Kitabı oku: «Putin’s People», sayfa 5

2
Inside Job

*

‘What we’ve discussed is how the darkest forces never give up. The French Revolution, the Soviet one, all the others, appear first as a liberating struggle. But they soon morph into military dictatorship. The early heroes look like idiots, the thugs show their true faces, and the cycle (which isn’t what revolution means) is complete.’

Christian Michel

*

MOSCOW, August 25 1991 – It was late in the evening when Nikolai Kruchina trudged wearily through the door to his flat in the closely-guarded compound for the Party elite. Just four days before, on August 21, the attempted coup by Communist hard-liners seeking to preserve Soviet power had collapsed in failure. And now, the institutions Kruchina had served for most of his life were being dismantled in front of his eyes. The evening before, he’d held a series of high-level meetings with the powerful boss of the Central Committee’s International Department, Valentin Falin, and he seemed exhausted.[1] The KGB watchman outside his home noticed his downcast gaze, his clear reluctance to talk.[2]

The changes in those four short days had come thick and fast. First, the pro-democratic Russian leader Boris Yeltsin had signed a decree, broadcast live, suspending the Soviet Communist Party and ending its decades of rule. Yeltsin’s defiant stance against the hard-line leaders of the attempted coup had put him firmly in the ascendant. He now by far eclipsed Gorbachev, who stood timidly to the side of the podium as Yeltsin addressed the Russian parliament. Arguing that the Communist Party was to blame for the illegal coup, Yeltsin ordered that the sprawling, warren-like headquarters of the Party’s Central Committee on Moscow’s Old Square be immediately sealed. Filed in hundreds of its rooms were the secrets of the Soviet Union’s vast financial empire, a network that spanned thousands of administrative buildings, hotels, dachas and sanatoriums, as well as the Party’s hard-currency bank accounts and untold hundreds, perhaps thousands, of foreign firms set up as joint ventures in the dying days of the regime. Through these bank accounts and other connected firms, the strategic operations of the Communist Party abroad – and those of allied political parties – had been funded. It was the engine room of the Soviet struggle for supremacy against the West. This was the empire Kruchina had administered as the chief of the Communist Party’s property department since 1983. Its sudden sealing felt like a symbol of all that was lost.

Kruchina’s wife turned in early that night, leaving her husband alone, she believed, to spend the night sleeping on the couch. But early the next morning she was awoken by a knock on her door. It was the KGB watchman. Her husband, she was told, had fallen to his death from the window of their seventh-floor flat.[3]

There were no apparent signs of disturbance, and the watchman said he’d discovered a crumpled note lying on the pavement next to Kruchina’s body. ‘I’m not a conspirator,’ it said. ‘But I’m a coward. Please tell the Soviet people this.’[4] The KGB immediately declared his death a suicide. But to this day, no one knows what exactly happened – or if they do, they are not willing to tell. Those who were at the centre of events in those days, like Viktor Gerashchenko, then the head of the Soviet state bank, prefer to limit their explanations to a Delphic ‘He fell.’[5] Others like Nikolai Leonov, then the powerful head of the KGB’s analytical department, insist that Kruchina was a victim of a ‘deep depression’ that set in at the empire’s collapse.[6]

A little over a month later, the same thing happened to Kruchina’s predecessor as property department chief. On the evening of October 6, Georgy Pavlov fell to his death from the window of his flat. His death, at the age of eighty-one, was also recorded as a suicide. Eleven days after Pavlov’s death, another high-ranking member of the Party’s financial machine fell to his death from his balcony. This time it was the American Section chief of the Communist Party’s international department, Dmitry Lissovolik. Again, it was recorded as a suicide.

What linked the three men was an intimate knowledge of the secret financing systems of the Communist Party at the time the KGB was preparing for the transition to a market economy under Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms. The property department Kruchina and Pavlov oversaw had been understood to have a value of $9 billion.[7] Western experts estimated its foreign holdings at many times more.[8] But in the first few days after the Communist Party’s collapse, Russia’s new rulers were bewildered to discover that the Party’s coffers were nearly empty. Rumours abounded that officials, overseen by Kruchina, had siphoned billions of roubles and other currencies through foreign joint ventures hastily set up in the final years of the regime.[9] Russian prosecutors, originally ordered by Yeltsin to investigate the Communist Party for its role in the August coup attempt, were soon redirected to investigate what had happened to the Party funds.

