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In a fight the Indians will select the positions and pick out quickly any vantage ground, and sometimes as high as 200 will concentrate at such a point where we could not concentrate twenty men without exposing them, and from this vantage ground they will pour a deadly fire on the troops, and we cannot see an Indian – only puffs of smoke. By such tactics as this they harass and defeat our troops. Many a fight occurred between Indians and soldiers both watching the smoke to show each other's position. You can watch this kind of a fight and never see a person unless some one is hit and exposes himself, when it is nearly always a sure death. The Indian character is such that he will not stand continual following, pounding, and attacking. Their life and methods are not accustomed to it, and the Indians can be driven by very inferior forces by continually watching, attacking, and following. None of our campaigns have been successful that have not been prepared to follow the Indians day and night, attacking them at every opportunity until they are worn out, disbanded, or forced to surrender, which is the sure result of such a campaign.

The Indians during the months they had been hostile, and especially in their attacks on the stage-stations and ranches, had captured a large number of men, women, and children. These prisoners had made known to the troops, by dropping notes along the trail and through the reports of friendly Indians, their terrible condition and the usage that was being made of them. Their appeals to us to rescue them were pitiful.

I knew the prisoners would be sent far north to the villages, and their winter quarters out of our reach; that these villages were unprotected because every brave and dog-soldier had his warpaint on and was joining the hostile forces attacking along our lines, which were increasing every day. I also knew it would be impossible for any of our troops to reach them or to rescue them by following them, and as soon as I arrived at Fort Kearney I asked authority of the Government to enlist and muster into service two companies of Pawnee Indians, to be under the command of their old interpreter, Major North, who I knew to be a brave, level-headed leader. This authority was immediately given me, and Major North was given confidential instructions to proceed to the Sioux country, apparently on scout duty, but to watch his opportunity and rescue these prisoners, while their braves were down fighting us. He started, but storms of snow came down so heavy that his ponies could get nothing to eat, and during the latter part of February and all of March these storms were continuous, the snow falling to the depth of two feet over the entire plains. Major North was compelled to seek shelter in the river bottoms, and browsed his stock on cottonwood limbs to save them. In the campaign of the summer and winter of 1865 and 1866 Major North, with his two enlisted companies, to which I added two more, made some wonderful marches, scouts, battles, and captures, and during that campaign we recaptured and had surrendered to us many of these women and children prisoners.

After the war Major North became manager of the Indians in Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show, and died in that service. He was a noted man on the plains. My acquaintance with him commenced in 1856, and together we had seen and endured many hardships. It was seldom one met his equal in any of the different phases of plains life. Although he had led an eventful career, still I never heard him refer to what he had done or accomplished, or the part he had taken in battles, and probably no man was ever more worshiped than he was by the two tribes of Pawnee Indians; and his death was virtually their destruction, for during his life among them he held them under good discipline and kept them away from vice, diseases, and war.

A great many amusing reports came to me from my scouts and the captured Indians. When on the plains in the 50's I was known among the Indians by the name, in their language, that signified "Long Eye," "Sharp Eye," and "Hawk Eye." This came from the fact that when I first went among them it was as an engineer making surveys through their country. With my engineering instruments I could set a head-flag two or three miles away, even further than an Indian could see, and it is their custom to give a practical name to everything. Of course I was not many days on the plains until it reached the Indians that "Long Eye" was there, and in every fight that occurred they had me present. They said I could shoot as far as I could see. The scouts said the Indian chiefs laid their defeats to that fact. Then again they were very superstitious about my power in other matters. When the overland telegraph was built they were taught to respect it and not destroy it. They were made to believe that it was a Great Medicine. This was done after the line was opened to Fort Laramie by stationing several of their most intelligent chiefs at Fort Laramie and others at Fort Kearney, the two posts being 300 miles apart, and then having them talk to each other over the wire and note the time sent and received. Then we had them mount their fleetest horses and ride as fast as they could until they met at Old Jule's ranch, at the mouth of the Lodge Pole, this being about half way between Kearney and Laramie. Of course this was astonishing and mysterious to the Indians. Thereafter you could often see Indians with their heads against the telegraph poles, listening to the peculiar sound the wind makes as it runs along the wires and through the insulators. It is a soughing, singing sound. They thought and said it was "Big Medicine" talking. I never could convince them that I could not go to the telegraph poles the same as they did and tell them what was said, or send a message for them to some chief far away, as they had often seen me use my traveling-instrument and cut into the line, sending and receiving messages. Then again, most of the noted scouts of the plains who had married into the different tribes had been guides for me, and many of these men were half-breeds, and were with these hostile Indians. Some of them took part with them, but more of them had tried to pacify and bring them to terms, and they gave me information about those who were not engaged in the depredations.

