Kitabı oku: «The Turkish Empire, its Growth and Decay», sayfa 18

The wealthier Greeks in the Levant had already fitted out a squadron of thirteen frigates in support of their cause. These were now, by order of the Empress, supplied with guns at Trieste and were put under command of a brave Greek admiral, Lambro Caviziani. This squadron, when fitted out, made its way to the Ægean Sea, where it made its base in the Isle of Scios. The Turkish fleet in those waters was at a low ebb. The best of the Turkish vessels were being employed in the Black Sea. But seven Algerine corsairs came to the assistance of the Porte, and, in concert with some Turkish ships, fought a naval battle with the Greek squadron and sank the whole of its vessels.

The Russian army on land was more fortunate. Their chief operation in 1790 was the capture of Ismail, a most important fortress on the northern affluent of the Danube, about forty miles from the Black Sea. So long as this city was in the hands of the Turks an advance of an invading army from Bessarabia into Bulgaria was hardly possible. The fortress was defended by a very large garrison. Suvorov was again put at the head of a corps d’armée by Potemkin, the commander-in-chief, with the laconic order, “You will capture Ismail, whatever may be the cost.” Six days after his arrival before the fortress, Suvorov ordered his troops to assault it. Speaking to them in his usual jocular manner, he said: “My brothers, no quarter; provisions are scarce.” At a terrible cost of life the city was taken by storm. A scene of savage carnage ensued, unprecedented even in the experience of Suvorov. Thirty-four thousand Turks perished. Suvorov admitted to a friend that he was moved to tears when the scene was over. But he was accustomed to shed these crocodile tears after horrors of this kind, when he had made no effort to mitigate them. When news of the achievement arrived at St. Petersburg, the Empress, at her levée, addressing the British Ambassador, Sir C. Whitworth, said, with an ironic smile: “I hope that those who wish to drive me out of St. Petersburg will allow me to retire to Constantinople.”

Meanwhile the allied maritime Powers – England, Prussia, and Holland – having succeeded in their mediation between Austria and Turkey, and in restoring peace between them, on the basis of the status quo, were now engaged in efforts of the same kind as between Russia and Turkey. They offered mediation to the Empress Catherine in the course of 1790. In a reply to the Prussian King, she indignantly rejected intervention. “The Empress,” she said, “makes war and makes peace when she pleases. She will not permit any interference whatever in the management or government of her affairs.” It was understood, however, that she was not disinclined to peace upon the terms that Oczakoff and the district between the Rivers Dniester and Bug, which were in her full possession, were to be retained by her, and that all other of her conquests were to be restored to Turkey. The allied Powers were unwilling to assent to this, and made preparations for an armed mediation to compel Russia to restore Oczakoff to Turkey.

In the case of Great Britain, the proposed intervention on behalf of the Turks in support of their Empire was a new departure in policy. Its Government had been closely allied with that of Russia during the greater part of the eighteenth century. Its policy had been mainly determined by jealousy of France. It looked upon Russia as a counterpoise to that State. It had never raised any objection to the ambitious projects of Russia against Turkey. Lord Chatham, whose foreign policy had prevailed till now, had always held that it was not the interest of England to enter into a connection with the Turks. England had looked on with indifference in 1784, when the Empress Catherine had taken possession of the Crimea. Charles Fox was at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs in England, and he showed himself as much in favour of Russia as Chatham had been. “My system of foreign politics,” he wrote, “is deeply rooted. Alliance with the northern Powers (including Russia) ever has been and ever will be the system of every enlightened Englishman.” It was an entirely new departure when the younger Pitt, in 1790, entered the lists in alliance with Prussia against Russia in order to restore and maintain the balance of power in the south-east of Europe in favour of Turkey.

