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CHAPTER XVIII
DUFFERIN'S MISSION

Lord Dufferin's arrival at Cairo on the 6th November placed matters there on an entirely new footing. Up to that point Riaz Pasha and the rest of the Khedive's Ministers had been doing pretty much as they liked, subject only to Malet's weak supervision. But Dufferin was a man of another mould, and soon showed the Khedive that his position while in Egypt was to be that of master, not adviser. He paid little attention to his tales, and not much, I believe, to Malet's, but opened the doors of his Embassy to every one who could give information. Mackenzie Wallace, his chief assistant, in a very few days acquired a good general knowledge of what had been going on in Egypt during the last two years, and his book about it gives more of the truth than any other yet published in English. Dufferin, though an idle man, was a rapid worker, and where he had something serious to do, knew how easiest to do it.

Nevertheless, for the first fortnight after Dufferin's arrival, and until he had quite assured himself of his ground, the prosecution of Arabi was allowed to work on in its own casual way, swayed by the Khedive's ever shifting impulses of a desire to conceal the truth on the one hand, and an unwillingness on the other to let go his prey. These will be best recorded by simply reproducing the letters and telegrams which now passed almost daily between me in London and Messrs. Broadley and Napier at Cairo, as will the successive steps by which a compromise of the trial was eventually come to.

Broadley to Blunt, November 6th (in answer to his letter of November 2nd):

"I entirely concur in all you say, and shall exercise the greatest prudence. I am completing a perfect case for defence, showing:

"(1) Purity, honesty of Arabi's inspirations.

"(2) Perfect concurrence of Tewfik till July 12.

"(3) Perfect concurrence of the Sultan throughout.

"(4) Universality of the movement.

"(5) Wholly illegal constitution of the Court Martial.

"(6) Absurdity of the white flag (on which subject Napier has secured A 1 deposition from Lambton).

"(7) Abnormal humanitarian character of Arabi.

"(8) Abnormal iniquity of all proceedings until our arrival.

"(9) Torture of prisoners.

"(10) Letters from Tewfik to Constantinople against England.

"(11) Systematic falsification of the 'Moniteur.'

"Shall demand release of all the accused. Keep this private.

"Now all I fear is the enormous expense of a protracted trial of eight or nine months. Arabi alone calls 400 witnesses… I spend freely. I entertain the correspondents. I have wheedled the 'Egyptian Gazette' into being our special organ. I have turned public opinion here quite in favour of Arabi. We are obliged to employ a dozen interpreters at salaries varying from £1 to £2 10s. a week… My absence from Tunis means utter loss of all there. All my pending cases have been given up, including some of great magnitude. Bourke will tell you I have one retainer alone of £250 a year, and another of £100… I hope you will take all this into consideration… I only say I believe all will depend on liberal if not lavish expenditure. Remember we have every one against us, and people don't work without a reward here… An Arabi fund should be raised. The nine months' Tichborne trial is a specimen. But I don't think we should exceed one-tenth of that at the worst… All I say hinges on expenses. Don't think of me but only of incidental expenses… I work sixteen hours a day… Napier is invaluable."

Napier to Blunt, November 6th:

"You seem to be doubtful about the acte d'accusation. We have not had it officially communicated. It is not proposed by the prosecution to frame it until the close of the evidence. But in substance it is fairly stated in a telegram I think to the 'Times':

"(1) The abuse of the White Flag.

"(2) Complicity in massacres and pillage, June 11.

"(3) Complicity in destruction by fire of the city.

"(4) Carrying war into territory of the Sultan.

"(5) General acts of mutiny and rebellion against the Khedive and the Sultan."

Broadley to Blunt, November 7th (telegraphed):

"If you don't mind expense great success sure – see my yesterday's letter. I shall crush Tewfik and his crew past hope of redemption."

Napier to Blunt, November 10th:

"I have seen Dufferin to-day. He received me most kindly, though he declined to enter on business at once. He had only just received his instructions. Broadley and I are to meet him to-morrow.

