Kitabı oku: «Twelve Months with the Eighth Massachusetts Infantry in the Service of the United States», sayfa 4

Upon the second call for volunteers, it was decided to raise the infantry companies to full war strength of 106 men, and about the first of June the Eighth was ordered to send a recruiting detail of three officers and twelve men to Massachusetts for recruiting purposes. The officers in charge of this detail were Major William Stopford, Captain Herbert W. Whitten of Company M, and Lieutenant Henry W. French of Company K. The detail left Chattanooga on June 8th. The first batch of new recruits arrived at Chickamauga on June 25th, from which time until after the 4th of July, recruits arrived daily.

The average recruit who responds to the first call for volunteers, is usually an all around better man than the average recruit obtained upon subsequent calls. The interference with the original Government plan of raising four full regiments, not only weakened the regiment at first, but later lowered its morale by introducing a poorer class of men than could have been obtained if the companies had recruited to a full strength at their home stations under the first stimulus of war.

On June 12th the regiment had its first experience with a Southern rain storm. After a long dry spell, the heavens opened, and the floods descended. Innocent looking gullies became rushing brooks, which soon overflowed their banks and inundated many canvas homes. After the storm, a system of drainage was inaugurated, and the men were set to work on a main drain and connecting trenches, constructed on lines taught by experience.

In the wake of the storm, and as it were, a silver lining to the clouds, came Paymaster James C. Barr of the Eighth Massachusetts Infantry, M. V. M., with $17,500. from the State of Massachusetts in payment of the men for the time they had served at the Framingham camp. This was the first pay the regiment received, and the paymaster was welcomed like flowers in the spring. He was met at the railroad station by an armed party and escorted to camp, where his little fortune was safely guarded until distributed in payment to the men.

On June 22nd Captain Walter H. Nichols of Company H resigned, making the first break among the officers of the regiment.

On June 26th the camp was stirred to excitement by reason of an order transferring the regiment to the First Brigade, First Division, First Army Corps. The First Brigade was composed of the Eighth Massachusetts, Second Wisconsin, and Fifth Illinois Regiments, and was commanded by General Oswald Ernst. The division was commanded by General J. M. Wilson. The Brigade was expected to move in a few days to Newport News, where it was to take transports for Santiago. Camp took on new life and excitement. All superfluous baggage was packed for storage or home shipment. The excitement lasted a number of days, but the regiment was doomed to disappointment, as the order was countermanded and the regiment restored to its former place in the Third Division.

July 4th was observed as a holiday. Congressman William H. Moody of the Sixth Massachusetts District, who was spending a few days in camp, delivered a patriotic address. A program of sports had been arranged for the day, but the arrival of the U. S. Paymaster caused the games to be called off. About $45,000 was paid to the regiment, the men being paid from May 5th to June 30th. Many of the men took advantage of the arrival of the money for a trip to Chattanooga, where they passed the remainder of the day visiting the city or Lookout Mountain. In the evening there was a mammoth bonfire in camp, red fire was burned, and the drum corps gave a concert of patriotic airs, in celebration of the victory of Sampson over the fleet of Cevera off Santiago, the news of which was received that afternoon.

As the summer advanced, and the heat increased, reveille was sounded at 4.30 and drills were held at a correspondingly early hour, so that by the middle of the morning, all drills were over.

Soon after arriving in camp, the brigade was practiced in extended order and the use of cover. This drill was known to the men as "snake drill." Major Parker, of the Twelfth New York, a Regular Army officer, acted as instructor at first. Before many weeks the regiment became proficient in advancing on a position, and at the same time taking advantage of natural cover. On several occasions the regiment gave exhibitions for the benefit of officers of other organizations.

The evening parade was usually witnessed by many spectators. The field where it was held was near the camps of the Third Army Corps, and the men from this organization usually assembled to watch the ceremony. The drum corps had been increased to forty-seven pieces, and became celebrated for its military marches.