The British Government renewed its offer of mediation. Its Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed to inform the Empress that if she would accept a peace on the basis of the status quo, England would use her influence to obtain from the Turks a formal renunciation of their claims to the Crimea under the guarantee of the allies. The Empress, in her reply through her minister, expressed her indignation at the unparalleled conduct of the allies in attempting to dictate in so arbitrary a manner to a sovereign perfectly independent, and in want of no assistance to procure the conditions which seemed to her best suited to satisfy her honour. Rather than diminish the glory of a long and illustrious reign, the Empress was ready to encounter any risk, and she would only accept the good offices of the King of England “inasmuch as they may lead to preserve for her the indemnification she requires of Oczakoff and its district.”³⁰

The reply was important, for it showed that Russia was, at all events, willing to bring the war to an end and to forgo its intention of driving the Turks out of Europe. The fact was that, in spite of repeated victories, the Russian losses in killed and wounded, and still more by disease, were very serious. The Empress also had other troubles on her hands. The Polish question, in which she was more interested than in that of Turkey, was imminent. The Second Partition was decided on. It was necessary for her to have a free hand. In spite of this, she was determined not to yield possession of Oczakoff.

Meanwhile the British and Prussian Governments were in consultation. They were agreed that they were bound to insist upon the surrender of Oczakoff and its district, and upon a peace based on the status quo before the war. It was contended that, as Austria and Sweden had both made peace on such terms, the allies could not with honour demand less for the Turks, and that Turkey would consider itself betrayed if the allies were willing to give up those districts.

It was decided, therefore, by the allies to enforce by arms their mediation on the basis of the status quo. The British Government engaged to send a fleet of thirty-five vessels of the line into the Baltic, and Prussia to march an army into Livonia. It was agreed that neither Power would look for any territorial acquisition, but would only insist on greater security for the Porte in the Black Sea.

In this view Mr. Pitt, on March 28, 1791, presented to the House of Commons a message from the King asking for the supply of means to augment the forces of the Crown. He based his justification, says Mr. Lecky, who has given a summary of Pitt’s speech, mainly on the interests of Prussia and the obligation of Great Britain to defend her.

Prussia [Pitt said], of all European Powers, is the one who would be the most useful ally of England, and the events that were taking place were very dangerous to her. The Turkish Empire is of great weight in the general scale of European Powers, and if that Empire is diminished or destroyed, or even rendered unstable or precarious, the situation of Prussia would be seriously affected… Could any one imagine that the aggrandizement of Russia would not materially affect the disposition of other Powers – that it might not produce an alteration in Poland highly dangerous to Prussia?.. If a powerful and ambitious neighbour were suffered to establish herself upon the very frontier of Prussia, what safety was there for Denmark, or what for Sweden when Prussia shall no longer be in a position to help them? The safety of all Europe might afterwards be endangered. Whatever might be the result of the war in which the Turks were now unhappily engaged, if its results were to increase the power of Russia the effect would not be confined to the two Powers alone; it would be felt by the rest of Europe.

He asked for the means to equip a great fleet to be sent to the Baltic and a smaller one for the Black Sea.

The proposal of Pitt for giving effect to this policy was violently opposed by Charles Fox in a speech which produced a very great effect in the House of Commons and on the country.

The insistence [he said] on the surrender by Russia of Oczakoff and its district was in the highest degree unjust and impolitic. It was unjust because Russia had not been the aggressor in the war and because, in spite of her great successes, she had consented to concessions which displayed her signal moderation. It was impolitic, for the only result of an expensive and dangerous war would be to alienate, perhaps for ever, a most valuable ally, without obtaining any object in which England had a real interest… Russia was the natural ally of England. What had England to gain by this policy? In what way could English interests or English power be affected by the acquisition by Russia of a fortress on the Dniester and a strip of barren land along the northern shore of the Black Sea?.. The assertion that England was bound by the spirit of its defensive alliance with Prussia was in the highest degree dangerous and absurd. If defensive alliances were construed in such a way they would have all the evils of offensive alliances, and they would involve us in every quarrel in Europe. We bound ourselves only to furnish assistance to Prussia if she were attacked. She had not been attacked. She was at perfect peace. She was absolutely unmenaced. It was doubtful whether the new acquisition of Russia would under any circumstances be injurious to Prussia, and it was preposterous to maintain that it was the duty of England to prevent any other nations from acquiring any territory which might possibly in some future war be made use of against Prussia.

Fox was supported by Burke in a powerful speech, in spite of their growing differences on the subject of the Revolution in France.

