Kitabı oku: «The History of the Indian Revolt and of the Expeditions to Persia, China and Japan 1856-7-8», sayfa 97

Just at this period a most sudden and unexpected event put an end to the operations. Captain Rennie’s expedition returned to Mohamrah on the 4th of April; and on the 5th arrived news that peace had been signed between England and Persia. Outram’s army, European and native, was rapidly approaching 14,000 men; such a force, under such a leader, might have marched from one end of Persia to the other; and both officers and soldiers had begun to have bright anticipations of honour, and perhaps of prize-money. It was with something like disappointment, therefore, that the news of the treaty was listened to; there had not been fighting enough to whet the appetites of the heroic; while soldiers generally would fain make a treaty at the sword’s point, rather than see it done in the bureaux of diplomatists. Captain Hunt of the 78th Highlanders, who was concerned in the operations at Mohamrah and Ahwaz, and who wrote a volume descriptive of the whole campaign, told very frankly of the dissatisfaction in the camp: ‘The news of peace with Persia having been signed at Paris on the 4th of March damped the elation of all, and considerable disgust was felt at this abrupt termination to what had promised to prove a brilliant campaign.’

How and where the treaty of peace was concluded, we must now shew, in connection with the proceedings of ministers, legislators, and ambassadors.

When the Persian expedition was determined on, parliament was not sitting, and no legislative sanction for the war could be obtained; but when the session opened in February 1857, the policy of the government was severely canvassed. Ministers were charged with involving the country in a war, without the nation itself being acquainted with the causes, or even consulted at all in the matter. The Earl of Clarendon explained the course of events at considerable length. He went into the case of Mr Murray, and the quarrel with the Persian government on matters of diplomatic etiquette – justifying that envoy in all that he had done. But the earl was particular in his assertions that the Murray dispute was not the cause of the war. The siege and capture of Herat furnished the casus belli. He dwelt on the immense value of that city as a military station. ‘Herat is altogether a most important place for military operations; and an enemy once in possession of it is completely master of the position. Every government of this country has desired that Afghanistan should be protected; and it clearly cannot be protected if Herat remains in the power of Persia.’ He expressed a conviction that ‘the Russian government and the whole of the Russian people are under a belief that their destiny is to go forward, to conquer, and to hold new territory;’ and that this disposition would be greatly tempted if Persia, backed up by Russia, were permitted to seize Herat. He stated finally that the Persian ambassador at Paris had recently expressed a wish to renew negotiations for peace, and that the British government would willingly listen to any overtures for that purpose. Lord Palmerston gave similar explanations in the House of Commons. The Earls of Derby and Malmesbury, Earl Grey, Lord John Russell, Mr Gladstone, and Mr Disraeli, all spoke disparagingly of the Persian expedition – either because it was not necessary; or because, if necessary, parliamentary permission for it ought to have been obtained. The latter was the strong point of opposition; many members asserted, not only that the nation was involved in a new war without its own consent, but that no one could understand whether war had been declared by the Crown or by the East India Company. Earl Grey moved an amendment condemnatory of the ministerial policy; but this was negatived. The ministers declined to produce the diplomatic correspondence at that time, because there was a hope of renewed negotiations with Furukh Khan at Paris.

At the close of February it became known to the public that the East India Company had, not unnaturally, demurred to the incidence of the expenses of the Persian war on their revenues. It appeared that, so early as the 22d of October the Court of Directors had written to the president of the Board of Control – adverting to ‘the expedition for foreign service preparing at Bombay, under the orders (it is presumed) of her Majesty’s government, communicated through the Secret Committee;’ and suggesting for his consideration ‘how far it may be just and proper to subject India to the whole of the charges consequent on those orders.’ The directors, as a governing body, had no voice whatever in determining on the Persian war; and yet their soldiers and sailors were to take part in it, and the Indian revenues to bear all or part of the burden. It was ultimately decided that England should pay one-half of the expenses, the other half being borne by the Company out of the revenues of India.

