Kitabı oku: «Memoirs and Correspondence of Admiral Lord de Saumarez, Vol. I», sayfa 17

It is evident, from this testimony, that the colours were only struck once, and hoisted once union down, and only hoisted union down by the Frenchmen; and that the boats of the Cæsar and Venerable were only once on board the Hannibal after she was aground; namely, when their crews were taken prisoners. But both these boats were actually sent to her assistance at a previous period, when the Hannibal was directed by the Admiral to endeavour to obtain a position to rake the Formidable; and it was then that they were sent back. Captain Brenton first received the report of the Hannibal having her colours union downwards between twelve and one, while the Cæsar was engaging the island battery, and the Dessaix and the Muiron.

The Cæsar's boat was sent with others to the assistance of the Hannibal, according to the log, at seventeen minutes past one, and must have reached her certainly before the action ceased, and found her in the hands of the enemy, as described by Colonel Connolly.

It is absurd to suppose that, while actually engaging the enemy, Captain Ferris would haul down his colours, to hoist them as a signal of distress, when he had other ensigns to hoist, and when there was a signal in the book, "In distress, and in want of immediate assistance:" this is a circumstance which, I will venture to assert, never occurred in any naval action.

Captain Brenton, being decidedly of the same opinion, adds, "I can only say, when it was reported to me, while in action, that the Hannibal's colours were reversed, I considered her to be in possession of the enemy: that the Admiral took the same view of the subject, I have not the least doubt; and I think nothing would have induced him to abandon the Hannibal while she was engaged. I will further add, that I never remember the slightest doubt being expressed of the Hannibal having struck before the action terminated, until I read the narrative of Captain Ferris, at his court-martial, some time afterwards."

The moment these champions of "liberté, égalité, et la mort," entered the Hannibal, plunder was the order of the day; and, in their furious haste to get at the officers' trunks, they cruelly trod over the wounded in the cockpit and cable-tiers. Colonel Connolly relates that in a few minutes one of them had taken his new cocked-hat, and appeared on deck with it. He himself had given up seeking his desk, which contained a considerable sum of money besides valuable papers, because he could not get at it without creeping over the wounded; but the French, not so particular, soon found it.

We shall now give the extracts of the various logs to which we have had access. These have never yet been published, and we trust they will set the matter at rest. It is some satisfaction indeed, that all authors agree in declaring that nothing more could have been done, and that the honour of the British flag was to the last gloriously maintained on the 6th of July 1801.

Extract of the Cæsar's log in the Battle of Algeziras, 5th July:

Winds S.W. and variable. At 12h.30m. p.m. up mainsail and in royals; at 2h. made the signal for the squadron to prepare for battle, and, anchoring, bent the sheet cable through the larboard gun-room port to the sheet anchor; at 4h. set steering-sails,—fresh breezes and fair; at 8h. moderate breezes,—Cape Moulinau E.N.E. seven or eight miles; at 12h. (midnight), light airs inclinable to calm,—squadron in company, Venerable S.S.E. one mile. At 12h.30m. (6th), in steering-sails, and at 12h.40m. lowered down the yawl; at 3h.45m. a breeze sprung up,—made the signal for attention; at 4h.5m. beat to quarters,—Cabrita Point, S.E. by E. three or four leagues,—made the Pompée's signal to close; at 5h. set top-gallant steering-sails, and at 6h. the fore-top-mast steering-sail; at 7h. 45m. made the Venerable's signal to haul the wind,—took in the starboard steering-sails; at 8h. in steering-sails; at 8h.5m. in top-gallant sails,—made the signal for being at liberty to engage the enemy in passing; at 8h. do. to take stations for mutual support; at 8h.25m. set top-gallant sails,—the enemy's ships opened their fire,—saw the Venerable break round off,—Cæsar fired at a Spanish battery in passing; at 8h.35m. the action commenced with the Pompée, Venerable, and Audacious; at 8h. 45m. made the signal for the ships astern to make more sail; at 9h. light breezes, and variable,—opened our fire, and the engagement became general; at 9h.15m. passed the Venerable, and came to with the sheet-anchor in nine fathoms,—the sheet-cable became taut,—let go the best bower to steady the ship,—Spencer and Hannibal passed under our lee,—hailed them to get the boats ahead, and tow into action,—light airs; at 9h. 35m. the Spencer opened her fire; at 9h.40m. the Hannibal, do.—our spanker-boom shot away; at 10h.20m. sent boats to the Pompée and Hannibal; at 10h.26m. made the Hannibal's signal to tack,—saw the Pompée had broke her sheer, apparently by a flaw of wind, and was raked by the French Admiral; at 10h.30m. made the Pompée's signal to cut or slip; at 10h.35m., a breeze springing up from the N.W., cut our cable, wore, and made sail, engaging the enemy's ships while passing them; at 10h.50m. the Hannibal opened her fire on the French Admiral; at 10h.52m. made the signal for the squadron to come to,—the wind on the starboard tack; at 11h.5m. made the signal for the boats to tow the Pompée,—Cæsar engaging the southernmost ships,—Audacious, ditto,—Cæsar opened her fire on the island battery,—Audacious and Cæsar becalmed near the island reef,—boats employed towing the ship's head round; afternoon,—light winds and variable weather,—engaging the enemy; at 12h.33m. made the signal for the Hannibal being aground,—employed engaging the southernmost ship; at 1h. 17m. Audacious wore,—made the signal for armed-boats to proceed as denoted; at 1h.35m. the action ceased,—found the main-mast shot through in five places, (and other damage which need not be mentioned,) nine men killed, twenty-five wounded, and seven missing; at 5h. came-to at Gibraltar, with the small bower employed warping alongside of the sheer hulk.

