Kitabı oku: «Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt», sayfa 22

"To the House of Commons, where I saw Lawson. He asked me what could be done. I said, 'Nothing.' Dilke made a statement confirming the Ultimatum… Lord De la Warr called at six to ask whether I would not telegraph to advise an arrangement. But I told him I could not do this any longer, for the Egyptians could not give up their forts honourably. Home to Crabbet.

"July 11.– At Crabbet. I settled this morning in my mind that if the weather was fine things would go well in Egypt – and behold it is raining!.. I shall stay here now till all is over, except on Thursday, when I have been asked to Marlborough House, to have the honour of meeting Her Majesty… We shall know all in a few hours… It rained heavily till 2, then cleared. I remained indoors in a nervous state, unable to do anything… At half-past four David brought a 'Globe,' with news showing that the bombardment began at 7 and was still going on at half-past 11. At 5, Anne came from London with the 'Pall Mall' and 'St. James's,' showing it was not all over at 1.40. It is evident that the Egyptians fought like men, so I fear nothing. They may be driven out of the forts and out of Alexandria. But Egypt will not be conquered. The French fleet has gone to Port Saïd, and it is impossible there should not be an European war. I have sent my Gladstone correspondence to the Prince of Wales.

"July 12.– The forts are silenced, but the Egyptians show no sign of yielding, and the newspapers announce another bombardment for to-day. This is a monstrous thing. The Sultan, I am glad to see, stands firm; and a religious war is inevitable, succeeding, as Arabi said it would the political one. The prophecy about Gladstone will thus come true. His conscience must be a curious study just now, the conscience of a Eugene Aram, and I believe him capable of any treachery and any crime. I can do no more, and shall stay here. Went fishing in the forest, a bright warm day, with a slight threatening of thunder about noon. The evening papers talk of a flag of truce and a heavy swell which has prevented the ships from firing.

"July 13.– Saw Button, who tells me an occupation is inevitable. Old Edward Blount was in the train. He tells me the French are in no condition to fight. Their navy is so ill-found he doubts their having the ammunition. He thinks there will be a revolution in a few months… Found Sir Wilfrid Lawson at home in Grosvenor Crescent and had much discourse with him, but he agrees it is hopeless doing anything with the Government… Had luncheon with the Howards. She is staunch, he doubtful… Coming back by underground railway I read the news of Alexandria being in flames, of the evacuation of the town, and of a new massacre by roughs. This is nothing but what must have been. I am glad of one thing only, and that is the army has got safe out of that mousetrap. I have had it on my mind ever since Arabi went to Alexandria that he would be caught there in some way by his enemies. Now he seems to have done just what I recommended, retired to a fortified position out of reach of the guns of the fleet. People, or rather the newspapers, are very angry because he retired under flag of truce, but I am not military man enough to see where the treachery was, especially as Admiral Seymour had announced that he would understand a white flag to mean the evacuation of the forts." (This charge of having violated the white flag was made a special count against Arabi at his trial, and absurdly insisted upon by Gladstone, because he, Gladstone, had committed himself to a statement that to retire while under the white flag was a violation of the laws of war. This was persisted in after other graver charges were abandoned, until it was discovered that in Lord Wolseley's "Soldier's Pocket Book," a text book in our army, it is distinctly laid down that the contrary is the rule.)

"I was in two minds about going to Marlborough House, but decided it would be best to show loyalty. So went. Everybody cordial enough except old Houghton, who all but cut me. The Malets were there – poor old people – but I did not venture speaking to them. Robert Bourke came to me in great glee at the mess the Government found themselves in. Such are the amenities of party political life. Everybody else nearly was there that I had ever seen. The Prince of Wales shook hands with me, but he said nothing. Her Majesty was looking beaming – I suppose elated at her bombardment. Gladstone is said to have announced in the House that he would not send an army to Egypt. He declares he is not at war with anybody. However Button, with whom I dined, assures me troops are going and that they mean annexation. Dined with him and Lord Bective.