The men, early in the summer, discarded the blue uniform for brown canvas, and with the ponchos worn white side out in a yoke from the left shoulder, presented in ranks a natty and business-like appearance. Their drill and marching was excellent, and upon all ceremonies and reviews they created a most favorable impression.

On July 8th Captain Jacob C. R. Peabody arrived in camp and assumed command of Company H. On July 11th Assistant Surgeon Thomas L. Jenkins resigned.

Late on July 14th, news was received that Santiago had fallen. A celebration was promptly inaugurated. The three regiments in the brigade interchanged marching calls, headed by their band or field music. As the Eighth marched through the camp of the Twelfth New York singing patriotic songs, they were received with a novel illumination, a man stood at the entrance of each tent holding a lighted candle. In the camp of the Twenty-First Kansas, speeches were made by the Colonels of both regiments, after which the Eighth returned to its camp.

On July 21st the camp was again stirred by the report that the regiment had been selected for Porto Rico, and would embark in a few days. There was much activity in camp securing requisitions for the men. General Brooke, who commanded the First Corps, left for Porto Rico, and some of the regiments of the corps reached that Island before the order was countermanded.

The dull routine of camp life, repeated disappointments in orders to move, continued excessive heat, rain and mud, and the prevalence of camp diseases, were fast impairing the efficiency of the First Corps. General Breckenridge who succeeded General Wade in command, immediately planned to break the monotony by a practice march. The Third Division was ordered on a march into Tennessee, and a detail was sent in advance to secure camp sites.

Pending this general movement, the Eighth was granted permission to make a short march to Pea Vine Ridge. The start was made at daybreak on July 19th along the Ringgold Pike, which had been traveled by Sherman in his march to Atlanta. The morning was spent in advanced guard work. The farmers along the route cherished unpleasant memories of Northern troops, and spent their time guarding live stock while the regiment remained in the vicinity. Camp was made at noon near the Craven House, and the afternoon was devoted to play. Many of the men dammed a mountain brook and spent the afternoon splashing in its pools.

The Craven House was occupied by an old sailor from Newburyport, Massachusetts, who had ended his sea days many years before, and had settled with a Georgia wife in the Pea Vine Valley. The old gentleman was filled with enthusiasm to see the regiment, when he learned it was from Massachusetts, and had a company from old Newburyport. Unfortunately Company A had been left in Chickamauga as a camp guard. After the camp was established, the Colonel called to pay his respects. The excitement of the day had been too much for the old gentleman, and he was found stricken with apoplexy.

The neighbors were too busy watching their property to render assistance, and a detail from the regiment cared for the old gentleman until he died that night.

As the day wore on and no raids were made by the Northern troops upon barns or hen houses, the farmers allowed their curiosity to overcome their fears, and visited camp. They were soon selling peaches, butter milk and sweet potato pies to the troops. These pies were christened "rubbernecks" by the men, and were held in light esteem, although heavy as lead.

On July 23rd all the state knapsacks were condemned. They were little box affairs, covered with enamel leather, and had seen service at many a Framingham muster. They were piled at the head of each company street and burned. Blanket bags were later issued and were more acceptable. The tents brought from Massachusetts had been earlier condemned as unserviceable, and were replaced by a new issue.

August 1st, Lieutenant George N. Jewett of Company H resigned.

On August 9th the regiment was presented with a new set of colors. During its term of service it had three sets, two furnished by Massachusetts, and one drawn from the Government Quartermaster's department. The Regimental flag furnished by the Quartermaster's department, bore the coat of arms of the United States upon a blue field. This flag was rarely carried, and is the only one of its kind in the collection of flags carried by Massachusetts regiments, preserved at the State House.

By the middle of August the camp in the woods was water logged. Continual rain had saturated the soil. The drains took care of surface water, but as there was no seepage through the clay the drains were powerless to carry off the mass of water imprisoned in the soil, and for which evaporation was the only escape. Rain and evaporation were in equilibrium. The mud on the legs of the men like mercury in a thermometer, registered the fluctuation from this equilibrium. Ordinary rubbers were useless, and sometimes rubber boots were inundated.

