Kitabı oku: «The Growth of the English Constitution»
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
The proverb “qui s’excuse s’accuse” is so regularly turned against any author who gives any account of the origin of his work that it may be well to prevent its quotation by quoting it oneself. I have to ask that these three Chapters and their accompanying Notes may not be judged by the standard of a book. If I were to write a book on the English Constitution, it would be different in form and, in many points, different in style. What the reader has here is a somewhat extended form of two Lectures given at Leeds and Bradford last January. I had thought that they might be worth printing in the shape of two magazine-*papers; others thought that they might do good in their present shape. I therefore expanded the latter part of the second Lecture, which had to be cut very short in delivery, so as to make a third Chapter, and I added such notes and references as seemed to be needed.
I say all this, in order that what I have now written may be judged by the standard of lectures, not by the standard of a book. In a popular lecture it is impossible to deal with everything with which it is desirable to deal; it is impossible to go to the bottom of those things which one picks out to deal with. It is enough – because it is all that can be done – if the choice of subjects is fairly well made, and if the treatment of those that are chosen, though necessarily inadequate, is accurate as far as it goes. Many things must be left out altogether; many things must be treated very imperfectly; the attention of the hearers must be caught by putting some things in a more highly wrought shape than one would choose at another time. The object is gained, if the lecturer awakens in his hearers a real interest in the subject on which he speaks, and if he sends them to the proper sources of more minute knowledge. If I can in this way send every one who wishes to understand the early institutions of his country to the great work of Professor Stubbs – none the less great because it lies in an amazingly small compass – my own work will be effectually done. In Mr. Stubbs’ “Documents Illustrative of English History,” the ordinary student will find all that he can want to learn; while he who means to write a book, or to carry out his studies in a more minute way, will find the best of guidance towards so doing. The great documents of early English history, hitherto scattered far and wide, are now for the first time brought together, and their bearing is expounded in a continuous narrative worthy of the unerring learning and critical power of the first of living scholars.
For my own part, my object has been to show that the earliest institutions of England and of other Teutonic lands are not mere matters of curious speculation, but matters closely connected with our present political being. I wish to show that, in many things, our earliest institutions come more nearly home to us, and that they have more in common with our present political state, than the institutions of intermediate ages which at first sight seem to have much more in common with our own. As the continuity of our national life is to many so hard a lesson to master, so the continuity of our political life, and the way in which we have so often fallen back on the very earliest principles of our race, is a lesson which many find specially hard. But the holders of Liberal principles in modern politics need never shrink from tracing up our political history to its earliest beginnings. As far at least as our race is concerned, freedom is everywhere older than bondage; we may add that toleration is older than intolerance. Our ancient history is the possession of the Liberal, who, as being ever ready to reform, is the true Conservative, not of the self-styled Conservative who, by refusing to reform, does all he can to bring on destruction. One special point on which I have dwelt is the way in which our constitutional history has been perverted at the hands of lawyers. It is perfectly true that the history of England must be studied in the Statute-Book, but it must be in a Statute-Book which begins at no point later than the Dooms of Æthelberht.
As I have often had need to take facts and doctrines for granted which I believe myself to have proved in my larger works, I have in the Notes given frequent references to those works, instead of bringing in the evidence for the same things over again. And in the more modern part of the subject, I have given several extracts at full length, even from very familiar authors, because I know that a reader is often well pleased to have a striking passage set before him at once, without having to seek for it in the original. On the other hand, I have given at full length several extracts from statutes and other documents which most readers are not likely to have at hand. The historical portions of any Act of Parliament can be studied only in the Acts themselves, and not in the summaries of lawyers. Legal writers and speakers seem constantly to repeat what has been said before them, without any reference to the original sources. A memorable example is to be found in the assertion of Blackstone and of a crowd of lawyers after him, in Parliament and out of Parliament, that the King or Queen is by Law Head of the Church. I need hardly say that that title was used by Henry, Edward, and Mary, but that it was given up by Mary, and was not taken up again by any later Sovereign.
Somerleaze, Wells,
March 25, 1872.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
In this Second Edition I have made a few verbal corrections and improvements, and I have made two or three additions to the Notes. Otherwise the book is unchanged.
Somerleaze, Wells,
October 30, 1872.
CHAPTER I
Year by year, on certain spots among the dales and the mountain-sides of Switzerland, the traveller who is daring enough to wander out of beaten tracks and to make his journey at unusual seasons may look on a sight such as no other corner of the earth can any longer set before him. He may there gaze and feel, what none can feel but those who have seen with their own eyes, what none can feel in its fulness more than once in a lifetime, the thrill of looking for the first time face to face on freedom in its purest and most ancient form. He is there in a land where the oldest institutions of our race, institutions which may be traced up to the earliest times of which history or legend gives us any glimmering, still live on in their primæval freshness. He is in a land where an immemorial freedom, a freedom only less eternal than the rocks that guard it, puts to shame the boasted antiquity of kingly dynasties, which, by its side, seem but as innovations of yesterday. There, year by year, on some bright morning of the spring-tide, the Sovereign People, not entrusting its rights to a few of its own number, but discharging them itself in the majesty of its corporate person, meets in the open market-place or in the green meadow at the mountain’s foot, to frame the laws to which it yields obedience as its own work, to choose the rulers whom it can afford to greet with reverence as drawing their commission from itself. Such a sight there are but few Englishmen who have seen; to be among those few I reckon among the highest privileges of my life. Let me ask you to follow me in spirit to the very home and birth-place of freedom, to the land where we need not myth and fable to add aught to the fresh and gladdening feeling with which we for the first time tread the soil and drink in the air of the immemorial democracy of Uri1. It is one of the opening days of May; it is the morning of Sunday; for men there deem that the better the day the better the deed; they deem that the Creator cannot be more truly honoured than in using, in His fear and in His presence, the highest of the gifts which He has bestowed on man. But deem not that, because the day of Christian worship is chosen for the great yearly assembly of a Christian commonwealth, the more directly sacred duties of the day are forgotten. Before we, in our luxurious island, have lifted ourselves from our beds, the men of the mountains, Catholic and Protestant alike, have already paid the morning’s worship in God’s temple. They have heard the mass of the priest or they have listened to the sermon of the pastor, before some of us have awakened to the fact that the morn of the holy day has come. And when I saw men thronging the crowded church, or kneeling, for want of space within, on the bare ground beside the open door, when I saw them marching thence to do the highest duties of men and citizens, I could hardly forbear thinking of the saying of Holy Writ, that “where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.” From the marketplace of Altdorf, the little capital of the Canton, the procession makes its way to the place of meeting at Böblingen. First marches the little army of the Canton, an army whose weapons never can be used save to drive back an invader from their land2. Over their heads floats the banner, the bull’s head of Uri, the ensign which led men to victory on the fields of Sempach and Morgarten. And before them all, on the shoulders of men clad in a garb of ages past, are borne the famous horns, the spoils of the wild bull of ancient days, the very horns whose blast struck such dread into the fearless heart of Charles of Burgundy3. Then, with their lictors before them, come the magistrates of the commonwealth on horseback4, the chief magistrate, the Landammann, with his sword by his side. The people follow the chiefs whom they have chosen to the place of meeting, a circle in a green meadow, with a pine forest rising above their heads and a mighty spur of the mountain range facing them on the other side of the valley. The multitude of freemen take their seats around the chief ruler of the commonwealth, whose term of office comes that day to an end. The Assembly opens; a short space is first given to prayer, silent prayer offered up by each man in the temple of God’s own rearing. Then comes the business of the day. If changes in the law are demanded, they are then laid before the vote of the Assembly, in which each citizen of full age has an equal vote and an equal right of speech. The yearly magistrates have now discharged all their duties; their term of office is at an end; the trust which has been placed in their hands falls back into the hands of those by whom it was given, into the hands of the sovereign people. The chief of the commonwealth, now such no longer, leaves his seat of office and takes his place as a simple citizen in the ranks of his fellows. It rests with the free will of the Assembly to call him back to his chair of office, or to set another there in his stead. Men who have neither looked into the history of the past, nor yet troubled themselves to learn what happens year by year in their own age, are fond of declaiming against the caprice and ingratitude of the people, and of telling us that under a democratic government neither men nor measures can remain for an hour unchanged. The witness alike of the present and of the past is an answer to baseless theories like these. The spirit which made democratic Athens year by year bestow her highest offices on the patrician Periklês and the reactionary Phôkiôn5 still lives in the democracies of Switzerland, alike in the Landesgemeinde of Uri and in the Federal Assembly at Bern. The ministers of Kings, whether despotic or constitutional, may vainly envy the sure tenure of office which falls to the lot of those who are chosen to rule by the voice of the people. Alike in the whole Confederation and in the single Canton reelection is the rule; the rejection of the out-going magistrate is the rare exception6. The Landammann of Uri, whom his countrymen have raised to the seat of honour, and who has done nothing to lose their confidence, need not fear that when he has gone to the place of meeting in the pomp of office, his place in the march homeward will be transferred to another against his will.
Such is the scene, which, save for a moment, when the world was turned upside down by the inroads of revolutionary France7, has gone on year by year as far as history goes back in the most unchanged of European states. Let me ask you to follow me yet again to the place of assembly of a younger member of the same noble band of commonwealths8, to pass from Uri to Appenzell, from the green meadows of Bözlingen to the hill-side market-place of Trogen. Somewhat of the pomp and circumstance which marks the assembly of Catholic and pastoral Uri is lacking in the assembly of the Protestant and industrial population of the Outer Rhodes of Appenzell. But the stamp of antiquity, the stamp of immemorial freedom, is impressed alike on the assembly and on the whole life of either commonwealth. We miss in Appenzell the solemn procession, the mounted magistrates, the military pomp, of Uri, but we find in their stead an immemorial custom which breathes perhaps more than any other the spirit of days when freedom was not a thing of course, but a thing for which men had to give their toil and, if need be, their blood. Each man who makes his way to the Landesgemeinde of Trogen bears at his side the sword which the law at once commands him to carry and forbids him to draw9. And in the proceedings of the assembly itself, the men of Appenzell have kept one ancient rite, which surpasses all that I have ever seen or heard of in its heart-stirring solemnity. When the newly chosen Landammann enters on his office, his first duty is to bind himself by an oath to obey the laws of the commonwealth over which he is called to rule. His second duty is to administer to the multitude before him the same oath by which he has just bound himself. To hear the voice of thousands of freemen pledging themselves to obey the laws which they themselves have made is a moment in one’s life which can never be forgotten, a moment for whose sake it would be worth while to take a far longer and harder journey than that which leads us to Uri or Appenzell.
