Kitabı oku: «The Political History of England – Vol XI», sayfa 10

CHAPTER VI.
THE DOWNFALL OF NAPOLEON

The war between France and Russia, publicly threatened in August, 1811,⁵³ was long deferred. On Russia's part the adherence to a defensive policy delayed action until France was ready. But there was another reason why the preparations for war were only slowly pushed forward. Even at the court of St. Petersburg there was a French party which retarded such preparations as committing Russia too definitely to an open rupture. On the part of France, also, delay was necessary. Though deliberately provoked by himself, the war was not altogether welcome to Napoleon. It suited him best to have a strong but friendly neighbour in Russia, and victory promised him but the half-hearted friendship of a power to which he could no longer dare to leave much strength. Besides it was necessary to make far more extensive preparations than had been required for any of his previous campaigns. Russia was too poor and too thinly peopled for it to be possible for war to support itself, and immense supplies with correspondingly large transport arrangements were needed for a large army which would have to fight at so vast a distance from its base. It would have been impossible to be ready in time for a summer campaign in 1811; the country was not favourable to transport on a large scale during winter, and the war was therefore postponed till the summer of 1812. The end of May or beginning of June was the date originally selected for the beginning of operations, as it was expected that the difficulty of providing fodder would be greatly reduced when the grass had grown. But the preparations were not sufficiently advanced by that date, and hostilities were only opened on June 24.

The interval was spent by both powers in securing allies and pacifying enemies. Early in the year 1812 Prussia had made a last attempt to avert a French alliance by inviting Russia to join in a peaceful compromise. After the failure of this negotiation her position was helpless, and resembled that of Poland before its national extinction. Russia could not become her active ally without exposing her own army to destruction at a second Friedland, and Prussia could not fight France alone. Frederick William, therefore, accepted the terms dictated by Napoleon. By a treaty concluded on February 24 he agreed to supply the emperor with 20,000 men to serve as a part of the French army, and was to raise no levies and give no orders without his consent. The king was also to afford a free passage and provide food and forage for the French troops, payment for which was to be arranged afterwards. In return for this a reduction was made in the war indemnity due to France. This was probably as much as Napoleon could have obtained without authorising a dangerous increase in the Prussian army.

RUSSIAN ALLIANCES.

Austria was more fortunate, because an Austrian war would have been a serious diversion, not a step towards the invasion of Russia. She was in consequence able to impose her own terms on France. These terms, so far as the nature and extent of the Austrian assistance to France were concerned, had been sketched by Metternich to the British agent, Nugent, as far back as November, 1811, and they were accepted by France in a treaty of March 16, 1812.⁵⁴ Austria was to provide an army of 30,000 men to guard Napoleon's flank in Volhynia. In return France guaranteed the integrity of Turkey, and secretly promised a restoration of the Illyrian provinces to Austria in exchange for Galicia, which was to form a part of a reconstituted Poland. Elsewhere Napoleon's negotiations were unsuccessful. In January he fulfilled his threat of occupying Swedish Pomerania, but it had no effect on Swedish policy, and when in March he offered Finland and a part of Norway as the price of an alliance, his terms were rejected and Sweden allied herself with Russia. On April 17 Napoleon made overtures for peace with Great Britain, offering to evacuate Spain and to recognise the house of Braganza in Portugal and the Bourbons in Sicily, if the British would recognise the "actual dynasty" in Spain and Murat in Naples. The offer was certainly illusory. "Actual dynasty" was an ambiguous phrase, but would naturally mean the Bonapartes. Castlereagh declined to recognise Joseph, but declared his readiness to discuss the proposed basis if "actual dynasty" meant a recognition of Ferdinand VII. in Spain. Napoleon was enabled to say that his offers of peace had been rejected, and made no answer to Castlereagh.

