Kitabı oku: «A Collection of Essays and Fugitiv Writings», sayfa 4

No. III

 NEW YORK, 1788.

BILLS of RIGHTS

One of the principal objections to the new Federal Constitution, is, that it contains no Bill of Rights. This objection, I presume to assert, is founded on ideas of government that are totally false. Men seem determined to adhere to old prejudices, and reason wrong, because our ancestors reasoned right. A Bill of Rights against the encroachments of Kings and Barons, or against any power independent of the people, is perfectly intelligible; but a Bill of Rights against the encroachments of an electiv Legislature, that is, against our own encroachments on ourselves, is a curiosity in government.

The English nation, from which we descended, have been gaining their liberties, inch by inch, by forcing concessions from the crown and the Barons, during the course of six centuries.¹⁷ Magna Charta, which is called the palladium of English liberty, was dated in 1215, and the people of England were not represented in Parliament till the year 1265. Magna Charta established the rights of the Barons and clergy against the encroachments of royal perogativ; but the commons or people were hardly noticed in that deed. There was but one clause in their favor, which stipulated, that "no villain or rustic should, by any fine, be bereaved of his carts, plows and instruments of husbandry." As for the rest, they were considered as a part of the property belonging to an estate, and were transferred, as other moveables, at the will of their owners. In the succeeding reign, they were permitted to send Representativs to Parliament; and from that time have been gradually assuming their proper degree of consequence in the British Legislature. In such a nation, every law or statute that defines the powers of the crown, and circumscribes them within determinate limits, must be considered as a barrier to guard popular liberty. Every acquisition of freedom must be established as a right, and solemnly recognized by the supreme power of the nation; lest it should be again resumed by the crown under pretence of ancient prerogativ: For this reason, the habeas corpus act passed in the reign of Charles 2d, the statute of the 2d of William and Mary, and many others which are declaratory of certain privileges, are justly considered as the pillars of English freedom.

These statutes are however not esteemed because they are unalterable; for the same power that enacted them, can at any moment repeal them; but they are esteemed, because they are barriers erected by the Representativs of the nation, against a power that exists independent of their own choice.

But the same reasons for such declaratory constitutions do not exist in America, where the supreme power is the people in their Representativs. The Bills of Rights, prefixed to several of the constitutions of the United States, if considered as assigning the reasons of our separation from a foreign government, or as solemn declarations of right against the encroachments of a foreign jurisdiction, are perfectly rational, and were doubtless necessary. But if they are considered as barriers against the encroachments of our own Legislatures, or as constitutions unalterable by posterity, I venture to pronounce them nugatory, and to the last degree, absurd.

In our governments, there is no power of legislation, independent of the people; no power that has an interest detached from that of the public; consequently there is no power existing against which it is necessary to guard. While our Legislatures therefore remain electiv, and the rulers have the same interest in the laws, as the subjects have, the rights of the people will be perfectly secure without any declaration in their favor.

But this is not the principal point. I undertake to prove that a standing Bill of Rights is absurd, because no constitutions, in a free government, can be unalterable. The present generation have indeed a right to declare what they deem a privilege; but they have no right to say what the next generation shall deem a privilege. A state is a supreme corporate body that never dies. Its powers, when it acts for itself, are at all times equally extensiv; and it has the same right to repeal a law this year, as it had to make it the last. If therefore our posterity are bound by our constitutions, and can neither amend nor annul them, they are to all intents and purposes our slaves.

But it will be enquired, have we then no right to say, that trial by jury, the liberty of the press, the habeas corpus writ, and other invaluable privileges, shall never be infringed nor destroyed? By no means. We have the same right to say that lands shall descend in a particular mode to the heirs of the deceased proprietor, and that such a mode shall never be altered by future generations, as we have to pass a law that the trial by jury shall never be abridged. The right of Jury trial, which we deem invaluable, may in future cease to be a privilege; or other modes of trial more satisfactory to the people, may be devised. Such an event is neither impossible nor improbable. Have we then a right to say that our posterity shall not be judges of their own circumstances? The very attempt to make perpetual constitutions, is the assumption of a right to control the opinions of future generations; and to legislate for those over whom we have as little authority as we have over a nation in Asia. Nay we have as little right to say that trial by jury shall be perpetual, as the English, in the reign of Edward the Confessor, had, to bind their posterity forever to decide causes by fiery Ordeal, or single combat. There are perhaps many laws and regulations, which from their consonance to the eternal rules of justice, will always be good and conformable to the sense of a nation. But most institutions in society, by reason of an unceasing change of circumstances, either become altogether improper, or require amendment; and every nation has at all times, the right of judging of its circumstances and determining on the propriety of changing its laws.