The Venerable's log, which we have examined at the depôt at Deptford, and which is signed by Captain Hood, fully corroborates the above, with the addition,—"At 12h.40m. sent the first lieutenant in the pinnace to assist the Hannibal;" and this officer (Lieutenant Collis) in his own journal mentions the same fact. When he arrived at the Hannibal, she was in possession of the enemy; and he was taken prisoner, with his boat's crew, by persisting to go on board after he was warned by Lieutenant (now Colonel) Connolly, of the Marines. He says it was in consequence of the ensign being reversed that the boats were sent; and, before any of the boats reached her, she was in possession of the French, who hoisted the colours union downwards themselves, and that they never were hoisted in that manner at any other time.

These facts are also corroborated by the logs and journals of the Audacious and Spencer, which will be given in the next chapter. Every ship, indeed, mentions the impossibility of affording any assistance to the Hannibal, and that the signal was not made to leave off action until her situation was utterly hopeless.

The nature of the well-protected road of Algeziras being fully manifest in the diagram facing the 346th page, it is unnecessary to point out the difficulties the squadron had to contend with from the five strong batteries, which were served with much effect by the French artillerymen. The numerous gun-boats stationed at Algeziras for the annoyance of our commerce, were from their constant practice in that kind of warfare, of themselves a most formidable enemy; besides, the assistance they afforded in warping their ships in-shore, and placing them in such a position as to enable the different batteries to support them. But the failure of the attack must be mainly attributed to the unsteadiness and faintness of the wind, which enabled none of the squadron to obtain the position it wished; that is, in-shore of the enemy: while, by falling calm at a moment the most disadvantageous, it left the ships exposed to the enemy's fire without the possibility of returning it.

The loss sustained by each ship was severe. The Cæsar had her master, Mr. William Grave, six seamen, and two marines, killed; her boatswain, G.W. Forster, seventeen seamen, one boy, and six marines, wounded; besides the capture of Lieutenant Janvarin, a volunteer, Mr. Richard Best, and seven seamen, who were taken by boarding the Hannibal when in possession of the enemy. Her masts, particularly the main-mast, and yards, were very much injured; her boats were all cut to pieces, besides that taken at the Hannibal; and there were many shots in her hull. The Pompée had Mr. P. Roxborough, master, Mr. Stewart, midshipman, ten seamen, and three marines killed; Lieutenants Cheesman, Stapleton, and Innes, Messrs. Currie, Hillier, and Hibbert, fifty-three seamen, and ten marines, wounded. She was so completely damaged in masts, rigging, and sails, that all hope of refitting her as promptly as the rest was at an end. The Spencer had Mr. Spencer, a midshipman, and five seamen, killed; Mr. Chatterton, midshipman, twenty-three seamen, and three marines wounded. She was damaged chiefly in her rigging and sails, which were soon repaired. The Venerable had Mr. W. Gibbons, midshipman, and eight seamen, killed; Messrs. Austin and Collins, midshipmen, twenty seamen, and four marines, wounded; and eight missing. The Hannibal had seventy-five killed, among whom were Mr. D. Lindsay, clerk, and Lieut. James Williams, R.M.; and seventy wounded and missing. The Audacious had eight killed; Lieut. Day, of the Marines, thirty-one seamen and marines, wounded. The total loss of the squadron being one hundred and twenty-three killed, two hundred and forty-two wounded, and twenty-two missing.