"July 14.– Breakfasted with De la Warr. I showed him Arabi's letter to Gladstone, and he advised me not to send it, but offered to propose to the Prince of Wales to speak to me about it. I think this will be a good plan. I dare not let the Government have such a document in their hands until it is settled what form intervention is to take."

The letter here referred to is one that Arabi dictated to Sabunji at Alexandria and sent to me, desiring me to communicate it to Gladstone as from him. It was not signed or sealed by him, and was sent by Sabunji in English, not in Arabic; for which reason Arabi afterwards, when charged with having written it, among other charges made against him at the time of his arrest, denied having written at all to Mr. Gladstone. I was consequently taunted by my enemies with having forged the letter, though I had stated that it was "dictated" in my enclosing letter of two days later. The letter as sent to Mr. Gladstone was as follows:

"Alexandria, July 2, 1882.

"Sir,

"Our Prophet in his Koran has commanded us not to seek war nor to begin it. He has commanded us also, if war be waged against us, to resist and, under penalty of being ourselves as unbelievers, to follow those who have assailed us with every weapon and without pity. Hence, England may rest assured that the first gun she fires on Egypt will absolve the Egyptians from all treaties, contracts, and conventions; that the Control and debt will cease; that the property of Europeans will be confiscated; that the Canals will be destroyed; the communications cut; and that use will be made of the religious zeal of Mohammedans to preach a holy war in Syria, in Arabia, and in India. Egypt is held by Mohammedans as the key of Mecca and Medina, and all are bound by their religious law to defend these holy places and the ways leading to them. Sermons on this subject have already been preached in the Mosque of Damascus, and an agreement has been come to with the religious leaders of every land throughout the Mohammedan world. I repeat it again and again, that the first blow struck at Egypt by England or her allies will cause blood to flow through the breadth of Asia and of Africa, the responsibility of which will be on the head of England.

"The English Government has allowed itself to be deceived by its agents, who have cost the country its prestige in Egypt. England will be still worse advised if she attempts to regain what she has lost by the brute force of guns and bayonets.

"On the other hand there are more humane and friendly means to this end. Egypt is ready still – nay, desirous to come to terms with England, to be fast friends with her, to protect her interests and keep her road to India, to be her ally; but she must keep within the limits of her jurisdiction. If, however, she prefers to remain deceived and to boast and threaten us with fleets and her Indian troops, it is hers to make the choice. Only let her not underrate the patriotism of the Egyptian people. Her representatives have not informed her of the change which has been wrought among us since the days of Ismaïl's tyranny. Nations, in our age, make sudden and gigantic strides in the path of progress.

"England, in fine, may rest assured that we are determined to fight, to die martyrs for our country, as has been enjoined on us by our Prophet, or else to conquer and so live independently and happy. Happiness in either case is promised to us, and a people imbued with this belief, their courage knows no bounds.

"Ahmed Arabi."

"Went to see Gregory. He is frightened at Alexandria's being burnt, and will have it that Arabi did not order it. I say he ordered it, and was right to do so. This is the policy of the Russians at Moscow, and squares with all I know of their intentions. I cannot think it will do any harm in the long run, and it will get more completely rid of the Greeks and Italians. Of course, he was not responsible for the massacre, which is doubtless exaggerated. To fire the town, cut off the water supply and take up a strategical position on the railway is what any determined general would have done." (And so I say still. The burning of Alexandria gave Arabi just the time to entrench himself at Kafr Dawar. If he had carried out the other part of his program and blown up and blocked the Suez Canal, he might have made a good and long fight of it, and even possibly have won the campaign. I will return to this, however, when I come to treat of the war.)

"July 15.– Button writes that the Prince of Wales wants a copy of Arabi's letter, and I have sent word to say I shall be happy to read it to His Royal Highness. I will not let it out of my hand as yet… Sir Donald Currie came to see the horses. He is sensible about Egypt, as many people are individually. But the newspapers are raising a universal howl. I am depressed in mind, thinking of the future. Egypt can hardly not be ruined, and it is little consolation to think that the Europeans there and the bondholders will be ruined too. Still, there is a God in heaven for those who trust Him.