The English writers talk much of the omnipotence of Parliament; and yet they seem to entertain some scruples about their right to change particular parts of their constitution. I question much whether Parliament would not hesitate to change, on any occasion, an article of Magna Charta. Mr. Pitt, a few years ago, attempted to reform the mode of representation in Parliament. Immediately an uproar was raised against the measure, as unconstitutional. The representation of the kingdom, when first established, was doubtless equal and wise; but by the increase of some cities and boroughs, and the depopulation of others, it has become extremely unequal. In some boroughs there is scarcely an elector left to enjoy its privileges. If the nation feels no great inconvenience from this change of circumstances, under the old mode of representation, a reform is unnecessary. But if such a change has produced any national evils of magnitude enough to be felt, the present form of electing the Representativs of the nation, however constitutional, and venerable for its antiquity, may at any time be amended, if it should be the sense of Parliament. The expediency of the alteration must always be a matter of opinion; but all scruples as to the right of making it are totally groundless.

Magna Charta may be considered as a contract between two parties, the King and the Barons, and no contract can be altered but by the consent of both parties. But whenever any article of that deed or contract shall become inconvenient or oppressiv, the King, Lords and Commons may either amend or annul it at pleasure.

The same reasoning applies to each of the United States, and to the Federal Republic in general. But an important question will arise from the foregoing remarks, which must be the subject of another paper.

No. IV

 NEW YORK, 1788.

On GOVERNMENT

The important question I proposed to discuss in this number, is this: "Whether, in a free State, there ought to be any distinction between the powers of the people, or electors, and the powers of the Representativs in the Legislature." Or in other words, "whether the legislativ body is not, or ought not to be, a standing convention, invested with the whole power of their constituents."

In supporting the affirmativ of this question, I must face the opinions and prejudices of my countrymen; yet if we attend closely to the merits of the question, stripped of all its specious covering, we shall perhaps find more arguments in favor of the opinion, than we at first suspect.

In the first place, a Legislature must be the supreme power, whose decisions are laws binding upon the whole State. Unless the Legislature is the supreme power, and invested with all the authority of the State, its acts are not laws, obligatory upon the whole State.¹⁸ I am sensible that it is a favorite idea in this country, bandied about from one demagogue to another, that rulers are the servants of the people. So far as their business is laborious and embarrassing, it implies a degree of servitude; but in any other view, the opinion is totally false. The people ought at least to place their rulers, who are generally men of the first abilities and integrity, on a level with themselves; for that is an odd kind of government indeed, in which, servants govern their masters. The truth is, a Representativ, as an individual, is on a footing with other people; as a Representativ of a State, he is invested with a share of the sovereign authority, and is so far a governor of the people. In short, the collectiv body of the Representativs, is the collectiv sense and authority of the people; and so far are the members from being the servants of the people, that they are just as much masters, rulers, governors, whatever appellation we give them, as the people would be themselves in a convention of the whole State.

But in the second place, the public good or safety requires that the powers of a Legislature should be coextensiv with those of the people. That a Legislature should be competent to pass any law that the public safety and interest may require, is a position that no man will controvert. If therefore it can be proved that the reservation of any power in the hands of the people, may at times interfere with the power of the Legislature to consult the public interest, and prevent its exercise, it must be acknowleged, that such a reservation is not only impolitic, but unjust. That a Legislature should have unlimited power to do right, is unquestionable; but such a power they cannot have, unless they have all the power of the State; which implies an unlimited power to do wrong. For instance, suppose the constitution of any state to declare, that no standing army shall be kept up in time of peace; then the Legislature cannot raise and maintain a single soldier to guard our frontiers, without violating the constitution. To say that new enlistments every year will save the constitution, is idle; for if a body of troops raised for thirty years is a standing army, then a body raised for twenty years, or for six months, is a standing army; and the power to raise troops for a year, is a power to raise them at any time and maintain them forever; but with the addition of much trouble and a load of expense. Since therefore there never was, and probably never will be a time, till the millenium shall arrive, when troops will not be necessary to guard the frontiers of States, a clause in a constitution, restricting a Legislature from maintaining troops in time of peace, will unavoidably disable them from guarding the public interest. That a power to raise and equip troops at pleasure, may be abused, is certain; but that the public safety cannot be established without that power, is equally certain. The liberty of a people does not rest on any reservation of power in their hands paramount to their Legislature; it rests singly on this principle, a union of interests between the governors and governed. While a Legislator himself, his family and his property, are all liable to the consequences of the laws which he makes for the State, the rights of the people are as safe from the invasion of power, as they can be on this side heaven. This union of interest depends partly on the laws of property; but mostly on the freedom of election. The right of electing rulers is the people's prerogativ; and while this remains unabridged, it is a sufficient barrier to guard all their other rights. This prerogativ should be kept sacred; and if the people ever suffer any abridgment of this privilege, it must be their own folly and an irrecoverable loss.

