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CHAPTER II
A VIRGINIA NATIONALIST
Lace Congress up straitly within the enumerated powers. (Jefferson.)
Construe the constitution liberally in advancement of the common good. (Hamilton.)
To organize government, to retrieve the national character, to establish a system of revenue, to create public credit, were among the duties imposed upon them. (Marshall.)
I trust in that Providence which has saved us in six troubles, yea, in seven, to rescue us again. (Washington.)
The Constitution's narrow escape from defeat in the State Conventions did not end the struggle against the National principle that pervaded it.95 The Anti-Nationalists put forth all their strength to send to the State Legislatures and to the National House and Senate as many antagonists of the National idea as possible.96 "Exertions will be made to engage two thirds of the legislatures in the task of regularly undermining the government" was Madison's "hint" to Hamilton.97
Madison cautioned Washington to the same effect, suggesting that a still more ominous part of the plan was "to get a Congress appointed in the first instance that will commit suicide on their own Authority."98 Not yet had the timorous Madison personally felt the burly hand of the sovereign people so soon to fall upon him. Not yet had he undergone that familiar reversal of principles wrought in those politicians who keep an ear to the ground. But that change was swiftly approaching. Even then the vox populi was filling the political heavens with a clamor not to be denied by the ambitious. The sentiment of the people required only an organizer to become formidable and finally omnipotent.
Such an artisan of public opinion was soon to appear. Indeed, the master political potter was even then about to start for America where the clay for an Anti-Nationalist Party was almost kneaded for the moulder's hands. Jefferson was preparing to leave France; and not many months later the great politician landed on his native soil and among his fellow citizens, who, however, welcomed him none too ardently.99
No one knew just where Jefferson stood on the fundamental question of the hour when, with his two daughters, he arrived in Virginia in 1789. The brilliant Virginian had uttered both Nationalist and Anti-Nationalist sentiments. "I am not of the party of the Federalists," he protested, "but I am much farther from that of the Antifederalists." Indeed, declared Jefferson, "If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would not go there at all."100
His first opinions of the Constitution were, as we have seen, unfavorable. But after he had learned that the new Government was to be a fact, Jefferson wrote Washington: "I have seen with infinite pleasure our new constitution accepted." Careful study had taught him, he said, "that circumstances may arise, and probably will arise, wherein all the resources of taxation will be necessary for the safety of the state." He saw probability of war which "requires every resource of taxation & credit." He thought that "the power of making war often prevents it."101
Thus Jefferson could be quoted on both sides and claimed by neither or by both. But, because of his absence in France and of the reports he had received from the then extreme Nationalist, Madison, he had not yet apprehended the people's animosity to National rule. Upon his arrival in Virginia, however, he discovered that "Antifederalism is not yet dead in this country."102 That much, indeed, was clear at first sight. The Legislature of Virginia, which met three months after her Convention had ratified the Constitution, was determined to undo that work, as Madison had foreseen.103
John Marshall
From a painting by E. F. Petticolas
That body was militantly against the new Government as it stood. "The conflict between the powers of the general and state governments was coeval with those governments," declares Marshall. "The old line of division was still as strongly marked as ever." The enemies of National power thought that "liberty could be endangered only by encroachments upon the states; and that it was the great duty of patriotism to restrain the powers of the general government within the narrowest possible limits." On the other hand, the Nationalists, says Marshall, "sincerely believed that the real danger which threatened the republic was to be looked for in the undue ascendency of the states."104
Patrick Henry was supreme in the House of Delegates. Washington was vastly concerned at the prospect. He feared that the enemies of Nationalism would control the State Legislature and that it would respond to New York's appeal for a new Federal Constitutional Convention. He was "particularly alarmed" that the General Assembly would elect Senators "entirely anti-Federal."105 His apprehension was justified. Hardly a week passed after the House convened until it passed resolutions, drawn by Henry,106 to answer Clinton's letter, to ask Congress to call a new Federal Convention, and to coöperate with other States in that business.
