Kitabı oku: «The Battle of Atlanta», sayfa 12

GENERAL GRANT

Remarks at Army of Potomac Reunion

Niagara Falls, N. Y

When you consider that it is now thirty-three years after the war, that the Government has published every report, letter and order that was of any moment, you will agree with me that it is difficult to interest an Army audience in talking about another Army, and I shall not detain you long on that subject. There are, however, some incidents of General Grant's first visit to your Army, his return to ours, and the planning of the grand campaign that was to end the war, that may interest you.

In December, 1863, after the Battle of Chattanooga, the Army of the Tennessee camped along the railway from Columbia, Tenn., to Decatur and Huntsville, Ala. After the Battle of Chattanooga General Grant returned to Nashville and called there to meet him several Corps Commanders of the Army of the Tennessee, and General Sheridan of the Army of the Cumberland. If I remember rightly, there were present Generals Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Granger, Logan, Rawlins, and myself. All of us of the Army of the Tennessee were a hard-looking crowd. None of us had seen Nashville or any base of supplies since we had marched from the Mississippi River to Chattanooga, and we had been hard at work building railways and foraging. We arrived in Nashville late in the afternoon, and General Sherman took us to General Grant's headquarters. General Grant suggested that we should call upon the Military Governor of Tennessee, Andrew Johnson, and pay our respects to him. We, of course, followed General Grant, and were introduced to Governor Johnson. I remember that our uniforms were greatly worn, one or two of us wearing blouses with Army overcoats, and he looked at us with a very quizzical eye, until General Grant said to excuse us that he had not given us time since we reached the city to change our suits; but Grant knew we had no others. Governor Johnson was then a very radical man, and was very emphatic in informing us that while he was Military Governor of Tennessee no rebel would receive much consideration from him, and brought his fist down on a piano in the room with such force that the sound from it startled us all, and we left there with the idea that rebels in Tennessee had better get out; but we soon found that his words were much stronger than his acts, for I hardly ever got my hands on rebel stock or supplies that I did not find Johnson trying to pull them off.

After our visit, General Sherman suggested that we should all go to the theater that evening, and under his lead we went to the principal opera house to hear the play of Hamlet. We were all strangers in Nashville; even General Grant was not well known. We paid our way in and found the theater crowded with soldiers going to and returning from veteran furloughs. General Sherman, who you all know was a great lover of the theater, sat alongside of me and soon commenced criticising the play, earnestly protesting that it was being murdered. I had to check him several times and tell him unless he kept quiet the soldiers in the audience would recognize him and there would be a scene. We had entered late, and there soon came on the scene where Hamlet soliloquizes over the skull of Yorick. The audience was perfectly still, endeavoring to comprehend the actor's words, when a soldier far back in the audience rose up and in a clear voice called out, as the actor held up the skull, "Say, pard, what is it, Yank or Reb?" The house appreciated the point and was instantly in an uproar, and General Grant said we had better leave, so we went quietly out, no one discovering Grant's or Sherman's presence. Sherman immediately suggested that we should find an oyster-house and get something to eat, and General Rawlins was put forward as guide and spokesman. He led us to a very inviting place. We went in and found there was but one large table in the place. There was one man sitting at it, and Rawlins, in his modest way, without informing the man who his party was, asked him if he would change to a smaller table and let us have that one. The man said the table was good enough for him and kept on eating, and Rawlins backed out into the street again. Sherman said if we depended on Rawlins we would get nothing to eat, and said he would see what could be done. He hailed a man who pointed out another saloon kept by a woman, and to this Sherman took us, and she served us what we then considered a very nice oyster stew. As we sat around the table, we talked more than we ate, and by the time we had half finished our supper the woman came in and asked for the pay and said we must leave, as under the military rules her house must close at 12 midnight and it was then a few minutes after that hour; so out we got and took our way to Grant's headquarters, where we bunked down the best we could during the night. Some of the staff heard of our evening's adventure and gave the news to the press, and the next morning before breakfast all the parties were present to apologize to Grant that they did not recognize him, as we were out of our own jurisdiction and in that of the Army of the Cumberland; but Grant in his modest way satisfied them that he had no complaint. However, there poured in on him for all of us complimentary tickets and invitations to almost everything in Nashville.

