty; for we should be prepared to receive the enemy at a moment's notice.

Besides these the usual articles of war were again read over, which, among other things, threatened punishment of death to the sentinel who deserted his post or fell asleep while on duty. The same punishment would be inflicted on any soldier who left his quarters without his captain's permission, or who left his commanding officer in a moment of danger and took to flight.

CHAPTER CXLIX

The manner in which Cortes selects the men who were to row the brigantines; of the commanders who were appointed to each, and of other matters.

Cortes on selecting the men who were to serve on board the brigantines could not find a sufficient number of sailors to row them. All the sailors who had come with us, with Narvaez, and with the vessels which had recently arrived from Jamaica, had been duly noted down, but even then there was not a sufficient number. Besides which many would not condescend to this work, saying, it was unreasonable to think of making rowers of them.

Cortes then turned his attention to those who daily went out a fishing, and found they were mostly natives of Palos, Moguer, Triana, or other coast towns, which were celebrated for producing capital sailors. All these persons were commanded under threats of severe punishment, to enter without delay upon the service of the brigantines. Many, indeed, who were men of noble birth, remonstrated with our general, and told him, it was insulting to think of setting them to such work; but Cortes paid no respect to persons, and by these means he mustered one hundred and fifty capital oars, who indeed had better days of it than we who had to fight on the causeways, and obtained a much greater share of booty than we did, as will be sufficiently seen hereafter.

As soon as each brigantine was fully equipped for war, Cortes ordered a flag, bearing the royal arms, to be hoisted; and a second one, bearing the number of the vessel. The following were the commanders appointed: viz. Pedro Barba, Garcia Holguin, Juan de Limpias, the deaf Carvajal, Juan Xaramillo, Geronimo de la Mota, the other Carvajal, who now lives at an advanced age in the street San Francisco; a certain Portillo, an excellent soldier, who had just arrived from Spain and had brought a beautiful wife with him. The naval captain Zamora, who lives at present in Guaxaca. A certain Colmero, who was both a good sailor and a good soldier. Further, Lerma, Gines, Nortes, Briones of Salamanca, Miguel Diaz de Auz, and one other officer, whose name has slipped my memory.

The whole of the crews were strictly enjoined to pay implicit obedience to their commanders; and any one who left his vessel was liable to severe punishment. The several commanders then received their particular instructions as to the manner in which they were to cooperate with the land forces.

All these matters had just been arranged when Cortes received intelligence that the Tlascallan chiefs were marching with a large body of troops, consisting of Tlascallans and Huexotzincans. The chief command of these had been intrusted to the younger Xicotencatl, the same who commanded against us in our battles with Tlascalla. He was likewise accompanied by his two brothers, the two younger sons of the excellent Don Lorenzo de Vargas. One of the chiefs of Cholulla likewise made his appearance, but with a very small body of men; for, though the Cholullans had broken off their alliance with Mexico from the time we had punished them so severely, yet they never stood upon the best of terms with us; on the contrary, they appeared as if waiting to see how matters would terminate, and then to side with the triumphant party. After our direful retreat from Mexico, they were almost upon the point of declaring against us.

When Cortes was informed of Xicotencatl's approach, who had come a day before the time appointed, he went out with Alvarado and several other officers to a distance of about a mile from Tezcuco, and welcomed him and his brothers with every demonstration of joy. Xicotencatl, with his men, marched forward in the best order, and all were accoutred in their best garments. Every company had a standard, on which was embroidered a white bird with expanded wings, being the arms of Tlascalla, and resembled an eagle. Every one of the men had a bunch of plumes stuck on his head; they struck up their war music, waved their flags, and continually cried out, "Long live the emperor, our master! Spain for ever! Tlascalla for ever!"

It took these troops about three hours before they had all entered the town, and our general ordered them to be provided with good quarters, and the best food we could get. When they had all entered the town, he once more bid them heartily welcome, assuring them he would enrich them all, and then desired them to rest from their fatigues, adding, that he would let them know the next day the duty they would have to perform.