Before the British public could learn one single fact connected with the landing of Sir James Outram or of the second division in Persia, they were surprised by the announcement that Lord Cowley and Furukh Khan had succeeded in coming to terms of pacification at Paris – the Persian ambassador having received from his sovereign large powers for this purpose. A provisional treaty was signed on the 4th of March, of which the following is a condensed summary: Peace to be restored between England and Persia – British troops to evacuate Persia as soon as certain conditions should be complied with – All prisoners of war to be released on both sides – The Shah to give an amnesty to any of his subjects who might have been compromised by and during the war – The Shah to withdraw all his troops from Herat and Afghanistan within three months after the ratification of the treaty – The Shah to renounce all claim upon Herat or any other Afghan state, whether for sovereignty or for tribute – In any future quarrel between Persia and the Afghan khans, England to be appealed to as a friendly mediator – England to display equal justice to Persia and Afghanistan, in the event of any such appeal – Persia to have the power of declaring and maintaining war against any Afghan state in the event of positive insult or injury; but not to make such war a pretext for annexation or permanent occupation – Persia to liberate all Afghan prisoners, on condition of Persian prisoners being released by Afghans – All trading arrangements between England and Persia, in relation to consuls, ports, customs, &c., to be on an equal and friendly footing – The British mission, on its return to Teheran, to be received with due honours and ceremonials – Two commissioners to be named by the two courts, to adjudicate on British pecuniary claims against Persia – The British government to renounce all claim to any ‘protection’ over the Shah’s subjects against the Shah’s consent, provided no such power be given to [Russia or] any other court – England and Persia to aid each other in suppressing the slave-trade in the Persian Gulf – A portion of the English troops to remain on Persian soil until Herat should be evacuated by the Persians, but without any expense, and with as little annoyance as possible, to the Persian government – Ratifications to be exchanged at Bagdad within three months.

This treaty – which, if faithfully carried out, would certainly debar Persia from any undue interference with Afghan affairs – was signed at Paris on the very day (March 4th) when Sir James Outram announced to his troops at Bushire the intended attack on Mohamrah. Such was one of the anomalies springing from diplomacy at one place and war at another many thousand miles distant. Furukh Khan proceeded, on the 19th from Paris to London, where he was received by Queen Victoria as plenipotentiary extraordinary from the Shah of Persia, and where the arrangements for the fulfilment of the treaty were further carried out. The treaty having been forwarded to Teheran, was ratified by the Shah of Persia on the 14th of April, and the ratification arrived at Bagdad on the 17th. The English nation was still, as it had been from the beginning, without the means of judging whether the Persian war had been necessary or not; the government still withheld the state papers, on the ground that, as the ratification of the treaty would speedily be effected, it would be better to wait until then. When, later in the year, the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked the House of Commons for a vote of half a million sterling, ‘on account of the expenses of the Persian war,’ many members protested against the vote, on the ground that parliament had not been consulted in any way concerning the war. On the 16th of July Mr Roebuck moved a resolution – ‘That the war with Persia was declared, prosecuted, and concluded without information of such transactions being communicated to parliament; while expensive armaments were equipped without the sanction of a vote of this House; and that such conduct tends to weaken its just authority, and to dispense with its constitutional control over the finances of the country, and renders it requisite for this House to express its strong reprobation of such a course of proceeding.’ The government policy was censured on many grounds by Mr Roebuck, Lord John Russell, Mr Gladstone, and Mr Disraeli; the first of these speakers even went so far as to attribute the mutiny in India to the withdrawal of troops for the Persian war. The House of Commons agreed, however, pretty generally in the opinion, that although the ministers might reasonably have been more communicative before they commenced hostilities with Persia, there was ground sufficient for the hostilities themselves; and the resolution was negatived by 352 to 38. The question was reopened on the 17th, when the House granted the half-million asked by the Chancellor of the Exchequer towards defraying the expenses of this war; renewed attacks were made on the Asiatic policy of the Palmerston government, but the vote was agreed to; and nothing further occurred, during the remainder of the session, to disturb the terms of the pacification.