After breakfast we all assembled in a large room at headquarters to hear what General Grant had to say to us. He took up with us the plan for a winter campaign. He proposed himself to take about 30,000 of the troops concentrated at Chattanooga and transport them by the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to New Orleans, and there take with him the troops of General Canby and go thence to Mobile and attack that place. General Sherman was to go to Memphis, gather up all the forces along the Mississippi River, including the troops at Vicksburg and Natchez, together with the Seventeenth Corps, and march from Vicksburg to Meridian and thence join Grant at Mobile. I was to take the Sixteenth Corps, which was then located on the line of the Nashville and Decatur road, together with about 10,000 cavalry that General William Sooy Smith had concentrated near Nashville, and sweep down through Alabama, Northern Mississippi, and Western Tennessee, attacking any forces of the enemy that might be met, and destroying all the railroads and provisions that had been stored in that country, this with a view of making it difficult for any of the confederate armies to again occupy the territory, so as to enable Sherman and Grant, when the spring and summer campaign came on, to utilize all the Union troops that had been occupying that country. After the plans were all made and all the arrangements agreed upon, General Grant reported them to Washington, but President Lincoln objected because he was afraid, if we took so many troops from Chattanooga, that Longstreet, who was occupying Eastern Tennessee with his Army, would return to Chattanooga or Middle Tennessee and undo all we had accomplished in the Battle of Chattanooga. Grant had no fear of this, but he made up his mind to go immediately to East Tennessee and take the forces there under General Foster, attack and defeat Longstreet, and then come back and carry out his plans. He found after reaching Knoxville that General Foster's forces could not be used, so he abandoned the campaign, only sending Sherman to Vicksburg, who marched out to Meridian and returned, while the 7,000 cavalry under General William Sooy Smith, who was to join Sherman overland, moved south, fighting and driving the enemy until he reached West Point, where he met a superior force of the enemy and returned to Memphis.

In March, 1864, General Grant was called to Washington to be given his commission as Lieutenant-General of the Army and command of all the forces. On his return to Nashville, on March 17th, we were again called to meet him. General Grant told us of his visit to Washington, his reception by the President, and all the courtesies that had been paid him. He told us that he accepted the commission of Lieutenant-General and Commander of all the Armies on condition that his plans should not be interfered with at Washington and that he should have the command of the staff departments of the armies. Those departments had always considered themselves independent of the Commander in the field; in fact, in the beginning of the war the officers of Commissary Quarter-Master and Ordnance Departments declined to obey the orders of the commanders they were serving under, except upon the order of their chief in Washington. General Grant settled this. A Commissary of Subsistence declined to carry out one of his orders, and General Grant said to him that while he could not force him to obey the order, he could relieve him and put in his place one of the line officers who would obey all orders. This officer reported this to Washington and it changed their orders so that they were ordered to obey the orders of the officer in the field and to report their orders to their chiefs in Washington. General Grant said that President Lincoln said in reply to his request for the command of the staff departments that he could not give him that legally; but, he said, "There is no one but myself that can interfere with your orders; and you can rest assured that I will not do it." We were all anxious to hear of his visit to the Army of the Potomac, and his opinion of it, and Sherman soon got him to talking about it. He said it was the finest Army he had ever seen; far superior to any of ours in equipment, supplies, and transportation. He said, however, that the officers he talked with considered he would have a much more difficult problem on his hands than he had had in the West, and he said to Sherman that some officer who both of them knew, but whose name I have forgotten, told him, "You have not faced Bobby Lee yet;" and as he said it, I could see that twinkle in Grant's eye that we often saw there when he meant mischief. Grant, after discussing the Army of the Potomac and having nothing but praise for it, informed us that he should make his headquarters with that Army and leave Sherman to command the Armies of the West, also informing us that he proposed to take several of us East with him. Sherman protested strongly against this, and it was finally compromised by his taking Sheridan and leaving the rest of us with Sherman. During the two or three days we were with Grant he outlined in a general way his plan of campaign that every Army should move as early as possible in the spring, all on the same day against the enemy, so that Lee and Johnston could not detach any of their commands to reinforce the others. He said, "I will try to keep Lee from sending any force to Johnston, but," he said to Sherman, "if he does, I will send you two men where he sends one." He also informed us of the necessity of closing the war with this campaign.