Almost at the very moment these Tlascallans were marching into Tezcuco, a letter was put into Cortes' hands from Hernando de Barrientos, who was at Chinantla, about 360 miles from Mexico. Barrientos related that, while he was exploring the mines, being left behind for that purpose by Pizarro, the Mexicans had attacked him, and killed three of his companions, and that he alone had been fortunate enough to escape to the inhabitants of Chinantla, who were at enmity with the Mexicans. This was the same people who had furnished us with those long lances in our battle against Narvaez.

Without wishing to repeat the whole contents of this letter, I will only state that Cortes, in answer to it, told him he was about to besiege Mexico, and cautioned him to keep on good terms with the caziques of the country, and not to leave that place until he should receive further intelligence from head-quarters; for he would run great danger of being murdered on the road by the Mexicans.

CHAPTER CL

Of Cortes' further dispositions for the siege.

Cortes now divided the whole of our troops into three divisions. The first division, consisting of one hundred and fifty foot, all well armed with swords and shields, thirty horse, and eighteen musketeers and crossbow-men, was commanded by Alvarado, under whom Guiterrez de Badajoz, Andreas de Monjaraz, and Jorge de Alvarado had each the command of fifty men and a third part of the musketeers and crossbow-men; the cavalry being under the immediate command of Alvarado himself. To this division 8000 Tlascallans were added, and Alvarado, in whose division I also was, received orders to take up his position in the town of Tlacupa. Cortes particularly recommended us to furnish ourselves with good weapons, helmets, gorgets, and steel coverings for the legs, to protect our bodies from the destructive weapons of the Mexicans. These precautions were, indeed, very necessary; but, notwithstanding all our defensive armour, scarcely a day past by in which the enemy did not kill or wound some of our men.

The second division was placed under the command of Oli, and consisted of thirty horse, one hundred and sixty-five foot, and twenty crossbow-men and musketeers. Andreas de Tapia, Verdugo, and Lugo commanded under him, he himself having the immediate command of the cavalry. To this division, likewise, 8000 Tlascallans were added, and they were to take up their position in the town of Cojohuacan, about eight miles from Tlacupa.

Sandoval was appointed to the command of the third division, consisting of twenty-four horse, fourteen crossbow-men and musketeers, and one hundred and fifty foot armed with shields and swords. To this division were added 8000 Indians from the townships of Chalco, Huexotzinco, and other places in alliance with us. Cortes appointed Luis Marin and Pedro de Ircio, two intimate friends of Sandoval, to command under him, the latter himself having the immediate command of the cavalry. This division was to take up a position near Iztapalapan, and Sandoval's instructions were to attack that town, and do as much damage there as he could, until he received further orders. Sandoval did not leave Tezcuco before Cortes was about to step on board, who himself took the chief command of the brigantines. On this flotilla there were altogether 325 men. Thus Sandoval, Oli, and Alvarado were each ordered off to different points: one marched to the left, the other to the right; and those who are not acquainted with the situation of this town or of the lake in general, would imagine that these divisions were removing from one common centre rather than approaching it. Each of these three captains received particular instructions for his plan of operation, and the next morning was fixed for our departure.

In order to be detained as little as possible, we sent off the whole body of Tlascallans in advance to the Mexican frontiers. These troops marched out in the best possible humour, under their commander Chichimeclatecl and other officers, but discovered that their commander-in-chief, the younger Xicotencatl, had remained behind. After considerable inquiries, it was found that he had secretly returned to Tlascalla on the previous night to take forcible possession of the caziquedom and territory of Chichimeclatecl. It appears, according to the accounts of the Tlascallans, that he wished to avail himself of this favorable opportunity of raising himself to supreme power in his own country, which the absence of Chichimeclatecl offered to him, who, in his opinion, was the only person that stood in his way since the death of Maxixcatzin, as he did not fear any opposition from his old blind father. This Xicotencatl, the Tlascallans further added, had never felt any real inclination to join us in the war against Mexico, but had frequently assured them it would terminate in the destruction of us all.22

When Chichimeclatecl received information of this, he instantly returned to Tezcuco in order to apprize Cortes of it. Our general, on hearing this, despatched five distinguished personages of Tezcuco, and two Tlascallans, who were his particular friends, after Xicotencatl, to request his immediate return to his troops, in Cortes' name. They were to remind him that his father Lorenzo de Vargas would certainly have marched out against Mexico in person, if blindness and old age had not prevented him; that the whole population of Tlascalla continued loyal to his majesty, and that the revolt he wished to excite would throw dishonour on his own country. These representations Cortes desired should be accompanied by large promises, to induce him to return to obedience. Xicotencatl, however, haughtily replied, that he was determined to abide by his resolve, and our dominion in this country would not have continued thus long if his father and Maxixcatzin had followed his advice.