Although Yeltsin ordered the offices of the Central Committee on Old Square to be sealed, Valentin Falin, the head of the committee’s International Department, which oversaw the funding of foreign operations, immediately ordered his subordinates to start destroying documents.[10] What lay in the archives could provide a roadmap to the crimes of the Communist regime and, most importantly of all, to the cash that had been stashed away.

The most top-secret operations had been run out of Room 516, which had housed the International Department’s special section for ‘Party technology’. It was headed by Vladimir Osintsev, a specialist in black operations, who ran Communist Party influence campaigns to sow discord in countries where the existence of the Party was illegal, such as El Salvador, Turkey, South Africa and Chile. When the Russian prosecutors finally entered this room months later, in October 1991, reams of shredded files were found in ribbons across the floor. But signs of the lengths Party operatives had gone to run sleeper agents under deep cover remained. The prosecutors found piles of foreign passports and stamps from many different countries, heaps of other blank travel documents, and official stamps and visas waiting to be forged. There was a huge photo album filled with pictures of people of all types and races, a selection of wigs and beards, and even rubber moulds for faking fingerprints.[11]

One of the International Department’s employees, Anatoly Smirnov, had rebelled, and smuggled out what he could.[12] The top-secret documents he managed to extract included details of hundreds of millions of dollars in payments to Communist-linked parties abroad. One such document, dated December 5 1989, showed an order for the Soviet state bank to transfer $22 million directly to Falin for the Party’s International Fund for left-wing organisations.[13] Another, dated June 20 1987, ordered Gosbank, the central bank of the USSR, to transfer $1 million to the Party’s curator for international affairs to provide the French Communist Party with additional funds.[14] The physical transfer of the money to France was to be organised by the KGB.

To Smirnov, the fact that the Party was regularly dipping into state coffers to fund its political and influence operations abroad meant that ‘a crime was being committed against our people’.[15] For him, this was a red line. It was against Soviet law. The Party’s operations should have been funded from the donations it collected from members, not from state coffers.[16]

The Russian prosecutors calculated that more than $200 million had been transferred out of the Soviet Union to fund Communist-linked parties in the USSR’s final decade of existence; Smirnov put the total at many times more.[17] The sums transferred by more surreptitious means, for more clandestine activities, remained unknown.

But as the team of prosecutors trawled through what remained of the Central Committee’s archive, they began to find documents that cast light on the myriad of unofficial, secret schemes via which billions of dollars more in funds seemed to have been siphoned out. One such scheme involved what the Soviets called ‘friendly’ firms. These were the crony companies at the heart of the vast system of black-market operations that kept the eastern bloc afloat. Many of them were involved in the smuggling of embargoed technology. They included the string of front companies the East German trade official Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski deployed across East Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Others were involved in selling much-needed equipment to the Soviet oil, nuclear power and manufacturing industries at prices that were inflated many times over, while the profits were used to fund the activities of the Communist Party and other leftist movements in Italy, France, Spain, the UK and elsewhere.[18]

The money the CPSU would send directly to fund Communist Parties’ activities was nothing compared to the amounts sent via the friendly firms, said Antonio Fallico, a senior Italian banker with close ties to the top of the Soviet elite, and later to the Putin regime too. The official donations the Italian Communist Party received annually from the Soviet Union were ‘only about $15–20 million. This is not even money.’ The real funding, he said, came from the intermediaries. ‘All Italian firms who wanted to do business in the Soviet Union had to pay money to these firms … This was a colossal flow of money.’[19] A list of forty-five such ‘friendly firms’ was disclosed by prosecutors rooting through the archives. Among the mostly obscure import-export firms was at least one well-known name: Robert Maxwell’s Pergamon Press, a vast publishing house that had long been a channel for the sale of Soviet science books to the West.[20] Just days before the list was published, the body of the controversial former Labour MP and media tycoon had been found floating in the Atlantic Ocean not far from his yacht.