And now I may be asked why I have begun a discourse on the constitution of England with a picture of the doings of two small commonwealths whose political and social state is so widely different from our own. I answer that I have done so because my object is, not merely to speak of the constitution of England in the shape which the changes of fourteen hundred years have at last given it, but to trace back those successive changes to the earliest times which either history or tradition sets before us. In the institutions of Uri and Appenzell, and in others of the Swiss Cantons which have never departed from the primæval model, we may see the institutions of our own forefathers, the institutions which were once common to the whole Teutonic race, institutions whose outward form has necessarily passed away from greater states, but which contain the germs out of which every free constitution in the world has grown. Let us look back to the earliest picture which history can give us of the political and social being of our own forefathers. In the Germany of Tacitus we have the picture of the institutions of the Teutonic race before our branch of that race sailed from the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser to seek new homes by the Humber and the Thames. There, in the picture of our fathers and brethren seventeen hundred years back, the free Teutonic Assembly, the armed Assembly of the whole people, is set before us, well nigh the same, in every essential point, as it may still be seen in Uri, Unterwalden, Glarus, and Appenzell. One point however must be borne in mind. In the assemblies of those small Cantons it is only the most democratic side of the old Teutonic constitution which comes prominently into sight. The commonwealth of Uri, by the peculiar circumstances of its history, grew into an independent and sovereign state. But in its origin it was not a nation, it was not even a tribe10. The Landesgemeinden of which I have been speaking are the Assemblies, not of a nation but of a district; they answer in our own land, not to the Assemblies of the whole Kingdom, but to the lesser Assemblies of the shire or the hundred. But they are not on that account any the less worthy of our notice, they do not on that account throw any the less light on that common political heritage which belongs alike to Swabia and to England. In every Teutonic land which still keeps any footsteps of its ancient institutions, the local divisions are not simply administrative districts traced out for convenience on the map. In fact, they are not divisions at all; they are not divisions of the Kingdom, but the earlier elements out of whose union the Kingdom grew. Yorkshire, by that name, is younger than England, but Yorkshire, by its elder name of Deira, is older than England11. And Yorkshire or Deira itself is younger than the smaller districts of which it is made up, Craven, Cleveland, Holderness, and others. The Landesgemeinde of Uri answers, not to an Assembly of all England, not to an Assembly of all Deira, but to an Assembly of Holderness or Cleveland. But in the old Teutonic system the greater aggregate was simply organized after the model of the lesser elements out of whose union it was formed. In fact, for the political unit, for the atom which joined with its fellow atoms to form the political whole, we must go to areas yet smaller than those of Holderness or Uri. That unit, that atom, the true kernel of all our political life, must be looked for in Switzerland in the Gemeinde or Commune; in England – smile not while I say it – in the parish vestry12.
The primitive Teutonic constitution, the constitution of the Germans of Tacitus, the constitution which has lingered on in a few remote corners of the old German realm, is democratic, but it is not purely democratic. Or rather it is democratic, purely democratic, in the truer, older, and more honourable sense of that much maligned word; it is not purely democratic in that less honourable, but purely arbitrary, sense which is often put upon it in modern controversy. Democracy, according to Periklês, is a government of the whole people, as opposed to oligarchy, a government of only a part of the people13. A government which vests all power in any one class, a government which shuts out any one class, whether that class be the highest or the lowest, does not answer the definition of Periklês; it is not a government of the whole but only of a part; it is not a democracy but an oligarchy14. Democracy, in the sense of Periklês, demands that every freeman shall have a voice in the affairs of the commonwealth; it does not necessarily demand that every freeman should have an equal voice. It does not forbid the existence of magistrates clothed with high authority and held in high reverence, nor does it forbid respect for ancient birth or even an attachment to an hereditary line of rulers. The older school of English constitutional writers delighted to show that the English Constitution contained a monarchic, an aristocratic, and a democratic element, the three being wrought together in such true and harmonious proportion that we could enjoy the good side of all the three great forms of government without ever seeing the evil side of any of them. These worthy speculators were perhaps a little Utopian in their theories; still there is no doubt that, in every glimpse we get of old Teutonic politics, we see what we may fairly call a monarchic, an aristocratic, and a democratic element. Those earliest glimpses set before us three classes of men as found in every Teutonic society, the noble, the common freeman, and the slave15. The existence of the slave, harshly as the name now grates on our ears, is no special shame or blame to our own forefathers. Slavery, in some shape or other, has unhappily been the common law of most nations in most ages; it is a mere exception to the general rule that, partly through the circumstances of most European countries, partly through the growth of humanity and civilization, the hateful institution has, during a few centuries past, gradually disappeared from a certain portion of the earth’s surface. And we must not forget that, in many states of society, the doom of slavery may have been thankfully received as an alleviation of his lot by the man whose life was forfeited either as a prisoner in merciless warfare or as a wrong-doer sentenced for his crimes16. But I mention the existence of slavery only that we may remember that when we speak of freedom, freeman, democracy, and the like, we are after all speaking of the rights of a privileged class – that, whether in Athens, in Rome, or in the early Teutonic communities, there was always a large mass of human beings who had no share in the freedom, the victory, or the glory of their masters. We are now more closely concerned with those distinctions which, from the earliest times, we find among the freemen themselves. In the Germany of Tacitus, as at this day in the democratic Cantons, the sovereign power is vested in the whole people, acting directly in their own persons. But if the sovereignty of the popular Assembly is plainly set before us, we have also no less plainly set before us the existence of a Council smaller than the popular Assembly, and also the existence of a class of nobles, the nature and extent of whose privileges is not very well defined, but who clearly had privileges of some kind or other, and whose privileges passed on by hereditary descent. Here we have an aristocratic element as distinctly marked as the democratic element which is supplied by the popular Assembly. And at the head of all we see personal chiefs of tribes and nations, chiefs bearing different titles, Kings, Dukes, or Ealdormen, who in most cases drew their title to rule from an union of birth and election, rulers whom the nation chose and whom the nation could depose, but who still were the personal leaders of the nation, its highest magistrates in peace, its highest leaders in war. Here then, besides the democratic and the aristocratic elements, we have a distinct monarchic element standing out clearly in our earliest glimpses of Teutonic political life. King, Lords, and Commons, in their present shapes, are something comparatively recent, but we may see something which may fairly pass as the germ of King, Lords, and Commons, from the very beginning of our history.
I will even go a step further. The Constitution which I have just sketched is indeed the common possession of the Teutonic race, but it is something more. We should perhaps not be wrong if we were to call it a common possession of the whole Aryan family of mankind. It is possible that we may even find traces of it beyond the bounds of the Aryan family17. But I will put speculations like these aside. It is enough for me that the Constitution which was the common heritage of the Teutonic race, was an heritage which the Teuton shared with his kinsfolk in Greece and Italy. Turn to the earliest records of European civilization. In the Homeric poems we see a constitution, essentially the same as that which is set before us in the Germany of Tacitus, established alike in the Achaian camp before Ilios, in the island realm of Ithakê, and even among the Gods on Olympos. Zeus is the King of all; but he has around him his Council of the greater Gods, and there are times when he summons to his court the whole Assembly of the Divine nation, when Gods of all ranks gather together in the court of their chief, when, save old Ocean himself, even all the River-gods were there, and when we are specially told – a fact which might perhaps be pressed into the service of very recent controversies – that not one of the Nymphs stayed away18. If we come down to earth, we find the King of Men as the common leader of all, but we find him surrounded by his inner Council of lesser princes and captains. And on great occasions, Agamemnôn on earth, like Zeus in heaven, gathers together the general Assembly of freeborn warriors, an assembly in which, if debate was mainly confined to a few eloquent leaders, the common freeman, the undistinguished citizen and soldier, had at least the right of speaking his mind as to the proposals of his chiefs, by loud applause or by emphatic silence19. Nor is this picture confined to the host in battle array beneath the walls of Ilios; we must remember that in all early societies the distinction between soldier and civilian is unknown; the army is the nation, and the nation is the army. The same picture which the Iliad sets before us as the constitution of the Achaian army is set before us in the glimpses of more peaceful life which we find in the Odyssey as being no less the constitution of every Hellenic commonwealth on its own soil. Everywhere we find the same three elements, the supreme leader or King, the lesser chiefs who form his Council, and the final authority of all, the general Assembly of the freemen20. We see the same in every glimpse which history or legend gives us of the political state of Rome and the other old Italian commonwealths21. Everywhere we find the King, the Senate, the Assembly of the people, and the distribution of powers is not essentially changed when the highest personal authority is transferred from the hands of a King chosen for life to the hands of Consuls chosen for a year22. The likeness between the earliest political institutions of the Greek, the Italian, and the Teuton is so close, so striking in every detail, that we can hardly fail to see in it possession handed on from the earliest times, a possession which Greek, Italian, and Teuton already had in the days before the separation, in those unrecorded but still authentic times when Greek, Italian, and Teuton were still a single people speaking a single tongue.
I have referred more than once to the picture of our race in its earliest recorded times, as set before us by the greatest of Roman historians in the Germany of Tacitus. Let me now set before you some special points of his description in his own words as well as I am able to clothe them in an English dress23.
“They choose their Kings on account of their nobility, their leaders on account of their valour. Nor have the Kings an unbounded or arbitrary power, and the leaders rule rather by their example than by the right of command; if they are ready, if they are foreward, if they are foremost in leading the van, they hold the first place in honour… On smaller matters the chiefs debate, on greater matters all men; but so that those things whose final decision rests with the whole people are first handled by the chiefs… The multitude sits armed in such order as it thinks good; silence is proclaimed by the priests, who have also the right of enforcing it. Presently the King or chief, according to the age of each, according to his birth, according to his glory in war or his eloquence, is listened to, speaking rather by the influence of persuasion than by the power of commanding. If their opinions give offence, they are thrust aside with a shout; if they are approved, the hearers clash their spears. It is held to be the most honourable kind of applause to use their weapons to signify approval. It is lawful also in the assembly to bring matters for trial and to bring charges of capital crimes… In the same assembly chiefs are chosen to administer justice through the districts and villages. Each chief in so doing has a hundred companions of the commons assigned to him, as at once his counsellors and his authority. Moreover they do no matter of business, public or private, except in arms.”
Here we have a picture of a free commonwealth of warriors, in which each freeman has his place in the state, where the vote of the general Assembly is the final authority on all matters, but where both hereditary descent and elective office are held in high honour. We see also in a marked way the influence of personal character and of the power of speech; we see the existence of local divisions, local assemblies, local magistrates; in a word, we see in this picture of our forefathers in their old land, seventeen hundred years ago, the germs of all the institutions which have grown up step by step among ourselves in the course of ages. And a Swiss of the democratic Cantons would see in it, not merely the germs of his constitution, but the living picture of the thing itself.