The loss of the French and Spaniards, by their own accounts, was considerable; the former having three hundred and six killed,—among whom were Captains Moncousu, of the Dessaix, seventy-four, and Lalonde, of the Indomptable, eighty-four,—and near five hundred wounded; five gun-boats were sunk, and others damaged; and the forts, in which eleven men were killed, received considerable injury. The ships suffered a good deal in hull, masts, and rigging; but not so much as was anticipated.

The French, as might be expected, from their usual disregard to truth, made this out one of the most brilliant exploits ever performed. Their account stated that three French ships had completely beaten six English, which took refuge in Gibraltar after leaving the Hannibal in their possession, &c.; saying nothing of the heavy batteries and gun-boats they had to contend with. But the Spaniards, in the Madrid Gazette extraordinary, represented the "action as very obstinate and bloody on both sides; and likewise on the part of the batteries, which decided the fate of the day:" and in another place, "the fire of our batteries was so hot and well supported that the enemy suffered most from them; and particularly it is to the St. Jago we owe the capture of the English ship, for her bold manœuvre of attempting to pass between the French Rear-admiral's ship, the Formidable, and the shore, made her take the ground; and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions to get her afloat, it was found impossible to move her. Then the fire from the battery very soon dismasted her, and compelled her to strike.³³

The diagram, besides pointing out the situations of the five strong batteries, which so completely protect the harbour, and which did the greatest execution, shows the first position of the ships about the time they all anchored, and before the enemy's ships had warped near the shore. The second, represented by the outlines, shows the situation of the hostile squadrons at the time the Hannibal struck, when the Pompée had nearly reached the Mole, the distance of which from Algeziras is little more than four miles, and the Spencer was considerably advanced in that direction.

We cannot conclude our account of this action without a few remarks on the circumstances we have related. There cannot be a doubt that, had the enemy remained in the position he held at the commencement of the action, every ship would have been taken. Praise is certainly due to Admiral Linois for his able manœuvre of warping his ships aground, being the only chance he had of escaping; while it was acknowledging that, as long as his ships were continued afloat, he had no confidence in protection from the batteries, strong as they were, against the valour and perseverance of British seamen.

Although the attack was not crowned with the success it merited, in a national point of view the result was as complete as if the whole squadron had been destroyed, as the enemy were thereby prevented from proceeding further in the execution of the ulterior object of their expedition; and the chance of this alone was sufficient to justify Sir James in this bold and daring attempt, which, it will be seen, ultimately led to one of the most glorious achievements which adorn the annals of the empire.³⁴

CHAPTER XV

1801

Observations on the Battle of Algeziras.—Copies of the Journals of the Spencer, Audacious, and Venerable.—Remarks on them.—Further particulars.—The Spanish account.—The French account.—Bulletin from the Moniteur.—Anecdote of an occurrence at St. Malo.—Sword presented to Linois.—Lines on the occasion.—His improvement of Naval tactics.—Epigram.—Anecdote of the intrepidity of one of the Cæsar's men.

It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter that, owing chiefly to the minutes of Captain Ferris's court-martial, and to the discrepancies in different statements, a controversy has arisen on the subject. In order to avoid the possibility of our becoming a party thereto, correct copies of the logs, which are now at the Record Office in the Admiralty, are subjoined, after having been compared with those at Somerset House.