In vain did the Nationalist members strive to soften this resolution. An amendment which went so far as to request Congress to recommend to the several States "the ratification of a bill of rights" and of the twenty amendments proposed by the Virginia Convention, was defeated by a majority of 46 out of a total vote of 124.107 Swiftly and without mercy the triumphant opposition struck its next blow. Washington had urged Madison to stand for the Senate,108 and the Nationalists exerted themselves to elect him. Madison wrote cleverly in his own behalf.109 But he had no hope of success because it was "certain that a clear majority of the assembly are enemies to the Govṭ."110 Madison was still the ultra-Nationalist, who, five years earlier, had wanted the National Government to have an absolute veto on every State law.111
Henry delivered "a tremendous philippic" against Madison as soon as his name was placed before the General Assembly.112 Madison was badly beaten, and Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson were chosen as the first Senators from Virginia under the new National Government.113 The defeated champion of the Constitution attributed Henry's attack and his own misfortune to his Nationalist principles: Henry's "enmity was levelled … agst the whole system; and the destruction of the whole system, I take to be the secret wish of his heart."114
In such fashion did Madison receive his first chastisement for his Nationalist views and labors. He required no further discipline of a kind so rough and humiliating; and he sought and secured election to the National House of Representatives,115 with opinions much subdued and his whole being made pliant for the wizard who so soon was to invoke his spell over that master mind.
Though Marshall was not in the Virginia Legislature at that session, it is certain that he worked with its members for Madison's election as Senator. But even Marshall's persuasiveness was unavailing. "Nothing," wrote Randolph to Madison, "is left undone which can tend to the subversion of the new government."116
Hard upon its defeat of Madison the Legislature adopted an ominous address to Congress. "The sooner … the [National] government is possessed of the confidence of the people … the longer its duration" – such was the language and spirit of Virginia's message to the lawmakers of the Nation, even before they had assembled.117 The desperate Nationalists sought to break the force of this blow. They proposed a substitute which even suggested that the widely demanded new Federal Convention should be called by Congress if that body thought best. But all to no purpose. Their solemn118 amendment was beaten by a majority of 22 out of a total vote of 122.119
Thus again was displayed that hostility to Nationalism which was to focus upon the newborn National Government every burning ray of discontent from the flames that sprang up all over the country during the constructive but riotous years that followed. Were the people taxed to pay obligations incurred in our War for Independence? – the National Government was to blame. Was an excise laid on whiskey, "the common drink of the nation"120– it was the National Government which thus wrung tribute from the universal thirst. Were those who owed debts compelled, at last, to pay them? – it was the National Government which armed the creditor with power to recover his own.
Why did we not aid French Republicans against the hordes of "despotism"? Because the National Government, with its accursed Neutrality, would not let us! And who but the National Government would dare make a treaty with British Monarchy, sacrificing American rights? Speculation and corruption, parade and ostentation, – everything that could, reasonably or unreasonably, be complained of, – were, avowed the Anti-Nationalists, the wretched but legitimate offspring of Nationalism. The remedy, of course, was to weaken the power of the Nation and strengthen that of the States. Such was the course pursued by the foes of Nationalism, that we shall trace during the first three administrations of the Government of the United States.
Thus, the events that took place between 1790 and 1800, supplemented and heated by the French Revolution, developed to their full stature those antagonistic theories of which John Marshall and Thomas Jefferson were to become the chief expounders. Those events also finished the preparation of these two men for the commanding stations they were to occupy. The radical politician and States' Rights leader on the one hand, and the conservative politician and Nationalist jurist on the other hand, were finally settled in their opinions during these developing years, at the end of which one of them was to occupy the highest executive office and the other the highest judicial office in the Government.
It was under such circumstances that the National Government, with Washington at its head, began its uncertain career. If the Legislature of Virginia had gone so far before the infant National establishment was under way, how far might not succeeding Legislatures go? No one knew. But it was plain to all that every act of the new Administration, even with Washington at the helm, would be watched with keen and jealous eyes; and that each Nationalist turn of the wheel would meet with prompt and stern resistance in the General Assembly of the greatest of American Commonwealths. Mutiny was already aboard.
John Marshall, therefore, determined again to seek election to the House of Delegates.
Immediately upon the organization of the National Government, Washington appointed Marshall to be United States Attorney for the District of Virginia. The young lawyer's friends had suggested his name to the President, intimating that he wished the place.121 Marshall, high in the esteem of every one, had been consulted as to appointments on the National bench,122 and Washington gladly named him for District Attorney. But when notified of his appointment, Marshall declined the honor.
A seat in the Virginia Legislature, was, however, quite another matter. Although his work as a legislator would interfere with his profession much more than would his duties as United States Attorney, he could be of practical service to the National Government in the General Assembly of the State where, it was plain, the first battle for Nationalism must be fought.
