Kitabı oku: «The Boys' Nelson», sayfa 11

CHAPTER XIV
The Campaign of the Baltic
(1800–1)

“The service of my King and Country is the object nearest my heart.”

Nelson.

Ostensibly Nelson had come back to England because of illness. That his health was improved by the prolonged journey home via the overland route is quite possible. The relief from worry as to the Mediterranean in general and to Keith in particular no doubt conduced largely to so desirable a result. It is evident that he had returned to a normal condition of mind and of body; otherwise we should not find him writing to the Secretary of the Admiralty on the day of his arrival in England that his health was “perfectly re-established” and that he wished “to serve immediately.”

Nelson did not have to wait long for his wishes to be fulfilled. On the first day of the new year he was made a Vice-Admiral of the Blue, not as a reward for his services but in a general promotion. A little over a fortnight later he hoisted his flag on the San Josef (112), one of the prizes of the battle off Cape St Vincent, commanded by the devoted Hardy. Nelson then made the request, apparently on the principle of “nothing venture nothing have,” that the Lords of the Admiralty would not consider his “necessary coming from Italy as a dereliction of the service, but only a remove from the Mediterranean to the Channel.” Although he was a favourite of the rank and file of the Navy, he was certainly not esteemed so highly by “the powers that be.” No doubt he was himself partly responsible. His friend Collingwood’s “Correspondence” at the time affords a little sidelight on the matter. “We are at present lying completely ready,” he writes on the 25th January, “and, on the least motion made by the enemy, should sail; so you may conceive what an anxious time I have of it. Lord Nelson is here; and I think he will probably come and live with me when the weather will allow him; but he does not get in and out of ships well with one arm. He gave me an account of his reception at Court, which was not very flattering, after having been the admiration of that of Naples. His Majesty merely asked him if he had recovered his health; and then, without waiting for an answer, turned to General –, and talked to him near half an hour in great good humour. It could not be about his successes.”

The early days of the nineteenth century were overshadowed by a storm-cloud which burst with sudden fury and dispersed almost as rapidly, giving place to a short-lived peace followed by twelve years of incessant tempest. So far back as 1780 Russia, Sweden and Denmark had entered into a league of Armed Neutrality by which, in the terse summing-up of Laughton, they had “bound themselves to resist the right of ‘visit and search’ claimed by the belligerents, and to enforce the acceptance of certain principles of so-called international law; among others, the security of a belligerent’s property under a neutral flag,—‘a free ship makes free goods’; that a blockade to be binding must be maintained by an adequate force; and that ‘contraband of war’ must be distinctly defined beforehand. As these principles, if admitted by England, amounted to the import by France of naval stores,—masts, hemp, tar—from the Baltic, to be paid for by French exports, the English Government was resolved to contest them.” From 1793 to 1800 Sweden and Denmark were neutral, but Great Britain, secure in her maritime supremacy, had continued to search merchant-ships, whether convoyed by a vessel of war or not. Matters were brought to a crisis by the capture of the Danish frigate Freya on the 25th July 1800, and the subsequent passage of the Sound by a British squadron. At the moment Denmark was not prepared for hostilities, and entered into a convention with Great Britain, which admitted the right of search.

When, a little later, the half-crazy Czar, Paul I., dissatisfied with England as an ally, and led on by specious promises on the part of Napoleon, definitely renewed the League, the two Baltic Powers willingly joined him. He laid an embargo on all British ships in Russian ports, and generally showed that it was a case of “off with the old love and on with the new.”