Although the Government had furnished no lumber for tent floors, the men had quite generally appropriated means to raise their beds above the ground. The larceny of boards was encouraged as a sanitary virtue. A few buildings which the Park authorities cherished as ancient landmarks, about which the tide of the great battle ebbed and flowed in 1863, has entirely disappeared. The companies of the Third Battalion had purchased lumber at Chattanooga and constructed tent floors. The quarters of the enlisted men were on the highest ridge and were less exposed. The quarters of the Colonel and Staff were approachable only through a sea of liquid mud, and were shifted onto higher ground.

Application was repeatedly made for permission to change the camp. The order for a change came just before the regiment moved to Lexington. The First Battalion was the only unit to occupy the new camp, which was located in an open field on the eastern side of the Alexander Bridge road.

On August 19th Lieutenant Roland H. Sherman of Company L, resigned and was discharged.

In order to fill the vacancies in the line officers of the regiment, the following promotions were made while at Chickamauga: Second Lieutenant Augustus G. Reynolds was promoted to first lieutenant in Company H, and First Sergeant Thomas O. H. Pineau of that company was commissioned second lieutenant. First Sergeant Eugene Larrivee, of Company L, was commissioned second lieutenant in that company.

On August 21st orders were received to furlough all sick men, as the regiment was to leave Chickamauga. Some two hundred furloughs were issued. On the night of August 22nd a huge bonfire in camp celebrated the last night at Chickamauga. Early the next morning camp was broken, and the regiment marched to Rossville, Georgia, where it entrained early in the morning and was enroute to the blue grass region of Kentucky. Chickamauga was left with no regrets.

Sickness at Chickamauga

The prevailing sickness at Chickamauga was diarrhœa, dysentery and typhoid. During the spring and summer about 80,000 men passed through the park, but there were probably never over 50,000 encamped there at any one time. The board which investigated the sanitary conditions of 44,803 men at Camp Thomas, reported 9,960 probable cases of typhoid, and 713 fatal results from this disease. One man in every five suffered from this fever, and almost every man was afflicted with some intestinal disorder. Much has been said as to whether this suffering was preventable, and was due to ignorance and neglect, or was paid as the necessary price of war.

In the first call for troops the War Department expressed a desire that the States should give preference among volunteers to National Guard organizations, in the expectation that they were equipped and had been prepared for war by a previous training.

Massachusetts perhaps, satisfied this expectation as fully as any state. Her regiments were at least uniformed, armed, and equipped with means for preparing food, but they had no experience in caring for themselves in the field. The Government ration consisted of bread, coffee, potatoes, onions, canned tomatoes, fresh beef seven days, and bacon three days out of ten. One hundred rations were sufficient in quantity to feed one hundred men one day, but this required careful management on the part of company commanders, and proper preparation by company cooks. Any system of training men for the field should make provision for accustoming men to live, and live comfortably upon this ration.

It is not an answer to say that the United States Army in time of peace, does not live upon this ration, but supplements it by purchases from their company funds. A volunteer regiment going into the United States service, will have no company funds, and must live on the ration until companies accumulate funds, which ordinarily would be impossible in the field. Any system of training which fails to recognize this fact is false in theory and practice.

Previous to the Spanish War, the Massachusetts Militia were fed by caterers at their summer outings. There was a Commissary Department, but its officers were appointed for other reasons than efficiency and experience in handling supplies. Some states had commissary departments which furnished rations, and required the companies to prepare the food, but there was no where any systematic attempt to train men to manage and support life upon the Government ration.

Resulting from a lack of previous experience, the Massachusetts regiments suffered during the first six months of their field service. Men were starving in the regiments, because unable to assimilate the Government ration, which, through a lack of experience in handling and preparing, was served to them in a form which did not properly nourish, and aggravated and perpetuated the ordinary intestinal troubles which recruits usually experience when first taking the field. Many men were improperly nourished, their vitality lowered, and their power of resisting disease impaired. So far as this resulted from a defect in their militia training, the State of Massachusetts was responsible.