This immemorial Teutonic constitution was thus the constitution of our forefathers in their old land of Northern Germany, before they made their way into the Isle of Britain. And that constitution, in all its essential points, they brought with them into their new homes, and there, transplanted to a new soil, it grew and flourished, and brought forth fruit richer and more lasting than it brought forth in the land of its earlier birth. On the Teutonic mainland, the old Teutonic freedom, with its free assemblies, national and local, gradually died out before the encroachments of a brood of petty princes24. In the Teutonic island it has changed its form from age to age; it has lived through many storms and it has withstood the attacks of many enemies, but it has never utterly died out. The continued national life of the people, notwithstanding foreign conquests and internal revolutions, has remained unbroken for fourteen hundred years. At no moment has the tie between the present and the past been wholly rent asunder; at no moment have Englishmen sat down to put together a wholly new constitution in obedience to some dazzling theory. Each step in our growth has been the natural consequence of some earlier step; each change in our law and constitution has been, not the bringing in of anything wholly new, but the developement and improvement of something that was already old. Our progress has in some ages been faster, in others slower; at some moments we have seemed to stand still, or even to go back; but the great march of political developement has never wholly stopped; it has never been permanently checked since the day when the coming of the Teutonic conquerors first began to change Britain into England. New and foreign elements have from time to time thrust themselves into our law; but the same spirit which could develope and improve whatever was old and native has commonly found means sooner or later to cast forth again whatever was new and foreign. The lover of freedom, the lover of progress, the man who has eyes keen enough to discover real identity under a garb of outward unlikeness, need never shrink from tracing up the political institutions of England to their earliest shape. The fourteen hundred years of English history are the possession of those who would ever advance, not the possession of those who would stand still or go backwards. The wisdom of our forefathers was ever shown, not in a dull and senseless clinging to things as they were at any given moment, but in that spirit, the spirit alike of the true reformer and the true conservative, which keeps the whole fabric standing, by repairing and improving from time to time whatever parts of it stand in need of repair or improvement. Let ancient customs prevail25; let us ever stand fast in the old paths. But the old paths have in England ever been the paths of progress; the ancient custom has ever been to shrink from mere change for the sake of change, but fearlessly to change whenever change was really needed. And many of the best changes of later times, many of the most wholesome improvements in our Law and Constitution, have been only the casting aside of innovations which have crept in in modern and evil times. They have been the calling up again, in an altered garb, of principles as old as the days when we get our first sight of our forefathers in their German forests. Changed as it is in all outward form and circumstance, the England in which we live, has, in its true life and spirit, far more in common with the England of the earliest times than it has with the England of days far nearer to our own. In many a wholesome act of modern legislation, we have gone back, wittingly or unwittingly, to the earliest principles of our race. We have advanced by falling back on a more ancient state of things; we have reformed by calling to life again the institutions of earlier and ruder times, by setting ourselves free from the slavish subtleties of Norman lawyers, by casting aside as an accursed thing the innovations of Tudor tyranny and Stewart usurpation.
“Mind shall the harder be,
Heart shall the keener be,
Mood shall the more be,
As our main lessens.
Here lies our Elder,
All down hewn,
A good man in the dust;
Ever may he groan
Who now from this war-play
Of wending thinketh.
I am old of life;
Hence stir will I not,
And I by the half
Of my lord,
By such a loved man
To lie am thinking.”
This institution of military companionship seems to have struck Tacitus with some amazement. He says that this kind of personal relation was among the Germans not thought shameful. This was the natural feeling of a Roman. The duty of a Roman citizen was wholly towards the state. The state might be represented either by a responsible magistrate or by an irresponsible Emperor; in either case obedience was due to the representative of the state; but there was no personal relation to the man. The old Roman institution of patron and client, which was so like the German comitatus, had pretty well died out by the time of Tacitus, and it had at no time been entered into by men of high rank53. What amazed Tacitus was that among the Germans the noblest in birth and exploits were not looked on as dishonoured by entering the service of a personal lord. To Tacitus himself Trajan was the chief magistrate of the Roman commonwealth, the chief commander of the Roman army; he was a personal master to none but his slaves and freedmen54. It was only in a much later stage of the Roman Empire that personal service in the court and household of the Emperor began to be looked on as honourable55. But among the Teutonic nations the personal relation coloured everything; personal service towards a King or other chief was honourable from the beginning; the proudest nobles of Europe have down to this day thought themselves honoured by filling offices about the persons of Emperors, Kings, and other princes which Tacitus would have deemed beneath the dignity of any Roman citizen. We are now accustomed to see this kind of service paid in the case of royal personages only; a few centuries back men of any rank deemed themselves honoured by paying the like service to men of the rank next above their own, or even to men of their own rank who had the start of them in age and reputation. The knight was served by his esquire and the master by his scholar; and the same principle, laid aside everywhere else, lingers on in what is undoubtedly a trace of the Teutonic comitatus, the fagging of our public schools. Now the political effect of the existence of the principle of personal service, the institution of the comitatus, alongside of the primitive political community, was most important in our early history. The personal relation went far to swallow up the purely political one. To enter the service of a chief became so established a practice that at last it was deemed that it was the part of every man to “seek a lord,” as the phrase was, to commend himself, to put himself under the protection of some man more powerful than himself56. The man owed faithful service to his lord; the lord owed faithful protection to his man. The very word Lord, in its older and fuller form Hlaford, implies the rewards which the lord bestowed on his faithful man. The word is in some sort a puzzling one; but there can be no doubt that it is connected with hlaf, loaf, and that its general meaning is the giver of bread57. Now herein lurks something which has greatly affected all later political and social arrangements. The institution of the comitatus in its first state had nothing whatever to do with the holding of land. But the man looked for reward of his faithful service at the hands of his lord; he looked for the bread of which his lord’s title proclaimed him as the giver. There was of course no form of reward, no form of bread, so convenient or so honourable as that of a grant of land to be held as the reward of past and the condition of future service. Moreover the custom of granting out lands to be held by the tenure of military service had become common in the later days of Roman power58. Such lands were of course held, not of the Emperor as a personal lord, but of the Roman Commonwealth of which he was the head and representative. But the custom of holding lands by military service fell in well with the Teutonic institution of personal service, and the union of the two in the same person produced that feudal relation which has had such an important bearing on all political and social life through the whole of the middle ages and down to our own time. The land granted by the lord to his man, or the land which the man agreed to hold as if it had been so granted, might be a kingdom held of the Emperor or the Pope, or it might be the smallest estate held of a more powerful neighbour. In either case, such a holding by military service was a fief, and from the institution of such fiefs the so-called Feudal System, with all its manifold workings for good and for evil, had its rise. But so far as the Feudal System existed, either in England or in any other country, it existed wholly as a system which had grown up by the side of an earlier system which it wholly or partially displaced. The feudal tenant, holding his land of a lord by military service gradually supplanted, wholly or partially, in most countries of Europe, the allodial holder who held his land of no other man, and who knew no superior but God and the Law59. In England this change took place only gradually and partially; it was through the Norman Conquest, or, more accurately, through the subtle legal theories which came in with the Norman Conquest, that it was finally established. And, after all, it was rather in theory than in fact that it was established. The Feudal System, as something spreading into every corner of the land, and affecting every relation of life, never obtained the same complete establishment in England which it did in some continental countries.
But it is only indirectly that my subject has anything to do with the Feudal System, and especially with its social working. I have to do with the comitatus, out of which the feudal relation grew, mainly in another aspect equally indirect, namely, the way in which it affected our earliest political institutions. It gave us a new form of nobility, a nobility of office and of personal relation to the King, instead of a nobility founded on birth only. It gave us a nobility of Thegns, which gradually supplanted the earlier nobility of the Eorls. As the royal power and dignity grew, it came to be looked on as the highest honour to enter into the personal service of the King. Two results followed; service towards the King, a place, that is, in the King’s comitatus, became the badge and standard of nobility60. And it greatly strengthened the power of the King that he stood to all the chief men of his kingdom in the relation, not only of a political ruler, but of a personal lord, a lord to whose service they were bound by a personal tie, and of whom they held their lands as the gift of his personal bounty. It marks perhaps a decline from the first idea of the comitatus that the old word Gesith, companion, answering exactly to the Latin Comes used by Tacitus, was supplanted by the name Thegn, literally servant61. But when personal service was deemed honourable, the name of servant was no degradation, and the name Thegn became equivalent to the older Eorl. The King’s Thegn, the men who held their land of the King and who were bound to him by the tie of personal service, formed the highest class of nobility. The Thegns of inferior lords, of Bishops and Ealdormen, formed a secondary class. A nobility of this kind, there can be no doubt, was so far more liberal than the elder nobility of birth that admission to it was not forbidden to men of lower degree. The Ceorl, the ordinary freeman, could not in strictness become an Eorl, for the simple reason that he could not change his forefathers; but he might, and he often did, become a Thegn62. But, on the other hand, such a nobility, while it made it easier for the common freeman to rise, tended to lower the condition of the common freemen who did not rise. For the very reason that the barrier of birth is one which cannot be passed, it is in some respects less irksome than the barrier of wealth or office. The privileges of a strictly hereditary nobility are much more likely to sink into mere honorary distinctions than the privileges of a nobility whose rank is backed by the solid advantages of office and of a personal relation to the sovereign.
The tendency then of the first six hundred years after the settlement of the English in Britain was to increase the power of the Crown, to depress the lower class of freemen, to exchange a nobility of birth for a nobility of personal service to the King. That is to say, England had, before the Norman Conquest, already begun to walk, though with less speed than most other nations, in the path which led to the general overthrow of liberty throughout Europe. The foreign invasion which for a moment seemed to have crushed her freedom for ever did in truth only lead to its new birth, to its fresh establishment in forms better fitted to the altered state of things, forms better fitted to be handed on to later times, forms better fitted to preserve the well-being of a great nation, than those forms of the old Teutonic community which still linger on in those remote corners of the world which I spoke of at my beginning. That momentary overthrow, that lasting new birth, will be the subject of my second chapter. I will now only call you to bear in mind that England has never been left at any time without a National Assembly of some kind or other. Be it Witenagemót, Great Council, or Parliament, there has always been some body of men claiming, with more or less of right, to speak in the name of the nation. And bear too in mind that, down to the Norman Conquest, the body which claimed to speak in the name of the nation was, in legal theory at least, the nation itself. This is a point on which I mean again to speak more fully; I would now simply suggest the thought, new perhaps to many, that there was a time when every freeman of England, no less than every freeman of Uri, could claim a direct voice in the councils of his country. There was a time when every freeman of England could raise his voice or clash his weapon in the Assembly which chose Bishops and Ealdormen and Kings, when he could boast that the laws which he obeyed were laws of his own making, and that the men who bore rule over him were rulers of his own choosing. Those days are gone, nor need we seek to call them back. The struggles of ages on the field and in the Senate have again won back for us the selfsame rights in forms better suited to our times than the barbaric freedom of our fathers. Yet it is well that we should look back to the source whence comes all that we boast of as our own possession, all that we have handed on to our daughter commonwealths in other continents. Let us praise famous men and our fathers that begat us. Let us look to the rock whence we were hewn and to the hole of the pit whence we were digged. Freedom, the old poet says, is a noble thing63; it is also an ancient thing. And those who love it now in its more modern garb need never shrink from tracing back its earlier forms to the first days when history has aught to tell us of the oldest life of our fathers and our brethren.