It was thought in England that negotiations, backed by a strong fleet, would be sufficient to sever Denmark from the alliance. With this object in view fifteen sail-of-the-line⁵² having a considerable number of soldiers on board for use if necessary, and attended by a collection of smaller vessels, sailed early in March. When Nelson heard of Sir Hyde Parker’s appointment as Commander-in-chief, he was no more pleased than when Keith had returned to his former station in the previous year, but he wisely smothered his disappointment. His “sole object,” he informs Lord St Vincent, “and to which all my exertions and abilities tend, is to bring this long war to an honourable termination; to accomplish which, we must all pull in the collar, and, as we have got such a driver who will make the lazy ones pull as much as the willing, I doubt not but we shall get safely, speedily, and honourably to our journey’s end.” This is Nelson at his best, the Nelson who could sacrifice himself for King and Country. It was not until the 17th February that he received definite instructions to “put himself under the command” of Parker. Shortly afterwards he changed his ship for the St George (98). “The St George will stamp an additional ray of glory to England’s fame, if Nelson survives;” he writes to Lady Hamilton, “and that Almighty Providence, who has hitherto protected me in all dangers, and covered my head in the day of battle, will still, if it be his pleasure, support and assist me.” To his old friend Berry he says, “I hope we shall be able as usual to get so close to our Enemies that our shot cannot miss their object, and that we shall again give our Northern Enemies that hail-storm of bullets which is so emphatically described in the ‘Naval Chronicle,’ and which gives our dear Country the Dominion of the Seas. We have it, and all the Devils in Hell cannot take it from us, if our Wooden walls have fair play.” As this letter was penned on the 9th March, before the armament left Yarmouth, it is clear that the Admiral did not set much store by the proposed negotiations, for which purpose Mr Vansittart,⁵³ reputed to be a skilful diplomatist, sailed with the fleet when it weighed anchor three days later.

The first general rendezvous was the Skaw, which was made on the 19th. A period of heavy weather—bad winds, sleet, snow, frost, and rain—had set in. Believers in omens not unnaturally predicted the ill-success of the expedition, which was intensified by the loss of the Invincible (74) with some 400 souls. She struck a sandbank, floated off into deep water, and then went down. Nelson’s own ship was not in the best of condition; she was both leaky and uncomfortable. However, a vessel is but a means to an end, and so long as the St George could float and her men could fire a broadside Nelson was content. In his eager, passionate way, the Admiral strongly disapproved of what he had been able to ascertain of Parker’s plans: “honour may arise from them, good cannot. I hear we are likely to anchor outside Cronenburg Castle, instead of Copenhagen, which would give weight to our negotiation: a Danish Minister would think twice before he would put his name to war with England, when the next moment he would probably see his Master’s Fleet in flames, and his Capital in ruins; but ‘out of sight out of mind,’ is an old saying. The Dane should see our Flag waving every moment he lifted up his head.”

A council of war was held on the 23rd. On the following day Nelson wrote a lengthy letter to the Commander-in-chief detailing his opinion of what should be done, Vansittart’s latest report being to the effect that the Danish Government was hostile “in the greatest possible degree.” He urged that not a moment should be lost in attacking the enemy. He brings all the persuasiveness of which he was capable to bear on Parker. “Here you are,” he says, “with almost the safety, certainly with the honour of England more intrusted to you, than ever yet fell to the lot of any British Officer.” This is exaggerating somewhat, but doubtless the writer felt deeply the urgency of the matter. “On your decision depends,” he adds with nearer approach to truth, “whether our Country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or whether she shall rear her head higher than ever: again do I repeat, never did our Country depend so much on the success of any Fleet as on this.” He then proceeds to sketch a plan of campaign, starting with the supposition that the fleet enters by the Passage of the Sound. He allows for a certain amount of damage “amongst our masts and yards” taking place before Cronenburg is reached. There the ships and Crown Island are attacked, “Ships crippled, and perhaps one or two lost.” This mode Nelson calls “taking the bull by the horns,” and does not prevent the ships from Revel, or the Swedish squadron, from joining their allies. He therefore proposes passing Cronenburg, “taking the risk of damage,” to “pass up the deepest and straightest Channel above the Middle Grounds; and coming down the Garbar or King’s Channel, to attack their Floating batteries, &c., &c., as we find it convenient. It must have the effect of preventing a junction between the Russians, Swedes, and Danes, and may give us an opportunity of bombarding Copenhagen.” He also suggests a passage to the northward of Southolm. An alternative mode of attack is by the passage of the Belt, an attack on Draco, thus preventing the junction of the Russians, and “with every probability of success against the Danish Floating batteries.” His concluding words are in the true Nelson spirit: “Supposing us through the Belt with the wind first westerly, would it not be possible to either go with the Fleet, or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one Bomb and two Fire-Ships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian Squadron at that place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment, and with the remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The measure may be thought bold, but I am of opinion the boldest measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous exertion of her force, directed with judgment.” Nelson concludes with the assurance that “no exertion of head or heart” shall be wanting on his part.

