Kitabı oku: «War Inconsistent with the Religion of Jesus Christ», sayfa 6

OBJECTIONS ANSWERED

As was proposed, a number of objections to the general sentiments that have been advocated shall be stated and answered.

Objection first. Shall we stand still and suffer an assassin to enter our houses without resistance and let him murder ourselves and families?

Answer. I begin with this because it is generally the first objection that is made to the doctrine of peace by all persons, high and low, learned and unlearned; notwithstanding it is an objection derived from a fear of consequences and not from a conviction of duty, and might with the same propriety have been made to the martyrs who, for conscience’ sake, refused to repel their murderers with carnal weapons, as to Christians who, for conscience’ sake, refuse at this day to resist evil. No Christian will pretend that defense with carnal weapons is not criminal, if the gospel really forbids it, let the consequences of nonresistance be what they may. For the requisitions of the gospel are the rule of duty. But I presume the objection above stated arises altogether from an apprehension of consequences rather than from regard to duty.

Every candid person must admit that this objection is of no force, until the question whether the gospel does or does not prohibit resistance with deathly weapons is first settled. It might, therefore, justly be dismissed without further remark; but as mankind are often more influenced by supposed consequences than by considerations of duty, and as the objection is very popular, it may deserve a more particular reply.

In the first place, I would observe that the supposition of the objector relates to a very extreme case, a case which has very rarely, if ever, occurred to Christians holding to nonresistance with deathly weapons, and it bears little or no resemblance to the general principles or practices of war which are openly advocated and promoted by professing Christians. Should an event like that supposed in the objection take place, it would be a moment of surprise and agitation in which few could act collectedly from principle. What was done would probably be done in perturbation of mind. But war between nations is a business of calculation and debate, affording so much time for reflection that men need not act from sudden and violent impulse, but may act from fixed principle. In this respect, therefore, war is a very different thing from what is involved in the objection which does not in the least affect the principles or practice of systematic warfare. It is not uncommon to hear persons who are hopefully pious, when pressed by the example and the precepts of Christ against war, acknowledge that most of the wars which have existed since the gospel dispensation cannot be justified on Christian principles; yet these very persons are never heard to disapprove of the common principles of war, or to counteract them by their lives and conversation before a wicked world; but, on the contrary, they will often eulogize heroes, join in the celebration of victories, and take as deep an interest in the result of battles as the warriors of this world; and if their conduct is called in question, they will attempt to justify it by pleading the necessity of self-defense, and immediately introduce the above objection which is by no means parallel with the general principles and practices of all wars.

The truth is, war is a very popular thing among mankind, because it is so congenial to their natural dispositions; and, however gravely some men may, at times, profess to deplore its calamity and wickedness, it is too evident that they take a secret pleasure in the approbation of the multitude and in the fascinating glory of arms; and we have reason to believe that this objection is often made merely to ward off the arrows of conviction which would otherwise pierce their consciences.

The objection, however, wholly overlooks the providence and promise of God. Assassins do not stroll out of the circle of God’s providence. Not only is their breath in his hand, but the weapons they hold are under his control. Besides, God’s children are dear to him, and he shields them by his protecting care, not suffering any event to befall them except such as shall be for his glory and their good. Whoever touches them touches the apple of his eye. He has promised to be a very present help to them in every time of need, and to deliver them that trust in him out of all their trouble. He will make even their enemies to be at peace with them. For the eyes of the Lord are over the righteous and his ears are open to their prayers, but the face of the Lord is against them that do evil; and who is he that will harm you if ye be followers of that which is good? But if ye suffer for righteousness’ sake, happy are ye, and be not afraid of their terror, neither be troubled. If God be thus for his children, who can be against them? Is not the arm of the Lord powerful to save, and a better defense to all who trust in him than swords and guns? Whoever found him unfaithful to his promises or feeble to save? Are not the hosts of heaven at his command? Are not his angels swift to do his will? “Are they not all ministering spirits sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation?” “The angel of the Lord encampeth round about them that fear him, and delivereth them.” If the Lord is on their side, Christians have no cause to fear what man can do unto them. Says the blessed Saviour, “Whosoever will save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall find it.”