Other companies working with the Soviet regime that stayed off the radar included titans of European industry such as Fiat, Merloni, Olivetti, Siemens and Thyssen, according to a former KGB operative who worked closely with Putin in the nineties, and another businessman who worked in these ‘friendly firms’ during Soviet times. This businessman, who would speak only on condition of anonymity, said his firm had supplied military goods under the guise of medical equipment: ‘The medical equipment – it was a façade. Behind it, the firm produced very serious military equipment. It was the same with Siemens and with ThyssenKrupp. All of them were providing dual-use equipment to the Soviets. These friendly firms were not just fronts, the way things operate now. It was major European companies.’[21]

The network of friendly firms was not only involved in imports. According to one former aide to Gorbachev, some of them were engaged in barter operations that had been under way since the 1970s under Brezhnev.[22] The state oil-export monopoly Soyuznefteexport had, for instance, engaged in an elaborate scheme to barter oil for embargoed goods. It had first delivered oil via traders to vast storage reservoirs in Finland, where the oil’s origins were disguised before a web of intermediaries sold it on in exchange for embargoed technology and other goods, according to a former Soyuznefteexport associate. Fertiliser exports, too, had long been part of these schemes.

For the Russian prosecutors trying to investigate the Party’s finances, the traces of these schemes presented the biggest red flag. Untold fortunes in oil, metals, cotton, chemicals and arms had been transported out of the Soviet Union, either through barter schemes or export deals, and sold at knockdown prices to the intermediary friendly firms in the West. Under the export deals, the friendly firms would buy the raw materials at the Soviet internal price, which was fixed low under the rules of the planned economy, enabling them to reap vast profits when they sold them on at world market prices: the global oil price, for example, was almost ten times higher than the internal Soviet price in those days.[23] They could then stash the funds away into a web of accounts in friendly banks in Europe, such as Switzerland’s Banco del Gottardo, and tax havens in Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Panama, Hong Kong and the British Channel Islands. The fortunes they made could be deployed for the activities of the Communist Party abroad, for active measures to destabilise the West. Most importantly of all, the entire process was overseen by the KGB, whose associates manned the friendly firms and controlled much of the Soviet trade ministry. ‘The friendly firms sold what they had acquired for global prices. The profit was never returned to the Soviet Union,’ wrote the prosecutor general tasked with overseeing the investigation, Valentin Stepankov. ‘All contact with the friendly firms was carried out by the KGB.’[24]

The siphoning of commodities had rapidly accelerated in the final years of the Soviet regime. Later, the one-time head of economic analysis for Soviet military intelligence, Vitaly Shlykov, claimed that a large part of the Soviet Union’s huge military stockpiles of raw materials – literal mountains of aluminium, copper, steel, titanium and other metals – that had been intended to keep the Soviet military machine running for decades to come, were fast dwindling by the time of the Soviet collapse.[25] Prosecutors, however, found only scraps of information. The raw-materials deals had left barely any trace.

But as they searched the debris and destruction, the reams of shredded paper on the floor, the prosecutors found one vital document, which looked as if it might provide a partial key to what happened in the twilight years of the Communist regime. It was a memo, dated August 23 1990, signed by Gorbachev’s deputy general secretary Vladimir Ivashko, and it ordered the creation of an ‘invisible economy’ for the Communist Party.[26] The top Party leadership had evidently recognised that it urgently needed to create a network of firms and joint ventures that would protect and hide the Party’s financial interests as Gorbachev’s reforms sent the country hurtling into chaos. The Party was to invest its hard-currency resources into the capital of international firms operated by ‘friends’. The funds and business associations would have ‘minimum visible links’.

An even more telltale document was found in Nikolai Kruchina’s apartment. When investigators arrived after he had plunged to his death, they found a file lying on his desk. Inside were documents that pointed to a potentially vast network of proxies managing funds for the regime.[27] One of the documents they reportedly found had spaces left blank for the name, Party number and signature of the Party member signing up to become a trusted proxy, a doverennoye litso, or custodian of the Party’s funds and property.