Russia in her turn had to conciliate the Porte, Sweden, Persia, and Great Britain. The Turkish negotiations were prolonged, and it was only in May that the treaty of Bucharest was signed, by which Russia gave up all her conquests except Bessarabia. Sweden had offered Russia her alliance in February. She was prepared to surrender Finland to Russia on condition that Russia should assist her in the conquest of Norway. A joint army was to effect this conquest and then make a descent on North Germany, threatening the rear of the French army of invasion. The adhesion of Great Britain was to be invited. On April 5 an alliance between Russia and Sweden was signed on the terms suggested. This was followed on August 28 by the treaty of Åbo, which was signed in the presence of the British representative, Lord Cathcart. By this treaty Russia was to assist Sweden with 30,000 men and a loan, Sweden undertook to support Russia's claim, when it should be made, for an extension of her frontier to the Vistula. Shortly afterwards it was agreed to postpone the attack on Norway till the following year, and thus at length the Russian army in Finland was set free. The treaties with the Porte and Sweden were too late to liberate troops to oppose Napoleon's advance, but the troops thus liberated greatly endangered his retreat. With Persia no peace could be made. Great Britain was still nominally at war both with Russia and with Sweden. Negotiations with Russia in April came to nothing because the British government refused to take over a loan of £4,000,000, but on July 18 a treaty of alliance between the three powers was signed, in which Great Britain promised pecuniary aid to Russia. A further sign of friendship was given when the tsar handed over the Cronstadt fleet for safekeeping to the British. The formal treaty was, however, only the public recognition of a friendship and mutual confidence which had begun with the breach between Russia and France. This good understanding was shared by the nominal allies of France, Prussia and Austria. Russia was fully informed of the military and political plans of Austria, and knew that her forces would not fight except under compulsion.

At last, on June 24, Napoleon's grand army began the passage of the Niemen, which formed the boundary between the duchy of Warsaw and the Russian empire. The main body, at least 300,000 strong, was commanded by Napoleon himself. A northern division, including the Prussian contingent, was commanded by Macdonald, and, after advancing to Riga, which it pretended to besiege, remained idle throughout the campaign. The Austrians, under Schwarzenberg, formed a southern division, but they merely manœuvred, and made no serious attempts to impede the movements of the southern Russian army on its return journey from the war on the Danube. Napoleon himself drove the main Russian armies before him in the direction of Moscow. At last Kutuzov, who had taken over the command of the Russians in the course of the retreat, made a stand at Borodino, where on September 7 one of the bloodiest battles on record was fought. The figures are variously given, but the French army probably lost over 30,000 in killed and wounded out of a force of 125,000; and the Russians lost not less than 40,000 out of an army of slightly smaller dimensions. This awful carnage ended, after all, in little more than a trial of strength. The French gained the ground, but the Russians made good their retreat, and six days later Kutuzov retired through the streets of Moscow, taking the better part of the population and all the military stores with him. The French vanguard entered on the 14th, and Napoleon himself next day. A fire, kindled either by accident or by Russian incendiaries, raged from the 14th to the 20th and destroyed three-fourths of the city.

NAPOLEON'S RETREAT FROM MOSCOW.

The capture of Moscow was far from being the triumph that the French emperor had anticipated. Deceived by his recollections of Tilsit, he had fully counted upon receiving pacific overtures from Alexander or at least upon his eager acceptance of conciliatory assurances from himself. But as the weeks passed and the vision of negotiation with the Russians proved illusory, retreat became inevitable. On the night of October 18 the French army, now about 115,000 strong, evacuated Moscow. Kutuzov, who was stronger in cavalry, though perhaps still weaker in infantry, hung upon its rear, and, while avoiding a pitched battle, was able to prevent Napoleon from retreating by any other route than the now devastated line of his advance. It has often been questioned whether Kutuzov did not deliberately refrain from destroying the French army. He certainly informed Sir Robert Wilson on one occasion that he did not wish to drive Napoleon to extremities, lest his supremacy should go to the power that ruled the sea. The remark may have been nothing more than an outburst of ill-temper, but, whatever the motive, there can be no doubt as to the policy adopted. The retreating French army suffered terrible hardships from the cold, for which it was ill prepared. Twice it seemed on the point of falling into the hands of the Russians; at Krasnoe 26,000 prisoners are said to have been captured by Kutuzov's army, while at Borisov the southern army under Chichagov and the army returning from Finland under Wittgenstein joined hands, and disputed the French passage of the Berezina on November 26-29. According to Chambray's calculation, the French army numbered 31,000 combatants before the passage, of whom but 9,000 remained on December 1. All the non-combatants had been left in the hands of the enemy.