CHAPTER II
In my first chapter I dealt mainly with those political institutions of the earliest times – institutions common to our whole race, institutions which still live on untouched among some small primitive communities of our race – out of which the still living Constitution of England grew. It is now my business, as the second part of my subject, to trace the steps by which that Constitution grew out of a political state with which at first sight it seems to have so little in common. My chief point is that it did thus, in the strictest sense, grow out of that state. Our English Constitution was never made, in the sense in which the Constitutions of many other countries have been made. There never was any moment when Englishmen drew out their political system in the shape of a formal document, whether as the carrying out of any abstract political theories or as the imitation of the past or present system of any other nation. There are indeed certain great political documents, each of which forms a landmark in our political history. There is the Great Charter, the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights. But not one of these gave itself out as the enactment of anything new. All claimed to set forth, with new strength, it might be, and with new clearness, those rights of Englishmen which were already old. In all our great political struggles the voice of Englishmen has never called for the assertion of new principles, for the enactment of new laws; the cry has always been for the better observance of the laws which were already in force, for the redress of grievances which had arisen from their corruption or neglect64. Till the Great Charter was wrung from John, men called for the laws of good King Eadward. And when the tyrant had unwillingly set his seal to the groundwork of all our later Law, men called for the stricter observance of a Charter which was deemed to be itself only the laws of Eadward in a newer dress65. We have made changes from time to time; but they have been changes which have been at once conservative and progressive – conservative because progressive, progressive because conservative. They have been the application of ancient principles to new circumstances; they have been the careful repairs of an old building, not the pulling down of an old building and the rearing up of a new. The life and soul of English law has ever been precedent; we have always held that whatever our fathers once did their sons have a right to do again. When the Estates of the Realm declared the throne of James the Second to be vacant, they did not seek to justify the act by any theories of the right of resistance, or by any doctrines of the rights of man. It was enough that, three hundred years before, the Estates of the Realm had declared the throne of Richard the Second to be vacant66. By thus walking in the old paths, by thus hearkening to the wisdom of our forefathers, we have been able to change whenever change has been needed, and we have been kept back from changing out of the mere love of abstract theory. We have thus been able to advance, if somewhat slowly, yet the more surely; and when we have made a false step, we have been able to retrace it. On this last power, the power of undoing whatever has been done amiss, I wish specially to insist. In tracing the steps by which our Constitution has grown into its present shape, I shall try specially to show in how many cases the best acts of modern legislation have been, wittingly or unwittingly, a falling back on the principles of our earliest times. In my first chapter I tried to show how our fathers brought with them into the Isle of Britain those primæval institutions which were common to them with the whole Teutonic race. I tried to show how those institutions were modified in the course of time by the circumstances of the English Conquest of Britain, and by the events which followed that Conquest. I showed how the kingly power grew with every increase of the territorial extent of the kingdom; how the old nobility of birth gave way to a new nobility of personal relation to the sovereign; and how the effect of these changes seems to have been to make it easier for the individual freeman of the lower rank to rise, but at the same time to lower the position of the ordinary freemen as a class. This last change was still more largely brought about as an independent result of the same changes which tended to increase the kingly power. In a state of things where representation is unknown, where every freeman is an elector and a lawgiver, but where, if he exercises his elective and legislative rights, he must exercise them directly in his own person – in such a state of things as this every increase of the national territory makes those rights of less practical value, and causes the actual powers of government to be shut up in the hands of a smaller body. There is no doubt that in the earliest Teutonic assemblies every freeman had his place. There is no doubt that in England every freeman kept his place in the smaller local assemblies of the mark, the hundred, and the shire67. He still, where modern legislation has not wholly swept it away, keeps, as I hinted in my former lecture, some faint shadow of the old right when he gives a vote in the assembly, in which the assembly of the mark still lives on, that is, in the vestry of his parish. But how as to the great assembly of all, the Assembly of the Wise, the Witenagemót of the whole realm? No ancient record gives us any clear or formal account of the constitution of that body. It is commonly spoken of in a vague way as a gathering of the wise, the noble, the great men68. But, alongside of passages like these, we find other passages which speak of it in a way which implies a far more popular constitution. King Eadward is said to be chosen King by “all folk.” Earl Godwine “makes his speech before the King and all the people of the land.” Judicial sentences and other acts of authority are voted by the army, that is by the people under arms. Sometimes we find direct mention of the presence of large and popular classes of men, as the citizens of London or Winchester69. The inference from all this is obvious. The right of the ordinary freeman to attend, to vote – it might perhaps be nearer the truth to say to shout70– in the general Assembly of the whole realm was never formally taken away. But it was a right which, in its own nature, most men could hardly ever exercise. None but men of wealth would have the means, none but men of some personal importance would have any temptation, to take long journeys for such a purpose. It is not likely that any great multitude would, under ordinary circumstances, set off from Northern England to attend meetings which were habitually held at Westminster, Winchester, and Gloucester. It is plain that the habitual attendance would not go beyond a small body of chief men, Earls, Bishops, Abbots, the officers of the King’s court, the Thegns of the greatest wealth or the highest personal influence. But it is plain that, when the heart of the nation was specially stirred by some overwhelming interest, many men would find their way to the Assembly who would not find their way to it in ordinary times. And, when the Assembly was held in a town, the citizens of that town at once formed a popular element ready on the spot. Hence we can account for the seemingly contradictory way in which the Assembly is spoken of, sometimes in language which would imply an aristocratic body, sometimes in language which would imply a body highly democratic. It was in fact a body, democratic in ancient theory, aristocratic in ordinary practice, but to which any strong popular impulse could at any time restore its ancient democratic character71. Acts done by a freely chosen representative body may, without much straining of language, be said to be done by the whole people. But acts done by a body not representative could never be called the acts of the whole people, unless the whole people had an acknowledged right to attend its meetings, though that right might, under all ordinary circumstances, be exercised only by a few of their number.
Out of this body, whose constitution, by the time of the Norman Conquest, had become not a little anomalous and not a little fluctuating, our Parliament directly grew. Of one House of that Parliament we may say more; we may say, not that it grew out of the ancient Assembly but that it is absolutely the same by personal identity. The House of Lords not only springs out of, it actually is, the ancient Witenagemót. I can see no break between the two. King William summoned his Witan as King Eadward had summoned them before him. In one memorable assembly of the Conqueror’s reign, we read that the great men of the realm were reinforced by the presence of the whole body of the landholders of England, whose number tradition handed down as sixty thousand72. But, as a rule, the Great Councils after the Norman Conquest bear the same uncertain and fluctuating character as the Gemóts of earlier days. In the constitution of the House of Lords I can see nothing mysterious or wonderful. Its hereditary character came in, like other things, step by step, by accident rather than by design. And it should not be forgotten that, as long as the Bishops keep their seats in the House, the hereditary character of the House does not extend to all its members. To me it seems simply that two classes of men, the two highest classes, the Earls and the Bishops, never lost or disused that right of attending in the National Assembly which was at first common to them with all other freemen. Besides these two classes, the King summoned other men to our early Parliaments, pretty much, it would seem, at his own pleasure. The right of the King so to do could not be denied; when all had an abstract right to attend, we cannot blame the King for specially summoning those for whose attendance he specially wished. But it would almost naturally follow that such a special summons would gradually be held to bestow an exclusive right, and that those who were not specially summoned would soon be looked upon as having no part or lot in the matter. But it is certain that it was long before such a summons was held to confer a hereditary, or even a lasting personal right. The King did not always summon the same men to every Parliament. Besides the Earls and the Bishops, others both of the laity and the clergy were always summoned, but the list of those who were summoned, both of the laity and of the lesser ecclesiastical dignitaries, constantly varies from Parliament to Parliament73. That the personal summons conveyed an exclusive hereditary right was one of those devices of lawyers of which so many have crept into our constitution. When the notion of hereditary right had once established itself, the formal creation of peerages by patent was a natural stage. Looking at the matter from this historical point of view, it seems to me simply wonderful how any one can doubt the power of the Crown to create life-peerages, or to regulate the tenure or succession of a peerage in any way that it thinks good.
The House of Lords then, I do not hesitate to say, represents, or rather is, the ancient Witenagemót. An assembly in which at first every freeman had a right to appear has, by the force of circumstances, step by step, without any one moment of sudden change, shrunk up into an Assembly wholly hereditary and official, an Assembly to which the Crown may summon any man, but to which, it is now strangely held, the Crown cannot refuse to summon the representatives of any man whom it has once summoned. As in most other things, the tendency to shrink up into a body of this kind began to show itself before the Norman Conquest, and was finally confirmed and established through the results of the Norman Conquest. But the special function of the body into which the old national Assembly has changed, the function of “another House,” an Upper House, a House of Lords as opposed to a House of Commons, could not show itself till a second House of a more popular constitution had arisen by its side. Like everything else in our English polity, both Houses in some sort came of themselves. Neither of them was the creation of any ingenious theorist, though we need not doubt that many of the several steps in the growth of each were, each in its own time, the work of practical statesmanship. Our forefathers had no theories; but men, each in his own generation, had eyes keen enough to see that such and such a change in detail would get rid of such and such an immediate evil, or would bring with it such and such an immediate advantage. Nay more, it has sometimes happened that a change which was brought in with an evil intent has in the end worked for good. Measures which were taken with a view of strengthening the power of the Crown have come in the end to widen the rights of the people. On the other hand, institutions which once answered a good and needful purpose have sometimes, through change of times, changed their nature and have become instruments of evil instead of good. But in neither case were the institutions of our fathers the work of abstract theory. They have therefore lived on, and they have borne good fruit. Our national Assembly has changed its name and its constitution, but its corporate identity has lived on unbroken. We can therefore at any moment reform without destroying. In France, on the other hand, institutions have been the work of abstract theory; they have been the creations, for good or for evil, of the minds of individual men. The English Parliament is immemorial; it grew step by step out of the older order of things. In France the older order of things utterly vanished; the ground lay open for the creation of a wholly new institution, and the States-General were called into being at the bidding of Philip the Fair74. Englishmen in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had no theories of the rights of man or of universal humanity. But when they saw a practical grievance, they called for its redress. Frenchmen in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had theories as magnificent as any that have been put forth in the eighteenth or the nineteenth. And they had even then already learned to do deeds of blood in the name of freedom and philanthropy75. Therefore French institutions have not lasted. The States-General lived but a fitful life from century to century, and they perished for ever in the Great Revolution. Since that time no French institution, no form either of the legislative or of the executive power, has been able to keep up a continuous being of twenty years. This difference has not been owing to any lack of great men or of noble purposes on the part of our continental neighbours. It has been owing, partly, we may believe, to differences in the inborn character of the two nations, partly to differences in the course taken by their several histories. In France the Kings gradually swept away all traces of older free institutions, and established a simple despotism in the Crown76. The French therefore have been left without any traditional foundation to build on. In all their changes for good or for evil they have been driven to build afresh from the beginning. Our Kings never wholly wiped out our free institutions; they found means to turn them to their own purposes, and to establish a practical despotism without destroying the outward forms of freedom. The forms thus lived on, and in better times they could again be clothed with their substance. We ever had traditional principles to fall back upon, a traditional basis to build upon. It would be hard to reckon up the number of Assemblies, Conventions, Chambers of Deputies, and Legislative Bodies, which have risen and fallen in France, while the House of Lords and the House of Commons have lived on, with their powers, their duties, their relations to the Crown, to the Nation, and to one another, ever silently changing, but with their continuous being remaining throughout unbroken.