I was supposed to be, by the Indians of the plains, a person of great power and great moment. These half-breeds worked upon their superstitions, endeavoring to convince them it was useless to fight "Long Eye." No doubt my appearing on the plains the time I did, and the fact that from the time I appeared until the time I left, the troops had nothing but success, carried great weight with them, and seemed to confirm what the old voyageurs and guides told them, and had much influence in causing their abandonment of the Platte country and returning to their villages.

My own experience on the plains led me to be just as watchful and just as vigilant when I knew the Indians were not near me as I was when they were in sight. In all my travels I never allowed them to camp near or occupy my camps even in the time of peace, when they were friendly, and I never allowed myself to knowingly do them an injustice, making it a point never to lie to them in any of my councils and treaties, or never allow, if I knew it, the interpreter to deceive them. That brought me respect in all my dealings with them, and I treated them with respect, courtesy, and consideration, and demanded the same from them. This, no doubt, was one of the principal reasons that in fifteen years, more or less, of intercourse with them, traveling through their country both during the times they were hostile and at peace, that I escaped many of the misfortunes that befell others.

Although this short campaign was not remarkable for great battles or large loss by killed and wounded, still it required great fortitude from the troops, and often great personal courage, and its success was of great moment to the Government and to the people of the plains and the Pacific Coast, for over these three great overland routes were carried the mails, telegrams, and traffic during the entire war of the rebellion, which did much to hold these people loyal to our Government. A long stoppage was a destruction to business, and would bring starvation and untold misery; and when, with only thirteen days and nights of untiring energy on the part of the troops in a winter of unheard-of severity, California, Utah and Colorado were put in communication with the rest of the world, there was great rejoicing. In seventeen days the stages were started and overland travel was again safe, after being interrupted for two months, and by March 1st the commercial trains were all en route to their destinations and I had returned to my duties at the headquarters of the Department, in St. Louis.

It was with no little satisfaction that I answered a personal letter General Grant had written me, when he assigned me to this duty, and which I found awaiting me on my return to Fort Leavenworth. In his letter he outlined what it was necessary to do and why he had asked me to take the field. He judged rightly of the condition of affairs and the necessity of immediate action. I wrote him how promptly the troops responded to my call. They had opened the overland routes; they had made them secure and were then guarding them, and they would be kept open. But after grass came, unless these hostile Indians were thoroughly chastised, they would certainly and successfully attack them and prevent safe travel overland, and from my letter the order soon came for me to prepare for the extensive campaign of the next summer and winter that followed these Indians to the Yellowstone on the north and the Cimarron on the south, and conquered a peace with every hostile tribe.

THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS
1865 AND 1866

During the Indian campaigns of the winter and spring of 1864-65, against the Indians that were holding all the overland roads, stations, telegraph and emigrant routes over the plains, my command reopened them in a short campaign of sixty days in which many fights occurred in which the troops were uniformly successful. The telegraph-lines were rebuilt, the stages re-established, the mails transported regularly, and protection given. Although we were able to drive the Indians off of all of these routes and open them successfully and hold them open, my experience convinced me that as soon as grass started on the plains these Indians would again come down on the routes, and that the only possible way of settling the Indian question was to make a well-planned and continuous campaign against them on the Arkansas, the Smoky Hill, the Republican, and the North and South Platte Valley routes, and to keep them off the traveled roads. To do this we would be obliged to get our troops into their country as soon as possible and go for their villages.

In my report to the Government, in April, 1865, I set forth the necessity for this and outlined the plans. Upon the receipt of that report I received authority from General Grant and General Pope to go forward and carry out the plans that I had suggested. This plan contemplated placing upon the plains about 5,000 men to protect the stations and telegraph-lines, furnish escort to emigrants and Government trains of supplies that were necessary to supply the wants of that vast country with provisions and outfit five movable columns of soldiers, a total of 6,000 or 7,000 men. Contracts were immediately made for the supplies for this number of men; for horses for the cavalry, and for the supplying of the posts on the plains with a surplus at each, so that if the campaign extended into the winter it would not have to stop for want of provisions. The campaign in the spring had to be made on supplies moved there in the middle of winter, at great cost and suffering. The Quartermaster and Commissary at Fort Leavenworth made contracts for supplies to be delivered in June, and General Grant sent to Fort Leavenworth something like 10,000 troops, very few of whom got into the campaigns from the fact that the troops would no sooner reach Fort Leavenworth than they would protest, claiming that the Civil War was ended and saying they had not enlisted to fight Indians. The Governors of their States, Congressmen, and other influential men, would bring such pressure to bear that the War Department would order them mustered out. While the Government was at great expense in moving these troops to the plains, some even reaching as far as Julesburg, we never got any service from them; they were a great detriment, and caused much delay in our plans, so that the overland routes had to be protected by about one-half of the troops that it was at first thought necessary to accomplish the work. Three Regiments of infantry, eleven Regiments of cavalry, and three Batteries of artillery, that reported to me under the order of General Grant, were mustered out on the march between Fort Leavenworth and Julesburg.