This was the last direct attack made by the Russians on the relics of the grand army. But the worst ravages of the Russian winter had yet to come. On December 3 the cold became intense. As the survivors of the expedition dragged themselves homewards through the Polish provinces, they were met by large bodies of reinforcements pouring in from the west; these recruits, comparatively fresh, were at first appalled by the gaunt and famine-stricken aspect of the returning veterans, but soon perished themselves in nearly equal numbers. It is estimated that altogether only 60,000 men recrossed the frontier out of a total of 630,000, and in the estimate of 60,000 is included Macdonald's division, which was exposed to comparatively little hardship. That division with the Prussian contingent began to fall back on December 19. On the 30th, however, the Prussians were reduced to neutrality by the convention of Tauroggen, signed by the Prussian commander, Yorck, with the Russians, without the sanction of his government. Had Russia been in a condition to press onwards at once and carry the war into French territory, it is possible that Europe might have been spared the misery and bloodshed of the next few years. But, for the moment, her strength and resources were exhausted, nor was it until months had elapsed that other nations, or even France herself, became aware of the magnitude of the catastrophe which had overtaken Napoleon's host. That he was able to rally himself after it, to carry the French people with him, to enforce a new conscription, and to assume the aggressive in the campaign of 1813, must ever remain a supreme proof of his capacity for empire.

DISPUTES WITH THE UNITED STATES.

In the year 1812 war broke out between Great Britain and the United States. For a time the continental warfare had led to a great increase in American commerce, which was free from the attacks of privateers and from the restrictions which the opposing parties placed on one another. Presently, however, both parties attempted to force the United States into a virtual alliance with themselves. Orders in council on the one side and imperial decrees on the other had, as we have seen, declared a blockade of the ports of the continent of Europe and of Great Britain, and the United States saw their commerce threatened with disabilities approximating to those suffered by the belligerent powers. President Jefferson, who was supported by the republican party, adhered to a policy of strict neutrality, and prepared to suffer any commercial loss rather than be drawn into an European war. The only action which he took was the defence of the river mouths with a view to resisting any offensive movement. The federalist party on the other hand were in favour of energetic action against France, so as to secure English favour and the great commercial privileges which the mistress of the seas could bestow. For a time no hostilities resulted, but constant irritation was caused by the British claim to a right of search and to the impressment of sailors of British nationality found on American ships, while American ships accused of infringing the blockade were seized by either of the European combatants. To some extent the differences between Great Britain and the United States depended on rival views of the law of allegiance. The British maintained the doctrine nemo potest exuere patriam, and regarded all British-born persons, unless absolved from their allegiance by the act of the mother-country, as British subjects. The law of the United States, on the other hand, permitted an alien to become a citizen after fourteen years' residence, and previously to 1798 had required a residence of five years only. In this way it often happened that sailors who had received the American citizenship were impressed for service on British ships, and sometimes sailors of actual American birth were impressed. But it was impossible to justify the practice to which the Americans resorted of receiving deserters of British nationality from British ships of war, who were induced by offers of higher pay to transfer themselves to the American service.

Jefferson at first preferred to coerce the European powers by retaliatory legislation. As early as April, 1806, a law had been passed forbidding the importation of certain British wares, but was suspended six weeks after it came into operation. In June, 1807, irritation was intensified by the incident of the Leopard and the Chesapeake. Five men, four of whom were British born and one an American by birth, were known to have deserted from the British sloop Halifax, lying in Hampton roads, and to have taken service on an American frigate, the Chesapeake. After application for their surrender had been made in vain to the magistrates of the town of Norfolk, where the Chesapeake's rendezvous was, and to the officer commanding the rendezvous, Vice-admiral Berkeley sent his flagship, the Leopard, carrying fifty guns, with an order to the British captains on the North American station to search the Chesapeake for deserters from six ships named, including the Halifax, in case she should be encountered on the high seas. The Leopard arrived in Chesapeake bay in time to follow the Chesapeake beyond American waters, and then made a demand to search for deserters. On the captain of the Chesapeake refusing compliance, the Leopard opened fire. The Chesapeake was not in a condition to make any effectual reply, and, after receiving three broadsides, struck her flag. Only one of the deserters from the Halifax, an Englishman, was found on the Chesapeake; but three deserters from the British warship Melampus, which had not been named in Berkeley's order, all Americans by birth, were removed from the Chesapeake, which was now permitted to return to port.⁵⁵ Although the British government offered reparation for this action, recalled Berkeley, and disavowed the right to search ships of war for deserters, the incident could not fail to make a bad impression on American opinion.