Upon this our general ordered an alguacil to repair in all haste with four of our horse and five distinguished men of Tezcuco to Xicotencatl's abode, to take him prisoner, and hang him without any further ceremony. "All kindness," added Cortes, "is thrown away upon this cazique. His whole time is spent in devising plots and creating mischief. I cannot suffer this to continue any longer; the matter has now come to a crisis."

As soon as Alvarado received information of these commands, he urgently begged of Cortes to pardon Xicotencatl. Our general replied that he would consider about it, though he secretly gave the alguacil peremptory orders to put him to death, which was accordingly done. Xicotencatl was hung in a town subject to Tezcuco, and thus an end was put to all his plottings. Many Tlascallans assured us that the elder Xicotencatl himself had cautioned Cortes against his son,23 and had advised him to put him to death.

This affair delayed our departure from Tezcuco for one day; and thus it was not till the 13th of May, 1521, that we commenced our march. As our road lay for a considerable distance in the same direction, our division under Alvarado and that under Oli marched out at the same time. The first night we encamped in the township of Alcuman, to which place Oli had despatched some men in advance to prepare quarters for his troops, and had ordered that the houses which they took possession of should, by way of distinction, be decorated with green boughs. When we arrived with Alvarado, we found, to our surprise, that every house had been taken, and the two divisions were just about to settle the matter, sword in hand, when the officers stepped in between, and thereby put a stop to the dispute. But the insult which had thus been offered to us was not so easily to be forgotten; when, therefore, this circumstance became known to Cortes, he sent off father Melgarejo and Luis Marin to us, with letters to every officer and soldier, in which he reproached us for quarrelling, and admonished us to keep peace with each other. From this moment Alvarado and Oli were never upon such friendly terms as formerly.

The following morning the two divisions continued their march, and we encamped for the night in a town subject to Mexico, but which was quite deserted by its inhabitants. This was likewise the case in Quauhtitlan, where we took up our quarters the next night.

Tenayucan and Escapuzalco, through which we marched the day following, were also quite deserted. Our Tlascallan friends spread themselves all through these townships, and entered into every house during the fore part of the evening, from which they brought in quantities of provisions. We adopted every military precaution for the night, as we were not far distant from Mexico, and could plainly hear the Mexicans, who were lying in crowds in their canoes on the lake and along the causeways, hooting and yelling fearfully throughout the whole of the night, and challenging us to the combat. Their object, was to induce us to fall upon them in the dark, when they would have had a great advantage over us. We had, however, received a sufficient warning by our former misfortune, and very wisely kept ourselves as quietly as possible until next morning, which was a Sunday.

After father Juan Diaz had said mass, we commended ourselves to the protection of the Almighty, and both divisions marched forward to cut off the aqueduct of Chapultepec, which lies about two miles from Tlacupa, and supplies Mexico with water. On our way thither, we fell in with several bodies of Mexicans, who had received intelligence that this was to be the commencement of our operations against Mexico. The enemy had in every way the advantage ground over us, and attacked us vigorously with lances, arrows, and stones, by which three of our men were wounded; but we soon put them to flight, and they were so closely pursued by the Tlascallans that they lost twenty killed, and seven or eight were taken prisoners. We were now able to destroy the aqueduct without any further opposition, and the city of Mexico was deprived of this source of obtaining water during the whole of the siege.