The Virginia Nationalists, much alarmed, urged him to make the race. The most popular man in Richmond, he was the only Nationalist who could be elected by that constituency; and, if chosen, would be the ablest supporter of the Administration in the Legislature. Although the people of Henrico County were more strongly against a powerful National Government than they had been when they sent Marshall to the Constitutional Convention the previous year, they nevertheless elected him; and in 1789 Marshall once more took his seat as a member of Virginia's law-making and law-marring body.
He was at once given his old place on the two principal standing committees;123 and on special committees to bring in various bills,124 among them one concerning descents, a difficult subject and of particular concern to Virginians at that time.125 As a member of the Committee of Privileges and Elections, he passed on a hotly contested election case.126 He was made a member of the important special committee to report upon the whole body of laws in force in Virginia, and helped to draw the committee's report, which is comprehensive and able.127 The following year he was appointed a member of the committee to revise the tangled laws of the Commonwealth.128
The irrepressible subject of paying taxes in something else than money soon came up. Marshall voted against a proposition to pay the taxes in hemp and tobacco, which was defeated by a majority of 37 out of a total vote of 139; and he voted for the resolution "that the taxes of the present year ought to be paid in specie only or in warrants equivalent thereto," which carried.129 He was added to the committee on a notable divorce case.130
Marshall was, of course, appointed on the special committee to bring in a bill giving statehood to the District of Kentucky.131 Thus he had to do with the creation of the second State to be admitted after the Constitution was adopted. A bill was passed authorizing a lottery to raise money to establish an academy in Marshall's home county, Fauquier.132 He voted with the majority against the perennial Baptist petition to democratize religion;133 and for the bill to sell lands for taxes.134
Marshall was appointed on the committee to bring in bills for proceeding against absent debtors;135 on another to amend the penal code;136 and he was made chairman of the special committee to examine the James River Company,137 of which he was a stockholder. Such are examples of his routine activities in the Legislature of 1789.
The Legislature instructed the Virginia Senators in Congress "to use their utmost endeavors to procure the admission of the citizens of the United States to hear the debates of their House, whenever they are sitting in their legislative capacity."138
An address glowing with love, confidence, and veneration was sent to Washington.139 Then Jefferson came to Richmond; and the Legislature appointed a committee to greet him with polite but coldly formal congratulations.140 No one then foresaw that a few short years would turn the reverence and affection for Washington into disrespect and hostility, and the indifference toward Jefferson into fiery enthusiasm.
The first skirmish in the engagement between the friends and foes of a stronger National Government soon came on. On November 30, 1789, the House ratified the first twelve amendments to the Constitution,141 which the new Congress had submitted to the States; but three days later it was proposed that the Legislature urge Congress to reconsider the amendments recommended by Virginia which Congress had not adopted.142 An attempt to make this resolution stronger was defeated by the deciding vote of the Speaker, Marshall voting against it.143
The Anti-Nationalist State Senate refused to concur in the House's ratification of the amendments proposed by Congress;144 and Marshall was one of the committee to hold a conference with the Senate committee on the subject.
After Congress had passed the laws necessary to set the National Government in motion, Madison had reluctantly offered his summary of the volume of amendments to the Constitution recommended by the States "in order," as he said, "to quiet that anxiety which prevails in the public mind."145 The debate is illuminating. The amendments, as agreed to, fell far short of the radical and extensive alterations which the States had asked and were understood to be palliatives to popular discontent.146
Randolph in Richmond wrote that the amendments were "much approved by the strong federalists … being considered as an anodyne to the discontented. Some others … expect to hear, … that a real amelioration of the Constitution was not so much intended, as a soporific draught to the restless. I believe, indeed," declared Randolph, "that nothing – nay, not even the abolishment of direct taxation – would satisfy those who are most clamorous."147
The amendments were used by many, who changed from advocates to opponents of broad National powers, as a pretext for reversed views and conduct; but such as were actually adopted were not a sufficient justification for their action.148
The great question, however, with which the First Congress had to deal, was the vexed and vital problem of finance. It was the heart of the whole constitutional movement.149 Without a solution of it the National Government was, at best, a doubtful experiment. The public debt was a chaos of variegated obligations, including the foreign and domestic debts contracted by the Confederation, the debts of the various States, the heavy accumulation of interest on all.150 Public and private credit, which had risen when the Constitution finally became an accomplished fact, was now declining with capital's frail timidity of the uncertain.