But still Jefferson adhered to a policy of pacific coercion. In December, 1807, the act of April, 1806, was again put into force, and an embargo act, passed by the American congress, now cut off all foreign countries from trade with the United States. But the policy of embargo was disastrous to its promoters. It ruined the commerce and emptied the treasury of the United States. On March 1, 1809, a non-intercourse act, applying only to France, Great Britain, and their dependencies, was substituted for the embargo act.⁵⁶ The new act enabled the president to remove the embargo against whichever country should cancel its orders or decrees against American trade. Three days later Jefferson was succeeded by Madison as President of the United States. The change made no difference to the policy of the United States government. But the opposition was now much stronger and more violent than formerly; so much so that Sir James Craig, the Canadian governor, actually despatched a spy, John Henry, to sound the willingness of New England, where the federalist party was the stronger, to secede from the union and join Great Britain against the United States. This venture becomes the less surprising when we observe that in the previous year, 1808, John Quincy Adams, the future president, had predicted such a secession. Nothing, however, came of the attempt. Madison attempted to obtain concessions from the British government, but while the Perceval ministry lasted he met with no success. In May, 1810, the non-intercourse act expired, but a proviso was enacted that, if before March 3, 1811, either Great Britain or France should cancel her decrees against American trade the act should, three months after such revocation, revive against the power that maintained its decrees. Madison was cajoled into believing that Napoleon had recalled his decrees on November 1, 1810, and the non-intercourse act was accordingly revived against Great Britain and her dependencies in February, 1811.

WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES.

Almost the first act of the Liverpool administration was to cancel the restrictions on American trade. But it was too late. Five days earlier the United States had declared war against Great Britain on June 18, 1812. The explanation of this step must be sought in the party politics of the United States. While the federalists courted British alliance, the younger members of the republican party had conceived a hope of conquering Canada as a result of a victorious war against Great Britain. This was the reply of the national party in the United States to the action of the Canadian governor. Madison knew the impracticability of such a step, but, finding that he could only carry the presidential election of 1812 with the support of this section of his party, he declared war. Great Britain, with her best troops in the Peninsula, was in no condition to use her full strength in America, but the United States were entirely unprepared for war. Their treasury was still empty, and their army and navy were small, while Canada generally was contented and loyal to the British crown. Upper Canada was full of loyalists, who had been expelled from the revolted colonies, and who with their descendants hated the men that had driven them from their homes; lower Canada was half-French and had nothing in common with the United States, while the Roman catholic clergy threw the whole weight of their influence on the British side. General Hull, who commanded the forces employed against Canada, succeeded in crossing the river Detroit in July and threatened the British post of Malden. But an alliance with the Indians enabled the British first to possess themselves of Mackinac, at the junction of lakes Huron and Michigan, and afterwards to imperil Hull's communications through the Michigan territory.

Hull accordingly fell back on Detroit. The British, with 750 men under Major-General Brock, together with 600 Indians, now prepared to attack Hull at that place. Hull, who believed his retreat to be cut off by the Indians, did not await the British attack, but surrendered on August 16 with 2,500 men and thirty-three guns. The effect of the capitulation was to place the British in effectual possession, not merely of Detroit, but of the territory of Michigan, and thus to render any attack on Canada from that quarter extremely difficult. The advantages gained by the British through this success were unfortunately neutralised by the policy pursued by Sir George Prevost, who had succeeded Craig as governor of Canada. Prevost was of opinion that, when the news of the withdrawal of the orders in council reached Washington, the United States government would be ready to abandon hostilities; and he accordingly concluded a provisional armistice with General Dearborn, the commander-in-chief of the enemy's forces in the northern states. But President Madison, having engaged in war, was anxious to try the effect of another attack on Canada before negotiating for peace, and therefore declined to ratify the armistice. The interval enabled the United States to bring up reinforcements, but their new army failed in an attack on a British post on the Maumee river.