For a number of years the Massachusetts Militia had been equipped for eye service. The men were supplied with the equipments they could carry on their person, and which contributed to the success of a parade, by giving it a ready-for-war appearance. Not much attention was paid to other equipments.

There was a limited supply of blankets, ponchos, buzzacotts and tentage, but not enough for all the troops. These were held at the Framingham Arsenal, and did duty for a mysterious field equipment, ready for instant use. There were no shelter tents or wagons. Some of the supplies were of a stage property kind. The shovels carried by an improvised pioneer corps in one of the Boston street parades, lasted two hours when used for digging by a detachment of the Eighth. The Militia of Massachusetts had never been properly equipped for field service.

The appropriation of $500,000 by the Legislature in April, enabled them to take the field better supplied than the Guard Regiments from many states, but they were never fully equipped by the State, or instructed in the A B C of a soldier's duty.

They had been assembled for years in brigade camps, and taught ceremonies and parades, but no attempt had been made to teach company commanders the important lesson of how to meet the requirements of the field, and care for their men under service conditions. The increasing sick list reported in all the camps, accentuated this absence of individual experience and trained company officers.

The War Department was as unprepared as the Militia of Massachusetts. The machinery for handling an army of 26,000 men in peace, was called upon to mobilize 275,000 men of war. It was altogether inadequate to meet the emergency. There were practically no reserve supplies. On April 23rd the Government had enough Springfield rifles to equip the volunteers, but that was all. The cloth of the uniforms first issued to some regiments at Chickamauga, was not manufactured when the regiments were mustered into service.

Large quantities of commissary supplies were purchased in the market, and rushed to the large camps for concentration. These supplies were uniformly of standard quality, and were accumulated in sufficient quantities at the depots, but were often delayed in distribution to the troops. Volunteer officers were at first unacquainted with the use of requisition blanks, and the red tape of Government issue, and the Commissary Department lacked facilities to make prompt and full deliveries. This was the earliest department, however, to get into working order, and subsequent complaints at Chickamauga were due to the inexperience of officers and men in handling the rations.

The Quartermaster's Department also made large purchases in the market, but were handicapped by having to wait for articles to be manufactured to fill orders. This department at Chickamauga was further handicapped by inefficiency and failure to appreciate the situation, and the necessary requirements of the troops.

As soon as wagon transportation was issued to the Eighth, they began to bring the water from the Blue Spring. This was a long haul, and required many barrels for transportation and storage in camp. The supply of barrels issued by the Quartermaster's Department to the regiment was inadequate. The Chief Quartermaster was repeatedly requested to furnish sufficient barrels for this purpose, and refused. The regiment subsequently purchased, at its own expense, at Chattanooga, sufficient receptacles.

The refusal of the Chief Quartermaster was reported to the Inspector General's Department, and was thus commented upon:—

"One of the principal appeals made to me during the many inspections that I made was for water barrels and boilers, so that the strict order to boil all drinking water might be complied with. I made several trips to the office of the chief quartermaster in behalf of the command on this matter, but without success. I finally went to the corps commander, and he told me to go again to the chief quartermaster, who told me that the regiments had as many as 15 water barrels to each regiment (twelve companies), and the water being hauled from four to seven miles. This reply convinced me at once of a total failure to appreciate the condition of affairs, what was required, and what should be done. Owing to a failure of this department to provide the proper shelter, supplies, and clothing, I am satisfied that much of the sickness was caused.

The whole matter sums itself up in this, that the regulations necessary for the conduct of a small army during a period of thirty-five years of peace, when built upon and expanded into those required for an army ten times as large in time of war, failed absolutely and went to pieces."