"There seems to be a desire to burk inquiry into the rebellion question. The Government and all the papers are pledged to the ridiculous rebel cry, the one of all others that incenses me most. It is an old trick that has been played in Afghanistan, the Cape, and elsewhere. Any one can see that it may be smashed into a cocked hat at once… Proposals for a compromise must come from the other side, must be put in writing, and must contain all that you claim – indeed I think they ought to amount to unconditional surrender. Of this of course more fully afterwards. You may be assured that we will not consent to anything without communication with you, and fullest deliberation."

Napier to Blunt, November 15th:

"I suppose you can guess the innumerable difficulties with which we have to deal. In the first place since we were not permitted to be present at the examination of the witnesses, it is necessary for us not only to have the whole of the evidence copied, but also to submit the whole of it to each of the prisoners for his observation and consideration… There are 136 witnesses who will be brought against us. Besides these, 125 prisoners have been interrogated, and their answers will be used against each other. Then anybody who pleases seems to have been allowed to write letters to the Court, among others, H. H. the Khedive and, I believe, the Ministers, or some of them… Not one word of the evidence is on oath, and most of it consists of hearsay and opinion… 'In your opinion is Arabi a rebel?' 'I don't know.' 'You bad, wicked man, why don't you know?' 'I can't tell why I don't know.' 'Then think it over, and to-morrow bring a written statement of what you do know.' To-morrow the wretch arrives with a written statement that the prisoner in question is a rebel and incendiary.

"Then again the translations afforded us are not correct translations from the originals, and the originals are not true records of the evidence of the witnesses themselves…

"Thank Heaven they have imprisoned a man named Rifaat. [He had been Secretary to the Government and Director of the Press.] They could not have done anything so destructive to their own case. Not only does he know French well, but he has good literary ability, and a very fair knowledge of all these tortuous and involved intrigues rolled up one within another the untanglement of which is a business enough to make the head reel. How if it were to appear that the Abdin, Sept. 9, demonstration had been got up by the Khedive as the best means of ridding him of the disagreeable tutelage of Riaz and his Ministry! And how if the dark deeds of June 11 were plotted in the Palace to force the English and French to crush the now uncontrolled and uncontrollable National movement!

"I have been in hopes all along that the Government would not face the trial, and that they would find some means to put an end to the scandal that must ensue. But I begin to think that that will not be so. Many people in high places are prompted by motives of revenge, and still hope to wreak it upon their enemies. Others hope that by the unworthy devices of the Court a fair trial may yet be prevented. And I have no doubt they will in a great measure succeed. Again, perhaps it is the policy of the English Cabinet to insist upon the matter being threshed out, so as to give them time to meet the storm, and an opportunity of throwing over the Turks and perhaps Tewfik. If the trial is to go on I cannot tell what the expense will be, but I fear it will be very great."

Napier to Lady Anne Blunt, November 16th:

"Lord Dufferin began at once by lending us his assistance. Broadley and I called a day or two after his arrival. Broadley made a very masterly statement which put him in possession of the whole of our numerous causes of complaint. He has also been given copies of our formal protests, and I believe will indirectly assist us to defeat the Court of imbeciles with whom we have to deal… The correspondents, with the exception of Bell, are all, I believe, favourable. The 'Daily News' especially. Wallace of the 'Times' has just arrived, and I believe his influence will go far to counteract Bell's extraordinary correspondence. Bell will particularly be called to account for his 'Arabi's head-in-a-charger' policy. I think he seems a little uncomfortable on the prospect of being examined on his telegrams in Court."

Mackenzie Wallace, here alluded to, arrived with Dufferin from Constantinople, where he was "Times" correspondent, and afterwards became Dufferin's private secretary when His Lordship went to India as Viceroy. He was an able man, and acted while in Egypt entirely in concert with Dufferin, and has written the only English narrative of the events of 1882 which has any historical value.

What follows is in connection with the final attempt made by the prosecution to get evidence against Arabi on a point which might be treated as a capital one, namely, the arrest of Suliman Sami, who had been in command of the Egyptian rear-guard at the evacuation of Alexandria, and who, having been subjected to the usual intimidation treatment in prison, was now said to be ready to give evidence that Arabi had ordered him to burn the city. It was this sudden desperate attempt to obtain a capital verdict that brought matters to a crisis at Cairo, and resulted, as we shall see, in the compromise effected by Dufferin of the trial.