The proposed terms were definitely refused by Denmark, but Nelson’s “bold measure” of detaching part of the British fleet to attack the Russian squadron at Revel while the other attacked the Capital did not appeal to the unimaginative Parker. Copenhagen must first be overcome. The pilots also assured the Commander-in-chief that the passage of the Belt was the safest, which drew from Nelson the abrupt but thoroughly characteristic reply, “Let it be by the Sound, by the Belt, or any how, only lose not an hour!” Eventually the Sound was chosen.

Having shifted his flag from the St George to the Elephant (74), a more serviceable ship for the difficult passage, the British fleet, in order of battle, slowly threaded its way through the shoals on the 30th March, Nelson commanding the van, Parker the centre, and Graves the rear. The guns of Cronenburg Castle, dominating the Sound, blazed away, as did those on the armed hulks with which the Danes had hoped to defend the narrow channel, but the Swedish guns maintained a stolid silence. The fleet then anchored a few miles below Copenhagen. Parker, Nelson, and several other officers boarded a lugger to reconnoitre the enemy’s defences. Various soundings were made to the accompaniment of gun-firing, and it was found that the enemy had placed a formidable flotilla, including two 70-gun ships, a frigate, and two dismasted 64-gun ships, in the front of the harbour and arsenal. The Trekroner Battery had also been strengthened. A second council of war was held on the 31st, some interesting particulars of which are furnished by Colonel William Stewart, who was in command of some of the troops. After some difficulties had been stated anent “the three Powers we should either have to engage, in succession or united, in those seas,” Stewart tells us that “Lord Nelson kept pacing the cabin, mortified at everything that savoured either of alarm or irresolution. When the above remark was applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, ‘The more numerous the better’; and when to the Russians, he repeatedly said, ‘So much the better, I wish they were twice as many, the easier the victory, depend on it.’”

“At the battle of Copenhagen,” writes Mr Ferguson, surgeon of the Elephant, “I was amongst the companions of the hero. The attempt was arduous in the extreme: no common mind would have dared to conceive it; but it was suited to the exalted enterprise of Lord Nelson. As his was the invigorating spirit of the council that planned the attack, so in the execution he only could have commanded success. During the interval that preceded the battle, I could only silently admire when I saw the first man in all the world spend the hours of the day and night in boats, amid floating ice, and in the severest weather; and wonder when the light shewed me a path marked by buoys, which had been trackless the preceding evening.

“On the first day of April, in the afternoon, we took our departure with twelve sail-of-the-line, and a proportionate number of smaller vessels, from the main body of the fleet, then lying about four miles below Copenhagen; and coasted along the outer edge of the shoal called the middle ground, until we doubled its farthest extremities, when the fleet cast anchor. This shoal, of the same extent as the sea front of the town, lies exactly before it, at about three-quarters of a mile in distance; the interval between it and the shore had deep water, and is called the King’s Channel.

“In this channel the Danes had arranged their defence, as near the town as possible. It consisted of nineteen ships and floating batteries, flanked at the town’s extremity by two artificial islands at the mouth of the harbour, called the Crown batteries, and extending for a mile along the whole front of the town, leaving intervals for the batteries on shore to play.

“As our anchor dropped at eight in the evening, Nelson emphatically called out, ‘I will fight them the moment I have a fair wind.’ He spent the whole night in consultation.

“About half-past nine a.m. of the 2nd of April, the signals of the different ships having been made, repeated, and answered, we had the mortification to see the Agamemnon get upon the shoal on the first attempt to leave her anchorage, where she remained immovable. A similar misfortune followed in succession to the Russell and Polyphemus; and in addition to all this, the Jamaica frigate, with a convoy of gunboats and the small craft having fallen in with the counter current, and being unable to stem it, made the signal of inability to proceed. A mind less invincible than Nelson’s might have been discouraged: though the battle had not commenced, yet he had approached the enemy; and he felt that he could not retreat or wait for reinforcements, without compromising the glory of his country. The signal to bear down was still kept flying. His agitation during these moments was extreme; I shall never forget the impression it made on me. It was not, however, the agitation of indecision, but of ardent animated patriotism, panting for glory, which had appeared within his reach, and was vanishing from his grasp.”