The Regimental Commander repeatedly asked the Quartermaster's Department for disinfectants and lumber; these requisitions were disallowed. Whatever supplies of this nature the regiment had, were purchased by private contribution, until the spread of disease excited public indignation and demanded liberal issues. After official investigation began, a change was noticed in the policy of the department. By the end of the summer it is probable that porcelain lined bath tubs would have been issued for the mere asking.

During the hot summer months, 75 per cent. of the men at Chickamauga were forced to wear heavy woolen clothing. The Eighth was the only regiment fully equipped with canvas suits. These had been purchased by the State of Massachusetts. If sufficient energy had been displayed by the Quartermaster's Department, the same clothing would have been purchased and issued to all the regiments. What supplies were on hand were held in small storehouses, and their issues blocked by lack of system and necessary labor to handle the goods.

The Medical Department at Chickamauga was inefficient and displayed lack of both professional and executive ability. There was an unnecessary shortage of medical supplies and hospital attendants. No provision was at first made for general hospitals. The sick were cared for in regimental hospitals, and later when these were abolished, in Division Hospitals. Division hospitals are organized to accompany troops in the field, and serve as a collecting station, where the injured receive temporary treatment and are transferred as soon as practicable to general hospitals.

The field hospitals at Chickamauga were swarmed with the sick, and were forced to become general hospitals, as no other provision had been made. The accommodations were inadequate. Hospital tents were insufficient in number, and were not supplied with proper furnishings. There was a lack of medicine and nourishing food. The nurses were enlisted men detailed from the various regiments, and were ignorant of their duties, and without experience.

The quarters and grounds were dirty, and the service was undisciplined, disorganized and demoralized. Until taken firmly in hand by General Sanger and reorganized, the Third Division Hospital was a monument to the ignorance and incapacity of the Medical Department.

This Department was thus described in an inspection report:—

"I found quite a number of sick in each regiment, and was informed by the regimental surgeons that they could not get from the medical depot those medicines and other supplies needed for the sick, and was also informed that, in reply to their request, they were told that no issue of medicine or medical supplies could be had from the depot until the field cases were filled; that, although the medicines were on hand, it was not the intention to make issues until everything could be done in the order required by the Army Regulations, resulting in unnecessary discomfort and suffering to the sick. The different aid societies did a great deal toward helping out the unfortunate conditions, but on the whole, the administration of the affairs of this department was a dismal failure. Those regimental medical officers bought a great deal of medicine with their own funds and from funds furnished them by their friends at home. There were no cots, blankets, pillows, nor sheets. The medicine and medical supplies were entirely inadequate for many days after my reporting for duty. There were no floors in the tents where the sick were. They were crowded together in dangerous proximity to each other, and those gentlemen of the medical profession of the volunteer service were very bitter in their denunciations of our miserable system."

The medical officers of the Eighth were at all times zealous and efficient in instructing officers how to combat disease, and the regimental officers were intelligent and active in carrying out these instructions.

Before typhoid became epidemic, Colonel Pew assembled officers and men after evening parade, and explained to them the nature and cause of this fever. He said this disease had already broken out, and he anticipated it would become a scourge to the troops, because of the unsanitary condition of the various camps. That it was caused by microscopic germs found in the discharges of the sick. That these germs were very tenacious of life, and increased and multiplied rapidly in filth. That when dry they would drift about in the air and lodge on food, clothing or the person. That they were harmless unless taken into the mouth, but as they were too small to be seen, there was always danger of contagion. That they were killed by boiling, and for that reason the men would be required to drink only boiled water, and keep their food protected against dust. That all human excreta must be deposited in the proper place, and covered with a paddle, as Moses taught the children of Israel to care for themselves in the Wilderness. That police regulations would be enforced, and camp conditions made as unfavorable as possible for the growth and development of these germs. He urged the men to appreciate the danger to which they were exposed, and to avoid it by complying strictly with all sanitary regulations.