Broadley to Blunt, November 17th:

"An attempt has been made to force Suliman Bey to implicate Arabi. It has been done so clumsily that Suliman has contradicted every other witness called to prove the same thing, but I believe it was done at a midnight or secret sitting when Wilson was absent… Try and make your peace with the Foreign Office, Dufferin is square, and we could get a lot by soft words."

Beaman to Blunt, November 17th:

"I just write a line … to say that things are going on very well. The evidence of Suliman Sami, which seems to have rejoiced the prosecution, is not worth a straw, having been palpably invented for the occasion, and not supported by any of the preceding testimony. The only question seems to be if the prisoners will get off without a trial, or if they will have a chance of being fairly heard in their own defence. I am convinced that the Government here is using every effort to quash the proceedings, as the facts that would come out in cross-examination would be compromising to every man almost now in power, and would lay bare some very unpleasant facts about the Khedive. For this last reason it is just possible that our Government may feel inclined to propose terms to Arabi, as it will be a rough exposé if the trial proves the biggest scamp in Egypt is the man whom we brought an army here to uphold. Personally I have very little doubt that the Khedive and Omar Loutfi arranged the Alexandrian massacre in order to aim a blow at Arabi, who had just declared himself responsible for public safety. I hold proofs which carry me half way to conviction, but the time has not yet come to produce them."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 18th:

"Believe excellent compromise possible. Do not attack the Foreign Office. Absolute secrecy necessary."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 20th:

"London parleys Dufferin. Egyptian Government's desire to compromise lessened by thinking public opinion in England changed owing to Suliman Sami's perjury."

Broadley to Blunt, November 21st:

"Important crisis imminent. The friends of the Egyptian Government assert intention of hanging Arabi. Remain in London."

Broadley to Blunt, November 21st:

"Nothing I could say could give you an idea of the infamous conduct of the Egyptian Government. They set our procedure rules at defiance, and say they do not care a curse, as they are treating diplomatically for the hanging of Arabi."

Napier to Blunt, November 21st:

"We are simply fighting all the force of the Egyptian Government single-handed, though I believe Lord Dufferin will come to the rescue. They are striving to procure the judicial murder of these prisoners, and it takes all our time to meet their many wiles. Wilson and Dufferin are helping us, but they, the Egyptian Government, are quick and unscrupulous. We are necessarily more slow and cautious."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 26th:

"Egyptian Government proposes to try Arabi alone. Telegraph your opinion."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 27th:

"Letters explaining situation fully posted. Reason to believe if Arabi, Mahmud Sami and Toulba consent to admit formal charges of rebellion or continuing war against orders of the Khedive, the Egyptian Government will consent to exile or internment at the Cape of Good Hope, or elsewhere, some of the accused simple exile, the majority amnesty. I implore absolute secrecy. Napier and myself favourable to compromise seeing difficulty of proving efforts to prevent burning, etc."

Blunt to Broadley, November 28th:

"Cannot approve terms named – certainly not Cape, but am consulting friends to-night about funds. Our political position immensely strong. Definite answer later."

Broadley to Blunt. Letter. November 27th, 1882:

("Private and most urgent.)

"My dear Blunt,

"I invite all your prudence, calm consideration and tact to the subject of this letter. I have had a long interview [with] Dufferin to-day. He is most friendly. The dossier is before us. Nothing presents difficulties but the burning of Alexandria. As regards this I believe the proof will fail as to Araby's orders, but many ugly facts remain, viz.: no efforts to stop conflagration and loot. (2) Continued intimacy with Suliman Sami afterwards. (3) No punishment of offenders. (4) Large purchases petroleum. (5) Systematic manner of incendiarism by soldiers.

"This is the rub. Could Arabi have not stopped the whole thing? Besides, some of his former speeches, etc., have a very burning appearance.

"If Arabi will plead guilty formally to one of the charges of rebellion (i. e., his continuing war after Khedive's orders) he will be exiled.