Meanwhile a second attempt was made to invade Upper Canada, this time from the side of Niagara. On October 13, Brigadier-General Wadsworth, acting under the orders of General Van Rensselaer, led an attack on the British position of Queenstown on the Canadian bank of the Niagara river. Brock commanded the defence, but was killed early in the fight. The position was momentarily seized by the enemy, but was presently recaptured by the British, who had in the meantime been reinforced by Major-General Sheaffe, the son of a loyalist, with a force from Fort George, and before the day closed Wadsworth found himself compelled to surrender with 900 men. The remainder of the enemy's forces, consisting of militia, rather than exceed their military obligations by crossing the frontier, chose to leave these men to their fate. In spite of the ignominious surrenders with which the first two expeditions against Canada had terminated, a third attempt was made by Brigadier-General Smyth to force the Canadian frontier; but on November 28 he was repulsed with loss by the British under Bishopp between Chippewa and Fort Erie, above the Niagara Falls, and at the end of the year the Canadian frontier still remained unpierced.

AMERICAN SUCCESSES AT SEA.

The glory of the British military successes was unfortunately obscured in large measure by American successes on the sea. The maritime war resolved itself into a series of fights between individual frigates. This was the necessary result of the nature of the British force kept in American waters. Ever since the renewal of hostilities with France in 1803 a species of blockade had been maintained along the coast of the United States by British vessels on the watch for deserters or contraband of war. It was also found necessary to employ ships of war to guard against pirates in the West Indies and to protect British commerce in that quarter against French privateers. For all these purposes speed was of more importance than strength, and the British force in the west contained a disproportionate number of smaller vessels as compared with line of battle ships. The actual numbers of British warships in North American waters at the beginning of 1812 were three ships of the line, twenty-one cruisers and frigates, and fifty-three small craft. The United States navy was still weaker, and amounted merely to seven efficient frigates and nine small craft.⁵⁷ There was no question of a contest between fleets, and though the numbers of the British warships enabled them to destroy American trade, they were ship for ship inferior to the American frigates, which were thus enabled to win an empty glory in single-ship encounters. The American frigates were, in fact, superior in every respect to the British ships which nominally belonged to the same class. They were larger and more strongly built, a frigate being as strong as a British seventy-four. Their crews were more numerous, and were recruited entirely from seamen, about one-third of whom would appear to have been of British nationality, while, as has been seen, many of them had been decoyed from British war-vessels by offers of higher pay. The British ships on the other hand were manned largely by landsmen, often impressed from the jails. A false economy had induced the British admiralty to impose narrow limits on the use of ammunition for gunnery practice. The Americans on the other hand were very liberal in this respect, with the result that in the early years of the war they were greatly superior to their enemies in point of marksmanship.

A good example of the disproportion between the British and American frigates is furnished by the fight between the British frigate Guerrière and the American frigate Constitution, on August 19, one of the first naval actions in the war. The Guerrière was armed with twenty-four broadside guns, discharging projectiles with a total weight of 517 pounds; the Constitution with twenty-eight broadside guns, discharging a weight of 768 pounds. The crew of the Guerrière, counting men only, numbered 244, that of the Constitution with a similar limitation 460. Finally the Guerrière's tonnage amounted to 1,092, as against the Constitution's 1,533. The Guerrière's guns proved very ineffectual from the start, while the marksmanship, not only of the American gunners but of the riflemen in the Constitution's tops, was the wonder of the British. It is stated that none of her shot fell short. After a fight lasting nearly two hours the Guerrière surrendered. The ship was a complete wreck, and she had lost fifteen men killed and six mortally wounded as against seven killed and three mortally wounded on board her opponent.