CHAPTER XV
The Battle of Copenhagen
(1801)

“I have a right to be blind sometimes.”

Nelson.

Admiral Mahan, the most scientific of biographical historians, assures us that the fullest and most interesting account of the Battle of Copenhagen is that of Colonel William Stewart, an eye-witness of the thrilling scene and “a very fine gallant man” according to Nelson. The following particulars are therefore extracted from his graphic narrative:

“The Action began at five minutes past ten. In about half an hour afterwards, the first half of our Fleet was engaged, and before half-past eleven, the Battle became general. The Elephant’s station was in the centre, opposite to the Danish Commodore.... The judgment with which each Ship calculated her station in that intricate Channel, was admirable throughout. The failure of the three Ships that were aground, and whose force was to have been opposed to the Trekroner battery, left this day, as glorious for seamanship as for courage, incomplete.... The gallant Riou, perceiving the blank in the original plan for the attack of the Crown Battery, proceeded down the Line with his Squadron of Frigates, and attempted, but in vain, to fulfil the duty of the absent Ships of the Line. His force was unequal to it; and the general signal of recall, which was made about mid-action by the Commander-in-Chief, had the good effect of, at least, saving Riou’s Squadron from destruction.

“About one P.M., few if any of the Enemy’s heavy Ships and Praams had ceased to fire. The Isis had greatly suffered by the superior weight of the Provestein’s fire; and if it had not been for the judicious diversion of it by the Desirée, Captain Inman, who raked her, and for other assistance from the Polyphemus, the Isis would have been destroyed. Both the Isis and Bellona had received serious injury by the bursting of some of their guns. The Monarch was also suffering severely under the united fire of the Holstein and Zealand; and only two of our Bomb-vessels could get to their station on the Middle Ground, and open their mortars on the Arsenal, directing their shells over both Fleets. Our Squadron of Gun-brigs, impeded by currents, could not, with the exception of one, although commanded by Captain Rose in the Jamaica, weather the eastern end of the Middle Ground, or come into Action. The Division of the Commander-in-chief acted according to the preconcerted plan; but could only menace the entrance of the Harbour. The Elephant was warmly engaged by the Dannebrog, and by two heavy Praams on her bow and quarter. Signals of distress were on board the Bellona and Russell, and of inability from the Agamemnon. The contest, in general, although from the relaxed state of the Enemy’s fire, it might not have given much room for apprehension as to the result, had certainly, at one P.M., not declared itself in favour of either side. About this juncture, and in this posture of affairs, the signal was thrown out on board the London,⁵⁴ for the Action to cease.

“Lord Nelson was at this time, as he had been during the whole Action, walking the starboard side of the quarter-deck; sometimes much animated, and at others heroically fine in his observations. A shot through the mainmast knocked a few splinters about us. He observed to me, with a smile, ‘It is warm work, and this day may be the last to any of us at a moment’; and then stopping short at the gangway, he used an expression never to be erased from my memory, and said with emotion, ‘but mark you, I would not be elsewhere for thousands.’ When the signal, No. 39, [to discontinue the engagement], was made, the Signal Lieutenant reported it to him. He continued his walk, and did not appear to take notice of it. The Lieutenant meeting his Lordship at the next turn asked, ‘whether he should repeat it?’ Lord Nelson answered, ‘No, acknowledge it.’ On the Officer returning to the poop, his Lordship called after him, ‘Is No. 16 [for close action] still hoisted?’ the Lieutenant answering in the affirmative, Lord Nelson said, ‘Mind you keep it so.’ He now walked the deck considerably agitated, which was always known by his moving the stump of his right arm. After a turn or two, he said to me, in a quick manner, ‘Do you know what’s shown on board of the Commander-in-chief, No. 39?’ On asking him what that meant, he answered, ‘Why, to leave off Action.’ ‘Leave off Action!’ he repeated, and then added, with a shrug, ‘Now, – me if I do.’ He also observed, I believe, to Captain Foley, ‘You know, Foley, I have only one eye—I have a right to be blind sometimes’; and then with an archness peculiar to his character, putting the glass to his blind eye, he exclaimed, ‘I really do not see the signal.’⁵⁵ This remarkable signal was, therefore, only acknowledged on board the Elephant, not repeated. Admiral Graves did the latter, not being able to distinguish the Elephant’s conduct: either by a fortunate accident, or intentionally, No. 16 was not displaced. The Squadron of Frigates obeyed the signal, and hauled off. That brave Officer, Captain Riou, was killed by a raking shot, when the Amazon showed her stern to the Trekroner. He was sitting on a gun, was encouraging his men, and had been wounded in the head by a splinter. He had expressed himself grieved at being thus obliged to retreat, and nobly observed, ‘What will Nelson think of us?’ His Clerk was killed by his side; and by another shot, several of the Marines, while hauling on the main-brace, shared the same fate. Riou then exclaimed, ‘Come then, my boys, let us die all together!’ The words were scarcely uttered, when the fatal shot severed him in two. Thus, and in an instant, was the British service deprived of one of its greatest ornaments, and society of a character of singular worth, resembling the heroes of romance.