As soon as we had destroyed this aqueduct, our officers determined to make an attempt upon one of the bridges on the causeway leading from Tlacupa. We had scarcely begun to move along the causeway when numbers of canoes, filled with troops, advanced swiftly from both sides, while other large bodies of the enemy came marching up the causeway against us, so that we were quite astounded at the very sight. In the first encounter thirty of our men were wounded and three killed. Notwithstanding all this, we fought our way up to the first bridge. According to what we afterwards heard, it was the wish of the Mexicans that we should pass over the bridge; for we had no sooner done so than we were assailed by such terrific crowds, as to be unable to move. What indeed could we do on a causeway which was no more than eight paces in breadth, where we were attacked on all sides at once? Our crossbow-men and musketeers certainly kept up a continued fire on the canoes, but the enemy received but a trifling loss this way, for they had raised boards alongside of their canoes, by which their troops were sheltered from our fire. Those of the enemy's troops which attacked us on the causeway itself we certainly drove back each time into the water, but fresh troops kept pouring in too fast for us to gain much advantage this way. Here our cavalry was of no manner of use to us, while the horses were greatly exposed to the attacks of the enemy on each side of the causeway, and many were consequently wounded. If our cavalry attempted to pursue the enemy into the water, the latter had provided against this by palisades, behind which they retired, and stretched out against them their long lances, to which they had fastened the swords we unfortunately lost on our retreat from Mexico.

In this way the battle continued for upwards of an hour, the enemy each time returning to the attack with such excessive fury that, at length, we could stand our ground no longer: nor was this all, for we now saw another large fleet of canoes approaching with a fresh body of men, who were ordered to fall upon our rear. We therefore determined to retreat back along the causeway, for which purpose we ordered the Tlascallans to move off first, that we might effect our retreat in perfect good order. Here the Tlascallans had greatly embarrassed us in our movements, who, it is well known, never can fight standing in the water.

The instant the Mexicans perceived we were turning back, and saw the Tlascallans moving off the causeway, they set up most distracting yells, and attacked us man to man with great fierceness. It is indeed out of my power to describe it. The whole of the causeway was instantly covered with lances, arrows, and stones, besides that vast quantities fell into the water. When we had again reached the mainland, we returned fervent thanks to the Almighty for having rescued us from this severe battle.

Eight of our men were killed and fifty wounded: added to all this, we were obliged to put up with the hootings and jeers of the enemy, who kept calling upon the Tlascallans to come with double their numbers next time, and they would very soon settle their impudence. Our first deeds of arms, therefore, merely consisted in destroying the aqueduct of Chapultepec, and in reconnoitring the lake along the causeway, in which we did not exactly reap much honour.

For the rest, we passed the following night very quietly in our quarters, posted our sentinels, and dressed our wounds. One of our horses was so severely wounded that it died soon after.

The following morning Oli determined upon taking up the position assigned to his division at Cojohuacan, about six miles further on; and however Alvarado and the other cavaliers might beg of him not to separate the two divisions, yet he would not alter his determination. Christobal de Oli was a man of uncommon bravery, whose pride was wounded at the unsuccessful attempt we had made upon the causeway, and he accused Alvarado of inconsiderateness for having ordered the attack. Nothing, therefore, could induce him to stay, and he marched off with his men to Cojohuacan.

20.According to Torquemada there were 300 concerned in this conspiracy, and their intention was to elect Francisco Verdugo, brother-in-law to the governor of Cuba, captain-general in Cortes' stead; but adds that Verdugo, who was very courageous and highly esteemed, was not let into the conspiracy. (p. 55.)
21.According to Cortes, this canal was two miles long, twice the breadth of a man's length, and as deep. It was completed in fifty days by 8000 Indians. (p. 55.)
22.Herrera (Historia Gen. de las Indias) gives another reason for the younger Xicotencatl's return to Tlascalla. He says, that Alonso Ojeda had given a relation of Xicotencatl, named Piltectetl, who had been shamefully ill-used by the Spaniards, leave to return home, but as Xicotencatl was jealous of this man on account of some love affair, he also secretly decamped for Tlascalla. (p. 61.)
23.Torquemada remarks that, though the younger Xicotencatl was a man of uncommon bravery, his courage failed him when he saw the hour of death approaching. However, this is hardly to be credited, for it is quite contrary to the Indian character. (p. 62.)