"July 16.– It seems as if the Turks had at last consented to send troops. Button gave me the conditions yesterday. They are to come and go and catch Arabi, all in a month. The thing is absurd. If they go, they will go to stay. They will also make terms with Arabi, and all England will have gained will be that the Sultan will declare war. All things considered, this is the best solution I could have expected. Otherwise it must have been annexation… Wrote letter enclosing Arabi's letter for Gladstone.

"July 17.– Went to London and saw Button. I have agreed to send the letter to Gladstone and to the Prince of Wales, and have accordingly done so… I wish Gladstone to be warned of all the consequences of his action in Egypt, as on Saturday he stated that the destruction of Alexandria was a result which it was impossible to foresee, of bombarding it! Now, if Cairo is destroyed, he will be without excuse. Bright has resigned. At least he is an honest man. He made his statement to-night saying he considers the bombardment a breach of international law and the moral law."²⁰ (I have some reason to believe that Gladstone had shared Bright's delusion that the Alexandrian forts could be bombarded without serious consequences of bloodshed, conflagration, and war. The difference between the two men was this: that Bright, when he saw he had betrayed his principles by consenting to it 'went out and wept bitterly'; Gladstone stifled his remorse and profited as largely as he could by the popularity which war always brings to the Ministry that makes it.) "… Home late and in low spirits. I have done what I could to avert this war, and war is now the only solution."

Here, unfortunately, my diary of 1882 ends.²¹

CHAPTER XVI
THE CAMPAIGN OF TEL-EL-KEBIR

It now remains for me to give an account of the chief incidents of the brief campaign in which for two months native Egypt stood up in arms against her English enemy. No true description of it will be found in the works of any English writer, and still less are the French versions of the story true. The reign of terror, which under the protection of the English garrison for a year or more followed the re-establishment of the Khedive and the Turco-Circassian régime at Cairo, effectually stopped the mouths of native Egyptians as to what had happened there during the Khedive's absence, and though a momentary light was shed on the facts by the publicity of Arabi's trial, no organ of the vernacular press was found bold enough to allude to them otherwise than according to the official version; while later, when under French protection the organs of native opinion had gained courage, time had been given for certain legends to grow up which still to a large extent influence the educated Egyptian mind.

The first point to make clear, for it is denaturalized in the Blue Books and has been ignored by all English writers, is the essentially National character of the defence offered by native Egypt to the English invasion. The official version, of course, is that it was the army alone that offered resistance to Seymour's impossible demands at the time of the bombardment, and afterwards to Wolseley's land invasion. This was merely a continuance of the diplomatic fiction which had been built up at the Foreign Office to excuse its determination to intervene in financial interests, and may be read in its most grotesque form of untruth in Lord Dufferin's opening speech to the European Conference at Constantinople. According to the English Ambassador, Egypt – and this was before the bombardment – was in a state of anarchy, where neither life nor property was secure and where massacres were taking place, through the action of the army headed by Arabi and other mutinous colonels, which was making it impossible to carry on the government or secure order and financial stability. How gross an exaggeration this statement of the political case was, and how it had been gradually put together on a basis of lies and inventions, I have already sufficiently shown. What needs still to be explained is the precise share of responsibility for the acceptance of Seymour's challenge to the artillery duel at Alexandria, which commenced the war, assignable to Arabi, on whom the whole of it has been unjustly laid.²²

That Arabi had been, from the date of the publication of the Joint Note of 6th January, a chief advocate of self-reliance and preparedness for war is undoubted, but at the same time he had always been for conciliation, if possible, rather than war. Resistance had always been his political platform, but on it he by no means stood alone, and the arrival of the fleets at Alexandria in May had immensely strengthened his position with all sections of civilian opinion. With the example of Tunis before Mohammedan eyes it was indeed impossible not to see what was being prepared for Egypt by the European Powers, the creation of a fictitious condition of anarchy and rebellion which should justify intervention for the protection of the life and property of Europeans, the seizure by persuasion or constraint of the person of the ruler on the plea that he needed protection from his rebellious subjects, and the forced acceptance by him of a military protectorate. This had been effected by the French army in Tunis. It was to be repeated now exactly on the same lines by the English in Egypt. Egyptian patriotism, therefore, was not difficult to persuade that at last, with the dire alternative before them, it was a less ignoble fate to yield after a defeat than at once, at the first summons.