‘I _________ CPSU member since _____, Party number _____, with the following confirm my conscious and voluntary decision to become a trusted custodian of the Party and to carry out the tasks set for me by the Party at any post in any situation, without disclosing my membership of the institute of trusted custodians.

I pledge to preserve and carefully deploy in the interests of the Party the financial and material resources entrusted to me, and I guarantee the return of these resources at the first demand. Everything I earn as a result of economic activities with the Party’s funds I recognise as the Party’s property, and guarantee its transfer at any time and any place.

I pledge to observe the strict confidentiality of this information, and to carry out the orders of the Party, given to me by the individuals authorised to do so.

Signature of CPSU member _________________

Signature of the person taking on the duty _______________’[28]

The prosecutors scrambled to unravel what this document might mean. Few of the Party leadership and other members of the Party elite they questioned would reveal anything. Most claimed that they had been unaware of any such schemes. But the prosecutors’ team struck lucky when they came across Leonid Veselovsky, a former colonel in the foreign-intelligence directorate of the KGB. Fearing a wave of repressions, Veselovsky spoke openly of how he’d been one of a number of top KGB foreign-intelligence operatives drafted in to help manage and hide the Party’s property and wealth.[29] The foreign-intelligence officers were brought in for their knowledge of how Western financial systems worked. They reported to Kruchina, the property department chief, as well as to Vladimir Kryuchkov, the KGB chief, and Filip Bobkov, then the first deputy head of the KGB, and Vladimir Ivashko, the treasurer of the Central Committee.

Veselovsky, a specialist in international economics, had been transferred from his post in Portugal in November 1990 to work on the plan to create an ‘invisible economy’ for the Party’s wealth. It was he who proposed the system of ‘trusted custodians’, or doverenniye litsa, who would hold and manage funds on the Party’s behalf. He’d prepared a series of notes for Kruchina with proposals for disguising the Party funds to protect them from confiscation. These included investing them in charitable or social funds, or anonymously in stocks and shares. The process was to be led by the KGB.

‘On the one hand this will ensure a stable income independent of the future position of the Party. And on the other, these shares can be sold at any moment through stock exchanges and then transferred to other spheres to disguise the Party’s participation while retaining control,’ he wrote. ‘In order to conduct such measures there needs to be an urgent selection of trusted custodians who can carry out separate points of the programme. It could be possible to create a system of secret Party members who will ensure the Party’s existence under any conditions of these extreme times.’[30]

In another note, he suggested the creation of a network of companies and joint ventures, including brokerages and trading firms, in tax havens such as Switzerland, where the shareholders would be the ‘trusted custodians’.[31]

Just as the Stasi had begun preparing, transferring funds into a network of front companies before the fall, the KGB was readying the Party for regime change, fully aware that its monopoly on power was becoming ever more precarious. To some operatives of the foreign-intelligence network drafted in to work on the scheme, when they received the orders from Kryuchkov to start creating private companies it was a clear signal that the game was up for the Communist regime. ‘As soon as this happened, I understood it was the end,’ said Yury Shvets, a senior officer in the KGB’s Washington station until 1987.[32]

But when, after the botched coup attempt of August 1991, the Soviet Communist Party was suddenly no more, it was not at all clear what had happened to the structures created to preserve its wealth, or who was in charge of them. For the Russian prosecutors investigating, the documents left behind in the archives and in Kruchina’s flat provided only the faint outlines of the network. The figures and cogs in the schemes, the trusted proxies, the doverenniye litsa managing the funds, the network of companies, joint ventures and brokerages were hidden.[33] When later questioned about the documents, former members of the Politburo insisted that the collapse had come so swiftly and unexpectedly that no one had had time to implement Ivashko’s plans for the ‘invisible economy’.[34] But the prosecutors found plenty of signs that the project had been at least partially activated, and was long under way – and that it appeared to be led by the foreign-intelligence arm of the KGB.

Veselovsky’s career was just one indication. Two weeks before the August coup attempt he had resigned his position and headed for Switzerland, where he took up a post at a trading firm named Seabeco that was the epitome of a KGB-backed ‘friendly firm’,[35] and that had sold vast amounts of raw materials from the Soviet Union. It was headed by a Soviet émigré named Boris Birshtein, who in the seventies had gone first to Israel and then to Canada, where he set up a string of joint ventures, including one with a leading light of Soviet foreign intelligence.[36] The KGB appeared to have its fingerprints all over Seabeco’s rise. ‘None of this could have happened without the patronage of the KGB,’ said Shvets.

