Kitabı oku: «Tennessee at the Battle of New Orleans», sayfa 2
Six days after they gathered in Nashville, the troops embarked on boats for New Orleans. The main diversion offered the Tennesseans during the slow, tedious trip down the Cumberland, Ohio and Mississippi rivers was the daily drilling which Carroll and his two subordinates, Brigadier Generals Thomas Coulter and Bird Smith, gave the recruits. There had been no time for training prior to their hasty departure.
Enroute the militiamen were cheered when they overtook a New Orleans-bound keelboat laden with muskets. Thomas L. Servoss, a prominent Natchez businessman, was responsible for this fortunate occurrence. While visiting New York during the summer of 1814, he was informed by a government official that New Orleans was considered the likely site for a British invasion. Concerned for his family’s welfare, Servoss had left for home immediately. At Pittsburg he boarded one of two keelboats headed for New Orleans with large quantities of arms and ammunition. Experienced in navigation himself and familiar with the route, Servoss prevailed upon the captain to depart earlier than was scheduled. By doing so, Servoss unintentionally insured that Carroll’s troops were fully armed before their trip was completed.14
IV
While William Carroll and his men were plying their way down the Mississippi, John Coffee and his mounted militiamen were making their way toward Sandy Creek. The 16-day march was worse than any Coffee had ever experienced, because the area was interlaced with streams and covered with heavy undergrowth.15 Drenching rain fell for 20 successive days. At Sandy Creek, where quantities of corn had arrived from Tennessee, the men ate their first adequate meal since leaving Pensacola and the horses were foraged. Here they impatiently awaited further word from Jackson.
By now the British plan was becoming clear to Jackson, who hastened from Mobile to New Orleans. There, on December 2, he found the local situation one of general turmoil and confusion. The citizens appeared in a fighting mood and, on the whole, received him enthusiastically.
Jackson’s problems, however, increased immediately. There were only about 700 regular United States troops in the city—hardly enough to pose a threat to an invading veteran army—and the situation was made more difficult when the New Orleans militia refused to serve under United States officers. The offer of service by the Baratarian pirates made through the local Committee of Defense was refused by Jackson because the pirates were at that time being prosecuted in a Federal court. Since the pirates possessed artillery in considerable quantities and were proficient in its use, the Committee next turned to Federal Judge Dominick Hall. He advised them to have the Louisiana legislature, then meeting in New Orleans, adopt a resolution requesting that all charges against the pirates be dropped for four months. The resolution was then presented to Judge Hall, who, in turn, ordered the District Attorney to suspend his prosecution for the designated period. This action made possible the valuable contribution of the Baratarians in the defense of New Orleans.
Jackson’s problems were intensified by his own health. He was wracked with a high fever resulting from malaria which he contracted while in Florida. Lacking sufficient sleep and rest, he was touchy and sensitive to any criticism directed at him by the legislature or local groups.16
On December 15, Jackson notified Coffee that a large enemy fleet had been observed arriving off Cat and Ship islands, a dozen miles off the Mississippi Coast and 60 miles from the mouth of the Mississippi. In his communication, Jackson thought it unlikely that the British would attack up the river, because the approach from its mouth was guarded by two forts, Bourbon and St. Philip. Major W. H. Overton, of Nashville, one of Jackson’s capable subordinates, commanded St. Philip. Coffee was skeptical that the invaders would try the other logical route open to them, crossing Lake Borgne and marching directly on the city. In the event that the British should choose this route he promised, “I shall be ready to meet them, in the swamps, where one Tennessean can run down ten sailors, and worn out Europeans, through mud, water, and brush,—I do not believe they will ever land, but should they attempt it, I have no doubt as to the result, being favorable to our army.17” Events proved that Coffee’s confidence in his men was fully justified.
