Kitabı oku: «The Enchiridion», sayfa 2

Thus the Enchiridion was liberating for all intellectuals who learned from it that there are philosophical ways of self-redemption. From its time, the secular thinker could feel jubilant because he was not in need of a divine grace. Epictetus had taught him that philosophical reason could make him free and that he was capable of redeeming himself by sound reasoning.

In the Stoic distinctions of personality and world, of I and mine, of subjective consciousness and the world of objects, of freedom and dependence, we find implicit the basic elements of modern philosophies of rationalism and of objective idealism or pantheism. For this reason there is a continuous renascence of Stoicism from Descartes, Grotius, and Bishop Butler, to Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and Kant. In this long development in modern times, the tiny Enchiridion of Epictetus played a remarkable part.

The translations of Epictetus and of all other Stoics had the widest effect on philosophers, theologians, and lay thinkers. They were studied by the clergy of the various Christian denominations, by the scientists who were striving for a natural religion, and by the independent philosophers who were eager to separate philosophy from religion. There were many outstanding bishops in the Catholic and Anglican Churches who were eager to transform the traditions of Roman Stoicism into Christian Stoicism. Among the Calvinistic denominations were many thinkers who were in sympathy with Stoic moral principles because of their praise of the austerity of life and of the control of passions. Likewise the adherents of natural religion were propagating Stoicism as the ideal pattern of universally valid and intelligible religion. Renascent Stoicism had three functions in the rise of the modern world. First, it reconciled Christian traditions to modern rationalistic philosophies; secondly, it established an ideal pattern of natural religion; and, thirdly, it opened the way for the autonomy of morals.

ALBERT SALOMON

The New School

for Social Research

July, 1948

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Epictetus: Life and Work

Arnim, Hans V., “Epictetos” in Pauli-Wissowa (ed), Real-Encyclopaedie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, VI, col. 126-131.

Arnold, E. V., “Epictetus” in Hastings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, 1912. Vol. V, pp. 323, 324.

Bonhoeffer, A., Epiktet und die Stoa. Stuttgart, 1890.

– , Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet. Stuttgart, 1894.

– , Epiktet und das Neue Testament. Giessen, 1911.

Bruns, Ivo, De schola Epicteti. Kiel, 1897.

Bultmann, Rudolf, “Das religiöse Moment in der ethischen Unterweisung des Epiktets und das Neue Testament,” Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde des Urchristentums, Vol. XIII, 1912; pp. 97-110; 177-191.

Colardeau, Th., Etude sur Epictète. Paris, 1903.

Hartmann, K., “Arrian und Epiktet,” Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum, Vol. XV, 1905.

Jagu, Amand, Epictète et Platon. Paris, 1944.

Lagrange, M. J., “La philosophie religieuse d’Epictète et le Christianisme,” Revue Biblique, Vol. IX, 1912; pp. 5-21, 192-212.

Oldfather, W. A., “Introduction” to Epictetus, “Loeb Classics,” Vol. I.

Souilhé, J., “Introduction” to Entretiens. Paris, 1943.

Weber, Louis, “La morale d’Epictète et les besoins présents de l’enseignment moral,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1905, pp. 830-858; 1906, pp. 342-360; 1907, pp. 327-347; 1909, pp. 203-326.

Main Works on Stoicism and Related Problems

Arnold, E. V., Roman Stoicism. Cambridge, E., 1911.

Bevan, E., Stoics and Sceptics. Oxford, 1913.

Brochard, V., Etudes de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne, Paris, 1912.

Hicks, R. D., Stoic and Epicurean. New York, 1910.

Martha, C., Les moralistes sur l’Empire Romain. Paris, 1886.

Murray, Gilbert, Stoic, Christian, Humanist. London, 1940.

Robin, L., La morale antique. Paris, 1938, pp. 57, 130, 152, 167.

Wendland, Paul, Philo und die cynisch-stoische Diatribe. Berlin, 1895.

– , Die hellenistische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zum Judentum und Christentum. Tübingen, 1912.

Zanta, L., La renaissance du Stoicisme au XVIième siècle. Paris, 1914.

Zeller, E., The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. London, 1892.

Influence of Stoicism

Busson, Henry, La pensée religieuse Française de Charron à Pascal. Paris, 1933. Chap. VIII: Stoiciens et Epicuriens, pp. 379-429.

Dilthey, Wilhelm, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. II. “Einfluss der Stoa auf die Ausbildung des natürlichen Systems der Geisteswissenschaften,” pp. 153-162; “Anthropologie, Stoa und natürliches System im XVII. Jahrhundert,” pp. 439-457.