When questioned, former KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov admitted that the trading firm had been created as a channel for the Communist Party’s funds. But he insisted again that the plans had never been implemented – there’d been no time before the collapse of the regime.[37] But telltale signs emerged of Seabeco’s continued association with the KGB. A taped telephone conversation between a Seabeco associate and a Russian foreign-intelligence chief was leaked, in which the two men openly discussed the trading network they’d set up.[38] This Seabeco associate, Dmitry Yakubovsky, went public with claims that Seabeco had received tens of millions of dollars to finance KGB operations in Europe.[39]

Any remaining chance the prosecutors might have of following the money trail, however, seemed to evaporate completely when Veselovsky disappeared from his post in Switzerland without a trace. Without adequate funding and only a scanty paper trail, the prosecutors soon ran into a brick wall. Inside Russia, they’d been able to trace the transfer of billions of roubles from Kruchina’s property department to more than a hundred Party firms and commercial banks.[40] But their attempts to recover any of it were simply stonewalled.[41]

The new Yeltsin government seemed to have little interest in finding any of the funds amid the chaos of the Soviet collapse. For one brief moment that seemed to change, when Yegor Gaidar, Yeltsin’s round-faced new reformist prime minister, announced with great fanfare that the government had hired Kroll, a top international investigations firm, to hunt down the Party cash. But, a $1.5 million contract and a year scouring the globe for the missing Party funds later, Kroll appeared to have made even less progress than the prosecutors had. Apparently, there was nothing to report. ‘They didn’t find anything,’ said Pyotr Aven, the government minister whose initiative it was to bring in Kroll in the first place. ‘They found nothing more than the accounts of a handful of top-level bureaucrats. They had no more than half a million dollars on the accounts.’[42]

The problem was, it seemed, that the government did not want the funds to be found. The reason Kroll came back largely empty-handed was that it received no assistance from the Russian government at all. The firm had been blocked from working with the Russian prosecutors. ‘The Russian government was not interested in us finding anything, so we did not,’ said Tommy Helsby, a former Kroll chairman who worked on the probe.[43] ‘All the government wanted to do was use our name in a press conference.’ It only wanted to give the impression that a real search was under way.

The task was made more difficult by the fact that, rather than through straightforward bank transfers, much of the wealth of the Soviet Union appeared to have been transferred, via friendly firms like Seabeco through the raw materials trade. Another big operator in these trades, said Helsby, was the controversial Geneva-based Glencore founder, commodities trader Marc Rich.[44]

The KGB foreign-intelligence operatives who had been behind the creation of the scheme now held the keys to the hidden wealth. ‘At the end, when the Soviet Union collapsed, when the music stopped, these KGB men were the men who knew where the money was,’ said Helsby. ‘But by then they were the employees of a non-existent Soviet state.’

Some of them, however, stayed on; fragments of the KGB’s foreign-intelligence networks were being preserved. Behind the scenes, amid the chaos, ‘some of them continued to manage money for the KGB’, Helsby said.

The night Nikolai Kruchina plunged to his death was the night the Communist Party’s wealth was transferred to a new elite – and part of it had gone to the foreign-intelligence operatives of the KGB. Some of the cash had already undoubtedly been stolen, squirrelled away by top Party bosses and organised crime. But the foreign-intelligence operatives were the men who controlled the accounts when Yeltsin signed the Soviet Communist Party into history. Kruchina may have been grappling with the despairing realisation that the men who handled the funds were no longer under his control. Equally, he may have been sent to his death by those same men, to make sure he could never tell.