But I would again point out that, while the growth of English institutions has thus gone on almost in obedience to a natural law, the wisdom, the foresight, the patriotism, of individual statesmen is never to be put out of our reckoning. There was a given state of things, and some man had keenness of sight to see what was the right thing to do in that state of things. Our Constitution has no founder; but there is one man to whom we may give all but honours of a founder, one man to whose wisdom and self-devotion we owe that English history has taken the course which it has taken for the last six hundred years. It might no doubt have taken that course without him; things might have come about as they did without any one man coming so prominently to the front; or, if he had not arisen, some other man might have arisen to do his work. But we need not speculate as to what might have been; it is enough that one man did arise to do the work, that there is one man to whom we owe that the wonderful thirteenth century, the great creative and destructive age throughout the world77, was to us an age of creation and not of destruction. That man, the man who finally gave to English freedom its second and more lasting shape, the hero and martyr of England in the greatest of her constitutional struggles, was Simon of Montfort, Earl of Leicester. If we may not call him the founder of the English Constitution, we may at least call him the founder of the House of Commons78. It was in his age that the new birth of English freedom began to show itself; it was mainly by his work that that new birth was not stifled before it had brought forth lasting fruits. Strange it may at first sight seem that the founder of the later liberties of England was not an Englishman. Simon of Montfort, a native of France, did for the land of his adoption what even he might not have been able to do for the land of his birth. And why? The land of his birth was – shall I say flourishing or suffering? – under the baleful virtues of the most righteous of Kings. Saint Lewis reigned in France, Saint Lewis the just and holy, the man who never swerved from the path of right, the man who swared to his neighbour and disappointed him not, though it were to his own hindrance. Under his righteous rule there could be no ground for revolt or disaffection. By surrounding the Crown with the reflected glory of his own virtues, he did more than any other man to strengthen its power. He thus did more than any other man to pave the way for that foul despotism of his successors whose evil deeds would have daily vexed his righteous soul. In England, on the other hand, we had the momentary curse, the lasting blessing, of a succession of evil Kings. We had Kings who had no spark of English feeling in their breasts, but from whose follies and necessities our fathers were able to wring their freedom, all the more lastingly because it was bit by bit that it was wrung. A Latin poet once sang that freedom never flourishes more brightly than it does under a righteous King79. And so it does while that righteous King himself tarries among men. But to win freedom as an heritage for ever there are times when we have more need of the vices of Kings than of their virtues. The tyranny of our Angevin masters woke up English freedom from its momentary grave. Had Richard and John and Henry been Kings like Ælfred and Saint Lewis, the crosier of Stephen Langton, the sword of Robert Fitzwalter, would never have flashed at the head of the Barons and people of England; the heights of Lewes would never have seen the mightiest triumph of her freedom; the pavement of Evesham choir would never have closed over the mangled relics of her noblest champion80.
The Commons too themselves bear a name which had a far different meaning in England from what it bore elsewhere. The usage by which the Knights of the shire and the Citizens and Burgesses were brought together in a single House, whatever was its origin, whether it were at first the result of design or of happy accident, has been an usage no less wholesome, no less needful to our full constitutional developement, than that which decreed that the children of peers should be commoners. In most other countries the class of men who were returned as representatives of the counties, the Knights of the Shire, would have been members of the Estate of the Nobles. In France the words nobleman and gentleman had the same meaning, that of the members of an exclusive aristocratic caste. The Commons, the Third Estate, consisted of the citizens of the privileged towns only114. But in England the middle class was not confined to the towns; it spread itself, in the form of a lesser gentry and a wealthy yeomanry, over the whole face of the land. That class, the smaller landowners, was for a long time the strength of the country, and the happiest results came from the union of their representatives in a single chamber with those of the cities and boroughs. Each class gained strength from its fellowship with the other, and the citizen class gained, from their union on equal terms with the landed gentry, a consideration which otherwise they might never have reached. In short, the union of the two, the union of all classes of freemen except the clergy and the actual members of the peerage, of all classes from the peer’s eldest son to the smallest freeholder or burgess, made the House of Commons a real representation of the whole nation, and not of any single order in the nation.
Mark again that the form of government which political writers call bi-cameral, that is to say, where the Legislative Assembly consists of two Chambers or Houses, arose out of one of the accidents of English History. The merits of that form of government are now freely under discussion, but it is assumed on both sides that the only choice lies between one chamber and two; no one proposes to have three or four115. But most of the continental bodies of Estates consisted, as we have seen, of three Houses; in Sweden, where the peasants, the small freeholders, were important enough to be separately represented alongside of the Nobles, Clergy, and Citizens, there were till lately four116. The number two became the number of our Houses of Parliament, not out of any conviction of the advantages of that number, but because it was found impossible to get the Clergy in England habitually to act, as they did elsewhere, as a regular member of the parliamentary body. They shrank from the burthen, or they deemed secular legislation inconsistent with their profession. Thus, instead of the Clergy forming, as they did in France, a distinct Estate of the Legislature, we got a Parliament of two Houses, Lords and Commons, attended by a kind of ecclesiastical shadow of the Parliament in the shape of the two Houses of the ecclesiastical Convocation. Thus, for all practical purposes, there were only two Estates in the English Parliament, Lords and Commons. Thus the phrase of the Three Estates, which had a meaning in France, became meaningless in England. For centuries back there has been no separate Estate of the Clergy; some of their highest members have belonged to the Estate of the Lords, and the rest to the Estate of the Commons. Hence has arisen a common but not unnatural misconception, a misconception as old as the days of the Long Parliament, as to the meaning of the phrase of the Three Estates. Men constantly use those words as if they meant the three elements among which the legislative power is divided, King, Lords, and Commons. But an Estate means a rank or order or class of men, like the Lords, the Clergy, or the Commons. The King is not an Estate, because there is no class or order of Kings, the King being one person alone by himself. The proper phrase is the King and the three Estates of the Realm. But in England, as I have already shown, the phrase is meaningless, as we have in truth two Estates only117.
We thus had in England, not an Estate of Nobles, forming a distinct class from the people, but an Upper House of hereditary and official Lords, whose privileges were purely personal, and whose children had no political privilege above other men. Our Bishops and some other of our ecclesiastical dignitaries had seats in the Upper House, but there was no distinct Estate of the Clergy, having its distinct voice in legislation. Our Lower House, lower in name, but gradually to become upper in real power, came to represent, not merely the inhabitants of privileged towns, but the whole nation, with the single exception of the personal holders of hereditary or official seats in the Upper House. That such an Assembly should gradually draw to itself all the real powers of the state was in the nature of things; but it was only gradually that it did so. Few things in our parliamentary history are more remarkable than the way in which the two Houses have for the most part worked together. I am not talking of very modern times, but of times when the two Houses were really coordinate powers in the state. During the six hundred years that the two Houses have lived side by side, serious disputes between them have been very rare, and those disputes which have happened have generally had to do with matters of form and privilege which were chiefly interesting to members of the two Houses themselves, not with questions which had any great importance for the nation at large118. For a while the Commons followed the lead of the Lords; then the Lords came gradually to follow the lead of the Commons; but open and violent breaches between the Houses have been rare indeed. From the days of Earl Simon onwards, both the power of Parliament as a whole, and the special power of the House of Commons, was constantly growing. The Parliaments of the fourteenth century exercised all the powers which our Parliament exercises now, together with some which modern Parliaments shrink from exercising. That is to say, the Parliaments of those days were obliged either to do directly or to leave undone many things which the developement of political conventionality enables a modern Parliament to do indirectly. The ancient Parliaments demanded the dismissal of the King’s ministers; they regulated his personal household; they put his authority into commission; if need called for such a step, they put forth their last and greatest power and deposed him from his kingly office. In those days a change of government, a change of policy, the getting rid of a bad minister and the putting a better in his place, were things which never could be done without an open struggle between King and Parliament; often they could not be done without the bondage, the imprisonment, or the death, perhaps only of the minister, perhaps even of the King himself. The same ends can now be gained by a vote of censure in the House of Commons; in many cases they can be gained even without a vote of censure, by the simple throwing out of a measure by which a Ministry has given out that it will stand or fall119.
The fifteenth century, as compared with the thirteenth and fourteenth, was in some respects a time in which things went back. It is plain that the Parliaments of that day were bodies which were much less independent than the Parliaments of earlier times. During the Wars of the Roses each successive military victor found a Parliament ready to confirm his claim to the Crown and to decree the condemnation of his enemies120. And it was a Parliament of Henry the Sixth which passed the most reactionary measure which any Parliament ever did pass, that by which the qualification for a county elector was narrowed to those freeholders whose estates were of the yearly value of forty shillings121. In this case time and the change in the value of money have redressed the wrong; there may be freeholders whose estates are under the value of forty shillings, but I cannot think that they are now a very large or important class. But, to understand the meaning of the restriction in the fifteenth century, for forty shillings we may fairly read forty pounds; and certainly, if we struck off the register all those electors whose qualification is a freehold – much more those whose qualification is an estate less than a freehold – under the value of forty pounds, the lessening of the constituencies of our counties would not be small. On the other hand, during the revolutionary times which followed, we more than once hear of direct appeals to the people which remind us of days far earlier. Edward the Fourth and Richard the Third were chosen Kings, or at least had their claims to the Crown acknowledged, by gatherings of the citizens of London which remind us of the wars of Stephen and Matilda122. Still even in this age, the power of Parliament was advancing123; the anxiety of every pretender to get a parliamentary sanction for his claims was a sign of the growing importance of Parliament, and we get incidental notices which show that a seat in the House of Commons, and that not as a knight of a shire, but as a burgess of a borough, was now an object of ambition for men of the class from which knights of the shire were chosen, and even for the sons of members of the Upper House124.