The Medical Board appointed to examine into the causes of the existence and spread of typhoid in the national camp of 1898, reported that this fever was brought to Camp Thomas by the volunteers, and spread by the neglect of the rules of sanitation and military hygiene. Out of forty-eight regiments whose medical records were examined, nine regiments reached Chickamauga with developed cases of typhoid, twenty-five regiments developed cases within two weeks, and at the expiration of one month only two regiments of the forty-eight were free from this disease. The first case of typhoid in the Eighth Regiment was reported July 13.

The average volunteer at Chickamauga had little discipline, and a slight knowledge of sanitation. He was willing to fight, as he had enlisted for that purpose, but he rather resented as an invasion of personal rights, any attempt to dictate what he should eat or drink. He did not accept in full faith the germ theory of disease, and was skeptical about the existence of bugs he could not see.

If water looked clear and was cool, he was unwilling to believe it was unwholesome, especially when it tasted sweet and satisfied his cravings. He was willing to believe that any water in which fish could swim, was good to drink, or to accept any other absurd test which was current.

The experience of an outpost from the regiment illustrates the chances intelligent college men would take, when it became a question of satisfying the appetite. This outpost was established on the banks of Chickamauga Creek, below the inflow of camp sewerage, and obtained their drinking water from a spring bubbling up in the slope of the bank. A sudden rain caused the creek to rise and submerge the spring. After the water subsided, the outpost discovered the surface of the spring covered with slime.

Someone suggested bad germs floated, and acting upon this theory, they plunged a canteen to the bottom of the spring, with the opening stopped by the thumb against the entrance of bacteria. When the canteen was on the bottom, the thumb was removed until the canteen was filled, the opening was then again plugged with the thumb, and the supply brought to the surface. Every member of this outpost was stricken with typhoid as a result of this experiment.

Although orders had been issued to drink only boiled water, most men in the corps drank what they pleased. Unsatisfactory rations led many men to patronize the various food venders. Near the railroad station a swarm of booths sprung up, where all kinds of food were dispensed. These stands were not subject to medical inspection, and later were denounced by the Medical Department as sources of contagion.

The chief sources of contagion were company sinks. Digging and caring for sinks did not appeal to the men as heroic soldiering. They hated and shirked this duty and as a result the sinks of many regiments were so repulsive that the men refused to use them, and polluted territory surrounding the camp.

The care of the sinks was always a matter of great solicitude to the officers of the Eighth. Their cleanliness was insisted upon at all times with martinet rigidity, and men were punished for not using them, after the formality of a trial and conviction before a summary court.

It was recognized that these pest holes might become breeding grounds of flies which would infest the camp and carry contagion. The following extract from a circular shows to what extent this danger was appreciated.

"No doubt typhoid fever, camp diarrhœa, and probably yellow fever are frequently communicated to soldiers in camp through the agency of flies, which swarm about fecal matter and filth of all kinds deposited upon the ground or in shallow pits and directly convey infectious material, attached to their feet or contained in their excreta, to the food which is exposed while being prepared at the company kitchens or while being served in the mess tent. It is for this reason that a strict sanitary police is so important."

Although the Eighth prevented flies breeding in its own camp, it could not prevent them swarming from other camps and spreading contagion. Flies increased and multiplied. A roast of beef exposed for a few minutes looked as black as a mass of charcoal, so dense was its surface packed with flies. Netting was purchased, and an attempt was made to keep all food covered. Some of the officers constructed mess quarters of scantlings covered with fly screens.

For two months the Eighth Regiment, fully realizing the danger to which it was exposed, fought against typhoid and combated it with intelligence and energy. During the last two months of its stay at Chickamauga, it was smitten with a heavy hand, and became the victims of a system which failed to furnish sanitary safeguards against the spread of communicable disease.

Digging was at all times difficult in the territory of the Eighth, as the soil was a hard clay and the outcropping ledges caused the abandonment of many sink holes when half dug. When the rainy season began a new danger threatened the regiment. The sinks would fill with water and stay full. Refilling the holes with lumps of clay that had been taken out, would cause an overflow and pollute the surrounding ground. Sinks had to be abandoned after every heavy rain, and new holes dug.