Kitabı oku: «Birds of Prey», sayfa 7
2. The Conquest of Wilderness
Combining diplomacy and hunting proved to be lucrative politics for Göring. From 1934 he led the negotiations with Poland over Danzig and later took control of German-Polish relations. There are accounts that Göring was repeatedly invited by the Polish ambassador to hunt in Białowieźa from 19341, but the only official and detailed account came from February 1937. The hunt was set to a time when the snakes were in hibernation. The Polish hunting officials agreed a lynx would be a suitable trophy. The gamekeepers cornered a Lynx, but it managed to escape the night before Germans arrived. Göring was well received but on the day of the hunt, his tally was small with three wolves and two wild boars. Scherping, however, not only bagged more game but also killed a young lynx. Before the Nazi delegation departed, Göring announced that he better appreciated the difficulties of hunting in a “Polish primaeval forest”.2 In November 1937, Germany hosted the International Hunting Exhibition in Berlin. The RFA promoted this as an international event comparable to the Olympic Games (1936). The Polish contingent included representatives from Białowieźa national park. Adolf Hitler’s appeared, on 6 November, and was hailed by the RFA as the high point of the exhibition.3 The exhibition was a triumph for Göring. During the exhibition, Göring told the Polish ambassador the Jews and Bolshevism were dragging the world into war.4 In 1938 Göring secured Poland’s agreement to German demands during the Sudeten crisis promising it was Germany’s ‘last territorial claim.’ Göring’s confidence was riding high after the Luftwaffe’s success in the Spanish Civil War. The Nazi author commissioned to write the operational history incorporated Göring’s ambition of the Greater German Reich as the purpose of his diplomacy and war-making.5
Image 6: Preparation for a diplomatic function at Rominten. Note the Nordic runes on the picture rail under the ceiling.
Source: Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1979-138-33 / CC-BY-SA 3.0
Diplomacy, hunting and rituals reached its apotheosis during the Polish crisis (1938–39). An important account of these events came from Sir Neville Henderson, British ambassador to Berlin. There were doubts over his selection as ambassador. He joined the diplomatic service in 1905. Henderson had a reputation for ‘jujitsu methods in diplomacy’, a tendency to ‘go native’, and was prone to hero-worship. Anthony Eden’s secretary thought he might be ‘another Ribbentrop to Berlin.’ Peter Neville found sources that noted Henderson could shoot adding to his suitability.6 Henderson’s memoirs recalled his visits with Göring at Carinhall in 1938 and being taken around the European Bison breeding pens. Göring subsequently invited him to hunt in Rominten Heide. His observations about the leading officers of ‘The Green’, in their political heartland, was insightful. Henderson noted the lodge was a ‘simple shooting-box with a thatched roof’. The serving staff included maids and a servant, working in a comfortable but relaxed atmosphere.7 Henderson was introduced to the leading RFA and Jagdamt officials and went hunting with them. The party included: “One of his [Göring’s] Swedish brothers-in-law, Count Rosen, was the only other guest, and the rest of the party consisted of Oberstjägermeister Scherping, Oberstjägermeister Menthe, and a young air officer A.D.C., von Brauschitz [sic Brauchitsch], a son [nephew] of the present German commander-in-chief.” Absent from the recollection, but known to be present, was Oberforstmeiser Walter Frevert. The ambience of the wilderness and the solemn rituals captivated Henderson and he described the Bruchzeichen and Totenwacht ceremonies. He heard ‘the hallali [sic] … sounded on the horns of the jägers [sic] …’8
Henderson explained the differences between “stag-shooting” in Europe to deer stalking in Britain. The stags cannot be found so easily in the dense European forests, so were tracked by their roar during the rutting season. A Hochstände (high stand) was usually placed where the stags grazed or rutted. According to Henderson, all the huntsmen had to do was climb the stand and shoot the stag. Henderson’s first hunt included Scherping and Menthe as companions. He lay on his stomach and crawled to a good shooting position and killed a stag. When Göring was told, he allegedly roared with laughter having previously bemoaned that British hunters were very capable with shotguns, but not so with rifles. He was amused by the image of Henderson on his belly and announced to his courtiers it was the perfect place for diplomats. The ‘jujitsu diplomat’ melted under Göring’s generosity and liked him. Henderson recalled how Göring confessed his youthful support for the Boer guerillas but admired the British pirates like Sir Francis Drake. He regretted the British had been ‘debrutalised’.9 In 1940 Henderson blamed Göring for his lack of moral integrity that led to the outbreak of war.