It is unnecessary to trace the course of events in Persia after the ratification of the treaty. The British officers, and the troops under their charge, had no further glory or honour to acquire; they would be called upon simply, either to remain quietly in Persia until Herat was evacuated, or to go through the troublesome ordeal of re-shipment back to Bombay. The troops all assembled in and near Bushire, where they resumed their former camp-life. The officers, having little to do, took occasional trips to Bassorah, Bagdad, and other places on the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris; while the soldiers were employed in destroying the fortifications of the encampment, now no longer needed. On the 9th of May Sir James Outram issued a ‘Field-force Order’ – thanking the troops for their services during this brief and rather uneventful war, and announcing the break-up of the force. Some of the regiments and corps were to return to India, as rapidly as means of transport could be obtained for them; while the rest, under Brigadier-general Jacob, were to form a small compact army, to remain at Bushire until all the terms of the treaty were fulfilled. Outram, Havelock, and a large number of officers, embarked within a few days for India; and by the time they reached Bombay and Madras, according to the place to which they were bound, the startling news reached their ears that a military mutiny had broken out at Meerut and Delhi. What followed, the pages of this volume have shewn. As to Persia, much delay occurred in carrying out the terms of the treaty, much travelling to and fro of envoys, and many months’ detention of British troops at Bushire; but at length the Persians evacuated Herat, the British quitted the Gulf, and the singular ‘Persian war,’ marked by so few battles, came to an end.

§ 2. THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE EXPEDITIONS, 1856-7-8

The occurrences westward of India having thus been briefly narrated, attention may now be directed to those on the east.

Viewed in relation to the circumstances which immediately preceded hostilities, it might almost be said that England declared war against China because a few persons went on board a small vessel to search for certain offenders, and because a Chinese official would not civilly receive visits from a British official. These trifling incidents, however, were regarded as symptoms of something greater: symptoms which required close diplomatic watching. To understand this matter, a brief summary of earlier events is needed.

During the first thirty years of the present century, in like manner as in earlier centuries, Europeans had no recognised right of residing in China, or even of visiting its ports. Merchants were allowed to reside at Canton, by official connivance rather than sanction; and even this was possible only at certain times of the year – they being required in other months to retire to Macao. They were liable to be expelled from Canton at any time, with or without assigned cause; their trade was liable to be stopped with equal suddenness; and, under the designation of ‘barbarians,’ all negotiation was denied to them except through the medium of a mercantile community called the Hong merchants. During many years, Indian opium was the chief commodity sold by the English to the Chinese, in exchange for tea and other produce. This opium-trade was always declared illegal by the Chinese government, though always covertly favoured by the Chinese officials. Quarrels frequently arose concerning this trade, and the quarrels sometimes ended in violence. The import of opium became so large that the exports were insufficient to pay for it; and when silver was thus found necessary to make up the balance, the imperial anger waxed stronger and stronger. The ‘barbarians’ were commanded not to bring any more opium; but, finding the trade too profitable to be abandoned, they continued their dealings in spite of the mandates of the celestial potentate.