In his "First Report on the Public Credit," Hamilton showed the way out of this maddening jungle. Pay the foreign debt, said Hamilton, assume as a National obligation the debts of the States and fund them, together with those of the Confederation. All had been contracted for a common purpose in a common cause; all were "the price of liberty." Let the owners of certificates, both State and Continental, be paid in full with arrears of interest, without discrimination between original holders and those who had purchased from them. And let this be done by exchanging for the old certificates those of the new National Government bearing interest and transferable. These latter then would pass as specie;151 the country would be supplied with a great volume of sound money, so badly needed,152 and the debt be in the process of extinguishment.153
Hamilton's entire financial system was assailed with fury both in Congress and among the people. The funding plan, said its opponents, was a stock-jobbing scheme, the bank a speculator's contrivance, the National Assumption of State debts a dishonest trick. The whole was a plot designed to array the moneyed interests in support of the National Government.154 Assumption of State debts was a device to increase the National power and influence and to lessen still more the strength and importance of the States.155 The speculators, who had bought the depreciated certificates of the needy, would be enriched from the substance of the whole people.
Without avail had Hamilton answered every objection in advance; the careful explanations in Congress of his financial measures went for naught; the materials for popular agitation against the National Government were too precious to be neglected by its foes.156 "The first regular and systematic opposition to the principles on which the affairs of the union were administered," writes Marshall, "originated in the measures which were founded on it [the "First Report on the Public Credit"]."157
The Assumption of State debts was the strategic point of attack, especially for the Virginia politicians; and upon Assumption, therefore, they wisely concentrated their forces. Nor were they without plausible ground of opposition; for Virginia, having given as much to the common cause as any State and more than most of her sisters, and having suffered greatly, had by the sale of her public lands paid off more of her debt than had any of the rest of them.
It seemed, therefore, unjust to Virginians to put their State on a parity with those Commonwealths who had been less prompt. On the other hand, the certificates of debt, State and Continental, had accumulated in the North and East;158 and these sections were determined that the debt should be assumed by the Nation.159 So the debate in Congress was heated and prolonged, the decision doubtful. On various amendments, sometimes one side and sometimes the other prevailed, often by a single vote.160
At the same time the question of the permanent location of the National Capital arose.161 On these two subjects Congress was deadlocked. Both were disposed of finally by the famous deal between Jefferson and Hamilton, by which the latter agreed to get enough votes to establish the Capital on the Potomac and the former enough votes to pass the Assumption Bill.
Washington had made Jefferson his Secretary of State purely on merit. For similar reasons of efficiency Hamilton had been appointed Secretary of the Treasury, after Robert Morris, Washington's first choice, had declined that office.
At Jefferson's dinner table, the two Secretaries discussed the predicament and made the bargain. Thereupon, Jefferson, with all the zeal of his ardent temperament, threw himself into the contest to pass Hamilton's financial measure; and not only secured the necessary votes to make Assumption a law, but wrote letters broadcast in support of it.
"Congress has been long embarrassed," he advised Monroe, "by two of the most irritating questions that ever can be raised, … the funding the public debt and … the fixing on a more central residence… Unless they can be reconciled by some plan of compromise, there will be no funding bill agreed to, our credit … will burst and vanish and the states separate to take care every one of itself." Jefferson outlines the bargain for fixing the Capital and assuming the debts, and concludes: "If this plan of compromise does not take place, I fear one infinitely worse."162 To John Harvie he writes: "With respect to Virginia the measure is … divested of … injustice."163
Jefferson delivered three Southern votes to pass the bill for Assumption of the State debts, and Hamilton got enough Northern votes to locate the National Capital permanently where it now stands.164 Thus this vital part of Hamilton's comprehensive financial plan was squeezed through Congress by only two votes.165 But Virginia was not appeased and remained the center of the opposition.166
Business at once improved. "The sudden increase of monied capital," writes Marshall, "invigorated commerce, and gave a new stimulus to agriculture."167 But the "immense wealth which individuals acquired" by the instantaneous rise in the value of the certificates of debt caused popular jealousy and discontent. The debt was looked upon, not as the funding of obligations incurred in our War for Independence, but as a scheme newly hatched to strengthen the National Government by "the creation of a monied interest … subservient to its will."168
The Virginia Legislature, of which Marshall was now the foremost Nationalist member, convened soon after Assumption had become a National law. A smashing resolution, drawn by Henry,169 was proposed, asserting that Assumption "is repugnant to the constitution of the United States, as it goes to the exercise of a power not expressly granted to the general government."170 Marshall was active among and, indeed, led those who resisted to the uttermost the attack upon this thoroughly National measure of the National Government.