Arabi's voice was an important element in the decision arrived at on the 10th of July to reject the admiral's demands, but it had no need of his insistence and still less of being imposed by menace. All the members of the general Council convened to consider the answer declared themselves equally of opinion that it was beyond the legal power of the Khedive to yield any portion of Egyptian territory to the demand of a foreign commander without striking a blow or at least without direct orders to that effect having been received from the Sultan. Nor was the Khedive himself of any other opinion. It included many representative men besides the members of the Government – and the spectacle was witnessed of all alike pressing the view that the forts must be defended, and of the Khedive taking a specially prominent part in the patriotic talk and being supported in it by Sultan's representative, Dervish Pasha. No Moslem present, not even Sultan Pasha, who had definitely thrown in his lot with the English, dared make the public declaration that another answer than refusal was possible to Seymour's demands.

Arabi, as the result of their unanimous decision, received from the Khedive precise orders as Minister of War and Marine to prepare the forts for action and to reply with their artillery as soon as the English fleet should have opened fire, while urgent instructions the same evening, of the 10th, were sent to the Under-Secretary of War at Cairo to proclaim throughout the provinces that war had been resolved on, and to hasten the calling in of the reserves and the formation of new battalions of recruits. It may be said that the Khedive was insincere in the warlike attitude he adopted at the Council. Of course he was insincere. No public action of his life showed Tewfik otherwise than a double dealer. In all probability both he and Sultan Pasha, who had spoken in the same sense, had agreed to make this show of patriotism so as to cover themselves with public opinion in case it should so happen that the forts should prove stronger than the fleets, nor must it be forgotten that the Sultan's envoys were present at the Council, and the avowed policy of the English Government at the moment was still to get the Sultan to intervene. Tewfik, therefore, as usual was playing for the double chance, and was resolved clearly on one thing only, to side with the strongest party.

There is a curious despatch in the Blue Books which shows what he said to his English advisers. As early as the 6th of July he was made acquainted with Seymour's intention to bombard, and had apparently been urged to place himself for safety on board one of the English ships. But this did not suit his personal fears or the waiting game he was resolved on, and he sent to Colvin to acquaint him with what his plan was in regard to his safety during the firing. He could not do otherwise – so we read – than remain in Egypt. He could not desert those who had stood by him faithfully in the crisis, or abandon Egypt when attacked by a foreign Power, merely, as it would be said, to secure his personal safety. He would, therefore, retire to a palace on the Mahmoudieh Canal with Dervish Pasha. And he remarked that the more rapidly the whole affair was conducted, the less would be the danger to himself personally. And this was the program he adhered to, except that he finally decided on retiring, not to the Mahmoudieh Palace, but to his country palace at Ramleh, eight miles farther from Alexandria, as a still safer place from the chance firing of Seymour's guns.

Shortly after the war I had a curious confirmation of Tewfik's indecision from no less authoritative a source than Lord Charles Beresford, who had commanded the Condor at the bombardment and had acted as Provost-Marshal in Alexandria after it, and who told me that in a moment of unusual frankness the Khedive had one day explained to him the reason of his remaining ashore during the fight, as being nothing else than his extreme perplexity as to which of the combatants would prove the better fighter. The general belief in Egypt had been that the English ships would be sunk, and he had been in a state of panic doubt all day at Ramleh, running every half hour to the roof of the palace to see how it fared with them. It was only when he discovered in the evening that they remained intact, while the forts had been silenced, that he finally made up his mind to place himself under Seymour's protection. Beresford's experience of the weeks he had then spent at Alexandria, I may explain, had given him a profound contempt of Tewfik, and a certain sympathy with Arabi and the fellahin who had carried on the war in spite of their prince's defection.