“The Action now continued with unabated vigour. About two P.M., the greater part of the Danish Line had ceased to fire: some of the lighter Ships were adrift, and the carnage on board of the Enemy, who reinforced their crews from the Shore, was dreadful. The taking possession of such Ships as had struck, was, however, attended with difficulty; partly by reason of the batteries on Amak Island protecting them, and partly because an irregular fire was made on our Boats, as they approached, from the Ships themselves. The Dannebrog acted in this manner, and fired at our boat, although that Ship was not only on fire and had struck, but the Commodore, Fischer, had removed his Pendant, and had deserted her. A renewed attack on her by the Elephant and Glatton, for a quarter of an hour, not only completely silenced and disabled the Dannebrog, but, by the use of grape, nearly killed every man who was in the Praams, ahead and astern of that unfortunate Ship. On our smoke clearing away, the Dannebrog was found to be drifting in flames before the wind, spreading terror throughout the Enemy’s Line. The usual lamentable scene then ensued; and our Boats rowed in every direction, to save the crew, who were throwing themselves from her at every port-hole; few, however, were left unwounded in her after our last broadsides, or could be saved. She drifted to leeward, and about half-past three blew up. The time of half-past two, brings me to a most important part of Lord Nelson’s conduct on this day, and about which so much discussion has arisen: his sending a Flag of Truce on shore. To the best of my recollection, the facts were as follow. After the Dannebrog was adrift, and had ceased to fire, the Action was found to be over, along the whole of the Line astern of us; but not so with the Ships ahead and with the Crown batteries. Whether from ignorance of the custom of war, or from confusion on board the Prizes, our Boats were, as before mentioned, repulsed from the Ships themselves, or fired at from Amak Island. Lord Nelson naturally lost temper at this, and observed, ‘That he must either send on shore, and stop this irregular proceeding, or send in our Fire-ships and burn them.’ He accordingly retired into the stern gallery, and wrote, with great dispatch, that well-known Letter addressed to the Crown Prince,⁵⁶ with the address, ‘To the Brothers of Englishmen, the brave Danes, &c.’:⁵⁷ and this Letter was conveyed on shore through the contending Fleets by Captain Sir Frederick Thesiger, who acted as his Lordship’s Aid-de-camp; and found the Prince near the Sally-port, animating his people in a spirited manner.

“Whether we were actually firing at that time in the Elephant or not, I am unable to recollect; it could only have been partially, at such of the farther Ships as had not struck. The three Ships ahead of us were, however, engaged; and from the superiority of the force opposed to them, it was by no means improbable that Lord Nelson’s observing eye pointed out to him the expediency of a prudent conduct. Whether this suggested to him the policy of a Flag of Truce or not, two solid reasons were apparent, and were such as to justify the measure: viz., the necessity of stopping the irregular fire from the Ships which had surrendered—and the singular opportunity that was thus given, of sounding the feelings of an Enemy, who had reluctantly entered into the war, and who must feel the generosity of the first offer of amity coming from a conquering foe. If there were a third reason for the conduct of the noble Admiral, and some of his own Officers assert this, it was unnecessary that it should have been expressed; it was certainly not avowed, and will for ever remain a matter of conjecture.⁵⁸ While the Boat was absent, the animated fire of the Ships ahead of us, and the approach of two of the Commander-in-chief’s division, the Ramilies and Defence, caused the remainder of the Enemy’s Line to the eastward of the Trekroner to strike: that formidable Work continued its fire, but fortunately at too long a range to do serious damage to any one except the Monarch, whose loss in men, this day, exceeded that of any Line-of-Battle Ship during the war. From the uninjured state of this Outwork, which had been manned at the close of the Action with nearly 1500 men, it was deemed impracticable to carry into execution the projected plan for storming it; the Boats for this service had been on the starboard side of each Ship during the Action. The firing from the Crown Battery and from our leading Ships did not cease until past three o’clock, when the Danish Adjutant-General, Lindholm, returning with a Flag of Truce, directed the fire of the battery to be suspended. The signal for doing the same, on our part, was then made from our Ship to those engaged. The Action closed after five hours’ duration, four of which were warmly contested.