The year 1831 may be said to have commenced the political or international stage of this difficulty. The governor-general of India wrote a letter to the governor of Canton, complaining of the conduct of the Chinese authorities, and demanding explanations, &c. Why his lordship, rather than any functionary in England, did this, was because the East India Company in those days sold opium on its own account, and made use of its political power to render that trade as profitable as possible – one of the pernicious anomalies arising out of the Company’s double functions. In 1832, the governor of Canton vouchsafed a partial explanation, but only to the Hong merchants – refusing with superb scorn, to communicate either with the Company’s merchants, or with the governor-general. In 1833 an imperial edict forbade the introduction of opium; but this, like many that preceded it, remained inoperative. In 1834 the Company’s trading monopoly ceasing, private merchants thereupon engaged in the tea-trade with China. The English government sent three commissioners – Lord Napier, Mr (afterwards Sir) J. F. Davis, and Sir G. B. Robinson – as ‘superintendents of British commerce in China.’ The Chinese authorities refused to acknowledge these commissioners in any way, in spite of numerous invitations; while on the other hand the commissioners refused to retire from Canton to Macao. These disputes led to violence, and the violence brought a British ship-of-war up the Canton river. A compromise was the result – the commissioners retiring to Macao, and the Chinese authorities allowing the resumption of the opium-traffic. Lord Napier died towards the close of the year, and was succeeded as chief-superintendent by Mr Davis – Captain Elliot being appointed secretary, and afterwards third superintendent. During the next three years trade continued; but the Chinese officials were uniformly rude and insulting. The British government would not permit Captain Elliot to submit to these indignities; missives and counter-missives passed to and fro; and the year 1837 ended with threatening symptoms. In 1838 Admiral Maitland arrived in Canton river with a ship of war, to protect British interests – by cannon-balls, if not by friendly compact. The nearest approach to equality between the two nations was in an interview between Admiral Maitland and the Chinese Admiral Kwan; in which Maitland assured his brother-admiral that he would remain peaceful – until provoked. In 1839, as in previous years, the opium-trade was often violently interrupted by the Chinese authorities. The officers of the English government, political and naval, were placed in an embarrassing position in this matter; their duty was to protect Englishmen; but they could not compel the Chinese to trade in opium – for the Chinese government held the same power as all other despotic governments, of prohibiting or encouraging trade with other countries. In this year, when Maitland was absent, Elliot became powerless at Canton; he and all the English were made prisoners, and could not obtain release until they had destroyed all the opium in the English stores – more than twenty thousand chests. This was done: Elliot guaranteeing that the English government would repay the merchants. Commissioner Lin saw that the opium was wholly destroyed; and by the end of May almost every European had quitted Canton.

It was thus that commenced the first Chinese war – a war which had a bad moral basis on the English side; since it arose more out of the forced sale of an intoxicating drug, than out of any other circumstance. The British government, finding themselves bound by Captain Elliot’s promise to pay an enormous sum for the opium destroyed, and feeling the importance of maintaining British supremacy in the east, resolved to settle the quarrel by warlike means. Fighting and negotiating alternated during 1840 and the two following years. At one time, Sir Gordon Bremer, at another, Sir Hugh Gough, commanded troops on the Chinese coast, acting in conjunction with ships-of-war; and according to the amount of naval or military success, so did the Chinese authorities manifest or not a disposition to treat. Commissioner Lin, then Commissioner Keshen, and afterwards Commissioner Key-ing, conducted negotiations – a perilous duty; for their imperial master did not scruple to punish, or even to put to death, those diplomatists who made a treaty distasteful to him; and nothing but the noise of cannon induced him to respect treaties when made. The chief military and naval events of the three years, in connection with this struggle, were the following: The British ship Hellas attacked by junks, and many of the crew killed; an attempt to burn the British fleet by fire-rafts; Chusan taken by the English; naval action near Macao; attack and capture of Chuen-pe and Tae-cok-tow; Hong-kong taken by the English; the Bogue forts, with 460 guns, taken by Sir Gordon Bremer; Canton attacked by the British, under Sir Hugh Gough, and only spared on the prompt payment of five million dollars; Amoy, with 300 guns, taken by the British; the cities of Ting-hae, Ching-hae, Ning-po, and several others on the coast, captured; several military engagements in the vicinity of the captured cities; an advance of a powerful squadron up the Yang-tsze-kiang; and a threatening of the great city of Nankin, which brought the emperor effectually to terms – all the previous offers of negotiation on the part of the Chinese having been mere expedients to save time.

The war ended thuswise. Sir Henry Pottinger arrived in the Chinese waters in April 1842, with full power as representative of the British Crown; and it was he who procured the important ‘Treaty of Nankin,’ signed by the respective plenipotentiaries in 1842, and the ratifications exchanged by the respective sovereigns in 1843. This treaty having had an important bearing on the later or second war with China, we will epitomise a few of its chief conditions: Lasting peace and friendship established between England and China – China to pay 21,000,000 dollars for the opium destroyed, and for the expenses of the war; the payments to be spread over four years – The ports of Canton, Amoy, Fuh-choo-foo, Ning-po, and Shang-hae, to be thrown open to British merchants, with consular facilities, and just and regular tariffs – The island of Hong-kong to become a permanent British possession – All British subjects, at that time confined in China, to be at once and unconditionally released – The Chinese emperor to give an amnesty to all his own subjects, in respect of any proceedings on their part friendly to the British – Correspondence in future to be conducted on terms of perfect equality between the officers of the two governments – The islands of Chusan and Kulangsoo to be held by the British until the fulfilment of all the conditions of the treaty, and then given up.