I. War
The Second World War in Eastern Europe began at 4.45 am on 1 September 1939 when the old German battleship Schleswig-Holstein opened fire on Polish fortifications in Danzig (Gdansk: Poland).10 The Bialystok-Białowieźa area came within the Soviet zone, under the protocols of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The German Army advanced into Białowieźa ten days before the Red Army. The 413th Infantry Regiment, 206th Infantry Division, arrived in Hajnówka on 12 September.11 Rumours claimed the Luftwaffe bombed the Tsarist styled Orthodox Church and a Soviet military hospital by accident. The ‘Berlin Bear’ symbol made an appearance as the 3rd Panzer Division’s vehicle insignias as it drove through towards Brest-Litovsk.12 Locals claimed Göring declared the forest a heiliger Hain (sacred grove) and under his protection. During the brief occupation the innkeeper of the Źubr tavern, Michał Zdankiewicz, was killed for venting criticism against the Germans. Before shooting Zdankiewicz, it’s rumoured the soldiers set their dogs on him.13 The Germans withdrew once the Red Army arrived on 21 September 1939.14. The Soviet occupation was marked by terror during a sustained period of violence, disorder, deportations and mass killings.15 Contemporary Polish allegations blamed the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Jews within the communities of welcoming the Red Army as liberators. Jan Gross has argued that the Soviets encouraged violence against Poles as ‘thousands were killed, often with primitive and premeditated brutality.’ Peasant vigilantes were raised to administer ‘justice’, which led to atrocities.16 The Polish state bureaucracy and archives were ransacked and taken by the Soviet secret police (NKVD) to Moscow.17 There were mass arrests (130,000) and deportations (370,000) of Poles by the summer of 1941.18 The Soviets introduced the oblast (division), a regional system of government. The Bialystok oblast included Bielsk and incorporated Białowieźa as a sub-district.19
A local account has described the Soviet occupation of Białowieźa. Since 1937, trained NKVD agents were being infiltrated into Poland, their mission was to destabilise the borderlands. Paid collaborators organised communist cells and initiated strikes. Once the Soviets took control of the bureaucracy they instituted a system that isolated all inhabitants’ since the end of the Polish-Soviet War in 1921. Stalin ordered widespread arrests. On 19 December 1939 the Soviet commissar of Belarus released lists of persons for deportation. From February 1940, there were arrests and deportations of forestry officials and forest dwellers. An NKVD captain from Bialystok led the action, assisted by a lieutenant from Bielsk, who arrived with a list of 1,463 persons. This list included local farmers, public officials, and national park staff (92 clerk’s families and 46 families from the palace, museum and gamekeepers). The NKVD organized about 113 snatch squads each of three men to round up all those listed for deportation. The deportation trains were stabled in Białowieźa, Hajnówka, Narewka, and Bielsk Podlaski. The snatch squads, with dogs, started rounding up victims in the early hours. They forced people to pack and prepare their children and belongings within two hours. They bundled the people onto horse-drawn sledges and took them to the freight trains; the action was completed in one day.20 Almost two years later the Germans returned.
II. The Battle for Białowieźa (22–30 June 1941)
In the early hours of 22 June 1941, Hitler unleashed Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Soviet Russia. Army Group Centre was designated the task of conquering the area that included Białowieźa. The army group formed on the west bank of the River Bug. The operational plans called for a pincer movement forcing destructive encirclements on the Red Army. Białowieźa came within the scope of the Fourth Army’s southern pincer. The troops in the first wave were tasked with capturing Bialystok and Minsk. They were to advance at all costs, ignoring their flanks, leaving pockets of strong Soviet resistance. The second and third waves were tasked with mopping up isolated pockets of Red Army forces to sustain the momentum of the advance. Fourth Army commander, Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge, assigned the task of breaking through the forest to IX Army Corps, commanded by General of Infantry Hermann Geyer.21 The IX Corps’ fighting formations were three infantry divisions (137th, 253rd, and 292nd).22 Facing them were the Red Army’s 13th Mechanised Corps, and elements of the Tenth Army under Major-General Golubev.