If consequences are rightly examined, they may prove to be of more importance than at first supposed. If the gospel does forbid resistance with deathly weapons, then he who saves his temporal life by killing his enemy may lose his eternal life; while he who loses his life for Christ’s sake is sure of everlasting life. Thus the Christian, if he is killed, goes to heaven; but the assassin, if he is killed, goes to hell, and the soul of the slayer is in danger of following. Whoever kills another to prevent being killed himself, does it on presumption; for, whatever may be the appearances, God only can know whether one man will assassinate another, before the event has taken place. Men, however, seem to think little of killing or being killed by fighting, whether in single combat or on the field of general battle, though they shudder at the idea of being put to death by an assassin, unless they can inflict or attempt to inflict on him the same evil.

But the objection is usually made on the supposition that the doctrine in question requires Christians to stand still and rather court the dagger than otherwise. This is an unfair statement, for it would be presumption to stand still when there was a chance of escape. Besides, the Christian must act on the defensive, not with carnal, but with spiritual weapons, which are more powerful when exercised in faith than swords or spears.

Probably no instance can be found of robbers murdering such as conscientiously held to nonresistance. It is resistance that provokes violence; forbearance and good will repress it. But if instances of this kind may be found, it is no evidence against the doctrine in question any more than against the principles of the Martyrs. God may, for wise reasons, call away some of his children by the hands of murderers; if so, instead of losing, they save their lives.

Objection second. Self-defense, and, if necessary, with deathly weapons, is the first law of nature. All the animal creation are armed with means of defense, and the principles of the gospel are not contrary to the principles of nature; therefore self-defense is not inconsistent with Christianity.

Answer. It is admitted that the laws of the gospel are not contrary to the primitive laws of nature; but it is by no means granted that they are consistent with the laws of corrupt nature. In consequence of the revolt of man the earth was cursed for his sake. It appears probable that before the fall of man animals were harmless and docile; and it is not improbable that when the curse shall be removed, when the earth shall be filled with righteousness and peace, the lion and the lamb may literally lie down together. At present, indeed, the dove, the lamb, and some other animals have no means of defense, unless flight be considered such. And while warriors are figuratively represented by ferocious beasts, real Christians are represented by lambs and doves. So far as nature is made to speak fairly on the subject, it speaks in favor of the doctrine which has been advocated.

But corrupt nature strongly dictates many things quite contrary to the precepts of the gospel; and no doctrine will be given up more reluctantly by corrupt nature than that of the lawfulness of war, because no doctrine is more congenial with the depraved feelings and propensities of unsanctified men, for their “feet are swift to shed blood; destruction and misery are in their ways, and the way of peace have they not known; there is no fear of God before their eyes.”

Objection third. The precepts of the gospel are consistent with the moral law, or the eternal nature of things, which is forever the standard of right and wrong to all moral beings in the universe; and war has been prosecuted consistently with this rule of right and wrong; therefore war cannot be contrary to the precepts of the gospel.

Answer. This is an objection founded on an undefinable something aside from divine precept; yet as some terms in it have been much used in polemic divinity by men of eminent talents and piety, whose praise is in the churches, I think it neither proper nor modest to dissent from so high authority without offering some reasons. I shall, therefore, make a few general observations on what is called the moral law, the eternal rule of right and wrong, or the nature of things; all of which phrases, I believe, have been occasionally used by eminent writers as conveying the same ideas.

I cannot agree with such as suppose that a moral law or nature of things exists independently of the will of God and is the common law of God and man. It appears to me as inconsistent to suppose a law to exist without a lawgiver as to suppose a world to exist without a creator. If God is the only eternal and independent Being in the universe, and if all things are the work of his power and goodness, then the supposition that an eternal law exists independently of him appears to me to be absurd, as on this supposition there exists a law without a lawgiver and an effect without a cause. If God is not the author of all things, then there must be more than one eternal cause of things.

To suppose that the reason and fitness of things independently of the will of God, either in his works, his providence, or word, can be a rule of man’s duty appears to me as inconsistent as to suppose that men might institute divine worship from such fitness of things independently of the existence of God; for the will of God to man seems as necessary to lay a foundation of moral obligation and to direct man’s obedience as the existence of God is necessary to lay a foundation of religious worship. Should it be asked whether the laws of God are not founded on the eternal nature and fitness of things, I would answer that such a supposition appears to me no more reasonable than to suppose that his power is founded on the eternal capacity of things; for the capacity of things has just as much reality and eternity in it to found the omnipotence of God upon, as the reason and nature of things have to found his infinite wisdom or justice upon.