Under the influence of this Treaty of Nankin, trade rapidly extended between England and China. Instead of being confined to Canton, and conducted in a stealthy and undignified manner, it was openly carried on at five ports. The British government did not undertake to protect the opium-trade more than that in any other commodity; on the contrary, the representatives of the English government would gladly have seen that trade diminish; but in truth, the East India Company realised several millions sterling a year profit by it, and English merchants reaped many additional millions: insomuch that a very powerful influence was brought to back up this trade.

A ‘Supplementary Treaty’ was signed in October 1843, for regulating the terms of commercial intercourse at the five ports, and providing for the courteous reception of British representatives by the Chinese officials, in matters relating to mutual trade. During the thirteen years following the signature of the Treaty of Nankin, the trade between England and China gradually increased, though not at so rapid a rate as had been hoped by British manufacturers and merchants. The English had trading establishments, with consuls and other officials, at the five ports, and a colony or military settlement at Hong-kong; while there were always a few ships-of-war in the Chinese waters. The relations, however, were not wholly peaceful. The inhabitants of Canton had a general ill-will towards the English; so had the imperial viceroy; and violence arising out of this ill-will led to a brief period of hostilities. In April 1847, the English seized the Bogue Forts, in the Canton river, in order to obtain redress for various insults; this seizure was followed by a new convention.

Thus matters continued until October 1856. On the 8th of that month, an incident occurred, trivial in itself, which gave rise to the ‘Second War with China.’ Sir John Bowring was at that time chief representative of British interests in China, with Hong-kong as his head-quarters; Admiral Sir Michael Seymour commanded the royal ships in those seas; Commodore Elliot was under Seymour in the Canton and Hong-kong district; and Mr Parkes was consul at Canton. These were the English officials more immediately concerned in the matter. On the day here named, a Chinese officer and a party of soldiers boarded a lorcha or small vessel called the Arrow, anchored off Canton; and then seized twelve out of fourteen of the crew, bound them, and carried them away. The Arrow had a colonial register from the governor of Hong-kong, which placed it under British protection; the master, an Englishman, protested against the seizure, but was not listened to. The British flag, too, was hauled down from the lorcha. This was the statement on the part of the British. Most of the accusations, however, were stoutly denied by the officials of Canton, who asserted that the lorcha was Chinese, that the owner was Chinese, that the crew were Chinese, and that the boarding was effected simply to take into custody men who had committed some offence against Chinese laws.

When the seizure of the men from the Arrow became known, Mr Parkes remonstrated with the Chinese officer, on the ground that the crew were under British protection. No notice being taken of this remonstrance, Mr Parkes communicated with the highest dignitary in that part of China, whose name was Yeh Mingchin, and whose office was variously designated imperial commissioner, governor, and viceroy. The letter sent by Parkes to this functionary demanded that the twelve men should be brought back to the lorcha by the same officer who had taken them away, that an apology should be made, and an assurance given that the British flag should in future be respected. The men were sent back, after much negotiation; but Mr Parkes complained that the return ‘was not made in the public manner which had marked the seizure, and that all appearance of an apology was pointedly avoided.’ The facts were communicated to Sir John Bowring, and by him to Admiral Seymour. No real injury had been done, for the men had been reinstated; but there was an insult, which the English representatives conceived themselves bound to resent. They had often been piqued at the absence of respect shewn by the officers of the Celestial Empire, and were willing to avail themselves of any reasonable opportunity for bringing about a more diplomatic state of affairs.