At last came the sixteenth century, the time of trial for parliamentary institutions in so many countries of Europe. Not a few assemblies which had once been as free as our own Parliament were, during that age, either utterly swept away or reduced to empty formalities. Then it was that Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second overthrew the free constitutions of Castile and Aragon; before long the States-General of France met for the last time before their last meeting of all on the eve of the great Revolution125. In England parliamentary institutions were not swept away, nor did Parliament sink into an empty form. But, for a while, Parliaments, like all our other institutions, became perverted into instruments of tyranny. Under Henry the Eighth, Parliaments, like Judges, Juries, and ecclesiastical Synods, decreed whatever seemed good to the caprice of the despot. Why had they so fallen away from what they had been in a past age, from what they were to be again? The reason is plain; the Commons had not yet gained strength enough to act without the Lords, and the Lords had ceased to be an independent body. The old nobility had been cut off at Towton and Barnet, and the new nobility were the abject slaves of the King to whom they owed their honours. A century later, the new nobility had inherited the spirit of the old, and the Commons had grown to the fulness of their power. Thus it came that we find in the Parliaments of the sixteenth century an abject submission to a tyrant’s will, of which we find no sign in the Parliaments either of the fourteenth or of the seventeenth. Very different indeed from the Parliaments which overthrew Richard the Second and Charles the First were the Parliaments which, almost without a question, passed bills of attainder against any man against whom Henry’s caprice had turned, the Parliaments which, in the great age of religious controversy, were ever ready to enforce by every penalty that particular shade of doctrine which for the moment commended itself to the Defender of the Faith, to his son or to his daughters. Why, it may be asked, in such a state of things, did not parliamentary institutions perish in England as they perished in so many other lands? It might be enough to say that no ruler had an interest in destroying institutions which he found that he could so conveniently turn to his own purposes. But why did not those institutions sink into mere forms, which they certainly did not do, even in the worst times? One reason undoubtedly is that special insular position of our country which has in so many other ways given a peculiar turn to our history. The great foe of parliamentary institutions was the introduction of standing armies. But the sovereign of England, shut up within his island, had far less need of a standing army than the sovereigns of the Continent, engaged as they were in their ceaseless wars with neighbours on their frontiers. But I believe that the personal character of Henry the Eighth had a great deal to do with the final preservation of our liberties. Do not for a moment fancy that I belong to that school of paradox which sets up Henry the Eighth as a virtuous and beneficent ruler. Do not think that I claim for him any feelings of direct thankfulness such as I do claim for Earl Simon and King Edward. The position of Henry is more like the position of William the Conqueror, though I certainly hold that the Conqueror was in everything the better man of the two. Both served the cause of freedom indirectly, and both served it by means of features in the personal character of each. In one respect indeed William and Henry stood in utterly different positions towards England. William was a stranger, and it was largely because he was a stranger that he was able to do us indirect good. Henry, with all his crimes, was a thorough Englishman; throughout his reign there was a sympathy between him and the mass of his subjects, who, after all, did not greatly suffer by the occasional beheading of a Queen or a Duke. But the despotism of William and the despotism of Henry agreed in this, that each, even in his worst deeds, retained a scrupulous regard for the letter of the Law. In the case of William this is not hard to see for any one who carefully studies the records of his age126; in the case of Henry it stands boldly proclaimed in the broadest facts of English history. While his fellow-tyrants abroad were everywhere overthrowing free institutions, Henry was in all things showing them the deepest outward respect. Throughout his reign he took care to do nothing except in outward and regular legal form, nothing for which he could not shelter himself under the sanction either of precedent or of written Law. In itself, this perversion of Law, this clothing of wrong with the garb of right, is really worse – at all events it is more corrupting – than deeds of open violence against which men are tempted openly to revolt. But such a tyranny as Henry’s is one form of the homage which vice pays to virtue; the careful preservation of the outward forms of freedom makes it easier for another and happier generation again to kindle the form into its ancient spirit and life. Every deed of wrong done by Henry with the assent of Parliament was in truth a witness to the abiding importance of Parliament; the very degradation of our ancient Constitution was a step to its revival with new strength and in a more perfect form127.
A like witness to the importance of Parliament in this age was shown in two other very remarkable ways, whereby the power and importance of the House of Commons was acknowledged in the very act of corrupting it. One was the active interference of the Government in parliamentary elections; the other was the creation of boroughs in order to be corrupt. One needs no stronger proofs than these of the importance of the body which it was found needful thus to pack and to manage. The Crown still kept the power of summoning members from any boroughs which it thought fit, and throughout the Tudor reigns the power was freely abused by sending writs to places which were likely to return members who would be subservient to the Court128. Thus arose many of the wretched little boroughs in Cornwall and elsewhere which were disfranchised by our successive Reform Bills. These boroughs, which always were corrupt and which were created in order to be corrupt, must be carefully distinguished from another class which perished with them. Many towns to which Earl Simon and King Edward sent writs decayed in process of time; sometimes they decayed positively; more commonly they decayed relatively, by being utterly outstripped by younger towns and so losing the importance which they had once had. The disfranchisement of both classes was equally just; but the different history of the two classes should be carefully borne in mind. It was right to take away its members from Old Sarum, but there had been a time when it was right to give Old Sarum members. In the case of a crowd of Cornish boroughs, it not only was right to take away their members, but they never ought to have had members at all129.
It was in the days of Elizabeth that something of the ancient spirit again breathed forth. It is then that we come to the beginning of that long line of parliamentary worthies which stretches on in unbroken order from her days to our own. A few daring spirits in the Commons’ House now began once more to speak in tones worthy of those great Assemblies which had taught the Edwards and the Richards that there was a power in England mightier than their own130. Under the puny successor of the great Queen the voice of freedom was heard more loudly131. In the next reign the great strife of all came, and a King of England once more, as in the days of Henry and Simon, stood forth in arms against his people to learn that the power of his people was a greater power than his. But in the seventeenth century, just as in the thirteenth, men did not ask for any rights and powers which were admitted to be new; they asked only for the better security of those rights and powers which had been handed on from days of old. Into the details of that great struggle and of the times which followed it is not my purpose to enter. I have traced at some length the origin and growth of our Constitution from the earliest times to its days of special trial in the days of Tudor and Stewart despotism. Our later constitutional history rather belongs to an inquiry of another kind. It is mainly a record of silent changes in the practical working of institutions whose outward and legal form remained untouched. I will therefore end my consecutive historical sketch – if consecutive it can claim to be – at the point which we have now reached. Instead of carrying on any regular constitutional narrative into times nearer to our own, I will rather choose, as the third part of my subject, the illustration of one of the special points with which I set out, namely the power which our gradual developement has given us of retracing our steps, of falling back, whenever need calls for falling back, on the principles of earlier, often of the earliest, times. Wittingly or unwittingly, much of our best modern legislation has, as I have already said, been a case of advancing by the process of going back. As the last division of the work which I have taken in hand, I shall try to show in how many cases we have, as a matter of fact, gone back from the cumbrous and oppressive devices of feudal and royalist lawyers to the sounder, freer, and simpler principles of the days of our earliest freedom.
CHAPTER III
In my two former chapters I have carried my brief sketch of the history of the English Constitution down to the great events of the seventeenth century. I chose that point as the end of my consecutive narrative, because the peculiar characteristic of the times which have followed has been that so many and such important practical changes have been made without any change in the written Law, without any re-enactment of the Law, without any fresh declaration of its meaning. The movements and revolutions of former times, as I have before said, seldom sought any acknowledged change in the Law, but rather its more distinct enactment, its more careful and honest administration. This was the general character of all the great steps in our political history, from the day when William of Normandy renewed the Laws of Eadward to the day when William of Orange gave his royal assent to the Bill of Rights. But, though each step in our progress took the shape, not of the creation of a new right, but of the firmer establishment of an old one, yet each step was marked by some formal and public act which stands enrolled among the landmarks of our progress. Some Charter was granted by the Sovereign, some Act of Parliament was passed by the Estates of the Realm, setting forth in legal form the nature and measure of the rights which it was sought to place on a firmer ground. Since the seventeenth century things have in this respect greatly altered. The work of legislation, of strictly constitutional legislation, has never ceased; a long succession of legislative enactments stand out as landmarks of political progress no less in more recent than in earlier times. But alongside of them there has also been a series of political changes, changes of no less moment than those which are recorded in the statute-book, which have been made without any legislative enactment whatever. A whole code of political maxims, universally acknowledged in theory, universally carried out in practice, has grown up, without leaving among the formal acts of our legislature any trace of the steps by which it grew. Up to the end of the seventeenth century, we may fairly say that no distinction could be drawn between the Constitution and the Law. The prerogative of the Crown, the privilege of Parliament, the liberty of the subject, might not always be clearly defined on every point. It has indeed been said that those three things were all of them things to which in their own nature no limit could be set. But all three were supposed to rest, if not on the direct words of the Statute Law, yet at least on that somewhat shadowy yet very practical creation, that mixture of genuine ancient traditions and of recent devices of lawyers, which is known to Englishmen as the Common Law. Any breach either of the rights of the Sovereign or of the rights of the subject was a legal offence, capable of legal definition and subjecting the offender to legal penalties. An act which could not be brought within the letter either of the Statute or of the Common Law would not then have been looked upon as an offence at all. If lower courts were too weak to do justice, the High Court of Parliament stood ready to do justice even against the mightiest offenders. It was armed with weapons fearful and rarely used, but none the less regular and legal. It could smite by impeachment, by attainder, by the exercise of the greatest power of all, the deposition of the reigning King. But men had not yet reached the more subtle doctrine that there may be offences against the Constitution which are no offences against the Law. They had not learned that men in high office may have a responsibility practically felt and acted on, but which no legal enactment has defined, and which no legal tribunal can enforce. It had not been found out that Parliament itself has a power, now practically the highest of its powers, in which it acts neither as a legislature nor as a court of justice, but in which it pronounces sentences which have none the less practical force because they carry with them none of the legal consequences of death, bonds, banishment, or confiscation. We now have a whole system of political morality, a whole code of precepts for the guidance of public men, which will not be found in any page of either the Statute or the Common Law, but which are in practice held hardly less sacred than any principle embodied in the Great Charter or in the Petition of Right. In short, by the side of our written Law there has grown up an unwritten or conventional Constitution. When an Englishman speaks of the conduct of a public man being constitutional or unconstitutional, he means something wholly different from what he means by his conduct being legal or illegal. A famous vote of the House of Commons, passed on the motion of a great statesman, once declared that the then Ministers of the Crown did not possess the confidence of the House of Commons, and that their continuance in office was therefore at variance with the spirit of the Constitution132. The truth of such a position, according to the traditional principles on which public men have acted for some generations, cannot be disputed; but it would be in vain to seek for any trace of such doctrines in any page of our written Law. The proposer of that motion did not mean to charge the existing Ministry with any illegal act, with any act which could be made the subject either of a prosecution in a lower court or of impeachment in the High Court of Parliament itself. He did not mean that they, Ministers of the Crown, appointed during the pleasure of the Crown, committed any breach of the Law of which the Law could take cognizance, merely by keeping possession of their offices till such time as the Crown should think good to dismiss them from those offices. What he meant was that the general course of their policy was one which to a majority of the House of Commons did not seem to be wise or beneficial to the nation, and that therefore, according to a conventional code as well understood and as effectual as the written Law itself, they were bound to resign offices of which the House of Commons no longer held them to be worthy. The House made no claim to dismiss those Ministers from their offices by any act of its own; it did not even petition the Crown to remove them from their offices. It simply spoke its mind on their general conduct, and it was held that, when the House had so spoken, it was their duty to give way without any formal petition, without any formal command, on the part either of the House or of the Sovereign133. The passing by the House of Commons of such a resolution as this may perhaps be set down as the formal declaration of a constitutional principle. But though a formal declaration, it was not a legal declaration. It created a precedent for the practical guidance of future Ministers and future Parliaments, but it neither changed the Law nor declared it. It asserted a principle which might be appealed to in future debates in the House of Commons, but it asserted no principle which could be taken any notice of by a Judge in any Court of Law. It stands therefore on a wholly different ground from those enactments which, whether they changed the Law or simply declared the Law, had a real legal force, capable of being enforced by a legal tribunal. If any officer of the Crown should levy a tax without the authority of Parliament, if he should enforce martial law without the authority of Parliament, he would be guilty of a legal crime. But, if he merely continues to hold an office conferred by the Crown and from which the Crown has not removed him, though he hold it in the teeth of any number of votes of censure passed by both Houses of Parliament, he is in no way a breaker of the written Law. But the man who should so act would be universally held to have trampled under foot one of the most undoubted principles of the unwritten but universally accepted Constitution.