In the early hours on 22 June, IX Corps struck out and within a matter of days, the 13th Mechanised Corps had disintegrated with stragglers dispersing throughout the forest.23 IX Corps’ official war diary has few details about the first week’s fighting. In 1942 Hermann Geyer was sacked during Hitler’s purge of the generals. He subsequently wrote an account of the campaign, recalling the first ten days as the ‘most beautiful in the long and heavy battle which started on the 22 June.’ There were many opportunities for independent decisions and actions; the troops ‘were fresh, full of hope and successful.’ The Germans crossed the River Bug and quickly developed the breakthrough ‘with a pursuit full of verve.’ The opening barrage began at 3.15 am and Geyer recalled it was an ‘impressive sight!’ Pioneers from the 78th Infantry Division (XIII Corps) finished the first pontoon bridge shortly after 9.00 am. With no concerted counterattacks by the Soviets, the Germans pushed across the river unimpeded. Although more pontoon bridges were constructed bottlenecks soon developed as the distance lengthened between the advancing forces and those moving up behind. Upon reaching the east bank of the river German troops struggled with the terrain. The 263rd Infantry Division was slowed by deep sand clogging the movement of horses and men. Fortunately for the Germans, there was no Red Army presence and the advance completed twenty kilometres on the first day.
Th next day there were sporadic outbursts of Soviet resistance. In Brjansk, Geyer became embroiled in a firefight as Russian tanks attempted a desperate breakout. His account again mentioned the sandy ground and forest terrain as serious obstacles in moving forward. The 263rd and the 137th Infantry Divisions struck out towards Bielsk on 23–24 June. The 137th, tasked with reaching Bielsk, was ordered to turn eastwards, while the 292nd faced a difficult situation. Its line of advance was fifty-five kilometres and followed a zigzag pattern plotted to avoid Soviet strong points. Its progress was hampered by the breakdown of its signals’ communications. At the same time, resistance from scattered Red Army units kept interrupting the division’s progress as it pushed on towards Kleszele on the River Nurzec. There were some ferocious skirmishes and on 23 June Colonel Christiani, commander of its 508th Infantry Regiment, was killed in action. The 508th was so heavily engaged that only with the timely arrival of assault guns was the line held against concerted Russian pressure. On 24 June Geyer attended a progress conference and his army group commander, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock warned: ‘I expect my army group to act as it did in Poland and the West.’ Geyer understood Bock’s meaning and issued a general order of the day for his divisions to press on regardless, ignoring their flanks. He recalled that it was not his job to close up with German units approaching from the north but only to gain ground. The 292nd led the drive toward Hajnówka, then on to Białowieźa, and finally Porozow. It was a painful march, sixty kilometres over sandy soil, undulating terrain, and along narrow waterlogged roads.
By 25 June the 292nd had made deep inroads into the forest but its rear echelons were under constant enemy fire from all sides. Geyer recalled it was not very pleasant, it sapped the energy of the troops and wasted time. It was difficult to establish command and control or conduct supply. The following day, the 292nd was still fighting its way through the forest to reach the advance units of the Ninth Army and close the pincers around Bialystok. The signals problems continued to hinder the 292nd as it struggled through the forest. Three days later on 28 June Geyer decided to visit the division to clarify the situation because of the ongoing signals problems. Its losses were mounting, during the period 22–24 June 250 men had been killed while in the period 25–28 June 300 men were killed (there was no reference to Soviet casualties). By the sixth day of the campaign, the Corps had advanced 150 kilometres east of the River Bug. An Order of the Day (2 July 1941) referred to the advance through Białowieźa:
We had to deal with eight complete divisions (two tank divisions) and parts from ten other divisions. Up to the evening of 1 July, we captured 27,000 men. The bloody losses of the Russians were very high. … Huge stores of fuel, rations and equipment of all kind were captured in Bocki, Bielsk, Hajnówka, Wolkowysk and Cholstowo.24
The Fourth Army finally joined the encirclement of Bialystok, and IX Corps continued to advance to close up with other German forces.