The first act of war occurred on the part of the British. Sir John Bowring recommended to the admiral the seizure of a Chinese junk or war-boat, as a probable mode of bringing an apology. Sir Michael accordingly directed Commodore Elliot, of the Sybille, to carry out Bowring’s instructions; and placed at his disposal the Burracouta steam-sloop and the Coromandel tender. A junk was seized; but this was a profitless adventure; for, being found to be private property, the junk was given up again. The admiral next sent the steam-frigates Encounter and Sampson up the Canton river; ‘in the hope that the presence of such an imposing force would shew the high-commissioner the prudence of complying with our demands.’ The Chinese viceroy remained, nevertheless, immovable; he made no apology. Mr Parkes thereupon went from Canton to Hong-kong, to consult with Bowring and Seymour as to the best course to be adopted. They all agreed that the seizure of the defences of the city of Canton would be the most judicious, both as a display of power without the sacrifice of life, and of the determination of the English to enforce redress – ‘experience of the Chinese character having proved that moderation is considered by the officials only as an evidence of weakness.’

Then commenced the second stage in the proceedings. On the 23d of October, Sir Michael Seymour went in person up to Canton, with the Coromandel, Sampson, and Barracouta, and accompanied by the marines and boat-crews of the Calcutta, Winchester, Bittern, and Sybille. He captured four forts a few miles below Canton, spiked the guns, destroyed the ammunition, and burned the buildings. Another, the Macao fort, in the middle of the river, mounting 86 guns, he retained and garrisoned for a time. Mr Parkes was then sent to announce to Yeh that the British admiral had come to enforce redress for insults received, and would remain in the river until redress was obtained. The high-commissioner sent a reply which was not deemed satisfactory. On the morning of the 24th, marines and sailors were sent to capture the ‘Bird’s Nest Fort,’ the Shamin Fort, and others near Canton; this they did, spiking the guns and destroying the ammunition. On the afternoon of the same day, strong reinforcements were sent to the British factory, or trading-station of the merchants, to protect it from any sudden attack, and to guard against the floating of fire-rafts by the Chinese on the river.

‘Apology’ was the demand made by the British representatives; but no apology came; and thereupon the siege of Canton was proceeded with. On the 25th, a fort called the Dutch Folly, immediately opposite the city, was captured. The 26th being Sunday, nothing was done on that day. On the 27th, the admiral heightened his demands. He caused Consul Parkes to write to the Chinese commissioner, to the effect that as the required apology and reparation had not been given, the terms should be made more stringent. Henceforward, the field of contest was widened; it was no longer the lorcha and the flag alone that constituted the grievance. Sir John Bowring probably thought that the same amount of threat and of fighting, if fighting there must be, might be made to settle other annoyances, as well as those more immediately under notice. No reply being sent to Parkes’s letter, the guns of the Encounter and Barracouta were brought to bear upon the Chinese commissioner’s residence, and upon some troops posted on the hills behind a fort named by the English Gough’s Fort. This enraged Yeh Mingchin, who issued a proclamation, offering a reward of thirty dollars for every Englishman’s head.

Sir Michael, resolved to punish this obstinate viceroy, made preparations for a much more serious attack. He sent Captain Hall on shore, to warn the inhabitants of Canton to remove their persons and property from the vicinity of a certain portion of the city; this they did during the night of the 27th. On the 28th, a bombardment was kept up from the Dutch Folly, with a view of opening a clear passage to the wall of the city; and when this passage was opened by noon on the 29th, a storming-party was sent in under Commodore Elliot. Marines and sailors, with two field-pieces, advanced to the wall, and speedily obtained possession of the defences between two of the city-gates. One of the gates was then blown to pieces by gunpowder, and another body of seamen advanced to that spot under Captain Hall. Soon afterwards, Seymour, Parkes, and Elliot entered the city through this shattered gate, went to the high-commissioner’s house, inspected it, remained there some time, and then returned to the ships. The motive for this visit was a singular one, unusual in European warlike politics, but having a significance in dealing with so peculiar a people as the Chinese; it was simply (in the words of the admiral’s dispatch) ‘to shew his excellency that I had the power to enter the city.’