Groethuysen, Bernard, Philosophische Anthropologie. München, 1928. (Chap. “Die römisch-griechische Lebensphilosophie.”)

Rand, B., The Life, Letters, etc. of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury. London, 1900.

Saunders, Jason L., Justus Lipsius. The Philosophy of Renaissance Stoicism. New York, 1955.

Wenley, R. M., Stoicism and Its Influence. New York, 1927.

THE ENCHIRIDION

I

There are things which are within our power, and there are things which are beyond our power. Within our power are opinion, aim, desire, aversion, and, in one word, whatever affairs are our own. Beyond our power are body, property, reputation, office, and, in one word, whatever are not properly our own affairs.

Now the things within our power are by nature free, unrestricted, unhindered; but those beyond our power are weak, dependent, restricted, alien. Remember, then, that if you attribute freedom to things by nature dependent and take what belongs to others for your own, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will find fault both with gods and men. But if you take for your own only that which is your own and view what belongs to others just as it really is, then no one will ever compel you, no one will restrict you; you will find fault with no one, you will accuse no one, you will do nothing against your will; no one will hurt you, you will not have an enemy, nor will you suffer any harm.

Aiming, therefore, at such great things, remember that you must not allow yourself any inclination, however slight, toward the attainment of the others; but that you must entirely quit some of them, and for the present postpone the rest. But if you would have these, and possess power and wealth likewise, you may miss the latter in seeking the former; and you will certainly fail of that by which alone happiness and freedom are procured.

Seek at once, therefore, to be able to say to every unpleasing semblance, “You are but a semblance and by no means the real thing.” And then examine it by those rules which you have; and first and chiefly by this: whether it concerns the things which are within our own power or those which are not; and if it concerns anything beyond our power, be prepared to say that it is nothing to you.

II

Remember that desire demands the attainment of that of which you are desirous; and aversion demands the avoidance of that to which you are averse; that he who fails of the object of his desires is disappointed; and he who incurs the object of his aversion is wretched. If, then, you shun only those undesirable things which you can control, you will never incur anything which you shun; but if you shun sickness, or death, or poverty, you will run the risk of wretchedness. Remove [the habit of] aversion, then, from all things that are not within our power, and apply it to things undesirable which are within our power. But for the present, altogether restrain desire; for if you desire any of the things not within our own power, you must necessarily be disappointed; and you are not yet secure of those which are within our power, and so are legitimate objects of desire. Where it is practically necessary for you to pursue or avoid anything, do even this with discretion and gentleness and moderation.

III

With regard to whatever objects either delight the mind or contribute to use or are tenderly beloved, remind yourself of what nature they are, beginning with the merest trifles: if you have a favorite cup, that it is but a cup of which you are fond of – for thus, if it is broken, you can bear it; if you embrace your child or your wife, that you embrace a mortal – and thus, if either of them dies, you can bear it.

IV

When you set about any action, remind yourself of what nature the action is. If you are going to bathe, represent to yourself the incidents usual in the bath – some persons pouring out, others pushing in, others scolding, others pilfering. And thus you will more safely go about this action if you say to yourself, “I will now go to bathe and keep my own will in harmony with nature.” And so with regard to every other action. For thus, if any impediment arises in bathing, you will be able to say, “It was not only to bathe that I desired, but to keep my will in harmony with nature; and I shall not keep it thus if I am out of humor at things that happen.”

V

Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of things. Thus death is nothing terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the terror consists in our notion of death, that it is terrible. When, therefore, we are hindered or disturbed, or grieved, let us never impute it to others, but to ourselves – that is, to our own views. It is the action of an uninstructed person to reproach others for his own misfortunes; of one entering upon instruction, to reproach himself; and one perfectly instructed, to reproach neither others nor himself.

VI

Be not elated at any excellence not your own. If a horse should be elated, and say, “I am handsome,” it might be endurable. But when you are elated and say, “I have a handsome horse,” know that you are elated only on the merit of the horse. What then is your own? The use of the phenomena of existence. So that when you are in harmony with nature in this respect, you will be elated with some reason; for you will be elated at some good of your own.

VII

As in a voyage, when the ship is at anchor, if you go on shore to get water, you may amuse yourself with picking up a shellfish or a truffle in your way, but your thoughts ought to be bent toward the ship, and perpetually attentive, lest the captain should call, and then you must leave all these things, that you may not have to be carried on board the vessel, bound like a sheep; thus likewise in life, if, instead of a truffle or shellfish, such a thing as a wife or a child be granted you, there is no objection; but if the captain calls, run to the ship, leave all these things, and never look behind. But if you are old, never go far from the ship, lest you should be missing when called for.