In 1962 the old comrades’ association of the 137th Infantry Division compiled a unit history that included anecdotes from the Barbarossa campaign. Wilhelm Meyer-Detring, by then a corps commander in the post-war Bundeswehr, had been a staff officer with the division in 1941. He recalled Geyer was from the old school officer class, but constantly pressed his men to achieve their objectives. Their regiments were forced to skirt through the western edge of the forest. The troops were anxious in the face of a swamp, sand, Urwald, poor roads and Russian snipers. Meyer-Detring complained that the Germans, unlike the Soviets, had not been trained to fight in such forests. On 25 June the 449th Infantry Regiment met stiff resistance on the western edge of the forest. Both the advance guard and mounted reconnaissance troops were reluctant to engage the Russians in a nocturnal fight inside the forest admitting, ‘they were more cautious than cavalry should be’. They waited until dawn and pressed forward only to find the Russians had already withdrawn. They pressed on and reached the main Bialystok road the evening of 26 June but were in a difficult situation. The divisional signals kept in contact with the regiment through its 100watt receivers handling over a hundred coded messages to maintain contact and press the advance. A corporal of ammunition supplies recalled an incident when a horse and cart became stuck in swamp mud. The horse’s hind legs sunk into the deep thick mud just as the divisional commanding general arrived. A senior NCO was beating the horse so hard that deep red marks were cut into its hindquarters. The corporal pushed the NCO into the mud just in time for General Bergmann to witness the scene. Bergmann ordered the muddied NCO to stop beating the horse and told the corporal off for pushing the NCO. He then ordered the cart unloaded of its cases of hand grenades each weighing fifty kilos and the troops to carry the boxes two hundred meters to dry ground. The corporal recalled the general carrying a case of grenades, and that image remained with him long after the war.25
To the south of the forest and IX Corps, Colonel General Heinz Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 crossed the River Bug unmolested and began striking out through Red Army territory. However, upon reaching Pruzhany on the first day his 18th Panzer Division suddenly became locked in a tank battle. To the south, the Red Army also put up a bitterr resistance in Brest Litovsk’s fortress that denied Guderian the use of road and rail communications. He also experienced stiff Red Army resistance first hand on 25 June when he was forced to seek shelter as two Russian tanks broke cover and turned on a German supply road. Guderian received orders to assist in preventing the Soviets from breaking out of Bialystok and was assigned to the Fourth Army. He was not keen on the decision but pressed his senior commanders with the same energy as Geyer. The XXIV Corps commanded by General of Panzer Geyr von Schweppenburg was moving forward supporting Guderian’s attack on Bobruisk. Guderian recalled that Schweppenburg’s corps headquarters was set up in a castle once owned by the Radziwiłł family, one of the grand old families of Eastern Europe. The soldiers found a photograph of a hunting party with Wilhelm II.26 One of Schweppenburg’s formations was the 1st Cavalry Division, under General of Cavalry Kurt Feldt, advancing towards the Kobryn-Beresa-Kartuska road. By 28 June it was located in the Drohiczyn area. The cavalry was given the order to clear the area of the Pripet marshes of Red Army forces.27 Among the cavalry’s advance, in the Pripet marshes on the southern flank, was Artillery Captain (reserve) Walter Frevert leading his mounted batteries forward.
The lead formations of IX Corps had moved out of the forest by 27 June. David Glantz noted that Army Group Centre ‘had accomplished this classical pattern of destructive manoeuvre brilliantly during the battles of Belostok and Minsk, by doing so, liquidating the western front’s first echelon armies and savaging the Stavka’s first strategic echelons whose mission was to defend the border region.’28 The histories of Barbarossa, however, do not take proper account of the heavy fighting that continued in the rear areas after the frontlines had shifted eastwards. Deep inside the German rear area, there were still large numbers of Red Army forces putting up stiff resistance. The task of mopping up Białowieźa was given to General of Infantry Hans-Gustav Felber’s XIII Corps.29 The XIII Corps had three infantry divisions: 17th, 78th and 87th.30 The job of clearing the forest was assigned to General of Artillery Curt Gallenkamp commander of the 78th Infantry Division,31 which ‘distinguished itself in the battles of Białowieźa …’32 The stiff Red Army resistance forced the Corps to push more troops vicious fighting left a deep scar on German memories.33
The Corps published an account of its Barbarossa experience in 1942, including deeds of valour in Białowieźa. The operations covered the period 29–30 June 1941 and the account opened with a description of the situation:
[T]he forest of Bialowies is wonderful. Huge beech trees, ancient oaks, a lot of thickets, making the forest a paradise for hunters. A few poor settlements exist along its border areas. A single road leads through it. This road is surrounded by the green twilight of the primaeval forest, with huge trees, which are hundreds of years old. Reichsmarschall Göring went hunting together with Marshall Pilsudski here. There is still large numbers of noble game and the last remaining bison. They live in the swamp area, in the alder tree thicket, which appears to be impenetrable.34
The hunting clichés turned into typical heroic pathos: ‘Now another hunt started in the Bialowies Urwald.’ Strong Red Army forces concentrated deep inside the forest and settled into a stubborn pattern of resistance. German intelligence identified the Red Army’s 4th Tank Division, fully intact, as the main opposition.35 The fighting turned into a confusion of conventional warfare of open-ended encirclements, and ‘shoot n’ skoot’ tactics. The Russians dispersed during the day and concentrated at night. Snipers picked off German messengers or signallers attempting to lay telephone cables. The Russians replaced their supply through scavenging or turning around discarded weapons including artillery pieces, machine guns, flak artillery, and tanks to sustain the fight. They formed a formidable array of ad hoc fighting units. The Germans vilified the Red Army soldiers as ‘communistic fanatics, who bullied their men to fight on regardless of their losses and their shortages and supply difficulties.’ The corps was ordered to ‘smoke out this nest’ from an area roughly estimated at eighty-five kilometres long and thirty-five kilometres wide.