The remarkable thing is that, of these two kinds of hypothetical offences, the latter, the guilt of which is purely conventional, is almost as unlikely to happen as the former, whose guilt is a matter established by Law. The power of the Law is so firmly established among us that the possibility of breaches of the Law on the part of the Crown or its Ministers hardly ever comes into our heads. And conduct sinning against the broad lines of the unwritten Constitution is looked on as hardly less unlikely. Political men may debate whether such and such a course is or is not constitutional, just as lawyers may debate whether such a course is or is not legal. But the very form of the debate implies that there is a Constitution to be observed, just as in the other case it implies that there is a Law to be observed. Now this firm establishment of a purely unwritten and conventional code is one of the most remarkable facts in history. It is plain that it implies the firmest possible establishment of the power of the written Law as its groundwork. If there were the least fear of breaches of the written Law on the part of the Crown or its officers, we should be engaged in finding means for getting rid of that more serious danger, not in disputing over points arising out of a code which has no legal existence. But it is well sometimes to stop and remember how thoroughly conventional the whole of our received system is. The received doctrine as to the relations of the two Houses of Parliament to one another, the whole theory of the position of the body known as the Cabinet and of its chief the Prime Minister, every detail in short of the practical working of government among us, is a matter belonging wholly to the unwritten Constitution and not at all to the written Law. The limits of the royal authority are indeed clearly defined by the written Law. But I suspect that many people would be amazed at the amount of power which the Crown still possesses by Law, and at the many things, which in our eyes would seem utterly monstrous, but which might yet be done by royal authority without any law being broken. The Law indeed secures us against arbitrary legislation, against the repeal of any old laws, or the enactment of any new ones, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament134. But it is the unwritten Constitution alone which makes it practically impossible for the Crown to refuse its assent to measures which have passed both Houses of Parliament, and which in many cases makes it almost equally impossible to refuse the prayer of an address sent up by one of those Houses only. The written Law leaves to the Crown the choice of all its ministers and agents, great and small; their appointment to office and their removal from office, as long as they commit no crime which the Law can punish, is a matter left to the personal discretion of the Sovereign. The unwritten Constitution makes it practically impossible for the Sovereign to keep a Minister in office of whom the House of Commons does not approve, and it makes it almost equally impossible to remove from office a Minister of whom the House of Commons does approve135. The written Law and the unwritten Constitution alike exempt the Sovereign from all ordinary personal responsibility136. They both transfer the responsibility from the Sovereign himself to his agents and advisers. But the nature and extent of their responsibility is widely different in the eyes of the written Law and in the eyes of the unwritten Constitution. The written Law is satisfied with holding that the command of the Sovereign is no excuse for an illegal act, and that he who advises the commission of an illegal act by royal authority must bear the responsibility from which the Sovereign himself is free. The written Law knows nothing of any responsibility but such as may be enforced either by prosecution in the ordinary Courts or by impeachment in the High Court of Parliament. The unwritten Constitution lays the agents and advisers of the Crown under a responsibility of quite another kind. What we understand by the responsibility of Ministers is that they are liable to have all their public acts discussed in Parliament, not only on the ground of their legal or illegal character, but on the vaguest grounds of their general tendency. They may be in no danger of prosecution or impeachment; but they are no less bound to bow to other signs of the will of the House of Commons; the unwritten Constitution makes a vote of censure as effectual as an impeachment, and in many cases it makes a mere refusal to pass a ministerial measure as effectual as a vote of censure. The written Law knows nothing of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister; it knows them as members of one or the other House of Parliament, as Privy Councillors, as holders, each man in his own person, of certain offices; but, as a collective body bound together by a common responsibility, the Law never heard of them137. But in the eye of the unwritten Constitution the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of which he is the head form the main feature of our system of government. It is plain at a moment’s glance that the practical power of the Crown is not now what it was in the reign of William the Third or even in that of George the Third. But the change is due, far less to changes in the written Law than to changes in the unwritten Constitution. The Law leaves the powers of the Crown untouched, but the Constitution requires that those powers should be exercised by such persons, and in such a manner, as may be acceptable to a majority of the House of Commons. In all these ways, in a manner silent and indirect, the Lower House of Parliament, as it is still deemed in formal rank, has become the really ruling power in the nation. There is no greater contrast than that which exists between the humility of its formal dealings with the Crown and even with the Upper House138, and the reality of the irresistible power which it exercises over both. It is so conscious of the mighty force of its indirect powers that it no longer cares to claim the direct powers which it exercised in former times. There was a time when Parliament was directly consulted on questions of War and Peace. There was a time when Parliament claimed directly to appoint several of the chief officers of state139. There were much later times when it was no unusual thing to declare a man in power to be a public enemy, or directly to address the Crown for his removal from office and from the royal presence. No such direct exercises of parliamentary power are needed now, because the whole machinery of government may be changed by the simple process of the House refusing to pass a measure on which the Minister has made up his mind to stake his official being.
On the early history of the democratic Cantons, a subject than which none has been more thoroughly misunderstood, I am not able to point to any one trustworthy work in English. Among the writings of Swiss scholars – shut up for the most part from readers of other nations in the inaccessible Transactions of local Societies – there is a vast literature on the subject, of the whole of which I am far from pretending to be master. But I may refer to the Essai sur l’Etat des Personnes et la Condition des Terres dans le Pays d’Ury au XIIIe Siècle, by the Baron Frederick de Gingins-la-Sarraz, in the Archiv für schweizerische Geschichte, i. 17; to Dr. J. R. Burckhardt’s Untersuchungen über die erste Bevölkerung des Alpengebirgs in the same collection, iv. 3; to the early chapters of the great work of Bluntschli, Geschichte des schweizerischen Bundesrechtes (Zürich, 1849), and of Blumer’s Staats-und Rechtsgeschichte der schweizerischen Demokratien (St. Gallen, 1850); to Dr. Alfons Huber, Die Waldstaette (Innsbruck, 1861), and Dr. Wilhelm Vischer, Die Sage von der Befreiung der Waldstädte (Leipzig, 1867). Dr. H. von Liebenau, in Die Tell-Sage zu dem Jahre 1230, takes a line of his own. The results of the whole inquiry will be found in the most accessible form in M. Albert Rilliet’s Les Origines de la Confédération Suisse (Genève et Bâle, 1868).
The Federal system was in some sort restored by the Act of Mediation (Vermittlungsakte) of Napoleon Buonaparte, when First Consul in 1803. See the text in Bluntschli, ii. 322.
The unfavourable meaning which is often attached to the word democracy, when it does not arise from simple ignorance, probably arises from the use of the word by Aristotle. He makes (Politics, iii. 7) three lawful forms of government, kingship (βασιλεία), aristocracy (ἀριστοκρατία),and what he calls specially πολιτεία or commonwealth. Of these he makes three corruptions, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy (τυραννίς, ὀλιγαρχία, δημοκρατία), defining democracy to be a government carried on for the special benefit of the poor (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων). In this there is something of a philosopher’s contempt for all popular government, and it is certain that Aristotle’s way of speaking is not that which is usual in the Greek historians. Polybios, like Herodotus and Thucydides, uses the word democracy in the old honourable sense, and he takes (ii. 38) as his special type of democracy the constitution of the Achaian League, which certainly had in it a strong element of practical aristocracy (see History of Federal Government, cap. v.): ἰσηγορίας καὶ παρρησίας καὶ καθόλου δημοκρατίας ἀληθινῆς σύστημα καὶ προαίρεσιν εἰλικρινεστέραν οὐκ ἂν εὕροι τις τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ὑπαρχούσης. In short, what Aristotle calls πολιτεία Polybios calls δημοκρατία; what Aristotle calls δημοκρατία Polybios calls ὀχλοκρατία.
Ζεὺς δὲ Θέμιστα κέλευσε θεοὺς ἀγορήνδε καλέσσαι
Κρατὸς ἄπ' Οὐλύμπω πολυπτύχου· ἡ δ’ ἄρα πάντη
Φοιτήσασα κέλευσε Διὸς πρὸς δῶμα νέεσθαι.
Οὔτε τις οὖν Ποταμῶν ἀπέην, νόσφ' Ὠκεανοῖο,
Οὔτ' ἄρα Νυμφάων ταί τ' ἄλσεα καλὰ νέμονται,
Καὶ πηγὰς ποταμῶν, καὶ πίσεα ποιήεντα.
Besides the presence of the Nymphs in the divine Mycel Gemót, something might also be said about the important position of Hêrê, Athênê, and other female members of the inner council.
We find the mortal Assembly described at length in the second book of the Iliad, and indeed by implication at the very beginning of the first book.
