Kitabı oku: «Peace with Mexico», sayfa 2
III. – ANNEXATION OF TEXAS
At the time when the annexation of Texas took place, Texas had been recognized as an independent power, both by the United States and by several of the principal European powers; but its independence had not been recognized by Mexico, and the two contending parties continued to be at war. Under those circumstances, there is not the slightest doubt that the annexation of Texas was tantamount to a declaration of war against Mexico. Nothing can be more clear and undeniable than that, whenever two nations are at war, if a third Power shall enter into a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with either of the belligerents, and if such treaty is not contingent, and is to take effect immediately and pending the war, such treaty is a declaration of war against the other party. The causes of the war between the two belligerents do not alter the fact. Supposing that the third party, the interfering Power, should have concluded the treaty of alliance with that belligerent who was clearly engaged in a most just war, the treaty would not be the less a declaration of war against the other belligerent.
If Great Britain and France were at war, and the United States were to enter into such a treaty with either, can there be the slightest doubt that this would be actual war against the other party? that it would be considered as such, and that it must have been intended for that purpose? If at this moment, either France or England were to make such a treaty with Mexico, thereby binding themselves to defend and protect it with all their forces against any other Power whatever, would not the United States instantaneously view such a treaty as a declaration of war, and act accordingly?
But the annexation of Texas, by the United States, was even more than a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. It embraced all the conditions and all the duties growing out of the alliance; and it imposed them forever. From the moment when Texas had been annexed, the United States became bound to protect and defend her, so far as her legitimate boundaries extended, against any invasion, or attack, on the part of Mexico: and they have uniformly acted accordingly.
There is no impartial publicist that will not acknowledge the indubitable truth of these positions: it appears to me impossible, that they should be seriously denied by a single person.
It appears that Mexico was at that time disposed to acknowledge the independence of Texas, but on the express condition, that it should not be annexed to the United States; and it has been suggested, that this was done under the influence of some European Powers. Whether this last assertion be true or not, is not known to me. But the condition was remarkable and offensive.
Under an apprehension that Texas might be tempted to accept the terms proposed, the Government of the United States may have deemed it expedient to defeat the plan, by offering that annexation, which had been formerly declined, when the Government of Texas was anxious for it.
It may be admitted that, whether independent or annexed to the United States, Texas must be a slave-holding state, so long as slavery shall continue to exist in North America. Its whole population, with hardly any exception, consisted of citizens of the United States. Both for that reason, and on account of its geographical position, it was much more natural, that Texas should be a member of the United States, than of the Mexican Confederation. Viewed purely as a question of expediency, the annexation might be considered as beneficial to both parties. But expediency is not justice. Mexico and Texas had a perfect right to adjust their differences and make peace, on any terms they might deem proper. The anxiety to prevent this result indicated a previous disposition ultimately to occupy Texas: and when the annexation was accomplished; when it was seen, that the United States had appropriated to themselves all the advantages resulting from the American settlements in Texas, and from their subsequent insurrection; the purity of the motives of our Government became open to suspicion.
Setting aside the justice of the proceeding, it is true that it had been anticipated, by those who took an active part in the annexation, that the weakness of Mexico would compel it to yield, or at least induce her not to resort to actual war. This was verified by the fact: and had Government remained in the hands with whom the plan originated, war might probably have been avoided. But when no longer in power, they could neither regulate the impulse they had given, nor control the reckless spirits they had evoked.
Mexico, sensible of her weakness, declined war, and only resorted to a suspension of diplomatic intercourse; but a profound sense of the injury inflicted by the United States has ever since rankled in their minds. It will be found, through all their diplomatic correspondence, through all their manifestoes, that the Mexicans, even to this day, perpetually recur to this never-forgotten offensive measure. And, on the other hand, the subsequent administration of our Government seems to have altogether forgotten this primary act of injustice, and, in their negotiations, to have acted as if this was only an accomplished fact, and had been a matter of course.
IV. – NEGOTIATIONS AND WAR
In September, 1845, the President of the United States directed their consul at Mexico to ascertain from the Mexican Government, whether it would receive an Envoy from the United States, intrusted with full power to adjust all the questions in dispute between the two Governments.
The answer of Mr. De la Pena y Pena, Minister of the Foreign Relations of Mexico, was, "That although the Mexican nation was deeply injured by the United States, through the acts committed by them in the department of Texas, which belongs to his nation, his Government was disposed to receive the Commissioner of the United States who might come to the capital, with full powers from his Government to settle the present dispute in a peaceful, reasonable and honorable manner;" thus giving a new proof that, even in the midst of its injuries and of its firm decision to exact adequate reparation for them, the Government of Mexico does not reply with contumely to the measures of reason and peace to which it was invited by its adversary.
The Mexican Minister at the same time intimated, that the previous recall of the whole Naval force of the United States, then lying in sight of the port of Vera Cruz, was indispensable; and this was accordingly done by our Government.
But it is essential to observe that, whilst Mr. Black had, according to his instructions, inquired, whether the Mexican Government would receive an Envoy from the United States, with full power to adjust all the questions in dispute between the two Governments, the Mexican Minister had answered, that his Government was disposed to receive the Commissioner of the United States, who might come with full powers to settle the present dispute in a peaceful, reasonable and honorable manner.