The Germans could not identify the precise positions of the Russians but suspected they were somewhere to the north. Gallenkamp ordered his troops to march through the forest towards Rudnia, and occupy security positions of the forest’s northern border. He planned an encircling drive to push the Russians out and press them against German fixed positions. The divisional plan included placing a tactical command post in the town of Popielewo. Two infantry regiments the 195th (on the left facing north) and 215th (on the right flank facing north) were assigned to secure the town. The second and third battalions of the 215th Infantry Regiment were to lead the main attack forming a left hook coming around and behind the Russians. The 195th was to drive northwards expecting to close the encirclement of the Russians in an area north of Popielewo.36
From the beginning the Germans found themselves at a disadvantage Vorkommando (advanced guard) of the divisional staff came under artillery fire while advancing into Popielewo. The Russians opened fire on the Germans from houses. Then a German reconnaissance report identified strong enemy forces concentrated to the east and south of Popielewo.37 The Germans assumed this to be difficult if not impassable terrain within extensive marshland. Supported by artillery, machine guns, and tanks, however, the Russians mounted a surprise attack launched from the marshland terrain. They battled their way into Popielewo and came face-to-face with advanced units of the 215th Infantry Regiment. Irrespective of local Russian superiority the Germans held their ground in a tenacious defence with artillery, infantry and anti-tank troops deployed to enfilade the Russian attacks.
The situation became precarious as the Germans accused the ‘Bolsheviks’ of underhand methods: ‘the vicious and sneaky tactic, of cunningly occupying a field. Many Red Army riflemen set themselves up in the treetops and trained their rifles with telescopes.’ Some Russian snipers were accused of wearing civilian clothing and shooting concentrated rifle fire into the masses of German lines. The German plan was aimed at forcing a meeting engagement to identify the Russian positions. The strength of the Russian attack turned the fighting into a ‘struggle for survival’ against ‘a near invisible enemy that clung to their piece of soil.’38 The Germans were at a disadvantage because the forest thicket made it impossible to bring down artillery or Luftwaffe close support. The desperate fighting turned into a hand-to-hand struggle or Nahkampf (close combat) with bayonets. Another German infantry battalion was ordered into the fight to sweep the Russians from the forests north of Popielewo. While another battalion, trying to turn the Russian flank, was entangled in fighting before it could jump off.
The battalion command assumed ‘both companies were advancing quite well’, but the Russians watched and waited. The sixth infantry company, from that battalion, crawled alongside the edge of a wood through tracks in the thickets and beside a stream. The fifth, from the same battalion, seemed to move through the wood on the right flank. At the moment the Germans assumed the Russians had fled, ‘suddenly it was hell on earth’:
A hail of murderous fire was unleashed. The snipers, hidden in the treetops, again opened fire into the rear of both companies. At the same time, both companies came under fire from machine guns, artillery and flak guns shooting straight at them from well-camouflaged positions.39
All contact between the battalion and the companies abruptly ceased. Isolated groups of German soldiers clung to the ground under a withering hail of bullets and shells. The officer commanding the sixth company took the critical decision—he ordered his men to charge. The was a quick dash, some vicious close combat, but they captured a Russian artillery position. At 4.00 pm the remaining companies were released in an all-out assault. The counterattack broke the Russians and they scattered, disappearing into the woods. The Germans searched the area systematically: ‘Eventually some Bolshevists came out of the thicket with their hands up. The rest retreated and many more had been killed in combat.’ The fifth company was rescued and contact with the sixth company restored. The account ummarized the mopping-up process:
We walked by comrades killed in action. The Bolshevists had killed even those of our men only slightly wounded. They were inhuman and a beastly enemy that thought they could stay in the forest of Bialowies. The prisoners of war were mainly Mongols who hardly speak any Russian. They are simply instruments in the hands of their commander. The German soldier shows no mercy towards these people. This was proven by the battle for Popielewo, a small and shabby village in the large forest of Bialowies. The battle for Popielewo will remain an honourable memory in the history of this division.40