"Cape of Good Hope under certain conditions with sufficient allowance. I think I can secure these terms for him, Mahmud Sami and Toulba. Rest, simple exile or pardon. Can I think secure allowance or with forfeiture property – retention military rank.

"Against this we have enormous length trial – chances of turn public opinion – expense and the five facts which I allude to above.

"If a word of this transpires you will do me incalculable injury. Think over all this and remember our great and grave responsibility. Dufferin is charming. Please at once telegraph as follows: If you say 'I accept the principle. Make best possible terms,' say pax. I advise this course as best. If you say, 'Go on – no sort of compromise can be accepted,' say bellum.

"I am prepared to fight manfully to the bitter end strongly as ever. I leave all to you – but think well over all the contingencies.

"Very faithfully yours,

"A. M. Broadley."

Napier to Blunt. Letter. November 27th:

"Cairo, Nov. 27th, 1882.

"Dear Blunt,

"It is much to be regretted that the Post Office people have found out our correspondence, for they have, to my knowledge, opened your last letter to me registered and received last Friday. It contained the Borelli charges returned, and a short note from you. I do not think anything was abstracted. I shall send this by ordinary post under cover to H. H. Asquith, Temple, E. C., in the hope that it may escape their vigilance. I, of course, protested at once, but do not suppose that they will mend their ways. I also greatly regret that I have no time to keep copies of my own letters to you for reference. You must not be surprised therefore if you sometimes meet with repetition. I cannot tell you of all the tricks they have played upon us, as they would fill volumes. The letter had been obviously opened by being slit across above the seal, and gummed up again. It had been cleverly done, and I might not have discovered it but for the fact that the gum used was not quite set. It therefore opened along the line of the slit, and I at once found the gum where no gum should have been. I will send you a short note by the direct mail so that you shall not be surprised at the delay in the delivery of this. Although we have been hard at work since last mail, I do not know that anything of much importance has occurred except that we have been admitted to the defence of Mahmud Sami, with whom we have had several long conferences. Toulba is ill, suffering from nervous excitement, I think, and asthma. I do not know whether he will die, but I have done everything in my power to get him proper medical assistance, a change of room, a companion, and, if possible, a raised bed.

"The last evidence in the question of the burning of Alexandria has not been communicated to us except through the medium of the Egyptian Gazette, which may or may not be correct. It is not formidable in itself, but it is quite sufficient to give colour to a finding against the prisoner on that charge. It becomes, therefore, of the most vital importance to consider whether there is no way out other than through the portals of the court martial. There is no doubt that we could discredit the evidence, and even smash it up in cross-examination. And besides, on the other charges of Rebellion and Massacre of June 11th I feel sure we could make it hot for the prosecution, but there is an opinion in a very high quarter that there is a strong determination to execute if the Court should find guilty. Assume, therefore, that the Court Martial find the prisoner (for I am only speaking of the chief now) guilty, it will be for the English Government to reverse the sentence. I am of opinion that it would be dangerous to trust them to carefully examine the evidence and the manner in which it has been obtained. I think it possible that that matter would be hastily disposed of in the Foreign Office, and that they might leave the prisoner to the Court, declaring that everything had been done to secure a fair trial, and that they could not interfere with a verdict deliberately arrived at after the fullest opportunity given to the defence. And besides, it is more than probable that they would allow some sentence to pass – any sentence suffered here would be most dangerous to the prisoner. After careful consideration I dare not advise the prisoner to trust to the trial if he have an alternative. If terms of banishment are offered, with proper safeguards and provision for maintenance, I shall be strongly in favour of accepting them. To sum up: If found guilty by the Court, some punishment, perhaps death, certainly a serious one, will be inflicted: If acquitted, either voluntary banishment without means, or remaining in the country at the mercy of the Government here. If he leaves the country under a compromise all charges except that of rebellion would have to be withdrawn, and provision for his life in a suitable place would have to be accorded. I have reason to believe that the course of a compromise finds favour with all but Riaz, and is also favourably regarded by Dufferin.

"Give us your opinion, and believe me ever very sincerely yours,

"Mark Napier.