I therefore dissent from all standard of moral obligation which are supposed to exist aside from, and independently of, the divine will; and fully agree with the Assembly’s Shorter Catechism, in the answer to this question: “What is the duty which God requires of man? Answer: The duty which God requires of man is obedience to his revealed will.” Should it, however, be said that things do exist aside from the divine will, that it does not depend on the divine will, but on the nature of things, that two and two make four, or that a thing cannot be in motion and at rest at the same time, it is by no means admitted that this order or constitution of things exists independently of God; but it is believed to be as much the effect of his power and goodness as anything else. And if God is not the author of all the laws both in the natural and moral world, it may reasonably be inquired, who is?

If God is the moral governor of the world, then all his laws over men, as moral beings, must be moral laws; and to make a distinction between the laws designed to regulate the moral conduct of men, and to call some of them moral and others by different names, seems to me not necessary, while I find no such distinction in the Scriptures. Because some of God’s laws were intended to be temporary, under certain circumstances, they were no less of a moral nature on that account; neither was it any less criminal to violate them.

As created things are in some respects constantly changing, and as the relations of things are often varied, so a law may be relatively right at one time and relatively wrong at another. But as man is frail and short-sighted, and is incapable of seeing the end from the beginning, he is totally unable of himself to judge what is and what is not right, all things considered; hence the necessity of a revelation from God to direct his steps.

That there is a fitness of things and a standard of moral right and wrong cannot be denied; but, instead of being founded in a supposed nature of things independent of God, it originates in the very nature and perfections of God himself, and can never be known by man any farther than the nature and perfections of God are known. A standard of right and wrong independent of God, whether by the name of moral law or nature of things, is what never has been and never can be intelligibly defined. It is like a form without dimensions, like a foundation resting on nothing. It is, therefore, in my opinion, as extravagant to talk of an eternal nature of things, without reference to the laws of God, as it would be to talk of an eternal wisdom or an eternal omnipotence, independent of the existence of God.

But if the statement of the objector is meant only to imply a rule of right and wrong emanating from the nature and perfections of God, and coincident with his laws, then, admitting the propriety of the terms moral law, nature of things, etc., the objection, if it proves anything, may prove quite too much for its advocates; for under certain circumstances it has been consistent with this rule of moral right and wrong utterly to exterminate nations, to destroy men, women, and children, and show them no mercy.

Besides, the whole force of the objection rests on the supposition that no laws which have existed, and which were not contrary to the moral law, can be abrogated under the Christian dispensation or be inconsistent with the precepts of the gospel. It hence follows that whatever has been morally right and lawful for men to do must forever remain right and lawful to be done. This is a necessary result from the premises; but no Christian can consistently subscribe to this. The premises must, therefore, be unsound and the objection of no force.

If literal sacrifices, slavery, and many other practices which are totally abolished under the Christian dispensation were not contrary to the moral law under the Old Testament economy, why may not the same be true of war? Why may not the gospel forbid war as consistently as it can forbid slavery?

Objection fourth. The nature of religion and morality under the ancient dispensation was the same as under the new. Love to God and man was the substance of the law and the prophets; and though truth under the former was inculcated more by types and ceremonies, yet the essence of religion was the same under that as under the present dispensation; and as war was not inconsistent with the nature and precepts of religion then, it cannot be inconsistent with the nature and precepts of religion now, under like circumstances.

Answer. It is readily admitted that the essence of religion is the same under the present as under the former dispensation, both requiring at all times and in all actions holy exercises of heart in cordial obedience to divine command; yet the laws for external conduct under the two dispensations differ widely, and the practice of war involves much of the external conduct of men. It was never right for men to indulge unholy feelings in the act of war, but the external act was required as a means of executing the divine vengeance; the gospel does not command, but seems plainly to forbid, the external act of war.

But to suppose that saints under the gospel can ever be placed in circumstances like those of the ancient church is to suppose that they may be put under the same typical economy which has vanished away, given place to the substance, and ceased to be binding even on the natural Israelites. To be in like circumstances they must also be made the executors of God’s wrath, to inflict vengeance, by his particular command, on idolatrous and rebellious nations. The Israelites had the same high authority to exterminate the Canaanites and subdue the idolatrous nations about Palestine that the holy angels had to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah.

It is perfectly plain that if God should positively command Christians to take the weapons of war and not only repel invasion but actually exterminate nations, it would be their duty to obey, and a refusal would be open rebellion against God. The Old Testament saints received such commands, but Christians have no such authority, which makes a material difference in circumstances.

Some general observations relative to the different dispensations of the church of God may illustrate this topic more fully.