Considering the Turkish Empire [he said] as any part of the balance of power in Europe was new. The Turks were essentially Asiatic people, who completely isolated themselves from European affairs. The minister and the policy which should give them any weight in Europe would deserve all the ban and curses of posterity. For his part, he confessed that he had seen with horror the beautiful countries that bordered on the Danube given back by the Emperor of Austria to devastation. Are we now going to vote the blood and treasure of our countrymen to enforce similar cruel and inhuman policy?.. That so wise a man as Pitt should endeavour, on such slight and frivolous grounds, to commit this country to a policy of unlimited adventure, sacrificing the friendship of one of our oldest allies and casting to the winds the foreign policy of his own father, was the most extraordinary event that had taken place in Parliament since he had sat within its walls.

Pitt’s motion was carried, but by many votes short of his usual party majority. Two other debates took place on the subject. Though Pitt maintained his majority, it was evident that the opinion of the House of Commons, and still more of the country, was opposed to going to war with Russia on behalf of Turkey. Pitt very wisely decided to abandon his policy of war. He withdrew his proposal in the House of Commons. The Foreign Minister, the Duke of Leeds, who was personally committed to it, resigned his office. Another messenger was sent to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg with instructions not to present the menacing despatch to the Czar, and, fortunately, arrived in time to prevent it.

Sir E. Creasy describes the action of Charles Fox in thus defeating the policy of Pitt as due to violent and unscrupulous party motives, and Mr. Lecky, while agreeing in substance with the arguments of Fox, and condemning Pitt’s policy, does not acquit the former of political partisanship. He never loses an opportunity of impeaching the conduct of Charles Fox, on account of his action in the war with the American colonies and in the revolutionary war with France. It may be permitted to us to say, in spite of these high authorities, that seldom has a greater service been done to the country than in the defeat of Pitt’s proposal to go to war with Russia on this occasion. It was a unique case in our constitutional history when the House of Commons by its debates, and not by its votes, defeated a proposal for war made to it by a Prime Minister, with all the authority of the Crown and the Government. The merit of this was mainly due to Fox.

In the meantime the Turks were incurring further defeats on the Danube. They made desperate efforts to replenish their armies, but the men were ill-trained and were unable to meet the veteran troops of Russia. Kutusoff, at the head of a Russian army, routed a great Ottoman army at Babatagh in January 1791, and in July of the same year Prince Repnin, with forty thousand Russians, defeated and dispersed seventy thousand Turks at Maksyu, on the southern bank of the Danube. The Turks were equally unfortunate on the east of the Black Sea. A Russian army invaded the province of Kuban and defeated a Turkish army there, and occupied the whole of the province.

As a result of all these reverses the Divan was dispirited. There was no prospect of assistance to Turkey from any quarter. They were willing to come to terms. The Empress, on her part, was equally willing. She wanted her army to march into Poland to put down an outbreak of the Poles, under Kosciuszko. In spite of her recent victories, which had secured to her the occupation of Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and the Kuban, she was ready to give up all with the exception of the fortress of Oczakoff and the country between the Rivers Dniester and Bug. Terms on this basis, and without any mediation or interference of other Powers, were agreed on between Russia and Turkey in August, 1791, and were embodied in the treaty of Jassy in January of the following year. Under this treaty the River Dniester was the new boundary of the Russian Empire, and all conquests west of it were restored to the Turks. Russia also gave back the province of Kuban, but the treaty recognized the Empress as the protector of the petty independent principalities in that region.

The project of carving for Potemkin a kingdom out of the Danubian principalities was abandoned, and that of a Greek Empire at Constantinople was indefinitely adjourned. Potemkin, who was a Pole by birth and had been raised from the position of a sergeant in the Russian army to princely rank with a fortune estimated at seven millions of our money, died a few days after the treaty.

In the next four years the Empress achieved the final partition of Poland, and obtained for Russia the lion’s share. Had she lived, she would probably have used her acquisitions there as a vantage-ground for new aggressions on the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile Greece was abandoned to the tender mercies of its oppressors.

XVIII
TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST
1792-1812

Twenty years after the treaty of Jassy, another slice of the Ottoman territory was ceded to Russia in 1812 by the treaty of Bucharest. The history of Turkey during the interval is full of interest in its relation to the Napoleonic wars, but much of it has little bearing on the shrinkage of the Empire.