Jackson quickly augmented his New Orleans garrison by ordering Coffee to make a forced march of 135 miles from Baton Rouge to New Orleans, a feat which the latter accomplished in three days. Coffee encamped at Avart’s Plantation, five miles upriver from the city, on December 20. Further upriver, Carroll received a similar command to hasten his best trained and equipped troops and additional arms to supply Coffee’s men, whose arms and ammunition had been damaged by the heavy rain.18
After the defeat and capture of the five little American gunboats on Lake Borgne on December 14, the road to New Orleans was open for the invaders. The British secretly disembarked their troops between December 16 and 20 on Pea Island. Then on the 22nd, they boarded open boats and cautiously crossed Lake Borgne, about 60 miles across. Under cover of darkness the trip was made even more somber by the biting, penetrating cold weather. Jackson, seemingly, lost sight of the British army’s movements following its arrival at Ship and Cat islands. Arriving the following morning at Fisherman’s Village (an extreme point on Villere’s Canal) on the Bayou Bienvenue, the invaders with their movements still unnoticed marched stealthily across Villere’s plantation toward the Mississippi River. About 9 a.m., they surprised and captured Major Gabriel Villere, and a detachment of troops. Major Villere managed to escape into a nearby cypress swamp, and make his way to New Orleans where he notified Jackson at his headquarters on Royal Street that the British were below the city.19
Faced now with a sudden crisis, Jackson was equal to the occasion. It was noon when Jackson learned that the Redcoats were at the Mississippi, seven miles below New Orleans. About 2 p.m. he learned from Major Arsene Lacarriere Latour, his chief engineer, that the British numbered between 1,600 and 1,800. Jackson, meanwhile had called in his troops from various points on the outskirts of New Orleans. Coffee marched down from Avart’s plantation in mid-afternoon to rendezvous at Fort St. Charles. Carroll was sent to the upper branch of the Bayou Bienvenue to command Jackson’s center. The conference between Jackson and Coffee was brief. Jackson thought of awaiting the British attack, but acceded to Coffee’s strategy of carrying the fight to the enemy by a night attack. Thereupon, Coffee and his mounted infantry proceeded southward through the city, where one observer remembered them as follows:
Their appearance, however, was not very military. In their woolen hunting shirts and coperas dyed pantaloons; with slouched hat or cap made from the skins of raccoons or foxes; with belts of untanned deer-skin and in which were stuck their hunting-knives—but were admirable soldiers, remarkable for endurance and possessing that admirable quality in soldiers, of being able to take care of themselves. At their head rode their gallant leader, a man of noble respect, tall and herculean in appearance, mounted upon a fine Tennessee thoroughbred, was stately and impressive.20
The main body of the British army, lighthearted and confident that their movements were undetected, bivouacked the night of the 23rd on the upper part of Villere’s plantation. To a man they were fully confident of an overwhelming victory. A short distance away, however, the frontiersmen crept and crawled into position under the brilliant moonlight which enveloped the area. Drifting silently down river at the same moment was the small American schooner, the Carolina, which suddenly opened fire on the British camp about 7:30 p.m. The confused invaders were driven back three or four hundred yards from the river’s bank by the unexpected attack.
The Carolina’s fire was the signal to attack. Coffee, guided by Colonel Pierre Denis de la Ronde, whose plantation was near that of Villere, skirted the edge of a swamp to attack the enemy’s right flank while Jackson and Carroll struck from the front. Coffee’s powerful thrust sent the British 85th regiment reeling backward, permitting the Tennesseans to get behind the faltering line. Then by a “sudden movement Coffee was able to penetrate almost to the very heart of the British camp.”21 The engagement quickly became one of great confusion. Coffee’s riflemen were so determined in pressing their advantage that they became somewhat disorganized, but never lost their poise. The invaders, on the other hand, could not regain the initiative against the surprise attack. Much of the battle was fought hand-to-hand.
A decided advantage to the Tennesseans was their use of long rifles against the shorter weapons of the British. Jackson’s men kept up a brisk, punishing fire for over two hours. Their excellent marksmanship drew praise from Major Latour, who noted in one spot a half dozen marks made by their rifle balls within a diameter of only four inches.22 Little, if any, random shooting was done by the deliberate riflemen, who had been carefully schooled to take careful aim before firing.
The battlefield confusion became more pronounced when a heavy fog settled over the area and soldiers of both armies were captured after being separated from their comrades. The British gained some respite from their punishment when their Second Division arrived from Bayou Bienvenue and slipped behind Coffee’s rear. This advantage, however, was lost when a British commander failed to extend his line for fear of being cut off from the lake and boats. Finally, the Redcoats slowly retired from the battlefield to shelter under a river levee. By this time the fog was so heavy that pursuit would have entailed serious hazards to the Americans, including exposure to the Carolina’s fire which had continued intermittently throughout the fight. Accordingly, Coffee also left the field, withdrawing about a mile and a quarter to De la Ronde’s garden to await the dawn.
Although the result could be regarded as indecisive, the Americans considered the outcome a victory since only 1,600 of their men had been pitted against some 3,000 British. There was also a considerable difference in the number of casualties: American losses totaled 95 killed and wounded and 75 taken prisoner, while the British lost 400 killed and wounded and 100 captured.
The significance of the night action of December 23 was the indication that a numerically inferior American force could hold its own against British invaders. The Americans, many of whom lacked formal military training, had faced British military might and had given no quarter. They felt strongly that they possessed the mental and physical equipment to withstand and, indeed, to hurl back almost any onslaught which might be thrown against them. The only question remaining in their minds was when their victory might come.