The Old Testament economy has sometimes, perhaps without reason, been divided into the Adamic, Patriarchal, and Mosaic dispensations of the church; but as the latter was more full and complete, and as the distinction between the Mosaic and Christian dispensations is common, I shall confine my remarks chiefly to that distinction, though I consider the great distinction to be between the Old and New Testament economies.

The Old Testament economy, in general, was typical of the New. Under the former dispensation literal and temporal things typified spiritual and everlasting things under the latter. The nation of Israel, chosen and separated from all other nations, typified the true Israel of God, who are chosen out of every nation and sanctified and set apart as a holy nation and peculiar people, to offer up spiritual sacrifices to God. The land of Canaan was a type of the heavenly Canaan. Jerusalem was a type of the New Jerusalem from above. Mount Zion and the royal throne of Israel, which were in Jerusalem, typified the heavenly Zion and the throne of the true David who now reigns in glory. The sacrifices were types of spiritual offerings. The Israelites had enemies within and foes without, literal weapons of war and literal warfare, typical of spiritual foes, spiritual armor, and spiritual warfare.¹ Their kings were seated on the throne of the Lord (see 1 Chron. xxix. 23). At the command of God they judged and made war and conquered their enemies and thus typified the Son of God who is now on the throne of his Father David, and who in righteousness judges and makes war and rides forth conquering and to conquer. The ancient promises and threatenings were mostly temporal, but typical of spiritual and everlasting promises and threatenings. Doubtless the gospel was preached by types and figures under the Old Testament economy, and the saints of old looked upon those temporal things merely as shadows representing a more enduring substance. When they looked upon Canaan, the land of promise, they viewed it as a type of the heavenly Canaan, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on earth seeking a better country. When they looked on the bleeding lamb they beheld, by the eye of faith, the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world.

Thus we may see that almost the whole of the Old Testament economy was typical and temporary, and not intended to be perfect and everlasting. But under the gospel dispensation we have a new covenant and better promises which are intended to be perfect and everlasting. It is therefore more proper for those who live under this new and perfect dispensation to look at the substance than at the shadow for a rule of duty. Errors are often and easily propagated by reasoning from analogy and introducing it as proof of sentiments instead of illustration. This is frequently done in relation to the Old Testament economy and common political government. It is not uncommon to hear ministers, in their political sermons, reason and infer just as if there were a perfect parallel between the Jewish theocracy and political governments, when at the head of one was the Lord of hosts and at the head of the others are but men; when one was the church of the living God, and the others are but human institutions. They not unfrequently speak of God’s driving out the heathen before his American Israel and planting them in a goodly land, as though there were a perfect parallel between the Americans driving the Indians from their native soil and taking possession of it themselves, without divine commission, and the Israelites going at the express command of God and taking possession of Canaan. Thus they endeavor to keep up a parallel between God’s ancient church and civil governments. The economy of God’s ancient covenant people was by no means a political institution in the popular sense, but it was a dispensation of the church of God, and in its rites, ceremonies, and government was typical of the kingdom of Messiah under his mediatorial reign, and differed widely in its nature, origin, and design from mere political governments; therefore all reasoning drawn from a supposed analogy between them is specious and false. The Israelites had no authority to enact laws or to alter God’s laws one iota; their duty was implicitly to obey them.

But if Christians take their authority for going to war from the practice of the Old Testament saints, their example will prove too much; it will not only allow war, but offensive war in its most dreadful forms.

Objection fifth. Abraham went to war, not like the Israelites at the command of God, yet he met with the divine approbation when he returned from the slaughter of the kings; he, therefore, must have acted on a universal law still in force; and as Christians are called the children of Abraham they ought, of course, to imitate his example in such things as God approved.

Answer. Abraham, like the Israelites, was under a typical dispensation and practiced rites and ceremonies which were a shadow of good things to come. That he acted without divine command, in the war referred to, is more than we are warranted to say. He was a prophet and the friend of God and probably was acquainted with the divine will on this subject.

Christians are not called the children of Abraham because they imitate his example in war, but because they exercise like precious faith with him. If Christians are warranted to imitate the example of Abraham in all things which were tolerated by God, then they may sacrifice cattle, practice polygamy, and buy and hold slaves. But if they object to his example as a rule of duty in these instances, why not object to his example as a rule of duty in the case of war?

But to say that he acted from some universal law still in force is taking for granted the question in dispute, and cannot be admitted without evidence.