There was enlisted for the Indian campaign, five Regiments of United States volunteers, recruited from the rebel prisoners, who, desiring to be at liberty, were willing to enlist under the United States flag to fight Indians, and these five Regiments had to be depended upon mostly for taking care of all the country west of the Lakes, – the overland routes on the plains, to man the posts on the upper Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, and for escorts for surveying parties, etc. So when I was ready to move all five columns I had less than 7,000 officers and men in my department. The Indians commenced their depredations on all the routes in April, especially on the Arkansas route, where we had to contend with the South Cheyennes, Comanches, Apaches, Kiowas, and Arapahoe tribes. This district was under the command of Brigadier-General Ford, a very efficient officer, and it was planned that he should make a campaign in May and June into the Indian country, crossing the Arkansas and moving south for their villages, which we knew were situated in the Wichita Mountains. General Ford had a compact veteran command, and fought one or two battles before crossing the Arkansas. Just about the time he was ready to cross the Arkansas the Government sent west a peace commission composed of Senator Doolittle, General Alex McD. McCook, and others. The Indian agent for these tribes was Colonel J. H. Leavenworth. They no sooner reached the Indian country than they protested against the movement of any troops into the territory south of the Arkansas River. In fact, General McCook issued an order, using General Pope's name as authority, stopping General Ford's movement. He had no authority to do this, but General Ford obeyed, as the information came to him that these chiefs were assembling at the mouth of the Little Arkansas to make peace. After parleying with the Indians, the commission accomplished nothing, and the Indians all the time were committing their depredations on the emigrant trains that were passing up the Arkansas Valley to New Mexico and Colorado. All the protests and appeals of General Pope, General Ford and myself to the Government in relation to this matter seemed to have no effect. These Indians had murdered the settlers, wiped out their ranches, and stolen their property and their stock, and our scouts who went among them saw their captures in plenty. As soon as we would start out to punish them, even those that had crossed north of the Arkansas River, protests were sent to Washington and came back to us, so that we virtually accomplished nothing. The condition of matters became so complicated that on June 6, 1865, I stated my views of the question to Major-General John Pope, commanding the Military Division of the Missouri, as follows:

Headquarters Department of the Missouri

Fort Leavenworth, June 6, 1865

Major-General John Pope, Commanding Military Division of the Missouri:

General: You have been notified of the action of Major-General McCook, under the orders of the Congressional Committee, in stopping the expedition of General Ford south of the Arkansas, that they might confer, and, if possible, make peace with the Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanches, Kiowas, etc. Colonel Leavenworth started south a week ago to bring the chiefs up to the mouth of Cow Creek, and while we are endeavoring to make terms with them, their warriors are strung along the route from Zarah to Lyon, dashing in on any train that they find off its guard. They are in parties of from fifteen to fifty, and hide in the valleys and ravines. These Indians now have their villages at Fort Cobb, and have driven out all friendly Indians and traders, declaring that they mean war and nothing else. They are composed of one band of Arapahoes, led by Little Rover; one small band of Cheyennes, three bands of Apaches, a large body of Comanches, also the Southern Comanches, and all the Kiowas, and they have no respect for our authority or power, and I have no faith in any peace made by them until they are made to feel our strength. I do not believe it will be a month before we hear of large trains being captured or attacked by them in force. They notified Jesus, the Mexican trader sent in by General Carleton, to leave, and it is said they murdered Major Morrison, a trader permitted to go in by General Carleton. It appeared to me bad policy to give permits to any of the traders to go among them to trade. Not one of them will act as guide to take a force toward them.