The effect of the engagement both on British and on American public opinion was altogether out of proportion to its intrinsic importance. The inequality in strength of the opposing frigates was not understood, and any defeat of the mistress of the seas seemed an event of considerable significance. The Americans soon met with other similar successes. On October 18 their sloop Wasp, of eighteen guns, reduced the British sloop Frolic, a weaker vessel, though of similar armament, to a helpless hulk after a ten minutes' cannonade. The moral effect of this victory was not impaired by the fact that the conqueror and her prize were compelled to surrender a few hours later to the British seventy-four Poictiers. On the 25th the United States, of forty-four guns, captured the Macedonian, of thirty-eight, after three hours' fighting, and on December 29 the British thirty-eight-gun frigate Java, with a very inexperienced crew, was captured by the Constitution after a running fight of three hours and a half.⁵⁸

THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN OF 1813.

With the retreat of the French army from Russia the main scene of operations on the continent was shifted from Russia to Germany. Great Britain took little part in the actual warfare in Germany, and if she had a larger share in the political negotiations which ultimately determined the distribution of forces, still Austria and not Great Britain was the power whose diplomacy had most effect on the course of events. The upheaval of Europe against Napoleon, however, would have been much less effective if it had not been supported by English subsidies, and Austria, in the crippled state of her finances, would probably have had to remain inactive if she had not been able to rely on English gold and perhaps still more on English credit.

The campaign of 1813 falls naturally into three parts. During the first, from the beginning of January to the latter part of April the victorious Russians swept over North Germany, and, carrying the Prussian monarchy with them, strengthened a reaction which had already begun against the rule of Napoleon. The second part began with the arrival of Napoleon on the scene of action towards the end of April and lasted to the conclusion of an armistice on June 4. In this period of seven or eight weeks the allies were forced to retire at all points and the war was carried into Prussian territory. The armistice, which terminated on August 10, preceded the opening of the third part of the campaign in which Russia and Prussia were joined by Austria and Sweden, and, after gradually drawing closer round the main French position in Saxony, finally inflicted a crushing defeat upon Napoleon at Leipzig in the middle of October. The campaign was virtually over when Napoleon secured his retreat by the victory of Hanau on October 30; but it is impossible to sever it from the events outside Germany which were directly occasioned by the downfall of Napoleon's German domination. These are the revolt of Holland in November, that of Switzerland in December, and the Austrian attack on Northern Italy in October and November.

In the opening months of the campaign the movements were merely a sequel to those of the previous year. The French retreat was continued from the Niemen to the Vistula, the Elbe, and finally the Saale. The Russians entered Prussia proper a few days after Yorck's capitulation, and the French retired before them. Stein, the Prussian statesman who had received a commission from Russia to administer the Prussian districts occupied by her, ordered the provincial governor to convoke an assembly. Although some indignation was felt at such a step being taken by Russian orders, the assembly met and voted the formation of the Landwehr. In this way Prussia actually began to arm against France, while the Prussian government still professed to maintain the French alliance. A few days later King Frederick William left Berlin, which was still occupied by the French, for Breslau. Before the end of February he had concluded the treaty of Kalisch with Russia, by which the two powers were to conduct the war against France conjointly, and Russia was not to lay down her arms till Prussia should be restored to a strength equal to that which she had possessed in 1806. On March 2 Cathcart arrived at Kalisch as British ambassador to the Russian court. He actively promoted Russia's alliance with Prussia, from which Great Britain stood apart for the present. He was able to obtain from Prussia a renunciation of her claims on Hanover, but Frederick William was still opposed to any increase of Hanoverian territory. On the 17th Prussia declared war on France. By that time the Russians had entered both Berlin and Breslau, and had freed Hamburg from French dominion, thus reopening Germany to British commerce. The declaration of war by Prussia was accompanied by a convention with Russia providing for the deliverance of Germany and the dissolution of the confederation of the Rhine. This convention embodied Stein's policy. It relied on popular support and it aimed at an unified government, at least in the territories occupied at that date by adherents of France.