Our visit with Grant ended, he took Sherman as far as Cincinnati with him, to talk over and complete their plans, while we returned to our commands to fit them out for the campaign. General Sherman has since pointed out to me in the Burnett House, at Cincinnati, the room they occupied the night before they parted, and where over their maps the final orders were given him and final arrangements made that inaugurated the two great campaigns of Richmond and Petersburg in the East, and Atlanta in the West. After the Atlanta campaign I paid General Grant a visit at City Point. I reached his headquarters in October, and spent two weeks with him, and saw the Armies of the James and the Potomac. Evenings we would sit around his camp-fire, and in his genial, comprehensive way, he told us of his campaign and the great battles you had fought, and brought out fully to me what a great Army you were. I asked him what he claimed for the Battle of the Wilderness. There had been great discussion, as you know, about it, and Grant, with the same twinkle of the eye that I had seen at Nashville, said, "I only claim that after that battle, (and I took the initiative on the march towards Richmond,) that the Army of the Potomac was no longer afraid of Bobby Lee." He had not forgotten his talk with us at Nashville.

Now you have had Grant's opinion of your great Army, and as my toast is the Army of the Tennessee, I will close by giving you General Grant's description of that Army when called upon to respond to the same toast at one of our reunions. He said, "As an Army, the Army of the Tennessee never sustained a single defeat during four years of war. Every fortification which it assailed surrendered. Every force arrayed against it was either defeated, captured, or destroyed. No officer was ever assigned to the command of that army who had afterwards to be relieved from it or to be reduced to another command. Such a history is not accident."

USE OF BLOCK-HOUSES DURING THE CIVIL WAR

To the Editor of the Army and Navy Journal:

I was greatly interested in the communication of Captain Joubert Reitz, published in your journal March 21, 1903, giving a description of the block-house system inaugurated by General Kitchener in the Transvaal War. It was a continuous line of block-houses connected by barbed wire, to prevent the Boers crossing the railway lines, and virtually corralling their forces in certain districts until want of food forced them to surrender. Captain Reitz asserts that the block-house system did more to end the war than the whole British Army.

In the Civil War our block-house system was just as effective, but in another direction. We used it for the purpose of protecting our lines of communication, not as a trocha, or a line connected with wire fencing and other obstructions, as used by the British and by the Spaniards in the Cuban War. The British built theirs of bags filled with earth. The Spaniards erected neat structures of two stories, built of concrete, with wooden roofs and openings for two lines of fire, one above the other. These were erected not more than half a mile apart. In the Civil War our block-houses were usually erected of logs, one and two stories high. The face of the upper story had an angle of forty-five degrees to the face of the first story, thus concentrating a direct fire upon an enemy approaching from any point of the compass. The first block-houses in the West that I know of were built by my command in July and August, 1862, when it rebuilt the Mobile & Ohio Railroad from Columbus to Humbolt. There were many important bridges on this line, and we built block-houses at the most important ones, and stockades at the others.

In the fall of 1862, when Forrest and Jackson made the noted raids into West Tennessee, the forces at all these structures that my command had erected held their positions, and defeated the enemy when attacked, while at the bridges between Jackson, Tennessee, and Grand Junction, where they had only earth defenses, the forces were driven away or captured and the bridges destroyed. The result of this was that General Grant issued an order commending the action of the detachments that were successful, stating that wherever they stood success followed, and the enemy suffered a loss in killed and wounded greater than the garrisons of the block-houses and stockades. This result also caused General Grant to issue an order to build block-houses and stockades on the line of the Memphis & Charleston Railway at all important bridges from Memphis to Corinth, and they protected this line of communication until it was abandoned.

The block-houses held about a company, but sometimes stockades or earth intrenchments were added to hold two companies, and our orders were imperative to all forces occupying them never to leave them or surrender, no matter how large the attacking force. My first order stated that a company in a block-house or stockade was equal to a Regiment attacking, and I do not remember the enemy, in their numerous raids, ever capturing one that was defended, up to the time I left Corinth in the summer of 1863. After the Battle of Chattanooga, when our Armies were lying along the line of the railway from Nashville to Decatur and Nashville to Stevenson, I rebuilt the Nashville & Decatur Railway, on which there were at least thirty important bridges, at each of which we built strong block-houses and stockades, and the enemy never captured one of them, though in two instances they were attacked with a brigade, and often with two Regiments and batteries. We protected against artillery fire by throwing up earthworks to the height of the first line of fire, taking the chance of any damage being done above that. Our orders here were when Forest, Roddy, and Hannan attacked this line to hold the posts under any and all circumstances, stating that if they stayed in the block-houses and stockades nothing could defeat them, and so it proved. Where these forces struck a Regiment, and captured it in earth-works, they went twelve miles north to the Sulphur Trestle, a bridge one hundred and twenty-five feet high, defended by two companies in a block-house and stockade, and were signally defeated. The Army of the Cumberland protected the line from Nashville to Stevenson, and on to Chattanooga, with block-houses at all bridges and important points, and when on the 5th of May, 1864, General Sherman started on the Atlanta campaign, General Hooker reports on April 23, 1864, that he detailed 1,460 men to occupy block-houses from Nashville to Chattanooga, and this force held that line of road throughout the campaign, though many attempts were made to destroy it. During the Atlanta campaign as we advanced the railway was rebuilt, and all bridges and stations had block-houses or stockades to protect them.