Colonel Leavenworth satisfied the committee, and I think General McCook also, that the Comanches and others had not committed any depredations. There is not an officer or trader who has been on the plains but knows they have been in all or nearly all the outrages committed. I desire very much to have peace with the Indians, but I do think we should punish them for what they have done, and that they should feel our power and have respect for us. My plan to reach them is to start in three columns for Fort Cobb; viz., First, by Major Merrill's route; second, by Captain Booner's route; third, from the mouth of Mulberry Creek, on the Arkansas. Make the parties about 400 or 500 strong, and march direct for their villages. This will draw every warrior after us and leave the Santa Fe route free. When we get down there if the Indians are so anxious for peace, they will have an opportunity to show it, and we can make an agreement with them that will stop hostilities until the properly authorized authorities conclude a lasting peace. I have attempted to get these expeditions off twice. The first time they were stopped by General Halleck, on Colonel Leavenworth's representations. He started to make peace; the Indians stole all his stock, and very nearly got his scalp. He came back for fight and wished to whip them, but has now changed again, and it is possible he may get the chiefs together, but I very much doubt it; and, even if he does, they will only represent a portion of each tribe. I have concluded, by representations of the Congressional Committee made to General Ford, to wait and see the effects of Colonel Leavenworth's mission. I will have my troops at the designated points. If he should fail I will go forward and make the campaign as originally ordered. I desire to add that there is not a leading officer on the plains who has had any experience with Indians who has faith in peace made with any of these Indians unless they are punished for the murders, robberies and outrages they have committed for over a year; and unless we have a settled policy, either fight and allow the commanding officer of the department to dictate terms of peace to them, or else it be decided that we are not to fight, but make some kind of peace at all hazards, we will squander the summer without result. Indians will rob and murder, and some Indian agents will defend them, and when fall comes I will be held responsible for not having protected the route or punished them for what they may have done. It must be evident to the Government that I cannot be making war on the Indians while other parties are at the same time making peace, as has been the case so far. Whatever may be the desire of the Government, I will lend all my energies to carry it out and make every officer and man under me do the same. I cannot approve the manner in which the Indians have been treated, and have no faith in them, nor will I allow such treatment as shown at the Big Sandy fight. If peace is concluded I trust that their reservations may be made at safe distances from overland routes so far as possible, and that they be made to keep away from them.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. M. Dodge,

Major-General.

The Government, after receiving General Pope's and my own views, sent out Inspector-General D. B. Sackett, of the Regular Army, to investigate the conditions in that country and to report to the Government the actual facts. In the meantime the peace commission that had been endeavoring to negotiate with these Indians had gone on to Denver, still protesting against any movement against the Indians, believing that peace could be brought about. General Sackett, upon reaching the Indian country, sent the following dispatch, on June 14, 1865, to the commanding officer at Fort Larned, Kas.:

For the last few days the Indians along the route have been very active and hostile; many men have been murdered, hundreds of animals have been stolen, Fort Dodge has lost every animal. The force can now do nothing with the Indians. A large and effective cavalry force under a good commander must be sent here without delay, or the large number of trains now on the plains will be destroyed or captured.

Upon the receipt of this dispatch I immediately gave orders to the commanding officer to go out and concentrate our forces north of the Arkansas, and to protect the trains, but not to go south of the river. This they accomplished very effectively, and drove all the Indians south of the Arkansas, killing and capturing a good many. On June 14th, General Pope wrote a long letter to General U. S. Grant, enclosing my letter to him, reiterating what I had said, and insisting for very strong reasons that the Indians should be left entirely to the military; that there should be no peace commission sent until the military had met these Indians and brought them to terms, either by fighting or negotiations; and afterwards for the commission to go there and make such arrangements as they saw proper. In the mustering out of troops General Ford was relieved of the command and Major-General John B. Sanborn, a very efficient officer, was sent to take his place. It was now agreed that after the failure of the peace commission to accomplish anything with these Indians that I should make the campaigns south of the Arkansas, and General Sanborn concentrated his troops and moved to the Arkansas. Before I reached there I received a communication from Colonel Leavenworth stating that all the chiefs of the Indians were then on Cow Creek, anxious to meet him. At the same time, a dispatch came from Washington to General Pope, stopping Sanborn's movement. General Pope immediately arranged to have an interview with these Indians, and General Sanborn went there with instructions to make an agreement with them that they should keep off of the overland trails, and to arrange a time for a commission to meet them, later in the year. On August 5th Sanborn agreed with the chiefs of the Kiowas, Apaches, Comanches, and Arapahoes, on the part of the Government, to suspend all actions of hostility towards any of the tribes above mentioned and to remain at peace until the fourth day of October, 1865, when they were to meet the Government commissioners at Bluffs Creek about forty miles south of the Little Arkansas. This agreement did not take in the South Cheyennes, who had been more mischievous than any of the tribes, but this tribe kept south of the Arkansas, retaining all the stock they captured, and none of them were punished for the murders they committed. It was a business matter on their part to remain at peace only until the troops moved out of that country and to prevent Sanborn with his organized forces from going south to their villages and punishing them. The effect of this agreement was that the Indians continued their depredations through the following years, – not so much by killing but by stealing, – until finally they became so hostile that in the campaign against them by General Sheridan, in 1868, an agreement was made with them forcing all the tribes to move into the Indian Territory. If General Ford or General Sanborn had been allowed to go forward and punish these Indians as they deserved, they would have been able to make not only a peace, but could have forced them to go on the reservation in the Indian territories, and thus have saved the murders and crimes that they committed for so many years afterwards; however, this agreement of Sanborn's allowed the emigration to go forward over the Arkansas, properly organized and guarded, and it was not molested during the rest of that year.