Mr. Slidell was, in November following, appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America near the Government of the Mexican Republic; and he arrived in Mexico on the sixth of December.
Mr. Herrera, the President of Mexico, was undoubtedly disposed to settle the disputes between the two countries. But taking advantage of the irritation of the mass of the people, his political opponents were attempting to overset him for having made, as they said, unworthy concessions. The arrival of Mr. Slidell disturbed him extremely; and Mr. Pena y Pena declared to Mr. Black, that his appearance in the capital at this time might prove destructive to the Government, and thus defeat the whole affair. Under these circumstances General Herrera complained, without any foundation, that Mr. Slidell had come sooner than had been understood; he resorted to several frivolous objections against the tenor of his powers; and he intimated that the difficulties respecting Texas must be adjusted before any other subject of discussion should be taken into consideration.
But the main question was, whether Mexico should receive Mr. Slidell in the character of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, to reside in the republic. It was insisted by the Mexican Government, that it had only agreed to receive a commissioner, to treat on the questions which had arisen from the events in Texas; and that until this was done, the suspended diplomatic intercourse could not be restored, and a residing minister plenipotentiary be admitted.
Why our Government should have insisted, that the intended negotiation should be carried on by a residing Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, is altogether unintelligible. The questions at issue might have been discussed and settled as easily, fully and satisfactorily, by commissioners appointed for that special purpose, as by residing ministers or envoys. It is well known that whenever diplomatic relations have been superseded by war, treaties of peace are always negotiated by commissioners appointed for that special purpose, who are personally amply protected by the law of nations, but who are never received as resident ministers, till after the peace has restored the ordinary diplomatic intercourse. Thus the treaty of peace of 1783, between France and England, was negotiated and concluded at Paris by British commissioners, whom it would have been deemed absurd to admit as resident envoys or ministers, before peace had been made.
The only distinction which can possibly be made between the two cases is, that there was not as yet actual war between Mexico and the United States. But the annexation of Texas was no ordinary occurrence. It was a most clear act of unprovoked aggression; a deep and most offensive injury; in fact, a declaration of war, if Mexico had accepted it as such. In lieu of this, that country had only resorted to a suspension of the ordinary diplomatic relations. It would seem as if our Government had considered this as an act of unparalleled audacity, which Mexico must be compelled to retract, before any negotiations for the arrangement of existing difficulties could take place; as an insult to the Government and to the nation, which must compel it to assert its just rights and to avenge its injured honor.
General Herrera was not mistaken in his anticipations. His government was overset in the latter end of the month of December, 1845, and fell into the hands of those who had denounced him for having listened to overtures of an arrangement of the difficulties between the two nations.
When Mexico felt its inability to contend with the United States; and, instead of considering the annexation of Texas to be, as it really was, tantamount to a declaration of war, only suspended the ordinary diplomatic relations between the two countries, its Government, if directed by wise counsels, and not impeded by popular irritation, should at once, since it had already agreed to recognize the independence of Texas, have entered into a negotiation with the United States. At that time there would have been no intrinsic difficulty in making a final arrangement founded on an unconditional recognition of the independence of Texas, within its legitimate boundaries. Popular feeling and the ambition of contending military leaders, prevented that peaceable termination of those unfortunate dissensions.
Yet, when Mexico refused to receive Mr. Slidell as an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, the United States should have remembered, that we had been the aggressors, that we had committed an act acknowledged, as well by the practical law of nations, as by common sense and common justice, to be tantamount to a declaration of war; and they should have waited with patience, till the feelings excited by our own conduct had subsided.
General Taylor had been instructed by the War Department, as early as May 28, 1845, to cause the forces under his command to be put into a position where they might most promptly and efficiently act in defence of Texas, in the event that it should become necessary or proper to employ them for that purpose. By subsequent instructions, and after the people of Texas had accepted the proposition of annexation, he was directed to select and occupy a position adapted to repel invasion, as near the boundary line, the Rio Grande, as prudence would dictate; and that, with this view, a part of his forces at least should be west of the river Nueces. It was certainly the duty of the President to protect Texas against invasion, from the moment it had been annexed to the United States; and as that republic was in actual possession of Corpus Christi, which was the position selected by General Taylor, there was nothing, in the position he had taken, indicative of any danger of actual hostilities.
But our Government seems to have considered the refusal, on the part of Mexico, to receive Mr. Slidell as a resident Envoy of the United States, as necessarily leading to war. The Secretary of State, in his letter to Mr. Slidell of January 28, 1846, says: – "Should the Mexican Government finally refuse to receive you, the cup of forbearance will then have been exhausted. Nothing can remain but to take the redress of the injuries to our citizens, and the insults to our Government, into our own hands." And again, "Should the Mexican Government finally refuse to receive you, then demand passports from the proper authority, and return to the United States. It will then become the duty of the President to submit the whole case to Congress, and call upon the nation to assert its just rights, and avenge its injured honor."