Copy of the Log of his Majesty's ship Spencer, 6th July 1801

Moderate and cloudy,—spoke his Majesty's ship Cæsar, which informed us of having intelligence of three sail of French line-of-battle ships and a frigate being in Algeziras Bay,—answered the signal to prepare for battle at anchor,—employed clearing ship for battle at anchor; at 6h. Apes hill S. E.; at half-past 6 beat the general to quarters,—ship clear for action; a.m. light airs and variable; at 4h. sprung up a breeze from the westward; at 7h.58m. saw three French sail-of-the-line and one frigate, lying under the protection of the Spanish batteries of Algeziras, and a strong fortified island to the southward, and a number of forts and redoubts to the westward of them.

At 8h.17m. the batteries commenced firing on the Venerable, Pompée, and Audacious,—Venerable commenced firing; at 9h.11m. we commenced firing; at 9h.35m. found the sheet-cable cut through by the enemy's shot; at 9h. 48m. anchored between the Cæsar and the Hannibal, Audacious astern, the Pompée on our larboard bow, having a battery and the French Admiral's ship to oppose us on our larboard beam, a battery and gun-boats ahead; at 10h.33m. dismasted and disabled a gun-boat that was rowing to the assistance of the others; at 10h. 39m. cut the cable per Admiral's order whilst wearing,—the gun-boats attempted to approach us from under the land, but the brisk fire that was kept up made them retreat in great disorder; at 11h.3m. answered the signal to come to the wind on the larboard tack (No. 98); at 11h.7m. commenced firing at the outer ships of the enemy, which was kept up at intervals.

At 11h.37m. observed the Hannibal under the batteries at the north end of the town, with her main-top-mast shot away and aground, but keeping up a brisk fire on the enemy's ships and batteries; p.m. Hannibal still on shore, but keeping up a brisk fire at the enemy's ships and batteries; at 1h.16m. observed the Hannibal to slacken her fire, shortly after the ensign hauled down and hoisted union downwards; at 1h.35m. observed the enemy's boats boarding the Hannibal; at 1h.44m. ceased firing,—found the ship had suffered considerably in her hull, having several shots on both sides between wind and water. Our loss in the action was six killed, twenty-seven badly wounded, two of whom died of their wounds. The fore-mast, bowsprit, main-top-mast, main-top-gallant yard, and main-top-sail yard badly wounded; the boats and booms shot through in several places; the cutter and yawl that were towing astern were sunk by the enemy. At 6h.30m. anchored per signal, and moored ship in Rosia Bay, Gibraltar.

The following is a correct copy of the Audacious's log, at Somerset House.

This log, like the former, begins in the evening of the 5th July 1801.

Wind S.W. p.m. moderate and hazy; half-past 2 tacked,—Cape Trafalgar S. E. three or four leagues,—got springs on the anchors; at 8h. standing up the Gut of Gibraltar,—Admiral S. by W. three-quarters of a mile; at 12h. taken aback, came to the wind on the land-tack; at 6h. Gibraltar Rock N. by E. four or five leagues,—shortened sail to let the Pompée go ahead to her station; at half-past 7, saw the enemy's ships at anchor in Algeziras Roads, consisting of three line-of-battle ships, a frigate, gun-boats, &c.; three-quarters past 7, the batteries commenced firing on our ships as they passed; twenty minutes past 8, the enemy's ships began to fire on our ships; at half-past 8, the action became hot on both sides,—the Venerable, Pompée, and Audacious as yet only in action; at half-past 9, the Cæsar, Spencer, and Hannibal joined the action against the ships and batteries; at 11h. cut the cables, and tried to tow the ship's head round to the eastward, to bring the ship's broadside to bear on her opponent, but without effect; by this time the sails and rigging being much cut up, and the ship unmanageable, got the kedge anchor with a five-inch hawser out on the starboard bow, and succeeded in bringing the broadside to bear; at noon, light airs inclining to calm,—Cæsar, Spencer, under way, still in action.

p.m. dark weather; at forty-five minutes past 12, the Venerable and Pompée hauled to the wind on the starboard tack; at 1h. cut the sheet-cable, and slipped the end of the kedge hawser, and spring on the sheet-anchor,—got the boats ahead to tow,—found the ship drifting under the island fort, which did us considerable injury,—the rocks close under the lee-bow,—cut away the best bower-anchor to check her head, and bring her broadside to bear, it being calm; at twenty minutes past 1, a light breeze sprung up off-shore,—cut away the best bower-cable, and made sail on the starboard tack,—observed the Hannibal on shore, and the enemy take possession of her; at 4h. anchored in Rosia Bay, Gibraltar.