Knowing that they were outnumbered in the Legislature and that the people were against Assumption, Marshall and his fellow Nationalists in the House of Delegates employed the expedient of compromise. They proposed to amend Henry's resolution by stating that Assumption would place on Virginia a "heavy debt … which never can be extinguished" so long as the debt of any other State remained unpaid; that it was "inconsistent with justice"; that it would "alienate the affections of good citizens of this Commonwealth from the government of the United States … and finally tend to produce measures extremely unfavorable to the interests of the Union."171
Savage enough for any one, it would seem, was this amendment of the Nationalists in the Virginia Legislature; but its fangs were not sufficiently poisonous to suit the opposition. It lacked, particularly, the supreme virtue of asserting the law's unconstitutionality. So the Virginia Anti-Nationalists rejected it by a majority of 41 votes out of a total of 135.
Marshall and his determined band of Nationalists labored hard to retrieve this crushing defeat. On Henry's original resolution, they slightly increased their strength, but were again beaten by a majority of 23 out of 127 voting.172
Finally, the triumphant opposition reported a protest and remonstrance to Congress. This brilliant Anti-Nationalist State paper – the Magna Charta of States' Rights – sounded the first formal call to arms for the doctrine that all powers not expressly given in the Constitution were reserved to the States. It also impeached the Assumption Act as an effort "to erect and concentrate and perpetuate a large monied interest in opposition to the landed interests," which would prostrate "agriculture at the feet of commerce" or result in a "change in the present form of Federal Government, fatal to the existence of American liberty."173
But the unconstitutionality of Assumption was the main objection. The memorial declared that "during the whole discussion of the federal constitution by the convention of Virginia, your memorialists were taught to believe 'that every power not expressly granted was retained' … and upon this positive condition" the Constitution had been adopted. But where could anything be found in the Constitution "authorizing Congress to express terms or to assume the debts of the states?" Nowhere! Therefore, Congress had no such power.
"As the guardians, then, of the rights and interests of their constituents; as sentinels placed by them over the ministers of the Federal Government, to shield it from their encroachments," the Anti-Nationalists in the Virginia Legislature sounded the alarm.174 It was of this jealous temper of the States that Ames so accurately wrote a year later: "The [National] government is too far off to gain the affections of the people… Instead of feeling as a Nation, a State is our country. We look with indifference, often with hatred, fear, and aversion, to the other states."175
Marshall and his fellow Nationalists strove earnestly to extract from the memorial as much venom as possible, but were able to get only three or four lines left out;176 and the report was adopted practically as originally drafted.177 Thus Marshall was in the first skirmish, after the National Government had been established, of that constitutional engagement in which, ultimately, Nationalism was to be challenged on the field of battle. Sumter and Appomattox were just below the horizon.
The remainder of Hamilton's financial plan was speedily placed upon the statute books of the Republic, though not without determined resistance which, more and more, took on a grim and ugly aspect both in Congress and throughout the country.
When Henry's resolution, on which the Virginia remonstrance was based, reached Hamilton, he instantly saw its logical result. It was, he thought, the major premise of the syllogism of National disintegration. "This," exclaimed Hamilton, of the Virginia resolution, "is the first symptom of a spirit which must either be killed or it will kill the Constitution of the United States."178
The Anti-Nationalist memorial of the Legislature of Virginia accurately expressed the sentiment of the State. John Taylor of Caroline two years later, in pamphlets of marked ability, attacked the Administration's entire financial system and its management. While he exhaustively analyzed its economic features, yet he traced all its supposed evils to the Nationalist idea. The purpose and result of Hamilton's whole plan and of the manner of its execution was, declared Taylor, to "Swallow up … the once sovereign … states… Hence all assumptions and … the enormous loans." Thus "the state governments will become only speculative commonwealths to be read for amusement, like Harrington's Oceana or Moore's Utopia."179
The fight apparently over, Marshall declined to become a candidate for the Legislature in the following year. The Administration's financial plan was now enacted into law and the vital part of the National machinery thus set up and in motion. The country was responding with a degree of prosperity hitherto unknown, and, for the time, all seemed secure.180 So Marshall did not again consent to serve in the House of Delegates until 1795. But the years between these periods of his public life brought forth events which were determinative of the Nation's future. Upon the questions growing out of them, John Marshall was one of the ever-decreasing Virginia minority which stanchly upheld the policies of the National Government.