‘Kruchina was most probably frightened that he could be asked where all the property had gone,’ said Pavel Voshchanov, a former spokesperson for Yeltsin and a journalist who spent many years investigating the Party’s stolen wealth. ‘Kruchina gave the orders, but now he didn’t know where it all was. The state was being destroyed. The KGB was being destroyed. And already no one knew where these KGB guys were – and who they were.’[45]

*

The story of the prosecutors’ search for the missing Party wealth was fast forgotten in the tumult of the collapse. But what the prosecutors found then was a blueprint for everything that was to come later. The smuggling schemes, the friendly firms and the trusted custodians became the model on which the Putin regime and its influence operations would be run. The fact was that parts of the KGB foreign-intelligence elite had begun preparing for a market transition ever since former KGB chief Yury Andropov became Soviet leader in 1982. In the early eighties a handful of Soviet economists had begun to quietly discuss the need for a move to the market, whispering in the privacy of their kitchens about the chronic inefficiencies of the Soviet economy and publishing underground treatises on the need for reform. At the same time, there was a growing realisation among a tight-knit group within the intelligence elite that the Soviet economy was in a death spiral, that it was impossible to maintain the empire of the eastern bloc, let alone run broader influence and disruption campaigns in South America, the Middle East and Africa, and in the West. ‘If you want to have a policy of being a great empire you should be able to spend a huge amount of money,’ said one person who worked closely with reform-minded foreign-intelligence chiefs in those days.[46] ‘It was not within our means to compete with the US. It was very costly and very difficult, impossible perhaps.’ Even before progressive elements within the KGB began tentatively preparing for a possible transition in East Germany, they’d been pushing for sweeping reform in the Soviet Union itself.

The Soviet economy was being drained of resources by the push to build up military production and compete with the West at the expense of everything else. The Communist state was, in theory, succeeding in delivering its socialist vow of providing all workers with free education and healthcare. But in practice the planned economy simply didn’t work. Instead there was a corrupted system under which the ordinary people the Communist state was supposed to protect lived largely in poverty. The Communist state could access plenty of natural resources for corrupt trading schemes, but it was failing to develop light industry to produce competitive consumer goods. There was no private ownership, or even any understanding of what profit was. Instead, the government handed down production quotas to each and every enterprise, controlled all earnings and fixed prices for everything. There was no motivation for anyone, and the system just didn’t work. Consumer goods prices were fixed at incredibly low levels, but because of this there were acute shortages of everything – from bread, sausages and other foodstuffs, to cars, televisions, refrigerators and even apartments. The shortages meant queues and rationing, sometimes for months on end. Informal connections and payoffs to officials were often the only way to jump weeks-long queues for the most basic necessities – for shoe repairs, for a hospital bed, for coffins and funeral rites. The overweening power of the Soviet bureaucracy had built corruption deep into the system, while under these conditions the black market flourished.[47]

In the late sixties black marketeers, known as tsekhoviki, began to set up underground factories in which spare parts and materials siphoned from the state-owned plants were used to produce goods outside the regulated economy. Such activities could result in jail sentences of ten years or more, but increasingly these factories’ output was becoming the only way to make up for at least some of the shortages of the Soviet planned system. Hard-currency speculators would trawl the halls of the Soviet Intourist hotels, risking prison to buy dollars from visiting foreign tourists at an exchange rate far more advantageous to the tourist than the fixed Soviet one. It was a good deal for the speculators, too. In the system of Soviet shortages, anyone with access to hard currency was king. Dollars would gain you access to the well-stocked Bereyozki shops reserved for the Soviet elite, where the shelves were crammed with the quality foodstuffs and other luxuries of the West. It would enable you to buy Western clothing, Western pop music, anything produced outside the stagnating and dreary Soviet economy – all of which could then be sold on for vast profits. The shortages in the Soviet economy ran so deep that, according to the former KGB foreign-intelligence operative Yury Shvets, everyone was for sale. Factory directors fiddled the books to give materials to the black marketeers in return for a cut of the profits. Law-enforcement officials turned a blind eye to the currency speculators marauding through Soviet hotels in return for bribes and access to the hotel buffet.[48] And at the top of the pyramid, ever since the seventies, the Party elite had been taking a cut of the smuggling and trading schemes. All of it undermined any efforts to improve production. ‘The Soviet Union could not even make a pair of tights or shoes,’ said Shvets. ‘Prostitutes would give themselves for one night for one stocking, and then the next night for the other. It was a nightmare.’[49]