The next is the journal of Captain Hood of the Venerable.

6th July 1801.

Monday, 6th July, wind variable off Algeziras,—Gibraltar Bay, light breezes, and variable,—the captain went on board the Cæsar,—all sail set,—squadron in company,—the captain returned,—got the sheet-cable through the stern-port, and bent it to the anchor,—got springs on the sheet and bower-anchors; at 2h. Captain Hood went on board the Admiral; at 3h. returned,—received a midshipman and seven men per the Plymouth lugger, and from the Boladore, Spanish lugger; at 4h. Cape Trafalgar, N.E. seven or eight miles,—all sail set,—made and shortened sail occasionally for the squadron, and tacked occasionally,—a.m. do. weather; at 4h. made more sail; at 7h. discovered the enemy, consisting of three two-decked ships and a frigate, with an Admiral's flag flying, at anchor under the town and batteries of Algeziras, protected by many gun-boats, &c.—all sail set, standing in for the enemy, followed by the Pompée, Audacious, Cæsar, Spencer, and Hannibal; at 7h.50m. the batteries opened their fire on us,—Pompée and Audacious one mile and a half distant from us astern.

At 8h. it fell calm; at 8h.20m. the Pompée and Audacious, bringing up the breeze, passed us to windward, when the enemy's ships opened their fire on us; at 8h.14m. a light air sprung up,—passed the Audacious to leeward, at which time the Pompée and Audacious opened their fire; at 8h. 20m. the breeze dying away, came to with the sheet-anchor, as did the Pompée and Audacious,—hove in the spring; and at 8h.30m. opened our fire on the French Admiral's ship: at 10h. the Cæsar anchored on our bow, and sent a spring on board of us; at the same time the action became general, and the Hannibal got on shore, after attempting to cut off the French Admiral's ship.

At 10h.20m. the Pompée drifted between us and the French Admiral's,—hove in our spring, and brought our guns to bear on the other enemy's ship on our bow, and the other's stern: at 12h. the Pompée drifted between our fire and the enemy's,—slipt the sheet-cable, and eight-inch hawser, the spring, with the intention of getting alongside the enemy's southernmost ship,—light air springing up at the time from the N.E.; in awaiting this opportunity, the mizen-top-mast, fore-braces, and jibb halyards, with various other standing and running rigging, shot away, and main-mast badly wounded: at 11h.15m. breeze dying away prevented our intention,—opened our fire on the southernmost ship; at 12h. calm and hazy,—Cæsar, Hannibal, Audacious, Spencer, and us still firing on the enemy's ships, batteries, and gun-boats,—boats of the squadron towing off the Pompée to Gibraltar; p.m. calm,—still firing on the enemy's ships, which were warping farther in-shore.

At 12h.40m. sent Lieutenant Collis in the pinnace to assist the Hannibal; at 1h.40m. finding it impossible to near the enemy's ships with safety, it being calm, and a strong current setting in-shore, their batteries firing red-hot shot and throwing shells, ceased the action as per signal, as did the other ships, and steered for Gibraltar,—observed the Hannibal ceased firing, and hoist the colours reversed, having her fore and mainmasts shot away, and being in ten foot water, rendered all assistance useless.

24 Nov. 1801.³⁵

S. Hood.

Thus the logs and journals of the captains and officers of the Spencer, Audacious, Venerable, and Cæsar, all agree that the Hannibal struck her colours between 1h.20m. and 1h.40m. The Pompée, being by this time near the Mole at Gibraltar, could not see nor take minutes of that circumstance. The Spencer, according to her position at that time, was in the best situation for seeing the Hannibal, and accordingly her log is the most particular. The Cæsar's log need not be given, as it would be merely a repetition of Captain Brenton's narrative. All these agree with Colonel Connolly's testimony, and their evidence is quite conclusive as to the following facts; namely, that the Hannibal struck her colours before the main-mast fell; that these colours were hoisted union down by the enemy, who had possession of the ship before the boats came alongside from the Venerable and Cæsar, and that to save her was quite impossible.