Virginia's declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Assumption Act had now thundered in Jefferson's ears. He himself was instrumental in the enactment of this law and its unconstitutionality never occurred to him181 until Virginia spoke. But, faithful to the people's voice,182 Jefferson was already publicly opposing, through the timid but resourceful Madison183 and the fearless and aggressive184 Giles, the Nationalist statesmanship of Hamilton.185
Thus it came about that when Washington asked his Cabinet's opinion upon the bill to incorporate the Bank of the United States, Jefferson promptly expressed with all his power the constitutional theory of the Virginia Legislature. The opposition had reached the point when, if no other objection could be found to any measure of the National Government, its "unconstitutionality" was urged against it. "We hear, incessantly, from the old foes of the Constitution 'this is unconstitutional and that is,' and, indeed, what is not? I scarce know a point which has not produced this cry, not excepting a motion for adjourning."186 Jefferson now proceeded "to produce this cry" against the Bank Bill.
Hamilton's plan, said Jefferson, violated the Constitution. "To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress [the Twelfth Amendment]187 is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition." Even if the bank were "convenient" to carry out any power specifically granted in the Constitution, yet it was not "necessary," argued Jefferson; all powers expressly given could be exercised without the bank. It was only indispensable powers that the Constitution permitted to be implied from those definitely bestowed on Congress – "convenience is not necessity."188
Randolph was still more apprehensive. "Something is surely meditated against the new Constitution more animated, forcible, and violent than a simple application for calling a Convention." (Randolph to Madison, Oct. 23, 1788; Conway, 118.)
Seldom has any man achieved such a recovery as that of Jefferson in the period now under review. Perhaps Talleyrand's rehabilitation most nearly approaches Jefferson's achievement. From the depths of disfavor this genius of party management climbed to the heights of popularity and fame.
From this previous vote for a new Constitution, it is probable that Marshall warmly supported this resolution. But the friends of the old and vicious system instantly proposed an amendment "that the foregoing statement contains principles repugnant to Republican Government and dangerous to the freedom of this country, and, therefore, ought not to meet with the approbation of this House or be recommended to the consideration of the people"; and so strong were they that the whole subject was dropped by postponement, without further contest. (Journal, H.D. (1789), 108-09.)
In 1789 the Nationalists were much stronger in the Legislatures of the other States than they had been in the preceding year. Only three States had answered Virginia's belated letter proposing a new Federal Convention to amend the Constitution. Disgusted and despondent, Henry quitted his seat in the House of Delegates in the latter part of November and went home in a sulk. (Henry, ii, 448-49; Conway, 131.)
Fisher Ames thus states the different interests of the sections: "The funding system, they [Southern members of Congress] say, is in favor of the moneyed interest – oppressive to the land; that is, favorable to us [Northern people], hard on them. They pay tribute, they say, and the middle and eastern people … receive it. And here is the burden of the song, almost all the little [certificates of State or Continental debts] that they had and which cost them twenty shillings, for supplies or services, has been bought up, at a low rate, and now they pay more tax towards the interest than they received for the paper. This tribute, they say, is aggravating." (Ames to Minot, Nov. 30, 1791; Works: Ames, i, 104.)
Even close friends of Washington deeply deplored a "spirit so subversive of the true principles of the constitution… If Mr. Henry has sufficient boldness to aim the blow at its [Constitution's] existence, which he has threatened, I think he can never meet with a more favorable opportunity if the assumption should take place." (Ib.)
Washington replied that Stuart's letter pained him. "The public mind in Virginia … seems to be more irritable, sour, and discontented than … it is in any other State in the Union except Massachusetts." (Washington to Stuart, June 15, 1790; ib., 481-82.)
Marshall's father most inaccurately reported to Washington that Kentucky favored the measures of the Administration; and the President, thanking him for the welcome news, asked the elder Marshall for "any information of a public or private nature … from your district." (Washington to Thomas Marshall, Feb., 1791; Washington's Letter Book, MS., Lib. Cong.) Kentucky was at that time in strong opposition and this continued to grow.