To show the conditions on the overland routes up the two forks of the Platte River at the time, I sent this dispatch:

Headquarters Department of the Missouri

St. Louis, Mo., June 17, 1865

Major-General John Pope, Commanding Military Division of the Missouri, St. Louis:

General: There is no doubt but that all, or nearly all, the tribes of Indians east of the Rocky Mountains from the British Possessions on the north to the Red River on the south are engaged in open hostilities against the Government. It is possible that in a few of the tribes there are some chiefs and warriors who desire to be friendly, but each day reduces the number of these, and they even are used by the hostile tribes to deceive us as to their intentions and keep us quiet. The Crows and Snakes appear to be friendly, but everything indicates that they too are ready to join in the hostilities, and the latter (the Snakes) are accused of being concerned in the depredations west of the mountains. In my opinion there is but one way to effectually terminate these Indian troubles; viz., to push our cavalry into the heart of their country from all directions, to punish them whenever and wherever we find them, and force them to respect our power and to sue for peace. Then let the military authorities make informal treaties with them for a cessation of hostilities. This we can accomplish successfully, for the Indians will treat with soldiers, as they fear them and have confidence in their word. Any treaty made now by civilians, Indian agents, or others, will, in my opinion, amount to nothing, as the Indians in all the tribes openly express dissatisfaction with them and contempt for them. The friendly Indians say that whenever the hostile bands are made aware of our ability and determination to whip them, they will readily and in good faith treat with our officers and comply with any demands we may make. If we can keep citizen agents and traders from among them we can, I am confident, settle the matter this season, and when settled I am clearly of the opinion that these Indians should be dealt with entirely by competent commissioned officers of the Army, whom they will respect and who will not only have the power to make them comply with the terms of the agreements made, but will also have the power and authority to compel troops, citizens and others to respect implicitly and to comply strictly with the obligations assumed on our part. The cavalry now moving into the Indian country will, I doubt not, if allowed to proceed and carry out the instructions given them, accomplish the object designed by bringing about an effectual peace and permanent settlement of our Indian difficulties.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. M. Dodge,

Major-General.

The campaign to the north was planned with a view of going after all the northern Indians then at war – the Arapahoes, North Cheyennes, and the different bands of the Sioux. Their depredations had extended east to the Missouri River, and General Pope sent General Sully with a force up that river to take care of the hostile Sioux that had gathered and had been fighting the troops at Forts Rice, Berthoud, and other points. Before reaching these posts his column was turned and sent to Devil's Lake after the Santee Sioux, who had been committing depredations in Minnesota, but after reaching the lake he failed to find any Indians, they having fled to the British Possessions. He returned to the Missouri River and endeavored to make terms with the tribes concentrated on it, but only partially succeeded. We knew that there were from two to three thousand of the Sioux, Cheyennes and Arapahoes concentrated at or near Bear Butte, near the north end of the Black Hills, and it was the intention of General Sully with his force to go after this band, but, being turned to the east, I organized a force about 1,000 strong under Colonel Nelson Cole, who went up the Missouri River in boats to Omaha and whose orders were to move from Omaha to Columbus up the Loup Fork to its head and thence across the Niobrara to the White Earth River and then to Bear Butte. Failing to find the Indians there, he was to push on to Powder and Tongue Rivers, where he was to join Brigadier-General P. E. Connor, who was in command of this district. Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Walker's column of about 500 men of the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry was to go north from Fort Laramie along the west base of the Black Hills and join Colonel Cole, and later join General Connor on the Tongue River; while General Connor, with a small command of about 500 men, was moving north along the Platte to the head of Salt Creek down the Salt to Powder River, where he was to establish a fort and supply station; from thence he was to move along the east base of the Big Horn Mountains until he struck the hostile Indians in that vicinity. These columns should have moved in May or June, but it was July and August before they got started, on account of the failure of the contractors to deliver the supplies to them on the plains at the different supply-depots; but when they started they moved with alacrity, and would, no doubt, have accomplished the purpose of the campaign had it not been for the fact that they were stopped by an order from Washington to return to Fort Laramie by October 15th.