"P. S. – As far as the case goes nothing could be better. In law, in fact, and in the infamous manner it has been conducted. But there are the dangers and considerations I have alluded to. Broadley has in my opinion conducted all the different discussions with the Court and Dufferin with the greatest energy, skill, and judgment. The law of the case is perfect for us, but it is a case which will be decided in the Cabinet and not in the Court. It is impossible to rebut hearsay, and as I have had no opportunity to consider the whole evidence, I will not offer an opinion on that now."

Broadley and Napier to Blunt. Telegram. November 28th, 7.42 p. m.:

"Long interview with Dufferin. I entreat you give us discretion to obtain best terms possible. We know delay fatal. Rely on our judgment. Foreign Office's support unreliable. Dufferin disposed to exceed his instructions on our behalf. Dufferin rules Egyptian Government. Defense case burning Alexandria suspicious. Hence anxiety. Embrace present moment. Dufferin's good offices absolutely necessary. Telegraph instantly full discretion. Interview Dufferin ten to-morrow.

"Broadley, Napier."

Napier to Blunt. Same date:

"I give you my honour I most strongly concur in our telegram herewith. Strongest cause for full immediate discretion. Every personal interest contrary to our request. Napier, private."

Blunt to Broadley, November 28th midnight:

"Cannot approve terms less than honourable exile – not internment – Aden, Malta, Cyprus. Within these limits use discretion."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 29th:

"Arabi gives us written authority to act with discretion in concert with Dufferin, who proposes Arabi pleads guilty on formal charge of rebellion – others abandoned. Sentence read commuting punishment to exile – exile simple on parole – good place which you can settle with the Foreign Office – perhaps Azores. Suitable allowance granted and compensation for loss of property entailed by sentence. You probably fail to realize difficulty of rebutting case of burning Alexandria and obtaining evidence for defence. Foreign Office certainly indisposed to interfere in any Egyptian sentence short of death – for example, long detention in an Egyptian prison. Am convinced ultimate result inevitably worse, dreading great responsibility, having full knowledge of the position of affairs. I trust you will leave us discretion, to avoid possible disaster."

Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. November 29th, 3 p. m.:

"Have consulted De la Warr. We approve full discretion on basis of telegram just received."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 30th:

"All progressing well. Try to negotiate in concert with De la Warr the place of exile – Fiji suggested. Gratified at your confidence."

Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. November 30th, 2.30 p. m.:

"Reject Fiji or Azores. Insist on Moslem country for religious life. They cannot refuse. Will consult Chenery. De la Warr away."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 1st:

"Dufferin's conduct admirable. Suggests De la Warr's arranging place of exile with Foreign Office. Prisoners entirely satisfied."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 3rd:

"Arabi's trial over. For correct account see 'Standard.' Egyptian Government fulfilled all engagements to the letter."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th:

"Arabi delighted at result and sends thanks – inclined Cape. Dufferin brick [sic]."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th, 4.50 p. m.:

"Surprised your not wiring. Success complete. Anglo-Egyptian colony furious."

Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. December 4th:

"Congratulate all. De la Warr says place of exile in English territory left to Dufferin. I don't fancy Cape. How about Gibraltar or Guernsey. Consult Arabi."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th:

"Many thanks kind telegram."

It will be perceived by these telegrams that it was not without reluctance that I agreed to the compromise proposed by Dufferin. We had at the moment the full tide of English opinion with us, and I knew that the Foreign Office could not do otherwise than agree to almost any terms we chose to impose, and I was most unwilling that the charge of rebellion should be admitted by us. At the same time it was not possible for me in the face of Broadley's, and especially Napier's, telegrams to withhold my assent. The responsibility was too great. I had also the question of costs to consider. It is true that a public subscription had been opened which had brought us valuable names. But the actual sums subscribed did not yet amount to £200, while Broadley's bill was running already to £3,000. A continuation for another month of the trial would have meant for me a larger expenditure than I was prepared to face in a political quarrel which was not quite my own. I therefore took counsel with De la Warr, and especially with Robert Bourke, of whom I have already spoken, and who warned me how frail a thing public opinion was to rely on, and advised me strongly to consent. I remember walking up and down with him in Montagu Square, where he lived, in indecision for half an hour before I was finally convinced and yielded. I consequently sent the telegram of approval, and eventually, after much argument, we succeeded in obtaining as Arabi's place of exile the Island of Ceylon, the traditional place of exile of our father Adam when driven out of Paradise. No more honourable one could possibly have been fixed upon.