The war waged by Abraham against the kings was, I apprehend, offensive rather than defensive; for Lot, his brother’s son, whom he rescued, did not then belong to his family or kingdom, but was separated from him and was also a patriarch, a father of nations, and a prince or head over his own house or kingdom.

It appears very evident that offensive as well as defensive war was tolerated under the patriarchal economy, as may be seen from the words of the inspired Jacob when blessing his sons (Gen. xlviii. 22). That, as well as the Mosaic dispensation, was typical, and doubtless war was allowed under both for the same reasons.

But there can be no doubt that whoever attempts to justify war by the example of Abraham may equally justify the slavery of our fellow-men; and whoever depends on his example for authority for engaging in war, to be consistent, must advocate and defend the doctrine of slavery.

Objection sixth. It appears to be a universal law of God that “whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.” If one man, or one nation, attacks another and sheds his blood, his own must be shed in return. Hence this precept not only authorizes taking away the life of a murderer, but authorizes nations to repel by war nations that wage war against them.

Answer. Whether this was a precept given to man as a rule of duty or not is very questionable, though it has generally been so construed, at least since the dark ages of the church; and it is still more questionable whether it is a universal and perpetual law.

If we attend to the phraseology of this decree of God, we shall find it to be very different from that of the precepts, generally, delivered to Moses. God did not say to Noah, as he often did to Moses, thou shalt do this, or that, but he said, “I will require the life of man,” etc. If God had designed to delegate executive authority to Noah and his descendants to execute retributive judgment on the manslayer, the connection of the whole language must have been altered, for God declared what he would do himself. It appears, therefore, to have been God’s decree, and the promulgation of his law by which he would inflict righteous judgment on the guilty; the penalty was intended as a warning to deter mankind from violence, the sin for which the old world was swept away. And I see no reason why this threatening should not be considered parallel with the decrees of Christ, – that “all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword; he that leadeth into captivity shall go into captivity; he that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword; here is the faith and the patience of the saints.” Why the former should be considered as a rule of obedience for man, and these latter passages not so, I am unable to say. “He that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword” is as positive as “whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.”

It may be observed that the faith and patience of the saints is here spoken of in such a way as to imply that they exercised and manifested their faith and patience when they were put to death by violence or carried into captivity. And, indeed, how could their faith and patience appear if they, like the wicked world, returned evil for evil, carried into captivity, and killed with the sword?

The original threatening has been fulfilled by the providence, and sometimes by the express command, of God. As Noah was the head of the new world and the father of nations, it seems to have had reference to nations rather than to individuals; and all nations that have shed blood in war must, in their turn, have their own blood shed; so that all they that take the sword may perish with the sword agreeably to the threatening made known to Noah, and to those announced by Christ.

But, admitting that the law quoted in the objection was intended as a rule of duty for man, it does not appear that it was designed to be universal and perpetual. Before the flood no authority appears in any sense to have been delegated to man to shed the blood of man. So far from executing the penalty of death or causing it to be executed upon Cain, who was of the wicked one and slew his brother, notwithstanding his guilty forebodings, God threatened a sevenfold vengeance on him who should presume to do it.

Under the Mosaic dispensation many crimes were punishable with death according to positive precept; but God, for wise reasons, did not always have the penalty executed. David was guilty of murder and adultery, both capital crimes; yet he was permitted to live.

All kinds of vindictive punishment under the Christian dispensation appear to be absolutely forbidden. By vindictive I mean that which is intended to vindicate the law, as executing strict justice, and prevent offenses only, as taking away life, but which is not designed to promote the individual good of the person punished. That punishment which is designed and which has a tendency to promote the good of the punished, as well as to deter offenders, I consider to be strictly disciplinary or corrective, and consistent with the spirit and precepts of the gospel. Says an apostle, “Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but give place unto wrath: for it is written, Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord.” “For the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God.” It has been said that this only forbids a revengeful temper, but this evasion will not do; for Christians are here forbidden to do the very thing which God declares he will do himself, and he does nothing but what is holy.

“Render to no man evil for evil,” is a positive precept without any limitation, and which admits of no evasion; and it must plainly rescind the law of shedding man’s blood because he had shed the blood of man.

But the exclamation is often made, What, not punish a murderer with death! Little do those who make this exclamation think that they themselves also are sinners and that every sin deserves not only temporal death but God’s wrath and curse forever, and that they are in like condemnation unless redeemed by the blood of the Lamb. For such, it might be well to inquire if they know “what manner of spirit they are of.”