“The answer from the Prince Regent was to inquire more minutely into the purport of the message. I should here observe, that previous to the Boat’s getting on board, Lord Nelson had taken the opinion of his valuable friends, Fremantle and Foley, the former of whom had been sent for from the Ganges, as to the practicability of advancing with the Ships which were least damaged, upon that part of the Danish Line of Defence yet uninjured. Their opinions were averse from it; and, on the other hand, decided in favour of removing our Fleet, whilst the wind yet held fair, from their present intricate Channel. Lord Nelson was now prepared how to act when Mr Lindholm came on board, and the following answer was returned to the Crown Prince by Captain Sir Frederick Thesiger: ‘Lord Nelson’s object in sending the Flag of Truce was humanity’; etc.⁵⁹ His Lordship, having finished this letter, referred the Adjutant-General to the Commander-in-chief, who was at anchor at least four miles off, for a conference on the important points which the latter portion of the message had alluded to; and to this General Lindholm did not object, but proceeded to the London. Lord Nelson wisely foresaw, that, exclusive of the valuable opportunity that now offered itself for a renewal of Peace, time would be gained by this long row out to sea, for our leading Ships, which were much crippled, to clear the shoals, and whose course was under the immediate fire of the Trekroner. The Adjutant-General was no sooner gone to the London, and Captain Thesiger despatched on shore than the signal was made for the Glatton, Elephant, Ganges, Defiance, and Monarch, to weigh in succession. The intricacy of the Channel now showed the great utility of what had been done; the Monarch, as first Ship, immediately hit on a shoal, but was pushed over it by the Ganges taking her amid-ships. The Glatton went clear, but the Defiance and Elephant ran aground, leaving the Crown Battery at a mile distance; and there they remained fixed, the former until ten o’clock that night, and the latter until night, notwithstanding every exertion which their fatigued crews could make to relieve them. Had there been no cessation of hostilities, their situation would certainly have been perilous; but it should be observed, on the other hand, that measures would in that case have been adopted, and they were within our power, for destroying this formidable Work.

“The Elephant being aground, Lord Nelson followed the Adjutant-General, about four o’clock, to the London, where that negotiation first began, which terminated in an honourable Peace. He was low in spirits at the surrounding scene of devastation, and particularly felt for the blowing up of the Dannebrog. ‘Well!’ he exclaimed, ‘I have fought contrary to orders, and I shall perhaps be hanged: never mind, let them.’ Lindholm returned to Copenhagen the same evening, when it was agreed that all Prizes should be surrendered, and the suspension of hostilities continue for twenty-four hours; the whole of the Danish wounded were to be received on shore. Lord Nelson then repaired on board the St George, and the night was actively passed by the Boats of the Division which had not been engaged, in getting afloat the Ships that were ashore, and in bringing out the Prizes. The Desirée frigate, towards the close of the Action, going to the aid of the Bellona, became fast on the same shoal; but neither these Ships, nor the Russell, were in any danger from the Enemy’s batteries, as the world has frequently since been led to suppose.”

In sending a copy of Nelson’s Report to the Admiralty, Sir Hyde Parker paid a worthy tribute to the conduct of his second-in-command and of his “entire acquiescence and testimony of the bravery and intrepidity with which the Action was supported throughout the Line. Was it possible,” he continues, “for me to add anything to the well-earned renown of Lord Nelson, it would be by asserting, that his exertions, great as they have heretofore been, never were carried to a higher pitch of zeal for his Country’s service.