After the conclusion of the war with Russia in 1792, Sultan Selim was most anxious to maintain peace and to keep out of the complications arising from the French Revolution. He was fully conscious of the necessity for reforms in every branch of the administration of his country, and especially in the constitution and training of the army. He regarded the Janissaries as a grave danger to the State. He initiated many great schemes of reform. But in 1798 these were nipped in the bud by a fresh outbreak of hostilities. War was forced upon him most unexpectedly, and without just cause or even pretext, by the Revolutionary Government of France, a country whose traditional policy had been to support the Ottoman Empire against that of Austria. France had recently become a near neighbour to Turkey. Under the treaty of Campo-Formio in 1797, after the great victories of General Bonaparte in Italy, the Republic of Venice ceased to exist. Venice itself, and much of its Italian territories, were subjected to the rule of Austria, and its possessions in the Adriatic, the Ionian Islands, and the cities on the mainland, such as Prevesa and Parga, were ceded to France. This change of masters was welcomed by the inhabitants of the islands, who were weary of the tyranny of the Venetians.

The Directory, which then ruled in France, was filled with ambition for further extensions in the East. It was under the impression that the Ottoman Empire was on the point of complete dissolution. There was much, at the time, to justify this view. The central power of the State was almost paralysed. The pashas of many provinces, such as Ali of Janina, Passhwan Oghlou of Widdin, and Djezzar of Acre, had made themselves all but independent of the Sultan. Egypt was virtually ruled by the Mamelukes. Its pasha, appointed by the Porte, was without any authority. Serbia and Greece were seething with rebellion. Bonaparte, while commanding the army in Italy, sent emissaries to several of these provinces, and especially to Greece, holding out hopes of support in the event of open rebellion. It seemed at first as though his ambition was for extension of French dominion in Greece and other European provinces of the Porte. An army of forty thousand men, including the best of the veterans who had fought in Italy, was mobilized at Toulon. Two hundred transports were prepared to convey them to some unknown destination, and a powerful fleet of fifteen battleships and fifteen frigates was ordered to act as convoy. At the last moment the Directory, at the instance of Bonaparte, decided on the invasion of Egypt. A blow was to be struck there, not against the Porte, but against England, with whom France was at war. There were vague intentions or dreams, after the conquest of Egypt, of invading India and founding a great Eastern Empire for France on the ruins of the British Empire. It was pretended that the attack on Egypt was not an act of hostility to the Porte. Egypt, it was said, was to be delivered from the cruel and corrupt government of the Mamelukes. There was no declaration of war against the Sultan. It was expected that he would acquiesce in the suppression of the Mamelukes.

The utmost secrecy was maintained as to the destination of the expedition. It left Toulon on May 19, 1798, under the command of Bonaparte. He took with him many of the ablest generals who had served under him in Italy and a large party of ‘savants,’ who were to explore the monuments of Egypt. The orders from the Directory to Bonaparte, drawn up doubtless by himself, were

to clear the English from all their Oriental possessions which he will be able to reach, and notably to destroy all their stations in the Red Sea; to cut through the Isthmus of Suez and to take the necessary measures to assure the free and exclusive possession of that sea to the French Republic.

The destination of this great fleet and army was unknown to the British Government. But there was a strong British fleet at the entrance of the Mediterranean, under Lord St. Vincent, who detached a large part of it, under command of Nelson, to watch the issue of the French fleet from Toulon. It was composed of an equal number of battleships to that of the French fleet, but of inferior size, and with fewer guns. It was very deficient in frigates.

On June 10th, three weeks after escaping from Toulon, the French fleet arrived at Malta. The Knights of St. John, who had made so valiant and successful a defence of the island against the Ottomans in 1565, now offered a very feeble resistance to the French. The knightly monks had become licentious and corrupt. They very soon capitulated. Bonaparte annexed the island to France, and the ancient Order came to an ignominious end.

Leaving four thousand men at Malta, the fleet sailed for the island of Crete, and hearing there that Nelson was in pursuit, Bonaparte at once decided to sail to Alexandria. He then for the first time announced to the army its destination.