General Green B. Raum's Brigade was located at some of the most important structures. General Wheeler, with all of Johnston's Cavalry force and several batteries, endeavored to destroy this, our only line of communication for transporting supplies. General Raum's story is so to the point that I quote it almost entire. He says:

My experiences with block-houses extended from May to November, 1864, on the Memphis & Charleston railroad, and the Chattanooga & Atlanta railroad. Block-houses were built along these railroads exclusively for the protection of bridges. They were built of heavy square timbers, sometimes with two or three thicknesses of timber, and were of various sizes. I had a two-story block-house built at Mud Creek, east of Scottsboro, Ala.; it would easily hold 100 men. These houses were carefully pierced with loop-holes, so that the garrison could cover every approach. My garrisons were usually too large for the block-houses. In these cases I threw up an earth-work, and protected it with abatis. The Confederate forces soon learned to respect a block-house. I found it to be an absolute defense against musketry.

During the Atlanta campaign our block-houses were constantly attacked by raiding parties; small and great trains would be thrown from the track and burned, and small sections of the track destroyed. About July 5, 1864, an enterprising Confederate cavalryman with about 300 men made a rapid march up Dirt Town Valley, crossed the Chattanooga range by a bridle-path, threw a train of fifteen loaded cars off the track, burned them, and destroyed a small section of the track, but he did not attempt to destroy the bridge near by at Tilton – it was defended by a block-house with a capacity for seventy men.

When General Wheeler made his great raid north in August, 1864, he struck the railroad at various places. He destroyed two miles of track immediately south of Tilton, Ga., but did not come within range of the block-house, and did not attempt to destroy the bridge defended by the block-house. During this raid General Wheeler, without hesitation, attacked and carried a part of the works at Dalton. During the Atlanta campaign there was not a bridge destroyed by the Confederates between Nashville and Atlanta which was protected by a block-house.

After the fall of Atlanta, General Hood moved with his entire army against the Chattanooga and Atlanta railroad, destroying thirty-seven miles of track. On October 12 he struck the railroad at Resaca and Tilton. Tilton was garrisoned by the Seventeenth Iowa. Lieutenant-Colonel Archer commanding. He had about 350 men – no artillery. An Army Corps was in his front. Colonel Archer held the enemy off seven hours, fighting from his rifle-pits and block-house. At last the Confederate commander placed several batteries in position, and opened upon the devoted garrison. In a short time the block-house was rendered untenable, and Colonel Archer was forced to surrender. This was the first and only success against our block-house system. On December 4, 1814, Bates's division of Cheatham's Corps attacked the block-house at the railroad crossing of Overall's Creek, five miles north of Murfreesborough, Tenn. The enemy used artillery to reduce the block-house, and although seventy-four shots were fired at it, no material injury was done; the garrison held out until relieved by General Milroy from Murfreesborough.

After the Atlanta campaign, in the Department of the Missouri, every important bridge and town where detachments of troops were stationed was protected by block-houses and stockades, and during the Indian campaigns of 1864-5-6 our lines of communication, stage and telegraph, were all held successfully by small detachments of troops in block-houses and stockades, and were never captured unless overwhelming forces of the Indians attacked them, and only then when the defensive works were inferior or not properly constructed; and, even in cases where detachments left their stations, if they had remained they would have successfully held them. After I took command on the plains and issued positive orders for detachments to stay by their posts and never leave them, not a single detachment that I remember of was captured in its block-house or stockade. With the small force we had it would have been impossible to maintain our mail, telegraph and overland routes successfully, if it had not been for our system of block-houses and stockades, dotted for thousands of miles over each of the overland routes. It is evident from our experience in the West that our block-house and stockade system of defending our lines of communication was a great success, not only as against raids of cavalry, but from attacks of infantry and artillery, and saved to us a very large force for the field. I left on the line of the railway from Nashville to Athens during the Atlanta campaign only two Regiments of negroes, taking with me my entire Corps, and without the block-houses to defend the lines from Nashville to Stevenson and Stevenson to Atlanta, it would have taken a thousand men without block-house protection for every hundred required with it.

Grenville M. Dodge.