Be this, however, as it may, the conduct of the Khedive at the Council and the fact that he had given his name to the orders issued for a war à outrance imposed a perfectly legal aspect on the subsequent National defence, and invalidated, according to all Mohammedan rule and practice, the Khedive's counter orders when he had passed over to the enemy's side. This must be remembered if we are rightly to understand the Nationalists' legal case, and the view taken of the position by plain patriotic minds when their prince's perfidy gradually became known. The Mohammedan view about war is a simple one. When blows have been struck and war publicly announced by the Chief of the State, it is his duty and the duty of all his people to continue it until some definite victory has been achieved or reverse sustained. A prince made captive during the war by the enemy is by the fact incapacitated from giving any further valid orders, and à fortiori a prince who has turned traitor; and it was in this light that Tewfik was considered by his subjects until brought back by the force of English arms as their restored, but unloved lord to Cairo. Nothing of this aspect of the case will, of course, be found in any English narrative, but, in place of it, absurd laudations of a prince to be admired as "loyal" for the sole illogical reason that he showed himself loyal to England and served her through the war as her unashamed accomplice. But I will return to these matters later.

A second point which it is necessary should be insisted on is the proper apportionment of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order throughout Egypt, and for the strategical conduct of the war, between Arabi and the other Nationalist leaders who worked with him during those eventful two months. The facts as I have been able to ascertain them are these. With regard to the government of the country, as soon as it was clearly demonstrated at Cairo that the Khedive could be no longer looked upon as Chief of the State, exercising freely his right of issuing orders, a General Council was assembled to consider the position of affairs and decide what should be done. In this the lead was taken by the religious and other civilian dignitaries, rather than by the military element. Arabi was not himself present at the general meeting, being absent with the army at Kafr Dawar, nor did he once during the war pay any visit to Cairo or intervene personally in the management of affairs there. The Council, however, was very fully attended, there being present, besides the great religious sheykhs, the Turkish Grand Cadi, the Grand Mufti, the Sheykh el Islam, and the heads of the four orthodox sects. All the most representative Moslems of the country were there, including four princes of the Viceregal House who had openly espoused the National cause, many of the provincial Governors who had been expressly summoned to Cairo for the occasion, and the chief country Notables, and also, representing the non-Mussulman population, the Patriarch of the Copts and the Chief Rabbi. The Council was, therefore, fully entitled to any claim of validity in its decisions which universality can give, for it comprised all sections of political opinion and class divergency. Many of the chief men were of Circassian origin, but endowed with sufficient patriotism as Moslems to see that, now it had come to fighting against a European invader, no honest choice was left but to defend Egypt against him irrespective of party feuds.

It was, accordingly, resolved by the Council, without a dissentient voice, that the Khedive was no longer in a position legally to command, and that his decrees, while he remained in English hands, were from that very fact invalid. Tewfik's first announcement of his new attitude had been to dismiss Arabi from his post of Minister of War. The Council resolved that Arabi should be maintained in it, and instructed him as such to continue the defence of the country. A permanent Council, or rather it should perhaps be called "Committee of Defence," was named to assist him in his work, and this under the able presidency of Yakub Pasha Sami, the Under-Secretary for War, continued throughout the campaign to organize the details of recruitment, provisioning and the supply of military material. Similarly, with regard to the civil administration of the country it was resolved that in the absence of Ragheb and the other Ministers at Alexandria – for these had been detained more or less under compulsion by the Khedive and his English guard – the business of government should be carried on by the separate departments without any change in the ordinary routine, nor did this lead to the smallest confusion, seeing that the Ragheb Ministry had never been a working one. Indeed, the Administration gained considerable in efficiency, and it may safely be said that no Egyptian Government was ever better managed in its details than was the National one during the campaign. The Ministry of the Interior fell to the charge of the Under-Secretary, Ibrahim Bey Fawsi, and the police, in its most important section, to Ismaïl Eff. Jawdat, both very able administrators, who, in spite of the excitement of the time, succeeded in maintaining perfect order throughout the country. Two or three Circassian Mudirs, who had sought to ingratiate themselves with Tewfik by imitating Omar Lutfi and inciting to disturbance, were by them arrested and detained in prison to the end of the war, and after this no further rioting occurred. Such Europeans as remained at Cairo were carefully protected, and all who wished to leave were forwarded under police escort to Port Saïd.