Soldiers [he said in a proclamation], you go to undertake a conquest of which the effects upon the civilization and the commerce of the world will be incalculable. You will strike at England the most certain and the most acute blow, while waiting to give her the death-blow… The Mamelukes, who favour exclusively English commerce, some days after your arrival will exist no more.

Nelson meanwhile, when he discovered the departure of the French fleet from Toulon, shrewdly guessed that it was bound to Egypt, and bent his course there, hoping to find the enemy’s ships at Alexandria. He arrived there on June 28th, before the French fleet, and, hearing nothing of it, he doubled back to Sicily. The two fleets crossed one another not far from Crete, and within sight of one another if the weather had been bright; but a dense haze and the want of frigates to act as scouts prevented Nelson discovering the proximity of his enemy. But for this it is certain that the French fleet, encumbered as it was with two hundred transports, would have been totally destroyed and the whole armada would have met with unparalleled disaster. It is interesting matter for speculation what effect this would have had on the career of the Corsican general and on the history of Europe. As it was, the French fleet and army, favoured by their extraordinary good luck, arrived safely at Alexandria on July 1st. The army disembarked there. The battleships, not being able to get into the harbour, were anchored in Aboukir Bay. Alexandria was captured, after a slight resistance by its small garrison – though Bonaparte himself was slightly wounded in the attack. A week later the army commenced its march to Cairo.

Bonaparte issued one of his bombastic and mendacious proclamations to the Egyptian people, explaining that he was making war against the Mamelukes, and not against them or the Sultan.

For a long time [it said] the crowd of slaves bought in Georgia and the Caucasus have tyrannized the most beautiful place in the world; but God, on whom all depends, has ordained that their empire is finished. People of Egypt, they have told you that I have come to destroy your religion. Do not believe them. Answer that I am come to restore your rights, to punish the usurpers, and that I respect more than the Mamelukes, God, his Prophet, and the Koran… Thrice happy are those who will be on our side. They will prosper in their fortune and their rank… But woe threefold to those who arm themselves for the Mamelukes and fight against us… Each man will thank God for the destruction of the Mamelukes and will cry “Glory to the Sultan! Glory to the French army, his friend! Malediction to the Mamelukes and good luck to the people of Egypt.”

The army suffered greatly on its march to Cairo from the heat and the sand. The soldiers murmured and asked for what purpose they were brought to such a country, where they saw no evidence of wealth, and where there was nothing to loot. But they fought two battles on the way against the Mamelukes and easily defeated them. The armies against them on both occasions consisted of no more than twelve thousand men, of whom only five thousand were Mamelukes and the others ill-trained fellaheen. These were of no avail against thirty thousand veterans of the French. The city of Cairo, on the approach of Bonaparte, was sacked by the retreating Egyptians. He presented himself rather as the saviour of life and property. He had no difficulty in restoring order there.

Meanwhile Nelson, on the arrival of his fleet at Naples, heard definite accounts of the destination of the French armada. He retraced his course to Egypt. On the memorable 1st of August, 1798, he came in sight of the enemy’s fleet, anchored in Aboukir Bay. The oft-told story of the decisive and glorious battle need not be repeated. The French fleet, under Admiral Brueys, was annihilated by the British fleet, much inferior in number of men and guns. The admiral was killed. His flagship was blown up. Only two of his ships escaped for a time, and later were captured before reaching France. As a result, the communications of the French army with France were thenceforth completely severed. It was hopelessly stranded in Egypt. Bonaparte did not hear of the disaster till August 19th, on his return from an expedition, in which he defeated and chased from the country a force of Mamelukes, under Ibrahim Pasha. His sole remark was: “Eh bien! It will be necessary to remain in these countries or to make a grand exit like the ancients. The English will compel us to do greater things than we intended.”

The signal victory of the British fleet had far-reaching results. The Sultan of Turkey, who had hitherto been undecided as to his policy, now felt that he might safely take up arms against the French and reassert his sovereignty in Egypt. He well knew that Bonaparte could receive no reinforcements from France and that the invading army must gradually melt away. He declared war against France, and entered into alliances, offensive and defensive, with Russia and England. His alliance with the former led to strange results. A combined fleet of Russia and Turkey, hitherto the most deadly foes to one another, issued from the Dardanelles, and attacked and drove the French from the Ionian Islands, so recently acquired by them, and from their fortresses on the mainland.