Still further, I maintain that a people have no right to say, that any civil or political regulation shall be perpetual, because they have no right to make laws for those who are not in existence. This will be admitted; but still the people contend that they have a right to prescribe rules for their Legislature, rules which shall not be changed but by the people in a convention. But what is a convention? Why a body of men chosen by the people in the manner they choose the members of the Legislature, and commonly composed of the same men; but at any rate they are neither wiser nor better. The sense of the people is no better known in a convention, than in the Legislature.¹⁹

But admit the right of establishing certain rules or principles which an ordinary Legislature cannot change, and what is the consequence? It is this, a change of circumstances must supersede the propriety of such rules, or render alterations necessary to the safety or freedom of the State; yet there is no power existing, but in the people at large, to make the necessary alterations. A convention then must be called to transact a business, which an ordinary Legislature can transact just as well; a convention differing from the Legislature merely in name, and in a few formalities of their proceedings. But when people have enjoyed a tolerable share of happiness under a government, they will not readily step out of the common road of proceeding; and evils insensibly increase to an enormous degree, before the people can be persuaded to a change. The reservation therefore of certain powers may, by an imperceptible change of circumstances, prove highly pernicious to a State. For example: When the Commons of England were first admitted to a share in the legislation of that kingdom, which was probably in the reign of Henry III, in 1265,²⁰ the representation was tolerably equal. But the changes in the population of different parts of the kingdom have destroyed all equality. The mode of election therefore should be reformed. But how shall it be done? If there is a constitution in that kingdom, which settles the mode of election, and that constitution is an act of the people, paramount to the power of the Parliament, and unchangeable by them, a convention of the people must be called to make an alteration which would be as well made in Parliament. This would occasion infinite trouble and expense.

But the danger is, that as an evil of this kind increases, so will the lethargy of the people, and their habits of vice and negligence. Thus the disease acquires force, for want of an early remedy, and a dissolution ensues. But a Legislature, which is always watching the public safety, will more early discover the approaches of disorders, and more speedily apply a remedy. This is not precisely the case with the British constitution; for it was not committed at once to parchment and ratified by the people. It consists rather of practice, or common law, with some statutes of Parliament. But the English have been too jealous of changing their practice, even for the better. All the writers on the English constitution agree, that any Parliament can change or amend every part of it; yet in practice, the idea of an unalterable constitution has had too much influence in preventing a reform in their representation.

But we have an example nearer home directly in point. The charter of Connecticut declares that each town shall have liberty to send one or two deputies to the General Court; and the constant practice has been to send two. While the towns were few, the number of Representativs was not inconvenient; but since the complete settlement of the State, and the multiplication of the towns, the number has swelled the Legislature to an unwieldly and expensive size. The house of Representativs consists of about 170 members: An attempt has been made, at several sessions, to lessen the representation, by limiting each town to one Deputy. A question arises, have the Assembly a right to lessen the representation? In most States, it would be decided in the negativ. Yet in that State it is no question at all; for there is a standing law expressly delegating the whole power of all the freemen to the Legislature. But I bring this instance to prove the possibility of changes in any system of government, which will require material alterations in its fundamental principles; and the Legislature should always be competent to make the necessary amendments, or they have not an unlimited power to do right.²¹

The distinction between the Legislature and a Convention is, for the first time, introduced into Connecticut, by the recommendation of the late convention of States, in order to adopt the new constitution. The Legislature of the State, without adverting to laws or practice, immediately recommended a convention for that purpose. Yet a distinction between a Convention and a Legislature is, in that State, a palpable absurdity, even by their own laws; for there is no constitution in the State, except its laws, which are always repealable by an ordinary Legislature; and the laws and uniform practice, from the first organization of the government, declare that the Legislature has all the power of all the people. A convention therefore can have no more power, and differs no more from an ordinary Legislature, than one Legislature does from another. Or rather it is no more than a Legislature chosen for one particular purpose of supremacy; whereas an ordinary Legislature is competent to all purposes of supremacy. But had the Legislature of that State ratified or rejected the new constitution, without consulting their constituents, their act would have been valid and binding. This is the excellence of the constitution of Connecticut, that the Legislature is considered as the body of the people; and the people have not been taught to make a distinction which should never exist, and consider themselves as masters of their rulers, and their power as paramount to the laws. To this excellence in her frame of government, that State is indebted for uniformity and stability in public measures, during a period of one hundred and fifty years; a period of unparalleled tranquillity, never once disturbed by a violent obstruction of justice, or any popular commotion or rebellion. Wretched indeed would be the people of that State, should they adopt the vulgar maxim, that their rulers are their servants. We then may expect that the laws of those servants will be treated with the same contempt, as they are in some other States.²²