“Reges ex nobilitate; Duces ex virtute sumunt. Nec Regibus infinita aut libera potestas; et Duces exemplo potius quam imperio: si prompti, si conspicui, si ante aciem agant, admiratione præsunt… De minoribus rebus Principes consultant; de majoribus omnes; ita tamen ut ea quoque quorum penes plebem arbitrium est apud Principes pertractentur… Ut turbæ placuit, considunt armati. Silentium per Sacerdotes, quibus tum et coercendi jus est, imperatur. Mox Rex, vel Princeps, prout ætas cuique, prout nobilitas, prout decus bellorum, prout facundia est audiuntur, auctoritate suadendi magis quam jubendi potestate. Si displicuit sententia, fremitu adspernantur; sin placuit, frameas concutiunt. Honoratissimum adsensûs genus est, armis laudare. Licet apud concilium adcusare quoque et discrimen capitis intendere… Eliguntur in iisdem conciliis et Principes, qui jura per pagos vicosque reddant. Centeni singulis ex plebe comites, consilium simul et auctoritas, adsunt. Nihil autem neque publicæ neque privatæ rei nisi armati agunt.”
For a commentary, see Zöpfl, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtsinstitute, p. 94. See also Allen, Royal Prerogative, 12, 162.
“A! fredome is A noble thing.”
So said Herodotus (v. 78) long before:
ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὡς ἔστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον.
“Igitur communitas regni consulatur;
Et quid universitas sentiat sciatur,
Cui leges propriæ maxime sunt notæ.
Nec cuncti provinciæ sic sunt idiotæ,
Quin sciant plus cæteris regni sui mores,
Quos relinquant posteris hii qui sunt priores.
Qui reguntur legibus magis ipsas sciunt;
Quorum sunt in usibus plus periti fiunt;
Et quia res agitur sua, plus curabunt,
Et quo pax adquiritur sibi procurabunt.”
On the various confirmations of the Great Charter, see Hallam, Middle Ages, ii. 111.
The bearing of these precedents on the question of life peerages will be seen by any one who goes through Sir T. E. May’s summary, Constitutional History, i. 291-298.
Quam sub rege pio.” – Claudian, ii. Cons. Stil. 114.
“Rex cum suis voluit ita liber esse;
Et sic esse debuit, fuitque necesse
Aut esse desineret rex, privatus jure
Regis, nisi faceret quidquid vellet; curæ
Non esse magnatibus regni quos præferret
Suis comitatibus, vel quibus conferret
Castrorum custodiam, vel quem exhibere
Populo justitiam vellet, et habere
Regni cancellarium thesaurariumque.
Suum ad arbitrium voluit quemcumque,
Et consiliarios de quacumque gente,
Et ministros varios se præcipiente,
Non intromittentibus se de factis regis
Angliæ baronibus, vim habente legis
Principis imperio, et quod imperaret
Suomet arbitrio singulos ligaret.”
“Item come lez eleccions dez Chivalers des Countees esluz a venir as parlements du Roi en plusours Countees Dengleterre, ore tarde ount este faitz par tro[~p] graunde & excessive nombre dez gents demurrantz deinz mesmes les Countes, dount la greindre partie estoit par gentz sinon de petit avoir ou de null valu, dount chescun pretende davoir voice equivalent quant a tielx eleccions faire ove les plius valantz chivalers ou esquiers demurrantz deins mesmes les Countes; dount homicides riotes bateries & devisions entre les gentiles & autres gentz de mesmes les Countees verisemblablement sourdront & seront, si covenable remedie ne soit purveu en celle partie: Notre seigneur le Roy considerant les premisses ad pourveu & ordene par auctorite de cest parlement que les Chivalers des Countes deins le Roialme Dengleterre, a esliers a venir a les parlementz en apres atenirs, soient esluz en chescun Counte par gentz demurrantz & receantz en icelles dount chescun ait frank tenement a le valu de xl s. par an al meins outre les reprises; & que ceux qui seront ensy esluz soient demurrantz & receantz deins mesmes les Countes.” Revised Statutes, i. 306.
The necessity of residence in the case of either electors or representatives was repealed by 14 Geo. III. c. 58.
The statute goes on to give the Sheriff power to examine the electors on oath as to the amount of their property. It also gives the Judges of Assize a power foreshadowing that of our present Election Judges, that of inquiring into false returns made by the Sheriff.
Another statute of the same kind was passed later in the same reign, 23 Henry VI. A.D. 1444-5, from which it appears that the knights of the shire were ceasing to be in all cases knights in the strict sense, and that it was beginning to be found needful to fence them about with oligarchic restrictions.
“Issint que lez Chivalers dez Counteez pour le parlement en après a esliers so ent notablez Chivalers dez mesmez lez Counteez pour lez queux ils serront issint esluz, ou autrement tielx notablez Esquiers gentils homez del Nativite dez mesmez lez Counteez comme soient ablez destre Chivalers; et null home destre tiel Chivaler que estoise en la degree de vadlet et desouth.” Revised Statutes, i. 346.
Every enactment of this kind bears witness to the growth of the power of the Commons, and to the endeavours of the people to make their representation really popular.
“After the lordes had considered and weyghed his title and declaracion, they determined by authoritie of the sayd counsaill, for as much as kyng Henry, contrary to his othe, honor and agreement, had violated and infringed, the order taken and enacted in the last Parliament, and also, because he was insufficient to rule the Realme, & inutile to the common wealth, & publique profite of the pore people, he was therefore by the aforesayed authoritie, depriued & deiected of all kyngly honor, & regall souereigntie. And incontinent, Edward erle of Marche, sonne and heyre to Richard duke of Yorke, was by the lordes in the sayd counsaill assembled, named, elected, & admitted, for kyng & gouernour of the realme; on which day, the people of the erles parte, beyng in their muster in sainct Ihons felde, & a great number of the substanciall citezens there assembled, to behold their order: sodaynly the lord Fawconbridge, which toke the musters, wisely declared to the multitude, the offences & breaches of the late agremente done & perpetrated by kyng Henry the vi. & demaunded of the people, whether they woulde haue the sayd kyng Henry to rule & reigne any lenger ouer them: To whome they with a whole voyce, aunswered, nay, nay. Then he asked them, if they would serue, loue, & obey the erle of March as their earthly prince & souereign lord. To which question they aunswered, yea, yea, crieng, king Edward, with many great showtes and clappyng of handes… The erle, … as kyng, rode to the church of sainct Paule, and there offered. And after Te deum song, with great solempnitie, he was conueyed to Westmynster, and there set in the hawle, with the scepter royall in his hand, where to all the people which there in a great number were assembled, his title and clayme to the croune of England, was declared by, ii. maner of ways: the firste, as sonne and heyre to duke Richard his father, right enheritor to the same; the second, by aucthoritie of Parliament and forfeiture committed by, kyng Henry. Wherupon it was agayne demaunded of the commons, if they would admitte, and take the sayd erle as their prince and souereigne lord, which al with one voice cried, yea, yea… On the morow he was proclaymed kyng by the name of kyng Edward the iiij. throughout the citie.”
This was in Lent 1461, before the battle of Towton. Edward was crowned June 29th in the same year. The same chronicler describes the election or acknowledgement of Richard the Third, p. 372.
Hallam remarks (ii. 250) that it is in the reign of Edward the Fourth that we first find borough members bearing the title of Esquire, and he goes on to refer to the Paston Letters as showing how important a seat in Parliament was then held, and as showing also the undue influences which were already brought to bear upon the electors. Since Hallam’s time, the authenticity of the Paston Letters has been called in question, but it has, I think, been fully established. Some of the entries are very curious indeed. In one (i. 96), without any date of the year, the Duchess of Norfolk writes to John Paston, Esquire, to use his influence at a county election on behalf of some creatures of the Duke’s: “It is thought right necessarie for divers causes þt my Lord have at this tyme in the p’lement suche p’sones as longe unto him and be of his menyall S’vaunts wherin we conceyve yor good will and diligence shal be right expedient.” The persons to be thus chosen for the convenience of the Duke are described as “our right wel-belovid Cossin and S’vaunts John Howard and Syr Roger Chambirlayn.” This is followed by a letter from the Earl of Oxford in 1455, much to the same effect. In ii. 98, we have a letter addressed to the Bailiff of Maldon, recommending the election of Sir John Paston on behalf of a certain great lady not named. The letter is worth giving in full.
“Ryght trusty frend I comand me to yow prey[~i]g yow to call to yor mynd that lyek as ye and I comonyd of it were necessary for my Lady and you all hyr Ser[~u]nts and te[~n]nts to have thys p’lement as for [~o]n of the Burgeys of the towne of Maldon syche a man of worchep and of wytt as wer towardys my seyd Lady and also syche on as is in favor of the Kyng and of the Lords of hys consayll nyghe abought hys p’sone. Sertyfy[~=i]g yow that my seid Lady for her parte and syche as be of hyr consayll be most agreeabyll that bothe ye and all syche as be hyr fermors and teñntys and wellwyllers shold geve your voyse to a worchepfull knyght and on’ of my Ladys consayll Sr John Paston whyche standys gretly in favore wt my Lord Chamberleyn and what my seyd Lord Chamberleyn may do wt the Kyng and wt all the Lordys of Inglond I trowe it be not unknowyn to you most of eny on man alyve. Wherefor by the meenys of the seyd Sr John Paston to my seyd Lord Chamberleyn bothe my Lady and ye of the towne kowd not have a meeter man to be for yow in the perlement to have yor needys sped at all seasons. Wherefor I prey yow labor all syche as be my Ladys ser[~=u]ntts tennts and wellwyllers to geve ther voyseys to the seyd Sr John Paston and that ye fayle not to sped my Ladys intent in thys mater as ye entend to do hyr as gret a plesur as if ye gave hyr an Cli [100l.] And God have yow in hys kep[~=i]g. Wretyn at Fysheley the xx day of Septebyr. – J. Arblaster.”
The last meeting of the French States-General before the final meeting in 1789 was that in 1614, during the minority of Lewis the Thirteenth. See Sismondi, xiii. 342.
In the same page the historian, speaking of the different boroughs and counties which received the franchise in the sixteenth century, says, “It might be possible to trace the reason, why the county of Durham was passed over.” And he suggests, “The attachment of those northern parts to popery seems as likely as any other.” The reason for the omission of Durham was doubtless that the Bishoprick had not wholly lost the character of a separate principality. It was under Charles the Second that Durham city and county, as well as Newark, first sent members to Parliament. Durham was enfranchised by Act of Parliament, as Chester city and county – hitherto kept distinct as being a Palatinate – were by 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. c. 13. (Revised Statutes, i. 522.) Newark was enfranchised by a Royal Charter, the last case of that kind of exercise of the prerogative. Hallam, ii. 204.