The following further particulars relative to the action are given in the extract of a letter from an officer of the Cæsar, dated at Gibraltar:

There is one point that needs explanation; namely, when the Cæsar cut her cable at half-past ten o'clock, it was from a fine breeze springing up, and the hope of closing with the enemy. Orders were given for that purpose to the Audacious and Venerable; the Cæsar wore round them, and brought her broadside to bear on the Indomptable's bow, lying there (about three cables distant from her) a considerable time, with the fore-top-sail to the mast (aback). The Audacious, bringing up a breeze from the north-west, passed between us and the enemy, who, in this part of the day, suffered materially, his fore-top-mast going about five minutes before twelve o'clock. Shortly afterwards, the Audacious and Cæsar were becalmed upon the broadside of the Indomptable, without being able to bring one of their guns to bear,—the Cæsar not more than three cables' length from the island battery, and the Audacious still nearer,—both ships drifting on the reef.

It was at this time that Sir James Saumarez formed the resolution of attacking the island with marines. Boats were signalised for the purpose; but, being all employed with the Pompée, or sunk by the enemy's fire, it was found impracticable. A breeze again sprung up, and Sir James directed his ship to be laid alongside of the Indomptable, in the firm resolution of carrying her. The sails were trimmed for that purpose as well as the crippled state of the masts would allow, but a calm ensued. The Venerable had never received the breeze from the time of her cutting, and still lay unmanageable. The Spencer had drifted considerably in repairing her rigging.

The following is a translation of the Spanish official account of the battle of Algeziras, 6th July 1801:

The division of three French line-of-battle ships and one frigate, under the command of Rear-admiral Citizen Linois, that sailed from the road of Toulon on the 25th last June, destined for Cadiz, came in sight of this station and bay on the 1st of July; and, the Levant wind having failed on entering the Straits, they cruised between the coast of Africa and that of Europe, in which they captured the English brig of war the Speedy, of sixteen guns, that was a Mahon packet, and was conducting to Gibraltar a prize, the merchant brig the Union, loaded with oil and provisions.

The continuation of the westerly winds obliged the said division to come into this port on the 5th instant, at seven in the evening. From that moment, recollecting the desperate attacks of the English at Alexandria and Copenhagen, we could not but expect that their squadron, which had been seen off Cadiz on the 3rd instant, under the command of Rear-admiral Saumarez, would come and attack this division. So it happened.

As soon as the English received intelligence where the French had anchored, they steered directly for the Straits; and, on the 6th instant, at half-past six in the morning, six English ships doubled the Point of Carnero, and, coming round the island of Algeziras, advanced in a line within half cannon-shot of the French ships. The batteries of St. Garcia and the island opened their fire upon the English; and afterwards the frigate and republican ships.

As soon as the English line came opposite the French ships at anchor, they opened upon them an animated, bold, and unremitting fire. The English Admiral having placed himself against the French, and the British ship Hannibal being under sail, cannonaded furiously the French Admiral, who, with superior spirit and success, resisted them; insomuch that, having carried away the Admiral's mizen-mast, and sails of the main and fore-mast, with no small damage of his hull, the commander of the English ship Hannibal, despising the fire from the battery of St. Jago, pushed on to his succour; and, intending to place the French Admiral between two fires, by running between him and the shore, had the imprudence, being unacquainted with his position, to place himself within a quarter of a gun-shot of the battery, and ran aground. He relieved his Admiral, who, after this, went out of the action; but he lost his own ship and crew, as the fire from the battery and French Admiral dismantled him, and killed three parts of his ship's company.

Until this ship's surrender, which was about the time of the retreat of the English Admiral, the fire was constant upon the two French ships and frigate, as well as upon the seven Spanish gun-boats, the batteries of the island, St. Garcia, St. Jago, La Almiranta, and Almirante, which, as opportunity offered, returned their fire.