But from the manner in which government is constituted, it is evident that there is no power residing in the State at large, which does not reside in the legislature. I know it is said that government originates in compact; but I am very confident, that if this is true, the compact is different from any other kind of compact that is known among men. In all other compacts, agreements or covenants, the assent of every person concerned, or who is to be bound by the compact, is requisite to render it valid and obligatory upon such person. But I very much question whether this ever takes place in any constitution of government.

Perhaps so far there is an implied compact in government, that every man consents to be bound by the opinion of a majority; but this is all a supposition; for the consent of a hundredth part of a society is never obtained.

The truth is, government originates in necessity and utility; and whether there is an implied compact or not, the opinions of the few must be overruled, and submit to the opinions of the many. But the opinions of a majority cannot be known, but in an Assembly of the whole society; and no part of the society has a right to decide upon a measure which equally affects the whole, without a consultation with the whole, to hear their arguments and objections. It is said that all power resides in the people; but it must be remembered, that let the supreme power be where it will, it can be exercised only in an Assembly of the whole State, or in an Assembly of the Representativs of the whole State.

Suppose the power to reside in the people, yet they cannot, and they have no right to exercise it in their scattered districts, and the reason is very obvious; it is impossible that the propriety of a measure can be ascertained, without the best general information, and a full knowlege of the opinions of the men on whom it is to operate.

By opinions here I would not be understood to mean, the various opinions formed on a view of a particular interest, for these opinions may be obtained by sending to each district, and collecting instructions; but I mean the opinions of the whole society, formed on the information and debates of the whole society. These opinions can be formed no where but in a Convention of the whole State, or of their Representativs. So far therefore are the people from having a power paramount to that of their Representativs in Convention, that they can exercise no act of supremacy or legislation at all, but in a Convention of the whole State by Representativs.²³ Unless therefore, it can be proved that a Convention, so called, which is composed mostly of the same men as a Legislature, possesses some wisdom, power or qualifications, which a Legislature does not and cannot, then the distinction is useless and trifling. A Legislature is supposed to consist of men whom the people judge best qualified to superintend their interests; a convention cannot be composed of better men; and in fact we find it generally composed of the same men. If therefore no act of sovereignty can be exercised but in an Assembly of Representativs, of what consequence is it, whether we call it a Convention or a Legislature? or why is not the Assembly of Representativs of a people, at all times a Convention, as well as a Legislature?

To me it appears that a distinction is made without a difference; but a distinction that will often prevent good measures, perpetuate evils in government, and by creating a pretended power paramount to the Legislature, tend to bring laws into contempt.

POSTSCRIPT.– This reasoning applies solely to the individual States, and not to the United States, before they were formed into a federal body. An important distinction must be observed between the Constitution of a sovereign State, and of thirteen distinct sovereignties. In a sovereign State, whatever they may suggest to the contrary, the voices of a majority are binding upon the minority, even in framing the first plan of government. In general, a majority of the votes of the Representativs in Legislature or Convention have been admitted as obligatory upon every member of the State, in forming and establishing a Constitution: But when the Constitution has been submitted to the people, as it is called, in town meetings or other small assemblies, the assent of every individual could not be expressly obtained; and the dissent of any number, less than half the freemen present, who might not be one half the whole number in the State, could not prevent the establishment of the government, nor invalidate the obligation of every man to submit peaceably to its operation. The members of a state or community, cannot from necessity, be considered as parties to a contract, where the assent of every man is necessary to bind him to a performance of the engagement. But the several States, enter into a negociation like contracting parties; they agree that the assent of every individual State, shall be requisite to bind that State; and the frame of government, so agreed upon, is considered as a compact between independent sovereignties, which derives its binding force from the mutual and unanimous consent of the parties, and not merely from a necessity that the major part of the people should compel the rest to submission.

But in this very compact, the States have resigned their independent sovereignty, and become a single body or state, as to certain purposes; for they have solemnly contracted with each other, that three fourths of their number may alter and amend the first compact. They are therefore no longer separate individuals and contracting parties; but they form a single State or body politic; and a majority of three fourths can exert every act of sovereignty, except in two or three particulars, expressly reserved in the compact.