Nothing could have been more untrue than Lord Dufferin's repeated assertions at the Conference at Constantinople that massacres of Christians were occurring daily in Egypt. And so, too, with the other departments. There was no interruption in the regular gathering in of the taxes, or in the regular distribution of civil expenditure. At the end of the war the Treasury showed a perfectly clean balance, without the smallest deficit, when its coffers were delivered over to the Khedive's officers after Tel-el-Kebir. No smallest sum had been extracted and the books were in their usual order. The ordinary course of justice had been regularly maintained, and there was no visible sign of the country having passed through any unusual crisis. Four months' provision for the army remained in the magazines of the War Office when Wolseley took possession of them.

As to Arabi, his position continued to be essentially a political one, and it was as Minister of War that he worked with the supreme direction of the forces and as popular leader till Wolseley's advance on Tel-el-Kebir hurried him suddenly from the scene. His great prestige with the country sheykhs and the fellahin of the Delta made it easy for him to inspire these with enthusiasm for the war, and at his pleading supplies flowed in gratuitously from all sides, and also volunteers for the army. In this respect he proved himself of great service to the national defence, and he was probably well advised in making no attempt from first to last to take any personal part in handling troops in the field. His abstention on this head has been attributed by his detractors to physical cowardice, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there was some truth in this. Arabi was too pure and unadulterated a fellah to have any of the strong fighting instincts which are found in some races but are conspicuously absent in his own. His courage was of another kind than that which prompts to daring action in war, and in spite of his soldier's training he had never been present at any actual battle. He was probably conscious of his deficiency on this head as he certainly was of his complete lack of all the higher scientific knowledge which modern warfare requires. He was absolutely without military education of a modern type, or experience beyond that of the common barrack-yard routine, and he would, I imagine, have been quite unable to manœuvre a division had he been called upon to do so even on parade. The true explanation, however, of his personal inaction, I think, is that Arabi, being for the moment practically Head of the State, was not expected to lead the army in person. This does not, however, excuse him altogether in my eyes, nor has it excused him in those of his fellow countrymen who rightly blame him for not having personally crossed swords with the enemy, at least in the last days of the campaign.

With regard to the actual military operations I do not profess to have full knowledge, but nevertheless will venture a short account of them as I have been able to obtain them from Egyptian, and not English, sources. My admirable correspondent, Sabunji, had unfortunately left Egypt with the other fugitives just before the bombardment, and I remained without knowledge of what was passing in the country till the end of the war. Nor do the documents of the trial throw much light on this. What I have been able to learn has been gathered piecemeal in after years from those who took part in them, and accounts of this kind are never very accurate as to dates or figures. The only European present with the army was that excellent Swiss patriot and friend to Egyptian freedom, John Ninet, who was in a position to know much of what went on, as he spent the first month of the war with Arabi at Kafr Dawar, helping him with his foreign correspondence; and with Ninet I have had many talks. But his enthusiastic character injures him as a quiet safe historical witness, and the book he published in 1884 is so carelessly written and so controversial in its style that it is impossible for one to have full confidence in regard to the details he records. Moreover, Ninet had ceased to be at headquarters before the real campaign began, having remained on at Kafr Dawar when these were transferred to Tel-el-Kebir. Such knowledge as I have of the war I will nevertheless briefly give.