The Porte also collected two armies for the reconquest of Egypt, the one in Syria, the other in the island of Rhodes. Bonaparte decided to anticipate attack by the invasion of Syria. He spent at Cairo the winter of 1798-9, the least reputable period of his amazing career. His private life there was most scandalous, far more so than that, bad enough, of his wife, Josephine, whom he had left at Paris. His public life was little better. In the hopes of conciliating the Egyptian people and facilitating the further conquests in the East, of which he dreamt, he professed unbounded admiration for the Moslem religion. He feigned to be a convert to that faith. His vaunting proclamations were headed: “In the name of Allah. There is no God but God. He has no son and reigns without a partner.” He did his best to induce his soldiers to become Moslems, but in vain. No one was taken in by these fooleries. He gained no respect from Egyptians of any creed. There were many outbreaks in different parts of the country, and a most serious one in Cairo. They were put down with ruthless severity. He followed the Turkish practice of decapitating the prisoners and great numbers of suspects, and exhibiting their bleeding heads in public places as a warning to others.

Bonaparte left Egypt in January, 1799, with an army of twenty-five thousand, made up in part by sailors of his sunken fleet, and in part by recruits from the Mamelukes. He crossed the Isthmus of Suez, and reached Gaza on February 25th and Jaffa on March 7th. This last city was held by five thousand Turks. After a brave defence they capitulated on terms that they should be treated as prisoners of war. In disregard of this they were marched down to the beach and, by order of Bonaparte, were slaughtered in cold blood because it was inconvenient to encumber his army with prisoners. No worse deed of Turkish atrocity has been recorded in these pages. Leaving Jaffa, his army arrived before Acre in a few days. “When I have captured Acre,” he said to his generals, “I shall arm the tribes. I shall be in a position to threaten Constantinople. I shall turn the British Empire upside down.”

But he reached at Acre the end of his tether in the East. He had sent his heavy guns by sea to meet him there. They were captured on the way by the British fleet, and were now mounted on the mud ramparts of the fortress and used against him. A British fleet, under command of Sir Sidney Smith, was lying in the roadstead and kept the communications open with Constantinople. The admiral and his sailors assisted in the defence of the city, the garrison of which consisted of only three thousand men. Its weak fortifications had been strengthened by Colonel Philippeaux, a distinguished French royalist. Against these defences Bonaparte hurled his army in vain. In the sixty days of siege there were forty assaults and twenty sorties of the garrison. “In that miserable fort,” said Bonaparte, “lay the fate of the East.”

On May 7th large reinforcements arrived from the Turkish army at Rhodes. A last and desperate assault, led by General Kléber, was unsuccessful. Bonaparte was compelled to admit his failure. His dream of an Eastern Empire was dissipated for ever. On May 20th he commenced a retreat, after a loss by death of four thousand men and eight generals. The army suffered most severely in passing through the desert.

Shortly after the return of the French troops to Egypt on July 14th, an army of fifteen thousand Turks, convoyed by the British fleet, was landed at Aboukir. Bonaparte attacked on the 25th and utterly defeated it. Thousands of the Turks were driven into the sea and drowned. This victory of the veterans of the French army over the ill-trained Turkish levies, without guns or cavalry, was a godsend to Bonaparte. It shed a gleam of glory over the terrible failure of the whole expedition. His dispatches made the most of it. At this stage news from France showed the necessity for his return there. He decided to abandon the army to its fate. With the utmost secrecy arrangements were made for the embarkation of the general and his staff on board two frigates. They rode down to the shore and got into boats, leaving their horses behind them. The return of the riderless horses was the first intimation to those left behind that they were abandoned by their general. The two frigates left Egypt on August 22nd and, by hugging the African coast, they escaped the British cruisers, and after a most hazardous voyage of six weeks they landed their passengers in France, where Bonaparte posed as a conqueror. Nor did his failure in Egypt interfere with his subsequent triumphant career.