The battle lasted from half-past eight o'clock in the morning, when the fort of St. Garcia opened its fire, till two in the afternoon, when the last shot was fired from the French ship Indomptable. The persevering, active, and tremendous fire of the enemy, and that of the two nations (French and Spanish), were only distinguishable by the prudence, skill, and greatness of soul with which the allied chiefs directed theirs, and the audacity, temerity, and confusion which were shown in that of the English. The idea of this kind of fighting, which we form from the account of the battles of Alexandria and Copenhagen, does not, in proportion to the numbers engaged, bear any comparison with that of Algeziras, either in point of bloodiness or obstinacy.

The English, after having left the glory and the field of battle to the two nations, covered with shame, and taught by dear-bought experience, have only given an unequivocal proof of their inveterate hatred to France and Spain; since, not being able to obtain any advantage over the French and Spanish forces, they directed their fire against an inoffensive town, which received no small injury in the buildings. This is the only glory which the arms of Great Britain have to boast of.

The Pompée was towed out of the action by eight boats, who came to her succour from the garrison of Gibraltar. She was kept afloat by casks, or otherwise could not have been brought in.

The ships of the French Republic which sustained this attack were the Formidable, 84, Citizen Linois; Dessaix, 74, Moncousu, killed; L'Indomptable, 84, Lalonde, killed; the frigate Muiron, 36, Martinencq; five Spanish gun-boats damaged, and two sunk. In the French ships, three hundred and six killed; one hundred and eighty-four wounded. We suppose in the English squadron above five hundred are killed, and from two hundred and seventy to two hundred and eighty wounded.

Madrid Gazette Extraordinary

Merida, 10 July 1801.

The general commandant of the camp at St. Roque, in a despatch of the 6th instant, transmitted by a courier extraordinary, communicates an account of an action which has been fought between six sail of the line, and other vessels of war, belonging to the English, and the French squadron of three ships of the line, and one frigate, lying at anchor in the harbour of Algeziras; and of the glorious result which has taken place for his Majesty's arms, and those of the Republic, his ally.

About eight in the morning of that day, (viz. the 6th,) there were seen, coming out of Gibraltar, one ship of eighty-four guns, five of seventy-four, a lugger of sixteen, another of ten, and a polacre of ten, two armed launches, and fourteen boats. This force, under the command of a Rear-admiral, stood into Algeziras, for the purpose of attacking the French squadron then anchored in that port, which, as has been already stated, consisted of three sail of the line, and one frigate. The commanders of this squadron, being aware of the enemy's intention, made their dispositions for defence, placing themselves, as well as they were able, under the cover of our batteries, and waiting in this position for his approach.

The action commenced at nine; it was very obstinate and bloody on both sides, and likewise on the part of our batteries, which decided the fate of the day. The action was continued till two in the afternoon, at which hour the English drew off with the loss of one ship of the line; taking in tow another, which was dismasted and damaged in the hull; and having sustained very great loss and damage in the rest of their vessels. Their loss in men must have been considerable, as it is certain that a great number were killed and wounded on board all the ships. The French also have been equal sufferers, the killed and wounded in their squadron being estimated at eight hundred: that of our troops has been less; out of the whole, only the royal regiment of Ronda has lost eleven men.

The fire of our batteries was so hot and well supported, that the enemy suffered most from them; and particularly it is to that of St. Jago we owe the capture of the English ship, for her bold manœuvre of attempting to pass between the French Rear-admiral's ship, the Formidable, and the shore, made her take the ground; and, notwithstanding the utmost exertion to put her afloat, it being found impossible to move her, the fire from the battery very soon dismasted her, and compelled her to strike. The French vessels, and our batteries, have likewise received a good deal of damage; but they are already in a course of repair; and the most active dispositions are making in order to cause the enemy to repent, should he have any intention of renewing the action with troops so animated and well-conducted as ours and the French have proved themselves in the engagement of the 6th.

The French account of this action, as we have already noticed, was still more exaggerated than the Spanish; and, unfortunately for the friends and relatives of the Admiral, officers, and men of the squadron, it made its way to England some time previously to the true accounts,—causing much uneasiness. The Moniteur announced that