The exact terms of the arrangement come to with Dufferin were unfortunately not committed by him to writing, an oversight on Broadley's part, who ought to have insisted on this and thus saved us much after trouble and misunderstanding. The negligence allowed the Egyptian Government to inflict degradation of rank on the prisoners, which was certainly not in the spirit of Lord Dufferin's arrangement, though, perhaps, legally following the pro formâ sentence of death for rebellion. Room, too, was left for dispute as to what was the amount of the allowance intended as compensation for the confiscations. Broadley seems to have exaggerated to his clients the promises on this head. Personally I consider that they were not illiberally dealt with, as the property of most of them was insignificant, and they were allowed to retain property belonging to their wives. The only considerable sufferer pecuniarily was Mahmud Pasha Sami, who had a large estate which he forfeited. As to Arabi, his sole worldly possessions, besides what furniture was in his house at Cairo, a hired one, and some horses in his stable, consisted of the eight acres of good land he had inherited from his father in his native village, to which he had at various time added parcels of uncultivated land on the desert edge, amounting to some six hundred acres, paid for out of his pay in prosperous days. These at the time of the confiscation cannot have been worth much over £2,000 or £3,000, for barren land was then selling for only a few reals the acre, and he had not had time to reclaim or improve them.³³

A point, too, which was long disputed, but which is no longer of importance, was whether the paroles of the prisoners were given to the Egyptian or the English Governments. But with these matters I need not trouble myself more than to say that the English Government, having gained its end of getting the rebellion admitted by us, and so a title given for their intervention in Egypt, gave little more help to the defence of certain unfortunate minor prisoners who on various pretexts found themselves excluded from the amnesty, and were subjected to all the injustices of the Khedive's uncontrolled authority. These, however, belong to a period beyond that of which I now propose to write, namely, that of the permanent Occupation, and cannot be detailed in my present memoir, which now, I think, has made clear at least my own part in the events of the revolution to the last point where that part was personal.

Looking back at my action in Egypt during that period, with its early successes and its final failure to obtain for the National Government fair treatment at English hands, I cannot wholly regret the course I took. I made, of course, many mistakes, and I feel that I am in considerable measure responsible for the determination the Nationalists came to to risk their country's fortune on the die of battle. But I still think their fate would have been a worse one if they had not fought, tamely surrendering to European pressure. They at least thus got a hearing from the world at large, and if any attention since has been paid to fellah grievances it has been won wholly by Arabi's persistence, which I encouraged, in accepting the logic of their political principles even to the point of war. It obliged England to listen to their complaints and, if it could not prevent her from depriving them of their political liberty, it has forced her since to remedy most of their secular material wrongs.

What the future may bring to Egypt I know not. She has grown rich under English tutelage, and though I do not consider riches synonymous with the well being of a nation, they have been in Egypt of at least this value, that they have enabled the native Nile population so far to hold its own against foreign intrusion as owner of the soil. While this is, the Nation will remain alive, and the day may yet come for the fellah race when self-government will be restored to them, and the armed struggle of 1882 will appear to them in its true light as the beginning of their national life, and one, as such, glorious in their annals. To that day of final emancipation I still pin my hopes, though it is not likely I shall live to see it.³⁴

If my life is prolonged for a few years, it is my intention to continue the writing of my memoirs, and this will include much that is of importance to Egypt, though nothing of such high historical value as the recital already made. The present volume may well stand by itself, and so with regret I leave it. I should have wished to include in it an account of Lord Dufferin's mission of reconstruction, and the weak efforts made by Gladstone to undo the wrong he had inflicted on the cause of liberty, and on his own reputation as a man of good. But this would lead me too far, and I prefer to end my actual narrative at the point where we have now arrived, the close of the eventful year, 1882. On one of the last days of it I received a second characteristic letter from Gordon in which, speaking of the war and the suppression of liberty in Egypt, he quotes the following appropriate verse: