Kitabı oku: «The Times Guide to the House of Commons»
The Times: Guide to the House of Commons 2010
Editor
Greg Hurst
Assistant Editor
Emily Gosden
Design Production Editor
Chris Davalle
Chief Sub-Editor
Matthew Lyons

Table of Contents
Cover Page
Title Page
THE TIMES An aid to the navigation of uncharted political waters
The House of Commons
The new Parliament
An ordinary beginning to an extraordinary campaign
How the polls really got it right
A tremor that changed the political landscape
Who cares what the papers say?
And the winner is…television
It will never be the same again
Meet the Class of 2010, the new politics in person
Women failed to break through
Bad news for big spenders: money can’t buy you votes
Little joy for the smaller parties
Don’t emerge as sounding brass or tinkling cymbal
The old era
The man who detoxified the Conservative brand
At long last it’s OK to be a Tory
Path to power: how the Lib Dems made history
How Brown’s rivalry with Blair proved to be Labour’s undoing
Names of the dead were read to a silent Commons
Hail and a fond farewell to the dearly departed
The tragedy of Gordon Brown
New Labour found its reforming stride too late
‘This sucker’s going down’: diary of a financial crisis
SNP pioneers of minority rule
Northern Ireland comes back from the brink
Welsh coalition complications
All change, the gravy train has hit the buffers
The work of the House of Commons
The growing powers of the humble backbencher
New intake foots bill for the old
A few words of friendly advice for aspiring MPs
The pleasures of opposition
Life as a Member of Parliament
MPs who stood down before the election
Defeated MPs
Her Majesty’s Government The Cabinet
Departmental Ministers and Whips
General Election 2010: results by constituency
House of Commons, May 2010
MPs with majorities of less than 10 per cent
How the nation voted
Tories rediscovered the art of by-election victory
By-elections 2005-10
Manifestos
Coalition programme for government
Conservative manifesto
Liberal Democrat manifesto
Labour manifesto
Smaller parties’ manifestos
Index to candidates
Copyright
About the Publisher
THE TIMES An aid to the navigation of uncharted political waters
Greg Hurst
Editor of the Guide
The general election of 2010 was a watershed: the first since February 1974 at which no single party won an overall majority. The inconclusive outcome was accompanied by a strong sense of paradox. The Conservative Party won the most seats, 305, with one additional seat expected, and duly delivered, in the election in Thirsk & Malton that was delayed by the death of a candidate. And yet, by falling short of an absolute Commons majority, David Cameron was widely held to have failed to seize fully, particularly in the final year, the opportunity presented to him as the outgoing Government, and Gordon Brown in particular, became steadily more unpopular.
The Liberal Democrats, clear winners of the campaign itself, were stunned actually to suffer a net loss of five seats, bringing their tally down to 57. They had expected significant gains after the television debates propelled Nick Clegg into the living rooms of voters unhappy with Mr Brown but with nagging doubts about Mr Cameron. The ten-point jump in support for the Liberal Democrats after the first leaders’ debate was unprecedented in polling history. Even as the party’s poll ratings began to glide downwards many Liberal Democrats hoped for, and expected, net gains of perhaps 20 or 30 seats.
The paradox was greatest within the Labour Party. Clear loser of the election, with a net loss of 90 seats, it endured its worst performance since 1931 during the Great Depression. Within Labour ranks, however, a grim sense of satisfaction was evident, even some pride, both at having clawed back from the prospect of being pushed into third place by the Liberal Democrats and at having denied Mr Cameron the majority that he wanted and, they may have calculated, he needed.
One refreshing aspect was that turnout, having reached a postwar low in 2001, rose again to 65.1 per cent, up by 3.7 per cent on 2005; if an election is interesting or the result uncertain, voters are more inclined to take part.
If the result appeared confusing to some, its immediate aftermath must have seemed doubly so. Gordon Brown, vanquished, returned to Downing Street. The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, after weeks, months even, of fighting one another tooth and nail, dispatched teams to begin talks on a tentative arrangement for a minority administration or even a coalition. The outcome, Britain’s first coalition since Churchill’s cross-party administration during the Second World War, from 1940-45, and the first in peacetime since Ramsay MacDonald’s National Government of 1929-35, and those that followed, ushered in a new era of British politics.
Coalition politics presents significant new challenges for the House of Commons. Ministers who are members of competing parties must find ways of working together that go beyond pragmatism and practical effectiveness and are based on trust, while maintaining their separate political entities and those of their parties. Backbench Members of both governing parties must find the language, tone and levers to criticise and influence individual aspects of policy or decisions of administration without tearing at the fabric of the coalition itself. There will be others unhappy about the very fact of coalition government, whose challenge is to advance their cause without being cast as wreckers. Such questions apply well beyond the exchanges on the floor of the Commons, to its select committees, public bill committees and its very culture as an institution.
For the Labour Party, in particular, the task of opposition carries heightened responsibilities. In the previous two Parliaments, the Liberal Democrats provided an increasingly significant alternative voice to that of the official Opposition, for example as the only British party to oppose the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and offering an alternative analysis during the financial crisis of 2008-09. Their entry into office gives the coalition Government an initial working majority in the Commons of 82 once the Speaker and Sinn Féin are excluded and leaves the main duty of opposition on Labour’s shoulders alone. Furthermore, the coalition will have, between its peers, a large majority over Labour in the House of Lords, where cross-benchers do not vote as a block. This is the first time a Government has commanded majorities in both Houses of Parliament since John Major in 1997, and makes the opposition’s work of scrutiny and challenge in the Commons doubly important.
Gordon Brown’s resignation as Prime Minister and leader of the Labour Party heralded the opening of a new chapter for his party. Amid the uncertainty and fast-moving events of the post-election hiatus, this happened in two stages. First came an undertaking to step down at a future date if an alternative “progressive” coalition with the Liberal Democrats and minority parties could be negotiated. Then came his immediate departure as the coalition between Mr Cameron and Mr Clegg fell into place, although before its details were complete. Harriet Harman, Labour’s deputy leader, took his place temporarily as Leader of the Opposition as the party agreed to a timetable of more than four months to elect a new leader for its annual conference in late September.
Two parties are represented in the new House of Commons for the first time: the Green Party, 11 years after it gained two seats in the European Parliament, thanks to its method of election by proportional representation, and the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland. The United Kingdom Independence Party and British National Party polled substantially more votes than the Greens, and both improved their share of the vote, without winning seats. The trend of independent Members of Parliament, re-established by Martin Bell in 1997, was reversed in mainland Britain with the defeat of Richard Taylor in Wyre Forest, where he served two terms, and Dai Davies in Blaenau Gwent. It was maintained only by the presence of Lady Sylvia Hermon, who broke with the Ulster Unionists to retain her seat with a large majority. Her victory reflects the very different politics of Northern Ireland.
The outcome of the general election, inconclusive as it was, nonetheless captured the mood of Britain in the late spring of 2010: dissatisfied with Labour (other than in Scotland, the only part of Britain where the party’s vote went up, and Inner London); attracted in significant numbers by Mr Cameron, although with doubts harboured by some and antipathy among a minority; restless for change; and disenchanted with politics and the excesses of the previous Parliament.
The most important dynamic for the Commons itself is the scale of the turnover of its Members. More than one third, 227, are new to Parliament. This is fewer than the 242 new MPs returned in 1997, a postwar record, but is a massive transfusion for an institution that had lost touch with what the electorate expected from it. At the election 149 MPs stood down of their own volition (or their party’s) rather than face the voters again, far more than the 115 who did so before the end-of-era election of 1997. Five former MPs also return after periods of broken service.
The Times Guide to the House of Commons 2010 has itself undergone change. Its commitment to accuracy and balance remain, but with even greater emphasis on analysis and comment. Writers from The Times explore the wider undercurrents that had an impact on the voters’ view of politicians: the scandal of misuse of Commons allowances; the banking crisis and recession; and the handling of military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Guide gives greater scope for the best of The Times’s journalism beyond that of its writers, with the work of its photographers, illustrators, graphic artists and designers used to full effect.
Profiles of each Member of Parliament are livelier, intended to convey a sense of what each is like, what motivates them and how effectively they discharge their role, in addition to biographical details of what they have done. Information is included, too, on thousands of candidates who contested the election, were unsuccessful but attracted sufficient support to hold their deposit. Many among them, no doubt, will be the subject of fuller profiles in the next Guide as Members of Parliament.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a new chapter that explains and discusses the work of the House of Commons, its powers, recent reforms and their effect. Former Members of Parliament describe the reality of serving on the government and opposition benches, from the challenge of finding how to make their voice heard and the satisfaction of influencing events to the monotony of waiting, day after day, night after night, to vote.
The new Parliament is embarking on a journey of political change through waters familiar to much of continental Europe but, to date, largely uncharted by practitioners of politics, commentators, observers and electors in the United Kingdom. The Times Guide to the Commons seeks, as ever, to offer itself as their navigational aid.
The House of Commons
The following were elected Members of the House of Commons in the 2010 general election
Alliance Alliance
C Conservative
DUP Democratic Unionist Party
Green Green
Ind Independent
Lab Labour
LD Liberal Democrat;
PC Plaid Cymru
SNP Scottish National Party
SF Sinn Féin
SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party
Speaker Speaker
A
| Abbott, Diane Hackney North & Stoke Newington | Lab |
| Adams, Gerry Belfast West | SF |
| Adams, Nigel Selby & Ainsty | C |
| Afriyie, Adam Windsor | C |
| Ainsworth, Bob Coventry North East | Lab |
| Aldous, Peter Waveney | C |
| Alexander, Danny Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch | |
| & Strathspey | LD |
| Alexander, Heidi Lewisham East | Lab |
| Alexander, Douglas Paisley & Renfrewshire South | Lab |
| Ali, Rushanara Bethnal Green & Bow | Lab |
| Allen, Graham Nottingham North | Lab |
| Amess, David Southend West | C |
| Anderson, Dave Blaydon | Lab |
| Andrew, Stuart Pudsey | C |
| Arbuthnot, James Hampshire North East | C |
| Austin, Ian Dudley North | Lab |
B
| Bacon, Richard Norfolk South | C |
| Bagshawe, Louise Corby | C |
| Bailey, Adrian West Bromwich West | Lab |
| Bain, Willie Glasgow North East | Lab |
| Baker, Norman Lewes | LD |
| Baker, Steven Wycombe | C |
| Baldry, Tony Banbury | C |
| Baldwin, Harriett Worcestershire West | C |
| Balls, Ed Morley & Outwood | Lab |
| Banks, Gordon Ochil & Perthshire South | Lab |
| Barclay, Stephen Cambridgeshire North East | C |
| Barker, Greg Bexhill & Battle | C |
| Baron, John Basildon & Billericay | C |
| Barron, Kevin Rother Valley | Lab |
| Barwell, Gavin Croydon Central | C |
| Bayley, Hugh York Central | Lab |
| Bebb, Guto Aberconwy | C |
| Beckett, Margaret Derby South | Lab |
| Begg, Anne Aberdeen South | Lab |
| Beith, Sir Alan Berwick-upon-Tweed | LD |
| Bell, Sir Stuart Middlesbrough | Lab |
| Bellingham, Henry Norfolk North West | C |
| Benn, Hilary Leeds Central | Lab |
| Benton, Joe Bootle | Lab |
| Benyon, Richard Newbury | C |
| Bercow, John Buckingham | Speaker |
| Beresford, Sir Paul Mole Valley | C |
| Berger, Luciana Liverpool Wavertree | Lab |
| Berry, Jake Rossendale & Darwen | C |
| Betts, Clive Sheffield South East | Lab |
| Bingham, Andrew High Peak | C |
| Binley, Brian Northampton South | C |
| Birtwistle, Gordon Burnley | LD |
| Blackman, Bob Harrow East | C |
| Blackman-Woods, Roberta Durham, City of | Lab |
| Blackwood, Nicola Oxford West & Abingdon | C |
| Blears, Hazel Salford & Eccles | Lab |
| Blenkinsop, Tom Middlesbrough South | |
| & Cleveland East | Lab |
| Blomfield, Paul Sheffield Central | Lab |
| Blunkett, David Sheffield Brightside & Hillsborough | Lab |
| Blunt, Crispin Reigate | C |
| Boles, Nicholas Grantham & Stamford | C |
| Bone, Peter Wellingborough | C |
| Bottomley, Peter Worthing West | C |
| Bradley, Karen Staffordshire Moorlands | C |
| Bradshaw, Ben Exeter | Lab |
| Brady, Graham Altrincham & Sale West | C |
| Brake, Tom Carshalton & Wallington | LD |
| Bray, Angie Ealing Central & Acton | C |
| Brazier, Julian Canterbury | C |
| Brennan, Kevin Cardiff West | Lab |
| Bridgen, Andrew Leicestershire North West | C |
| Brine, Steve Winchester | C |
| Brokenshire, James Old Bexley & Sidcup | C |
| Brooke, Annette Dorset Mid & Poole North | LD |
| Brown, Russell Dumfries & Galloway | Lab |
| Brown, Gordon Kirkcaldy & Cowdenbeath | Lab |
| Brown, Nicholas Newcastle upon Tyne East | Lab |
| Brown, Lyn West Ham | Lab |
| Browne, Jeremy Taunton Deane | LD |
| Bruce, Fiona Congleton | C |
| Bruce, Malcolm Gordon | LD |
| Bryant, Chris Rhondda | Lab |
| Buck, Karen Westminster North | Lab |
| Buckland, Robert Swindon South | C |
| Burden, Richard Birmingham Northfield | Lab |
| Burley, Aidan Cannock Chase | C |
| Burnham, Andy Leigh | Lab |
| Burns, Conor Bournemouth West | C |
| Burns, Simon Chelmsford | C |
| Burrowes, David Enfield Southgate | C |
| Burstow, Paul Sutton & Cheam | LD |
| Burt, Alistair Bedfordshire North East | C |
| Burt, Lorely Solihull | LD |
| Byles, Dan Warwickshire North | C |
| Byrne, Liam Birmingham Hodge Hill | Lab |
C
| Cable, Vince Twickenham | LD |
| Cairns, David Inverclyde | Lab |
| Cairns, Alun Vale of Glamorgan | C |
| Cameron, David Witney | C |
| Campbell, Ronnie Blyth Valley | Lab |
| Campbell, Sir Menzies Fife North East | LD |
| Campbell, Gregory Londonderry East | DUP |
| Campbell, Alan Tynemouth | Lab |
| Carmichael, Alistair Orkney & Shetland | LD |
| Carmichael, Neil Stroud | C |
| Carswell, Douglas Clacton | C |
| Cash, Bill Stone | C |
| Caton, Martin Gower | Lab |
| Chapman, Jenny Darlington | Lab |
| Chishti, Rehman Gillingham & Rainham | C |
| Chope, Christopher Christchurch | C |
| Clappison, James Hertsmere | C |
| Clark, Katy Ayrshire North & Arran | Lab |
| Clark, Greg Tunbridge Wells | C |
| Clarke, Tom Coatbridge, Chryston & Bellshill | Lab |
| Clarke, Kenneth Rushcliffe | C |
| Clegg, Nick Sheffield Hallam | LD |
| Clifton-Brown, Geoffrey Cotswolds, The | C |
| Clwyd, Ann Cynon Valley | Lab |
| Coaker, Vernon Gedling | Lab |
| Coffey, Ann Stockport | Lab |
| Coffey, Therese Suffolk Coastal | C |
| Collins, Damian Folkestone & Hythe | C |
| Colvile, Oliver Plymouth Sutton & Devonport | C |
| Connarty, Michael Linlithgow & Falkirk East | Lab |
| Cooper, Rosie Lancashire West | Lab |
| Cooper, Yvette Normanton, Pontefract & Castleford | Lab |
| Corbyn, Jeremy Islington North | Lab |
| Cox, Geoffrey Devon West & Torridge | C |
| Crabb, Stephen Preseli Pembrokeshire | C |
| Crausby, David Bolton North East | Lab |
| Creagh, Mary Wakefield | Lab |
| Creasy, Stella Walthamstow | Lab |
| Crockart, Michael Edinburgh West | LD |
| Crouch, Tracey Chatham & Aylesford | C |
| Cruddas, Jon Dagenham & Rainham | Lab |
| Cryer, John Leyton & Wanstead | Lab |
| Cunningham, Jim Coventry South | Lab |
| Cunningham, Alex Stockton North | Lab |
| Cunningham, Tony Workington | Lab |
| Curran, Margaret Glasgow East | Lab |
D
| Dakin, Nic Scunthorpe | Lab |
| Danczuk, Simon Rochdale | Lab |
| Darling, Alistair Edinburgh South West | Lab |
| Davey, Edward Kingston & Surbiton | LD |
| David, Wayne Caerphilly | Lab |
| Davidson, Ian Glasgow South West | Lab |
| Davies, David Monmouth | C |
| Davies, Glyn Montgomeryshire | C |
| Davies, Philip Shipley | C |
| Davies, Geraint Swansea West | Lab |
| Davis, David Haltemprice & Howden | C |
| de Bois, Nick Enfield North | C |
| de Piero, Gloria Ashfield | Lab |
| Denham, John Southampton Itchen | Lab |
| Dinenage, Caroline Gosport | C |
| Djanogly, Jonathan Huntingdon | C |
| Dobbin, Jim Heywood & Middleton | Lab |
| Dobson, Frank Holborn & St Pancras | Lab |
| Docherty, Thomas Dunfermline & Fife West | Lab |
| Dodds, Nigel Belfast North | DUP |
| Doherty, Pat Tyrone West | SF |
| Donaldson, Jeffrey Lagan Valley | DUP |
| Donohoe, Brian Ayrshire Central | Lab |
| Doran, Frank Aberdeen North | Lab |
| Dorrell, Stephen Charnwood | C |
| Dorries, Nadine Bedfordshire Mid | C |
| Dowd, Jim Lewisham West & Penge | Lab |
| Doyle, Gemma Dunbartonshire West | Lab |
| Doyle-Price, Jackie Thurrock | C |
| Drax, Richard Dorset South | C |
| Dromey, Jack Birmingham Erdington | Lab |
| Duddridge, James Rochford & Southend East | C |
| Dugher, Michael Barnsley East | Lab |
| Duncan, Alan Rutland & Melton | C |
| Duncan Smith, Iain Chingford & Woodford Green | C |
| Dunne, Philip Ludlow | C |
| Durkan, Mark FoyleS | DLP |
E
| Eagle, Maria Garston & Halewood | Lab |
| Eagle, Angela Wallasey | Lab |
| Edwards, Jonathan Carmarthen East & Dinefwr | PC |
| Efford, Clive Eltham | Lab |
| Elliott, Julie Sunderland Central | Lab |
| Ellis, Michael Northampton North | C |
| Ellison, Jane Battersea | C |
| Ellman, Louise Liverpool Riverside | Lab |
| Ellwood, Tobias Bournemouth East | C |
| Elphicke, Charlie Dover | C |
| Engel, Natascha Derbyshire North East | Lab |
| Esterson, Bill Sefton Central | Lab |
| Eustice, George Camborne & Redruth | C |
| Evans, Jonathan Cardiff North | C |
| Evans, Christopher Islwyn | Lab |
| Evans, Nigel Ribble Valley | C |
| Evans, Graham Weaver Vale | C |
| Evennett, David Bexleyheath & Crayford | C |
F
| Fabricant, Michael Lichfield | C |
| Fallon, Michael Sevenoaks | C |
| Farrelly, Paul Newcastle-under-Lyme | Lab |
| Farron, Tim Westmorland & Lonsdale | LD |
| Featherstone, Lynne Hornsey & Wood Green | LD |
| Field, Frank Birkenhead | Lab |
| Field, Mark Cities of London & Westminster | C |
| Fitzpatrick, Jim Poplar & Limehouse | Lab |
| Flello, Rob Stoke-on-Trent South | Lab |
| Flint, Caroline Don Valley | Lab |
| Flynn, Paul Newport West | Lab |
| Foster, Don Bath | LD |
| Fovargue, Yvonne Makerfield | Lab |
| Fox, Dr Liam Somerset North | C |
| Francis, Hywel Aberavon | Lab |
| Francois, Mark Rayleigh & Wickford | C |
| Freeman, George Norfolk Mid | C |
| Freer, Mike Finchley & Golders Green | C |
| Fullbrook, Lorraine South Ribble | C |
| Fuller, Richard Bedford | C |
G
| Gale, Roger Thanet North | C |
| Gapes, Mike Ilford South | Lab |
| Gardiner, Barry Brent North | Lab |
| Garnier, Edward Harborough | C |
| Garnier, Mark Wyre Forest | C |
| Gauke, David Hertfordshire South West | C |
| George, Andrew St Ives | LD |
| Gibb, Nick Bognor Regis & Littlehampton | C |
| Gilbert, Stephen St Austell & Newquay | LD |
| Gildernew, Michelle Fermanagh & South Tyrone | SF |
| Gillan, Cheryl Chesham & Amersham | C |
| Gilmore, Sheila Edinburgh East | Lab |
| Glass, Pat Durham North West | Lab |
| Glen, John Salisbury | C |
| Glindon, Mary Tyneside North | Lab |
| Godsiff, Roger Birmingham Hall Green | Lab |
| Goggins, Paul Wythenshawe & Sale East | Lab |
| Goldsmith, Zac Richmond Park | C |
| Goodman, Helen Bishop Auckland | Lab |
| Goodwill, Robert Scarborough & Whitby | C |
| Gove, Michael Surrey Heath | C |
| Graham, Richard Gloucester | C |
| Grant, Helen Maidstone & The Weald | C |
| Gray, James Wiltshire North | C |
| Grayling, Chris Epsom & Ewell | C |
| Greatrex, Tom Rutherglen & Hamilton West | Lab |
| Green, Damian Ashford | C |
| Green, Kate Stretford & Urmston | Lab |
| Greening, Justine Putney | C |
| Greenwood, Lilian Nottingham South | Lab |
| Grieve, Dominic Beaconsfield | C |
| Griffith, Nia Llanelli | Lab |
| Griffiths, Andrew Burton | C |
| Gummer, Ben Ipswich | C |
| Gwynne, Andrew Denton & Reddish | Lab |
| Gyimah, Sam Surrey East | C |
H
| Hague, William Richmond (Yorks) | C |
| Hain, Peter Neath | Lab |
| Halfon, Robert Harlow | C |
| Hames, Duncan Chippenham | LD |
| Hamilton, Fabian Leeds North East | Lab |
| Hamilton, David Midlothian | Lab |
| Hammond, Philip Runnymede & Weybridge | C |
| Hammond, Stephen Wimbledon | C |
| Hancock, Mike Portsmouth South | LD |
| Hancock, Matthew Suffolk West | C |
| Hands, Greg Chelsea & Fulham | C |
| Hanson, David Delyn | Lab |
| Harman, Harriet Camberwell & Peckham | Lab |
| Harper, Mark Forest of Dean | C |
| Harrington, Richard Watford | C |
| Harris, Rebecca Castle Point | C |
| Harris, Tom Glasgow South | Lab |
| Hart, Simon Carmarthen West & Pembrokeshire South | C |
| Harvey, Nick Devon North | LD |
| Haselhurst, Sir Alan Saffron Walden | C |
| Havard, Dai Merthyr Tydfil & Rhymney | Lab |
| Hayes, John South Holland & The Deepings | C |
| Heald, Oliver Hertfordshire North East | C |
| Healey, John Wentworth & Dearne | Lab |
| Heath, David Somerton & Frome | LD |
| Heaton-Harris, Chris Daventry | C |
| Hemming, John Birmingham Yardley | LD |
| Henderson, Gordon Sittingbourne & Sheppey | C |
| Hendrick, Mark Preston | Lab |
| Hendry, Charles Wealden | C |
| Hepburn, Stephen Jarrow | Lab |
| Herbert, Nick Arundel & South Downs | C |
| Hermon, Lady Sylvia Down North | Ind |
| Heyes, David Ashton-under-Lyne | Lab |
| Hillier, Meg Hackney South & Shoreditch | Lab |
| Hilling, Julie Bolton West | Lab |
| Hinds, Damian Hampshire East | C |
| Hoban, Mark Fareham | C |
| Hodge, Margaret Barking | Lab |
| Hodgson, Sharon Washington & Sunderland West | Lab |
| Hoey, Kate Vauxhall | Lab |
| Hollingbery, George Meon Valley | C |
| Hollobone, Philip Kettering | C |
| Holloway, Adam Gravesham | C |
| Hood, Jim Lanark & Hamilton East | Lab |
| Hopkins, Kris Keighley | C |
| Hopkins, Kelvin Luton North | Lab |
| Horwood, Martin Cheltenham | LD |
| Hosie, Stewart Dundee East | SNP |
| Howarth, Gerald Aldershot | C |
| Howarth, George Knowsley | Lab |
| Howell, John Henley | C |
| Hoyle, Lindsay Chorley | Lab |
| Hughes, Simon Bermondsey & Old Southwark | LD |
| Huhne, Chris Eastleigh | LD |
| Hunt, Tristram Stoke-on-Trent Central | Lab |
| Hunt, Jeremy Surrey South West | C |
| Hunter, Mark Cheadle | LD |
| Huppert, Julian Cambridge | LD |
| Hurd, Nick Ruislip, Northwood & Pinner | C |
I
| Illsley, Eric Barnsley Central | Lab |
| Irranca-Davies, Huw Ogmore | Lab |
J
| Jackson, Glenda Hampstead & Kilburn | Lab |
| Jackson, Stewart Peterborough | C |
| James, Margot Stourbridge | C |
| James, Siân Swansea East | Lab |
| Jamieson, Cathy Kilmarnock & Loudoun | Lab |
| Javid, Sajid Bromsgrove | C |
| Jenkin, Bernard Harwich & Essex North | C |
| Johnson, Gareth Dartford | C |
| Johnson, Diana Hull North | Lab |
| Johnson, Alan Hull West & Hessle | Lab |
| Johnson, Joseph Orpington | C |
| Jones, Susan Elan Clwyd South | Lab |
| Jones, David Clwyd West | C |
| Jones, Kevan Durham North | Lab |
| Jones, Andrew Harrogate & Knaresborough | C |
| Jones, Graham Hyndburn | Lab |
| Jones, Marcus Nuneaton | C |
| Jones, Helen Warrington North | Lab |
| Jowell, Tessa Dulwich & West Norwood | Lab |
| Joyce, Eric Falkirk | Lab |
K
| Kaufman, Gerald Manchester Gorton | Lab |
| Kawczynski, Daniel Shrewsbury & Atcham | C |
| Keeley, Barbara Worsley & Eccles South | Lab |
| Keen, Alan Feltham & Heston | Lab |
| Kelly, Chris Dudley South | C |
| Kendall, Elizabeth Leicester West | Lab |
| Kennedy, Charles Ross, Skye & Lochaber | LD |
| Khan, Sadiq Tooting | Lab |
| Kirby, Simon Brighton Kemptown | C |
| Knight, Greg Yorkshire East | C |
| Kwarteng, Kwasi Spelthorne | C |
L
| Laing, Eleanor Epping Forest | C |
| Lamb, Norman Norfolk North | LD |
| Lammy, David Tottenham | Lab |
| Lancaster, Mark Milton Keynes North | C |
| Lansley, Andrew Cambridgeshire South | C |
| Latham, Pauline Derbyshire Mid | C |
| Lavery, Ian Wansbeck | Lab |
| Laws, David Yeovil | LD |
| Lazarowicz, Mark Edinburgh North & Leith | Lab |
| Leadsom, Andrea Northamptonshire South | C |
| Lee, Dr Philip Bracknell | C |
| Lee, Jessica Erewash | C |
| Leech, John Manchester Withington | LD |
| Lefroy, Jeremy Stafford | C |
| Leigh, Edward Gainsborough | C |
| Leslie, Charlotte Bristol North West | C |
| Leslie, Christopher Nottingham East | Lab |
| Letwin, Oliver Dorset West | C |
| Lewis, Ivan Bury South | Lab |
| Lewis, Brandon Great Yarmouth | C |
| Lewis, Julian New Forest East | C |
| Liddell-Grainger, Ian Bridgwater & Somerset West | C |
| Lidington, David Aylesbury | C |
| Lilley, Peter Hitchin & Harpenden | C |
| Lloyd, Stephen Eastbourne | LD |
| Lloyd, Tony Manchester Central | Lab |
| Llwyd, Elfyn Dwyfor Meirionnydd | PC |
| Long, Naomi Belfast East | Alliance |
| Lopresti, Jack Filton & Bradley Stoke | C |
| Lord, Jonathan Woking | C |
| Loughton, Tim Worthing East & Shoreham | C |
| Love, Andy Edmonton | Lab |
| Lucas, Dr Caroline Brighton Pavilion | Green |
| Lucas, Ian Wrexham | Lab |
| Luff, Peter Worcestershire Mid | C |
| Lumley, Karen Redditch | C |
M
| Macleod, Mary Brentford & Isleworth | C |
| MacNeil, Angus Na h-Eileanan an Iar | SNP |
| MacShane, Denis Rotherham | Lab |
| Mactaggart, Fiona Slough | Lab |
| Mahmood, Shabana Birmingham Ladywood | Lab |
| Mahmood, Khalid Birmingham Perry Barr | Lab |
| Main, Anne St Albans | C |
| Mann, John Bassetlaw | Lab |
| Marsden, Gordon Blackpool South | Lab |
| Maude, Francis Horsham | C |
| May, Theresa Maidenhead | C |
| Maynard, Paul Blackpool North & Cleveleys | C |
| McCabe, Steve Birmingham Selly Oak | Lab |
| McCann, Michael East Kilbride, Strathaven | |
| & Lesmahagow | Lab |
| McCarthy, Kerry Bristol East | Lab |
| McCartney, Jason Colne Valley | C |
| McCartney, Karl Lincoln | C |
| McClymont, Gregg Cumbernauld, Kilsyth | |
| & Kirkintilloch East | Lab |
| McCrea, Rev William Antrim South | DUP |
| McDonagh, Siobhain Mitcham & Morden | Lab |
| McDonnell, Dr Alasdair Belfast South | SDLP |
| McDonnell, John Hayes & Harlington | Lab |
| McFadden, Pat Wolverhampton South East | Lab |
| McGovern, Jim Dundee West | Lab |
| McGovern, Alison Wirral South | Lab |
| McGuinness, Martin Ulster Mid | SF |
| McGuire, Anne Stirling | Lab |
| McIntosh, Anne Thirsk & Malton | C |
| McKechin, Ann Glasgow North | Lab |
| McKinnell, Catherine Newcastle upon Tyne North | Lab |
| McLoughlin, Patrick Derbyshire Dales | C |
| McPartland, Stephen Stevenage | C |
| McVey, Esther Wirral West | C |
| Meacher, Michael Oldham West & Royton | Lab |
| Meale, Joseph Mansfield | Lab |
| Mearns, Ian Gateshead | Lab |
| Menzies, Mark Fylde | C |
| Mercer, Patrick Newark | C |
| Metcalfe, Stephen Basildon South & Thurrock East | C |
| Michael, Alun Cardiff South & Penarth | Lab |
| Miliband, Ed Doncaster North | Lab |
| Miliband, David South Shields | Lab |
| Miller, Maria Basingstoke | C |
| Miller, Andrew Ellesmere Port & Neston | Lab |
| Mills, Nigel Amber Valley | C |
| Milton, Anne Guildford | C |
| Mitchell, Austin Great Grimsby | Lab |
| Mitchell, Andrew Sutton Coldfield | C |
| Moon, Madeleine Bridgend | Lab |
| Moore, Michael Berwickshire, Roxburgh & Selkirk | LD |
| Mordaunt, Penny Portsmouth North | C |
| Morden, Jessica Newport East | Lab |
| Morgan, Nicky Loughborough | C |
| Morrice, Graeme Livingston | Lab |
| Morris, Grahame Easington | Lab |
| Morris, James Halesowen & Rowley Regis | C |
| Morris, David Morecambe & Lunesdale | C |
| Morris, Anne-Marie Newton Abbot | C |
| Mosley, Stephen City of Chester | C |
| Mowat, David Warrington South | C |
| Mudie, George Leeds East | Lab |
| Mulholland, Greg Leeds North West | LD |
| Mundell, David Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale | |
| & Tweeddale | C |
| Munn, Meg Sheffield Heeley | Lab |
| Munt, Tessa WellsL | D |
| Murphy, Conor Newry & Armagh | SF |
| Murphy, Jim Renfrewshire East | Lab |
| Murphy, Paul Torfaen | Lab |
| Murray, Sheryll Cornwall South East | C |
| Murray, Ian Edinburgh South | Lab |
| Murrison, Andrew Wiltshire South West | C |
N
| Nandy, Lisa Wigan | Lab |
| Nash, Pamela Airdrie & Shotts | Lab |
| Neill, Bob Bromley & Chislehurst | C |
| Newmark, Brooks Braintree | C |
| Newton, Sarah Truro & Falmouth | C |
| Nokes, Caroline Romsey & Southampton North | C |
| Norman, Jesse Hereford & Herefordshire South | C |
| Nuttall, David Bury North | C |
O
| O’Brien, Stephen Eddisbury | C |
| O’Donnell, Fiona East Lothian | Lab |
| Offord, Matthew Hendon | C |
| Ollerenshaw, Eric Lancaster & Fleetwood | C |
| Onwurah, Chi Newcastle upon Tyne Central | Lab |
| Opperman, Guy Hexham | C |
| Osborne, Sandra Ayr, Carrick & Cumnock | Lab |
| Osborne, George Tatton | C |
| Ottaway, Richard Croydon South | C |
| Owen, Albert Ynys Mon | Lab |
P
| Paice, Jim Cambridgeshire South East | C |
| Paisley, Ian Junior Antrim North | DUP |
| Parish, Neil Tiverton & Honiton | C |
| Patel, Priti Witham | C |
| Paterson, Owen Shropshire North | C |
| Pawsey, Mark Rugby | C |
| Pearce, Teresa Erith & Thamesmead | Lab |
| Penning, Mike Hemel Hempstead | C |
| Penrose, John Weston-super-Mare | C |
| Percy, Andrew Brigg & Goole | C |
| Perkins, Toby Chesterfield | Lab |
| Perry, Claire Devizes | C |
| Phillips, Stephen Sleaford & North Hykeham | C |
| Phillipson, Bridget Houghton & Sunderland South | Lab |
| Pickles, Eric Brentwood & Ongar | C |
| Pincher, Christopher Tamworth | C |
| Poulter, Daniel Suffolk Central & Ipswich North | C |
| Pound, Stephen Ealing North | Lab |
| Primarolo, Dawn Bristol South | Lab |
| Prisk, Mark Hertford & Stortford | C |
| Pritchard, Mark Wrekin, The | C |
| Pugh, John Southport | LD |
Q
| Qureshi, Yasmin Bolton South East | Lab |
R
| Raab, Dominic Esher & Walton | C |
| Randall, John Uxbridge & Ruislip South | C |
| Raynsford, Nick Greenwich & Woolwich | Lab |
| Reckless, Mark Rochester & Strood | C |
| Redwood, John Wokingham | C |
| Reed, Jamie Copeland | Lab |
| Rees-Mogg, Jacob Somerset North East | C |
| Reevell, Simon Dewsbury | C |
| Reeves, Rachel Leeds West | Lab |
| Reid, Alan Argyll & Bute | LD |
| Reynolds, Jonathan Stalybridge & Hyde | Lab |
| Reynolds, Emma Wolverhampton North East | Lab |
| Rifkind, Sir Malcolm Kensington | C |
| Riordan, Linda Halifax | Lab |
| Ritchie, Margaret Down South | SDLP |
| Robathan, Andrew Leicestershire South | C |
| Robertson, Hugh Faversham & Kent Mid | C |
| Robertson, John Glasgow North West | Lab |
| Robertson, Angus Moray | SNP |
| Robertson, Laurence Tewkesbury | C |
| Robinson, Geoffrey Coventry North West | Lab |
| Rogerson, Dan Cornwall North | LD |
| Rosindell, Andrew Romford | C |
| Rotheram, Steve Liverpool Walton | Lab |
| Roy, Lindsay Glenrothes | Lab |
| Roy, Frank Motherwell & Wishaw | Lab |
| Ruane, Chris Vale of Clwyd | Lab |
| Rudd, Amber Hastings & Rye | C |
| Ruddock, Joan Lewisham Deptford | Lab |
| Ruffley, David Bury St Edmunds | C |
| Russell, Bob Colchester | LD |
| Rutley, David Macclesfield | C |
S
| Sanders, Adrian Torbay | LD |
| Sandys, Laura Thanet South | C |
| Sarwar, Anas Glasgow Central | Lab |
| Scott, Lee Ilford North | C |
| Seabeck, Alison Plymouth Moor View | Lab |
| Selous, Andrew Bedfordshire South West | C |
| Shannon, Jim Strangford | DUP |
| Shapps, Grant Welwyn Hatfield | C |
| Sharma, Virendra Ealing Southall | Lab |
| Sharma, Alok Reading West | C |
| Sheerman, Barry Huddersfield | Lab |
| Shelbrooke, Alec Elmet & Rothwell | C |
| Shepherd, Richard Aldridge-Brownhills | C |
| Sheridan, Jim Paisley & Renfrewshire North | Lab |
| Shuker, Gavin Luton South | Lab |
| Simmonds, Mark Boston & Skegness | C |
| Simpson, Keith Broadland | C |
| Simpson, Thomas David Upper Bann | DUP |
| Singh, Marsha Bradford West | Lab |
| Skidmore, Chris Kingswood | C |
| Skinner, Dennis Bolsover | Lab |
| Slaughter, Andy Hammersmith | Lab |
| Smith, Sir Robert Aberdeenshire West & Kincardine | LD |
| Smith, Nick Blaenau Gwent | Lab |
| Smith, Henry Crawley | C |
| Smith, Chloe Norwich North | C |
| Smith, Andrew Oxford East | Lab |
| Smith, Angela Penistone & Stocksbridge | Lab |
| Smith, Owen Pontypridd | Lab |
| Smith, Julian Skipton & Ripon | C |
| Soames, Nicholas Sussex Mid | C |
| Soubry, Anna Broxtowe | C |
| Soulsby, Sir Peter Leicester South | Lab |
| Spellar, John Warley | Lab |
| Spelman, Caroline Meriden | C |
| Spencer, Mark Sherwood | C |
| Stanley, Sir John Tonbridge & Malling | C |
| Stephenson, Andrew Pendle | C |
| Stevenson, John Carlisle | C |
| Stewart, Bob Beckenham | C |
| Stewart, Iain Milton Keynes South | C |
| Stewart, Rory Penrith & The Border | C |
| Straw, Jack Blackburn | Lab |
| Streeter, Gary Devon South West | C |
| Stride, Mel Devon Central | C |
| Stringer, Graham Blackley & Broughton | Lab |
| Stuart, Graham Beverley & Holderness | C |
| Stuart, Gisela Birmingham Edgbaston | Lab |
| Stunell, Andrew Hazel Grove | LD |
| Sturdy, Julian York Outer | C |
| Sutcliffe, Gerry Bradford South | Lab |
| Swales, Ian Redcar | LD |
| Swayne, Desmond New Forest West | C |
| Swinson, Jo Dunbartonshire East | LD |
| Swire, Hugo Devon East | C |
| Syms, Robert Poole | C |
T
| Tami, Mark Alyn & Deeside | Lab |
| Tapsell, Sir Peter Louth & Horncastle | C |
| Teather, Sarah Brent Central | LD |
| Thomas, Gareth Harrow West | Lab |
| Thornberry, Emily Islington South & Finsbury | Lab |
| Thurso, John Caithness, Sutherland & Easter Ross | LD |
| Timms, Stephen East Ham | Lab |
| Timpson, Edward Crewe & Nantwich | C |
| Tomlinson, Justin Swindon North | C |
| Tredinnick, David Bosworth | C |
T
| Trickett, Jon Hemsworth | Lab |
| Truss, Elizabeth Norfolk South West | C |
| Turner, Karl Hull East | Lab |
| Turner, Andrew Isle of Wight | C |
| Twigg, Derek Halton | Lab |
| Twigg, Stephen Liverpool West Derby | Lab |
| Tyrie, Andrew Chichester | C |
U
| Umunna, Chuka Streatham | Lab |
| Uppal, Paul Wolverhampton South West | C |
V
| Vaizey, Ed Wantage | C |
| Vara, Shailesh Cambridgeshire North West | C |
| Vaz, Keith Leicester East | Lab |
| Vaz, Valerie Walsall South | Lab |
| Vickers, Martin Cleethorpes | C |
| Villiers, Theresa Chipping Barnet | C |
W
| Walker, Charles Broxbourne | C |
| Walker, Robin Worcester | C |
| Wallace, Ben Wyre & Preston North | C |
| Walley, Joan Stoke-on-Trent North | Lab |
| Walter, Bob Dorset North | C |
| Ward, David Bradford East | LD |
| Watkinson, Angela Hornchurch & Upminster | C |
| Watson, Tom West Bromwich East | Lab |
| Watts, Dave St Helens North | Lab |
| Weatherley, Mike Hove | C |
| Webb, Steve Thornbury & Yate | LD |
| Weir, Mike Angus | SNP |
| Wharton, James Stockton South | C |
| Wheeler, Heather Derbyshire South | C |
| White, Chris Warwick & Leamington | C |
| Whiteford, Eilidh Banff & Buchan | SNP |
| Whitehead, Alan Southampton Test | Lab |
| Whittaker, Craig Calder Valley | C |
| Whittingdale, John Maldon | C |
| Wicks, Malcolm Croydon North | Lab |
| Wiggin, Bill Herefordshire North | C |
| Willetts, David Havant | C |
| Williams, Hywel Arfon | PC |
| Williams, Roger Brecon & Radnorshire | LD |
| Williams, Stephen Bristol West | LD |
| Williams, Mark Ceredigion | LD |
| Williamson, Chris Derby North | Lab |
| Williamson, Gavin Staffordshire South | C |
| Willott, Jenny Cardiff Central | LD |
| Wilson, Sammy Antrim East | DUP |
| Wilson, Rob Reading East | C |
| Wilson, Phil Sedgefield | Lab |
| Winnick, David Walsall North | Lab |
| Winterton, Rosie Doncaster Central | Lab |
| Wishart, Pete Perth & Perthshire North | SNP |
| Wollaston, Dr Sarah Totnes | C |
| Wood, Mike Batley & Spen | Lab |
| Woodcock, John Barrow & Furness | Lab |
| Woodward, Shaun St Helens South & Whiston | Lab |
| Woolas, Phil Oldham East & Saddleworth | Lab |
| Wright, Iain Hartlepool | Lab |
| Wright, Jeremy Kenilworth & Southam | C |
| Wright, Simon Norwich South | LD |
| Wright, David Telford | Lab |
Y
| Yeo, Tim Suffolk South | C |
| Young, Sir George Hampshire North West | C |
Z
| Zahawi, Nadhim Stratford-on-Avon | C |
The new Parliament
An ordinary beginning to an extraordinary campaign
Roland Watson
Political Editor
After asking the Queen to dissolve Parliament, Gordon Brown returned from Buckingham Palace to Downing Street and declared: “I come from an ordinary family in an ordinary town.” As the opening line of the 2010 general election, it was designed to draw attention to the privileged background of his Eton-educated Conservative rival, David Cameron. It ill served as a guide for what followed, though, which was, by any standards of modern British political history, extraordinary.
None of the three leaders had led their parties into a general election and each faced a monumental task. Mr Brown was seeking an historic fourth term for Labour against the backdrop of the deepest recession for 60 years. He was also looking to overcome the memory of the election-that-never-was in October 2007 when, five months after inheriting the job from Tony Blair and revving up Labour’s campaign machine, he ducked out of going to the country at the last moment.
Mr Cameron needed to achieve the biggest swing since the war to gain the 116 seats required for a Commons majority. His party had endured a jittery few months in which questions about its economic policy and a tightening in the polls fed off each other to spread deep unease through Tory ranks. He was beginning the campaign with a seven-point lead, well down from the double digits the Tories had enjoyed for most of the past year and not enough for an outright win.
Nick Clegg, the Liberal Democrat leader, needed to capitalise on the prospects of a hung Parliament. He also had the first televised debates between the leaders to look forward to. They would offer him a stage never before enjoyed by his predecessors: equal prime-time billing with his two rivals. Initially, though, the campaign conformed to type, focusing on the two established parties. Mr Cameron pre-empted Mr Brown’s return from the Palace to stage a rally on the south bank of the Thames, across from Westminster. Waving his finger at the Houses of Parliament, he vowed to “make people feel proud again of that building over there”. He was, he said, campaigning for “the Great Ignored”, a group that encompassed black, white, rich, poor, town and country folk. It was a slogan he ignored for the rest of the campaign.
The styles of the Tory and Labour campaigns differed starkly from the start. As Mr Cameron tore round the country on a leased private plane, Mr Brown made political capital out of financial necessity, travelling by rail in standard class. Labour had raised less than half the Tories’ £18 million war chest, and had spent much of it during the phoney war since the start of the year. Once at his campaigning destinations, Mr Brown rarely delivered speeches, preferring to meet small groups of voters in supermarket canteens or the living rooms of Labour supporters, fuelling questions about whether he was reaching swing voters. Mr Cameron, boasting a campaign team with a sharper eye for “optics”, was pictured repeatedly, sleeves rolled up, in warehouses or stock rooms surrounded by workers and clearly visible logos of well-known brands.
The contrast carried through to their manifestos, in which Labour offered a “smarter” State, the Tories a smaller one. Mr Brown unveiled a traditional-looking pitch in a newly built and soon-to-be-opened wing of a Birmingham hospital. It promised to tailor public services to people’s needs, giving them guarantees on rights of redress against schools, hospitals and police forces if services failed to reach certain standards.
The Tory manifesto was unusual and innovative, and not just for being presented in the semi ruins of Battersea power station. A hard-backed blue book on A5 paper titled An Invitation to Join the Government of Britain, it urged people to take more control over their workplaces, children’s schools and how they are policed and ruled, offering a glimpse of life in what Mr Cameron billed the Big Society.
Mr Clegg chose the City of London as his launch pad, an attempt to show that the party often criticised for having uncosted policies was serious about its finances. The signature policy was to raise the starting threshold for income tax from £6,500 to £10,000, costing £17 billion. The document even included tax tables at the back to show that the sums added up, calculations immediately disputed by Labour and the Tories.
The choice between an empowered individual in a smaller Tory State and a smarter Labour State that provided service guarantees offered the central intellectual dividing line, although both sides fought surprisingly shy of their offering on the stump. Instead, the debate revolved around the economy, in particular whether the £6 billion of immediate savings the Tories were proposing to make in Whitehall, and subsequently used to ease Labour’s proposed rise in national insurance contributions, would help or hinder the recovery.
So far, so normal. The campaign was turned on its head from the moment Mr Clegg stared into the cameras of the first TV debate, hosted by ITV in Manchester, and told the 10 million viewers that he was offering something other than business as usual. Presenting himself as a fresh alternative to the tired old parties he was fighting, he spoke crisply and directly about bringing fundamental change to politics. Mr Brown, sensing the early mastery of the medium shown by Mr Clegg and keen to isolate Mr Cameron, used the words “I agree with Nick” half a dozen times. (The following day, the phrase was appearing on Lib Dem badges, posters and banners.) But Mr Clegg would not be caught in a Labour bear hug. Mr Cameron, expected to shine on a stage apparently made for the ease and informality of his communication skills, tried to look prime ministerial but instead appeared stiff and awkward.
Mr Clegg ran away with the verdict of viewers. In the course of 90 minutes he had wrested from Mr Cameron the mantle of change, in which the Tory leader had cloaked himself for the past four years. Within days, the Lib Dems shot up ten points in the polls. One found Mr Clegg to be the most popular political leader since Churchill. And so the game changed. Although campaigning continued, the oxygen sucked up by the first debate in effect suspended the state of the race while all sides waited for the second debate. Hosted by Sky in Bristol, it saw Mr Cameron recover some of his poise. Mr Clegg, despite his first success, refused to play safe, showed that his first offering was no fluke and cemented his place as a contender.
Shortly before the third debate, Mr Clegg, in an interview with The Times, said that the Lib Dems had replaced Labour as the progressive force in politics and that the election now boiled down to a two-horse race between him and Mr Cameron. Two weeks previously such an assertion would have been laughed out of court. With many polls showing the Lib Dems nudging ahead of Labour, it now carried weight.
Mr Clegg’s success, or Cleggmania to give it its official media term, forced Labour and the Tories into tactical switches. They both turned their guns on Lib Dem policies, such as an amnesty on some illegal immigrants, softer sentencing and a refusal to guarantee the future of Britian’s nuclear deterrent. The Tories did so with menaced warnings whereas Labour, with an eye on the possibilities of a Lib-Lab deal if voters returned a hung Parliament, were less harsh.
Mr Brown also re-wrote his personal campaign. Labour strategists, faced with selling a leader who was unpopular with voters, had kept the Prime Minister to a routine of small meetings largely behind closed doors. It had left Mr Brown frustrated. He would spend the final ten days meeting more “real people” and making more speeches. The new style made a calamitous start. In Rochdale, Mr Brown was accosted by a Labour-supporting grandmother, Gillian Duffy, who took him to task on issues ranging from student fees to immigration. She walked away happy to have had her say and quietly thrilled to have met the Prime Minister. He got into his official car and branded the mild confrontation a disaster, called her a bigoted woman and blamed an aide. The remarks were picked up by a radio microphone he had worn for his walkabout and had not yet taken off.
For the rest of the day Mrs Duffy became the centre of an extraordinary maelstrom. She was devastated to learn of Mr Brown’s remarks, which were played repeatedly on news channels. They were doubly damaging: Mr Brown had appeared deaf to the concerns of millions of voters on immigration; and his apparent instinct to blame aides underlined a wider perception of character flaws. Over the next six hours, Mr Brown apologised six times. He tore up his schedule, abandoned preparation for the following day’s final debate and returned to Rochdale where he spent 40 minutes in Mrs Duffy’s living room trying to explain himself.
The third and final debate, hosted by the BBC in Birmingham, was Mr Brown’s last chance to turn the campaign around. Labour aides had negotiated successfully for its theme to be the economy, Mr Brown’s perceived strongest suit. Although he put in his best performace, he again trailed in third place, according to snap polls. In the final days, he was at his best, delivering his most passionate speech on social justice to an audience in London. Some wondered where this fiery campaigner had been for the previous three weeks, and why he had not been let loose. Others concluded that he was able to let himself go because he suspected he had lost.
On the eve of polling day Mr Cameron campaigned through the night, a self-consciously arduous bus trip from Scotland to Bristol via Grimsby where he met night workers in depots and sorting offices along the way. Such a gruelling final lap was hardly the best preparation for what was to follow.
Polling day itself was marred by near tragedy when Nigel Farage, an MEP and the former leader of the UK Independence Party, escaped with his life from a light plane crash after a campaign stunt went disastrously wrong. The aircraft carrying Mr Farage, who was standing against the Speaker, John Bercow, in Buckingham, was trailing a 15ft banner that read: “Vote for your country – Vote UKIP”. The banner became entangled with the plane’s tail about 10ft above the ground, causing it to nosedive. Mr Farage said that he and his pilot, Justin Adams, had had a miraculous escape.
On the stroke of 10pm, the exit poll commissioned by the BBC, ITN and Sky suggested that the Tories would win 307 seats, Labour 255 and the Liberal Democrats 59, pointing to the first hung Parliament for 36 years. Its forecasting was immediately doubted by psephologists, both amateur and professional, who believed that a survey of 18,000 voters at 130 polling stations would fail to catch the Lib Dem surge. In fact, it turned out to be remarkably prescient.
An eleventh-hour surge of voters, Lib Dem or otherwise, did, however, surprise election officials across the country. Queues of voters, some who had been waiting up to an hour, were turned away from polling stations in Sheffield, Leeds, Manchester, Chester, Lewisham and Hackney. There, officials applied the letter of the law and closed the door on anyone who had not been admitted and received a ballot paper. Their counterparts in Newcastle and Sutton Coldfield defied electoral law and stayed open past 10pm to let people vote. The scenes of chaos, to which the police were called in some cases, triggered a review by the Electoral Commission that could have far-reaching implications for the way Britain votes.
Britain woke on May 7 to a landscape unfamiliar to this generation of politicians. There was no clear winner and each party leader had reason to feel disappointed. Mr Cameron had failed to translate an economic crisis and weariness with 13 years of Labour into an overall Tory majority. Mr Brown had polled 29 per cent, only marginally above the party’s disastrous showing in 1983, and had lost 91 seats. For all the enthusiasm that surrounded Mr Clegg during the campaign, he had lost five seats.
Voters had handed them not just the first hung Parliament for 36 years, but the most complicated Commons arithmetic since the 1920s. Mr Cameron, with 306 seats, was well short of the 326 that guaranteed a Commons majority. To soldier on alone as a minority government, he would at least need an assurance of broad Liberal Democrat support, known as a “confidence and supply” arrangement, under which the third party would not stand in the way of a Budget or Queen’s Speech in return for some concessions.
On the other side, Labour, with 258 seats, and the Liberal Democrats, with 57, were also well short of being able to form a Lib-Lab pact that commanded a Commons majority. The only certainty was that the Queen would not be receiving any of the party leaders this post-election Friday. Instead, she, and the rest of the country, witnessed an extraordinary three-act drama played out across Westminster as the three leaders began to play the hands dealt them by voters.
Mr Clegg moved first. Arriving at Liberal Democrat headquarters in Cowley Street after taking the dawn train from his constituency in Sheffield, he said that Mr Cameron had the right to try first to form a government. It was a momentous nod, but one that he had set himself up for by insisting during the campaign that he would respect the rights of the party that won the most seats and most votes.
Mr Brown was not for giving in. He pre-empted a Tory response with a brazen assertion of prime ministerial power, emerging from the front door of No 10 to remind the country that he remained in charge. He said his two leadership rivals should take as much time as they felt necessary to see if they could reach a deal. “For my part, I should make clear that I would be willing to see any of the party leaders.”
Within the hour, Mr Cameron was making what he called “a big, open and comprehensive offer to the Liberal Democrats”. Speaking at the St Stephen’s Club in the shadow of a portrait of Churchill, himself at different times a Liberal and a Conservative, Mr Cameron sketched out a possible deal for “collaborative government” between the parties. He did not use the word coalition. After a night grappling with the possibilities, though, that was what he was pitching.
With theatrical timing, Saturday required the three leaders to attend the Cenotaph for the 65th anniversary of VE-Day. Normal service would have seen the Prime Minister approach to lay his wreath first, followed by the two other party leaders in turn. The occasion was choreographed, though, to reflect the election result: the three approached the Cenotaph together. The body language ranged from uncertain to icy.
The first public sign of the talks came on Sunday when the negotiating teams – William Hague, George Osborne, Oliver Letwin and Ed Llewellyn for the Tories; Danny Alexander, Chris Huhne, David Laws and Andrew Stunell for the Lib Dems – arrived at the Cabinet Office. The arrangement for the use of government property with civil servants on hand to answer questions about policies and costings was a first, codified in advance by Sir Gus O’Donnell, the Cabinet Secretary, in preparation for just such an electoral outcome.
To the background clatter of news helicopters overhead, a crowd of political tourists joined reporters outside the teal door of 70, Whitehall, to await news of who would govern and how. The parties left after nearly six hours without a deal. Meanwhile, ominously for the Tories, Mr Brown returned from Scotland and went almost immediately into a meeting with Mr Clegg at the Foreign Office. Cabinet ministers, including Lord Mandeslon, Lord Adonis, Alan Johnson, Ben Bradshaw and Peter Hain were offering increasingly vocal support for the idea of a “rainbow coalition” of Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the nationalist parties and independents. It was clear that Mr Clegg was making Mr Cameron sweat.
Tory perspiration turned to desperation on Monday when Mr Brown played his final card. After two further conversations with Mr Clegg, he stood in Downing Street to announce that the Liberal Democrats wanted to open formal talks with Labour and that he intended to step down. His announcement reversed the chronology of his discussions with Mr Clegg. The Liberal Democrat leader had made clear during the campaign that he could not prop up a defeated Mr Brown in Downing Street. The Prime Minister’s departure, even if at a later date, was a pre-requisite for the start of Lib-Lab talks.
Nonetheless, Mr Brown’s bombshell took the Tories by surprise. Labour, it turned out, had sent its own team of negotiators – Lord Mandelson, Lord Adonis, Ed Balls and Ed Miliband – to talk to the Liberal Democrats on Saturday. Throughout the weekend senior Liberal Democrats, including Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon, Charles Kennedy, Sir Menzies Campbell and Vince Cable, had been urging Mr Brown to budge and thus usher in the “progressive alliance” or realignment of the Left that they, in varying degrees, had devoted their political lives to achieving. The message received in Downing Street from the senior Lib Dems was clear: we do not want to go into coalition with the Tories.
Mr Cameron and those around him had woken on Monday believing that they were heading to Downing Street. Despite offering Mr Clegg a referendum on the alternative vote system and Cabinet seats, they went to bed fearing that they were out of the game. The proposed Lib-Lab deal hit immediate problems, however, on the Tuesday morning. First, senior Labour figures including David Blunkett and John Reid hit the airwaves to warn that the country would not wear what was being dubbed a “coalition of the losers”. The maths were also against it: adding the three Welsh nationalists, four non-Unionist Ulster MPs, one independent Unionist and Britain’s first Green MP to the Labour and Lib Dem ranks gave such a coalition only 324 MPs, hardly the basis for stable government.
Secondly, the two parties’ negotiating teams fared badly. Labour subsequently accused the Liberal Democrats of making unrealistic spending demands; the Liberal Democrats accused Labour of posturing and failing to take them seriously. The upshot was that shortly after lunch, the Tory and Liberal Democrat negotiating teams were back in the Cabinet Office. There, they hammered out terms of a seven-page document that expressed where they agreed and where the Lib Dems would be allowed to opt out of government policy, such as on the future of Trident.
With every passing minute it became clearer that whatever emerged, Labour had lost the negotiations as well as the election. Mr Brown gathered his entourage in Downing Street for his farewell. With the sun beginning to set, and stung by accusations that in fulfilling his constitutional role to remain Prime Minister until an alternative emerged he had tried to cling to office, Mr Brown’s dignity could wait no longer.
In a telephone conversation with Mr Clegg, witnessed by the photographer Martin Argles who was in No 10 to record Mr Brown’s final hours for posterity, the Prime Minister said: “Nick, Nick, I can’t hold on any longer. Nick, I’ve got to go to the Palace. The country expects me to do that. I have to go. The Queen expects me to go. I can’t hold on any longer.”
In Downing Street he ended 13 years of Labour rule that had begun with Tony Blair being cheered from Whitehall to the front door of No 10. In a moment of poignant self-awareness, he said that the job had taught him about the best in human nature and about its frailties “including my own”.
He and his wife, Sarah, walked to the waiting car holding hands with their two sons, John and Fraser, a very rare sight of the family together after years in which the Browns had protected their sons’ privacy.
Within the hour Mr Cameron travelled from a Buckingham Palace bathed in late evening sunshine to the gloom of Downing Street at dusk. He arrived as the youngest Prime Minister since 1812, the twelfth to serve under Elizabeth II and the first Tory for 31 years to depose a Labour prime minister.
How the polls really got it right
Andrew Cooper
Founder of Populus
The 2010 general election saw more opinion polls published than ever before – more than 90 polls during the course of the campaign: a rate of about three per day. Nearly half of these were from one organisation, YouGov, who produced a daily poll for The Sun, but during the campaign 11 different research companies produced voting polls.
The polling organisations between them used every conceivable mode of interviewing voters and deployed a wide range of ways to weight and adjust their data. These differing approaches, however, produced a fairly consistent picture as the election campaign kicked off, with the Conservatives 7 to 10 per cent ahead of Labour and the Liberal Democrats about a further 10 per cent behind. The polling story of the campaign was the subsequent abrupt surge in Liberal Democrat support, and its failure to materialise on election day.
Several polls picked up a growing frustration among many voters during the first week of the campaign. Even before the first TV debate the Populus poll for The Times published on April 14 found that more voters were hoping that the election would result in a hung Parliament than in a Conservative or Labour majority. The same poll found 75 per cent thinking that it was “time for a change from Labour”, but only 34 per cent that it was also “time for a change to the Conservatives”; two fifths of the electorate wanting change, but unsure which party, if any, they trusted to deliver the kind of change they wanted. Furthermore, only 6 per cent of voters felt that the main parties were being completely honest about their plans for dealing with the deficit and only 4 per cent that they were being honest about their tax plans. These findings to a great extent defined the mood of the voters.
The first debate resulted in one of the most dramatic swings in party support ever seen, with the Liberal Democrats jumping by about 10 per cent more or less literally overnight, with the gain coming slightly more from the Conservatives than from Labour. There were nearly 40 polls published between the end of the first debate and the end of the third debate and the Lib Dems were in the lead in five of them and in second place, ahead of Labour, in all but four. When, on the stroke of 10pm on election night, the exit poll predicted that the Liberal Democrats would end up with fewer MPs than at the previous election it was met with widespread incredulity because it seemed irreconcilable with the consensus of pre-election polls. The exit poll turned out, of course, to be right.
Close analysis suggests that Lib Dem poll support was always frothy: it relied heavily on strong support from younger voters and people who had not voted at the previous election, groups that in past elections have been disproportionately likely to end up not voting at all. Most polls are weighted to take account of how likely respondents say they are to vote, but there is a tendency for people to overstate their own probability of voting and there is little or nothing pollsters can do systematically to compensate for those who insist that they are certain to vote and then do not.
Polls during the campaign also consistently suggested that Lib Dem support was softer: those saying that they were going to vote Lib Dem were also consistently more likely than Labour or Conservative voters to say that they had not definitely decided and may end up voting differently. The implication of these findings was that the election result was always likely to be worse for the Lib Dems than the mid-campaign polls implied. But voting polls are heavily modelled these days, applying adjustments intended to project what the result will look like, not just present a snapshot of responses. This means that by the end of the campaign the polls ought to have reflected the underlying softness in Lib Dem support in a lower vote share, and that did not happen. Furthermore all the opinion polls overstated support for the Lib Dems: if the polls overall were performing properly they should have scattered either side of the result, with some understating Lib Dem support, and that did not happen either.
There is some evidence that the swing away from the Lib Dems mainly occurred in the final 24 hours, too late to be properly reflected in the final pre-election polls. The Times poll published on election day, for example, put support for the Conservatives on 37 per cent (which is what they got), Labour on 28 per cent (they got 30 per cent) and Lib Dems on 27 per cent (they got 23.5 per cent). Fieldwork for this poll was done on the Tuesday and Wednesday before the election and the two halves of the sample produced revealingly different results. The 1,500 interviews conducted on Tuesday, May 4, would, if presented separately, have shown the Conservatives on 35 per cent, Labour on 26 per cent and Lib Dems on 29 per cent. But among the 1,000 people interviewed on Wednesday, May 5, the Conservatives were on 38 per cent, Labour on 30 per cent and the Lib Dems on 24 per cent. Conducting fieldwork over a longer timeframe – two or three days, rather than one – generally improves the chances of a poll sample being properly representative, capturing the views of busy and harder-to-reach voters. In this case it may have helped to obscure a very late swing away from the Lib Dems, principally to Labour.
It was not all bad news for the pollsters. All but one of the nine organisations that produced a poll on electioneve came within 2 per cent of the Conservative share, five were within 1 per cent and two got it exactly right. All but two of the final polls came within 2 per cent of the Labour share and two were within 1 per cent. Overall it was not as good a performance as 2005, when the polls as a whole were more accurate than ever before, but it was better than at many other elections.
A tremor that changed the political landscape
Peter Riddell
Chief Political
Commentator
The general election of May 6, 2010 was one of the most enthralling and exciting in living memory. Yet the dramas of the televised leaders’ debates and of the negotiations leading to the creation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition Government have tended to obscure the big changes in voting patterns.
Although the Conservatives failed to secure an overall Commons majority, they still gained 100 seats and one of the largest swings of votes ever recorded. There were big variations in party performance in different parts of the country, and all three main parties both gained and lost seats. In detail, the election was notable for a big increase in turnout of 3.7 points up to 65.1 per cent. This was still well below the levels familiar before 2001 (a range of 71 to 79 per cent between 1955 and 1997) but it partly reversed the sharp decline in 2001, down to 59.4 per cent, with just a small recovery to 61.4 per cent in 2005. The Conservatives boosted their share of the vote by 3.7 points to 36 per cent. With the higher turnout, this gave them nearly 2 million more votes, up to 10.71 million. This was a clear 2 million ahead of Labour, which suffered a decline of nearly 1 million in its vote to 8.6 million. Its share of the vote fell by 6.2 points to 29 per cent, its lowest since 1983.
Many Labour MPs were relieved that the party had not done worse, partly because of fears towards the end of the campaign that it might come third in share of the votes and win only 200 to 220 MPs. Labour also did well in the borough elections in inner London and in district elections in some northern and big cities. But May 6 was still the party’s second worst performance since 1918 and most of its gains achieved since the early 1990s in the Midlands and southern England outside the big cities were reversed.
More than a third of voters, 35 per cent, voted for parties other than the Tories and Labour, the highest proportion since 1918. Conversely, the creation of the coalition means that, together, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats won, at 59 per cent, the highest percentage of the vote for any new government since 1945. The Liberal Democrats managed to raise their vote by nearly 850,000 to 6.83 million, an increase of 1 point to 23 per cent. The Democratic Unionists are now the second largest opposition party, although with just eight MPs after Peter Robinson, their leader and the First Minister, lost his seat to the Alliance party, which gained its first Westminster MP.
The Scottish Nationalists were unchanged on six seats (although they did lose a by-election gain) with Plaid Cymru on three seats. The UK Independence Party did, as usual in general elections, much less well than in the previous European Parliament elections, but boosted its vote by a third to 917,832, an increase of 0.9 points to 3.1 per cent. This partly reflected a rise of 62 in its number of candidates up to 558.
The British National Party, with 220 more candidates, at 339, nearly tripled its vote to 564,000, a rise of 1.2 points to 1.9 per cent. The Greens, who gained their first MP, maintained their vote in absolute terms at 286,000, but had a 0.1 point decline in share to 1 per cent.
The Conservatives always faced an uphill struggle to win an overall Commons majority. Their starting point of 198 MPs was less than Labour at its lowest point in 1983 of 209. Even after adjusting for the boundary changes that came into force in the May 2010 election and produced a notional gain for the Conservatives up to 209, the party still faced a huge mountain.
The swing of 4.9 per cent from Labour to the Tories was the third largest since 1945, exceeded only by the huge 10.2 per cent swing to Labour in the Blair landslide in 1997 and the 5.3 per cent swing to the Tories under Margaret Thatcher in 1979. The May 6 swing was exactly the same as the late Sir Edward Heath achieved when winning office in 1970, but it was still not enough to produce an overall Conservative majority, given the number of seats that had to be won.
The Tory share of votes cast, at 36 per cent, was the party’s lowest lower for a century and a half, apart from the three Blair victories in 1997, 2001 and 2005. The most comparable performances were in the 1920s, another era of three-party politics. The Tories won 37 to 38 per cent of the total votes cast in three of the four general elections in the 1920s.
Nevertheless, the Conservatives gained a net 96 seats, rising to 306, only 20 short of an overall majority. This involved 100 gains and four loses (all but one to the Liberal Democrats). This is the largest number of seats gained by the Conservatives at a single general election since 1931 after the collapse of the Labour Government. It exceeds the 62 seats gained by Mrs Thatcher in 1979 and the 58 gained in 1983; and, in its turn, is exceeded only by Labour’s 236 gains in 1945 and 147 in 1997.
Labour lost a net 90 MPs, with 94 losses and four gains (including from independents in Blaenau Gwent and Bethnal Green & Bow). This is by far the worst Labour performance since its debacle in 1931, when it was reduced to just 52 MPs. Since the 1945 election, the biggest Labour losses of seats have been 78 MPs in 1950, 76 in 1970, and 60 in 1983.
The Lib Dems suffered a net loss of 5 seats, down to 57. This involved a loss of 13 seats (all but one to the Tories) and a gain of 8 (5 from Labour and 3 from the Tories).
One of the most striking features of election night was how the Tories won seats very high up on their target list but failed to win ones lower down, the mirror image of the Labour performance. For instance, the Tories captured Cannock Chase on a 14 per cent swing, but failed to take Birmingham Edgbaston, which required a swing of only 2 per cent. Gisela Stuart, the victor in Egbaston, was one of the heroines in being an early winner in the Blair landslide of 1997 and, apart from a brief period as a minister, she has been an independent- minded backbencher, notably on Europe.
Of the 116 gains needed to win an overall majority, the Tories failed to capture 34, nearly half of which were successfully retained by the Lib Dems. The Lib Dems’ net loss of seats was disappointing to them after the high expectations produced by Nick Clegg’s success in the television debates. Yet the party did well in resisting the broader pro-Tory swing, notably in some of the top 30 Tory targets, such as Cheltenham, Somerton & Frome, Eastleigh, Westmoreland & Lonsdale, Carshalton & Wallington and Taunton Deane (three held by future ministers in the coalition Government). The Tories also failed to win any of their target seats from the SNP.
The other Labour seats to hold out against the trend were Westminster North (held by Karen Buck against the controversial Tory barrister Joanne Cash), Eltham, Bradford West, Hammersmith, Halifax, Gedling, Poplar & Limehouse (where Jim Fitzpatrick easily saw off George Galloway, the former Respect MP), Elmet & Rothwell (where Ed Balls held on after a fierce campaign), Tynemouth, Bolton West and Bolton North East.
Labour did worse in England (down 7.4 points) and slightly worse in Wales (down 6.5 points) than it did nationwide (down 6.2 points), but managed to improve its relative share in Scotland by 3.1 points compared with 2005. In England, the best Labour performances were in London, where the swing to the Tories was just 2.5 per cent, half the UK average. This explains its success in holding on, against the trend, to the seats mentioned above, as well as in seeing off Lib Dem challenges in Islington South and the new Hampstead & Kilburn seat (where Glenda Jackson beat her Tory challenger by 42 votes in a tight three-way contest).
Labour’s vote fell by 2.3 per cent in London, but 8.2 per cent elsewhere in England and, apart from Battersea, the Tory gains were concentrated in a band on the northwest of the capital, from Brentford & Isleworth, via Ealing Central & Acton, up to Harrow East and Hendon. Labour did well in seats with a large Muslim population, where the party suffered in 2005 because of the Iraq war, such as some in East London where Respect had done well in 2005 (East Ham, West Ham and Bethnal Green & Bow).
Outside London and the big industrial cities and towns of the North Labour did very badly along the motorway belts and in the East and West Midlands (together accounting for a third of their losses). Labour lost Middle England (but not Scotland and, partly, Wales) where Tony Blair’s new Labour did so well in the 1990s. The map shows vividly how Labour was wiped out in the Medway towns, where it just held on in 2005 (Chatham & Aylesford, Dartford, Gillingham & Rainham); and on the other side of the Thames in Essex (Basildon South & Thurrock East, Thurrock, and Harlow); in its 1997 gains along the South Coast (Brighton Kemptown, Dover, Hastings & Rye, Hove, and Dorset South); in the southern East Midlands (both Milton Keynes and Northampton seats, Nuneaton and Rugby); in a belt of more than a dozen seats from Worcestershire up around Birmingham and into Staffordshire, Derbyshire and the northern East Midlands (such as Burton, Cannock Chase, Corby, Derbyshire South, Erewash, High Peak, Leicestershire North West, Lincoln, Stafford, Tamworth, Warwick & Leamington, Warwickshire North, Wolverhampton South West, Worcester and Redditch); in South Yorkshire and Humberside (Brigg & Goole and Cleethorpes); and then in an unbroken group on either side of the Pennines (Colne Valley, Dewsbury, Keighley, Pendle, Pudsey, Rossendale & Darwen and South Ribble).
This analysis is reinforced by a social breakdown by Ipsos MORI, based on its campaign polls weighted to reflect the final result. This suggests that Labour lost the support of skilled manual workers, the C2s, by a huge 18 points on the 2005 election. The switch was even sharper among C2 women. This is classic aspirational Britain, highlighted by Lord Radice, the Labour peer and former MP who produced a detailed analysis for the Fabian Society after Labour lost in 1992. Entitled Southern Discomfort, this showed why the party was out of touch with the interests and hopes of this group: a problem that Mr Blair successfully addressed in 1997.
One of the perennial complaints of the Tories is that the electoral system is biased against them because of the way that boundary changes work. They point to the much larger number of votes required to elect a Tory MP compared with a Labour MP, and hence the much larger vote share required for a Tory majority.
This is only partly true. On average, seats won by the Conservatives had larger electorates than those won by Labour by a margin of 3,750: 72,350 to 68,600. But there is an uneven pattern: only four of the ten constituencies with the largest electorates are Tory held, six are Labour held. The main explanation is differential turnout where there is a much larger gap. For instance, the turnout in seats that the Tories won was 68.4 per cent, but it was only 61 per cent in those held by Labour. Hence the proposal by the Conservatives, reaffirmed by the coalition agreement, to equalise the size of constituencies will only partly address the imbalance in the system against the Tories because it will not and cannot address the issue of differential turnout.
The three safest seats in the country are held by Labour in Merseyside: Liverpool Walton, Liverpool West Derby and Knowsley. The safest Tory seat is Richmond, North Yorkshire, held by William Hague. (All three of the main leaders at the election had above-average personal results in their constituencies.) Five seats have majorities of under 100: Hampstead & Kilburn (Lab, 42); Warwickshire North (C, 54); Camborne & Redruth (C, 66); Bolton West (Lab, 92); Thurrock (C, 92); and the narrowest of all in Northern Ireland, where Sinn Féin held Fermanagh & South Tyrone by only 4 votes.
The election saw a further slight improvement in the gender and ethnic balance among candidates, even slighter among MPs. Just over a fifth of candidates were women: at 20.8 per cent, this represented a slight improvement on the figure of 20.3 per cent in 2005. About 30 per cent of Labour’s candidates were women, against 24 per cent of Tories and 22 per cent of Lib Dems.
Just over a fifth (22 per cent) of the new MPs are women: at 142 the highest number and share ever. There are 48 Tory women MPs, 31 more than in 2005. The number of Labour women MPs is 17 less than in 2005 because of the party’s overall losses but, at 81, it is still well over half the total. The Lib Dems continue to perform poorly, with just seven women MPs.
A total of 26 MPs are from minority ethnic groups. The Tory total rose from two to eleven, while Labour numbers rose by two to fifteen. There are still no Lib Dem ethnic minority MPs.
The inconclusive result of the 2010 election leaves intriguing prospects for the next one. The Tories require a further two-point swing from Labour to gain an overall majority and Labour requires a swing from the Tories of 5 per cent to return to power with an absolute majority (exactly the same as the swing against it on May 6).
Who cares what the papers say?
Alexi Mostrous
Media Editor
In 2005, The Sun decided that the general election was so boring that it needed to employ a Page 3 girl to represent each of the three main parties. The paper followed up by announcing support for Mr Blair with a puff of red smoke from an office chimney. Five years on there were no such stunts. Political reporting was re-energised as Labour sought an historic fourth term. As doubts over David Cameron’s prospects of victory increased, editors flooded pages with election copy. In the month before polling day on May 6, national newspapers printed 11,017 stories mentioning the election, compared with 9,263 during the same period in 2005.
After two elections in which the majority of the press supported Tony Blair and new Labour – overwhelmingly in 2001, begrudgingly in 2005 – Gordon Brown entered this campaign without the unequivocal support of a single national daily newspaper. The Sun abandoned Mr Brown in September 2009, defecting on the day of his speech to the annual Labour Party conference. After more than a decade of supporting Mr Blair, the News Corporation publication offered its 7½ million readers the front-page headline: “Labour’s Lost It”. The paper spent the next seven months gleefully capitalising on Mr Brown’s unpopularity. A story in April revealed that even Peppa Pig, the children’s television character, had apparently “turned her back” on Labour.
Less than a week before polling day, The Times came out for the Tories for the first time in 18 years. In a fullpage editorial, the paper said that Mr Cameron had shown the “fortitude, judgment and character to lead this country”. After supporting Labour in the past four general elections, the Financial Times also concluded that “on balance, the Conservative Party best fits the bill”. Less surprisingly, The Daily Telegraph’s 2 million readers were encouraged, for the 18th consecutive time since 1945, to vote Tory, as were the Daily Mail’s 5 million.
In perhaps the most significant change, The Guardian decided to switch its support from Labour to the Liberal Democrats. “Invited to embrace five more years of a Labour government, and of Gordon Brown as prime minister, it is hard to feel enthusiasm,” the paper told its million readers. Even the Daily Mirror, Labour’s most loyal supporter since 1945, urged some of its 3.3 million readers to vote tactically for the Lib Dems.
At the same time, media cognoscenti were calling time on the very relevance of the press. Nick Clegg had supposedly broken the two-party mould with his barnstorming appearance in the first party leaders’ debate on ITV. Like Susan Boyle before him, a virtuoso performance seemed to catapult Mr Clegg into the nation’s consciousness. Unlike Susan Boyle, good first impressions did not translate into votes. The Lib Dem leader’s approval ratings jumped by 11 percentage points but subsequently fell back, with the party winning fewer seats although more votes than in 2005.
Part of that disparity may be explained by the barrage of anti-Clegg stories unleashed by right-leaning newspapers after the first debate on April 15. On the morning of the second debate, the Telegraph used a massive front-page headline to reveal that some Liberal Democrat donors had been paying money directly into Mr Clegg’s bank account. He produced bank statements showing that these were to fund part of a researcher’s salary. The Daily Mail upped the ante with a front page accusing Mr Clegg of a “Nazi Slur”. The story was based on remarks he made in 2002, when he wrote that Britain had a “more insidious…cross to bear” than Germany over Nazism. The scoop drew ire from Mr Clegg’s supporters, who pointed out that the Mail’s website at one point carried no fewer than eight anti-Clegg stories.
Private Eye provided some light relief. “Is Clegg A Poof?” ran a fake Sun headline in the satirical magazine. “Voting For Clegg Will Give You Cancer,” a fake Mail page warned. “And Cause Collapse In House Prices.”
Many journalists expressed excitement at Mr Clegg’s elevation, however, not least because it added to the tantalisingly vague prospect of a hung Parliament. Nick Robinson, the BBC’s political editor, told the Radio 4 Today programme that Cleggmania was “the reason people in our business are getting so excited”. The Sunday Times ran a front-page story on a YouGov poll showing Mr Clegg to be more popular than Winston Churchill.
Whether the attacks on Mr Clegg had a significant effect is arguable. They may have slowed some of his momentum and left voters in doubt as to his party’s ability to govern. Perhaps more likely is that voters showed themselves more influenced by sustained media exposure in the years before an election, which the Lib Dems have never enjoyed, than by a one-off television performance, however impressive. With Mr Clegg as Deputy Prime Minister, that disparity is likely to be corrected.
Mr Cameron and Mr Brown were convinced that newspapers move votes. Yet as Roy Greenslade, Professor of Journalism at City University, points out, the press has been mostly pro-Tory since 1945, but Labour has won more elections. According to an Ipsos MORI poll cited by Professor Greenslade, between 20 and 30 per cent of Daily Mail readers consistently voted Labour between 1997 and 2005, despite the paper’s protestations. In 2010, however, the result may have been more similar to 1992, when only 14 per cent voted for Neil Kinnock.
Times readers appear to be even more independent: 64 per cent agreed with the paper when it advised them to vote Tory in 1992, according to Ipsos MORI, but in 2001, when the paper came out for Labour, 40 per cent of readers still said that they would support the Tories.
About 45 per cent of Sun readers pledged to vote Tory in 1992, when the paper put Neil Kinnock’s head in a light bulb on polling day and ran the headline: “If Kinnock wins today will the last person to leave Britain turn out the lights.” In contrast, only 29 per cent said that they would vote Conservative when the paper supported Mr Blair in 2001. A similar swing back to the Tories this year may have carried influence, especially in marginal seats.
Readers themselves do not consider newspapers to be influential at all. A survey by Press Gazette in March suggested that nine out of ten voters believed that their vote would be unaffected by any media organisation. Editors have to hope that Anthony Wells, a political commentator for YouGov, is right when he says: “The real impact is more subconscious, the long-term drip-drip of positive or negative coverage.”
The great irony about reporting this election is found in the numerous editorials warning voters against a hung Parliament. In the event, the actual outcome of 2010 was one that no newspaper, save The Independent, endorsed.
And the winner is…television
Andrew Billen
Television Critic
The sky was dusty with volcanic ash and the airwaves thick with politics. Yet for a while the electorate refused to inhale. In a multichannel world, it is easy to avoid the news, easier still the election specials. ITVI’s studio debates, Campaign 2010 with Jonathan Dimbleby, lost rather than gained audience as the election wore on. The regular political gabfests, BBC One’s Question Time and The Andrew Marr Show, suffered dwindling not growing viewing figures. It was like soccer fans turning off Match of the Day during the World Cup.
If, like the grounded aeroplanes, the campaign was going to take off, it would take something new, and something different. It was supplied by three live, 90-minute election debates agreed between the politicians and networks after tortuous discussion. Their order having been decided by lottery, the first, ITV’s on April 15, centred on domestic policy. Its MC, Alastair Stewart, proclaimed it historic. Its 9.5 million viewers – a figure that would not disgrace a Saturday night Britain’s Got Talent – apparently agreed. But even Stewart could not have predicted that the commentariate and the focus-grouped would independently declare a clear winner in the Liberal Democrats’ Nick Clegg or that his party’s trend in the polls would go vertical. The debate was declared a “game changer”.
As talent contests, the following debates on April 22 and April 29 were less decisive, mainly because, what by now could be seen as Clegg’s challengers, Gordon Brown and, especially, David Cameron got better at them. Mr Cameron particularly mastered the “trick” of addressing the camera lens directly, a technique pioneered more than 50 years ago when hosts of Sunday Night at the London Palladium realised that faced with the choice of addressing the stalls or the nation’s sitting rooms it was wise to talk to the many not the few.
The second debate, focusing on foreign policy and held by Sky News, was a success for a channel whose political editor, Adam Boulton, had campaigned hard for them to happen. Its 4.4 million viewers was a record audience for a Sky News production. Ofcom, the regulator, received many hundreds of complaints, however, mainly because Boulton, as chairman, broke protocol by asking a question of his own. Most confidently staged was the BBC’s final “economic crisis debate”, although it attracted fewer viewers than the first. Its experienced host, David Dimbleby, intervened more than either Stewart or Boulton, but only to repeat his audience’s questions. In future such debates may have less constricted or more varied formats. It is, surely, impossible to imagine an election happening without them.
With even Jeremy Paxman’s traditional roastings of the leaders producing few headlines, only once outside the set-pieces did television change the agenda, and then it was by accident. A Sky News radio mike was left on and attached to Mr Brown as he sped from an unsatisfactory encounter with a pensioner supporter. She was, he told an aide, a “bigoted woman”. Within hours, his remarks were played back to him on Jeremy Vine’s Radio Two show. The camera showed him head in hands. After a self-immolating visit to Mrs Duffy’s home in Rochdale, Mr Brown emerged before more cameras bashfully declaring himself a sinner but a penitent one. The mini-soap looked a disaster for Mr Brown, but, as it turned out, his ratings had nowhere further to fall.
The election night programmes for the first time featured an exit poll jointly paid for by the BBC, ITV and Sky. Its prediction of a hung Parliament, with Mr Cameron short of an overall majority by 19, was initially treated with scepticism by the studio pundits, mainly because it insisted that the Lib Dems’ representation in Westminster would decline. It proved almost uncannily accurate. The result was so close that BBC One’s election programme, which began at 9.55pm on the Thursday did not end until 8.45am on the Friday. David Dimbleby, showing stamina uncommon in a septuagenarian, resumed his anchorman’s seat at 11am and carried on until 4pm. His efforts, showcased in a huge glass set built in Television Centre, earned the BBC more than 4 million viewers overnight. ITVI’s show, hosted by Alastair Stewart, attracted only an average of 1.26 million and was beaten by a satirical commentary on the results from Channel 4. Sky News did worse than it had five years before, its 111,000 viewers probably depleted by its new-fangled HD transmission causing its sound to ride out of synch.
And so, like the old politics, the senior mass medium endured. Just as there was no decisive breakthrough for the third party, there was none for multichannel or the blogosphere. Had television turned the election into a beauty contest? By the end it appeared more likely that its debates had found a new way to scrutinise not only character but policy and that those of each contestant had been found wanting. The Friday after polling day, Sandy Toksvig, chairwoman of Radio Four’s The News Quiz, made the Nick Clegg/Britain’s Got Talent comparison explicit. We saw someone new, liked what we heard but, in the end, decided to vote for someone else. At least, however, by then we knew whom we were voting for. After a foggy start, it was a good election for television.
It will never be the same again
Daniel Finkelstein
Executive Editor
On Friday, May 7, 2010 David Cameron, the Leader of the Opposition, woke from a very short night’s sleep and made an historic decision. It was one that would propel him into 10 Downing Street within five days and would change British politics for ever. He was, he determined, going to attempt to form the first coalition government since the Second World War.
Mr Cameron had long thought a hung Parliament rather likely. The number of seats that the Tories would have to win to have an overall majority was daunting. But his team had not, as Nick Clegg’s Liberal Democrats had, spent a great deal of time agonising over what to do if it actually happened. Mr Cameron did not unveil a carefully developed plan. He acted on instinct.
But it was not just Mr Cameron’s instinct that changed history. It was also the maths and Mr Clegg had always believed that the maths would be crucial. On May 7, the cold fact was that the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives could together form a government with a majority of more than 80, but the Lib Dems and Labour would not have a majority even if they voted as a single block on everything.
So just before lunch on Friday, Mr Clegg arrived back at Lib Dem HQ and announced that he was sticking to the plan he had formulated before the election, one designed precisely for the sort of numerical position he was now in. He regarded the party with the largest support as having earned the right to seek to show that they were able to govern in the national interest. And that meant opening talks with the Conservatives.
What Mr Clegg had almost certainly not expected was Mr Cameron’s response. The latter had quickly won support for coalition from his team, starting with his closest ally, George Osborne. Working with his adviser, Steve Hilton, he prepared a statement in which he said that while a mere pact with the Lib Dems was possible, he wanted to make a “big, open and comprehensive offer” to the third party. His aim: full coalition.
The negotiations began quickly, with the teams meeting that afternoon at the Cabinet Office for an initial session. Mr Osborne selected the venue. He wanted the Lib Dems to be able to see power out of the window. And so, looking over the Downing Street garden and in a sweltering room where the central heating had broken, the teams began to talk. Danny Alexander, David Laws, Chris Huhne and Andrew Stunnell for the Lib Dems quickly came to see that Mr Cameron was serious. They realised that his negotiating team – Mr Osborne, William Hague, Edward Llewellyn and Oliver Letwin – had come ready to make big concessions. Perhaps they did not quite realise why. From the word go, Mr Cameron realised that he needed a deal, but he also saw the whole thing as an opportunity.
First, the necessity. The Cameron team thought that a minority government was a very grim prospect indeed. Having introduced unpopular measures to deal with the deficit, the Government could be turfed out at the worst possible political moment.
There was raw political calculation in this, of course, but also consideration of the national interest. A minority government would not survive for long. It would need, or be forced, to fight an early election, making it impossible to begin the difficult work that the next administration needs to undertake. So the negotiators found themselves in an ironic position. The Lib Dems wanted policy concessions but were politically nervous of a full-scale coalition. The Tories, whom everyone assumed would play it tough, wanted to make policy concessions so that a proper long-term partnership could be formed.
One issue remained difficult: electoral reform. The Tories were offering a free vote in the Commons on a referendum on the Alternative Vote and that was not enough. That, plus the emotional pull of Lib Dems towards the Left, sent Mr Clegg’s team talking to Labour. For a brief period a new Lib-Lab arrangement appeared a real possibility. But it was brief. Labour did not have the heart for it. Labour’s negotiations – informally over the weekend and formally on the Monday after Gordon Brown announced his intention to resign – were half-hearted. They were not prepared to concede much, underestimated the progress the Lib Dems had made with the Tories, and thought that the numbers did not really stack up anyway.
It was also brief because the Tories made a big offer – a whipped vote to have a referendum on AV – and this offer, skilfully guided through the party in the hours after Mr Brown’s departure had scared the Tories into imagining a Lib-Lab deal, brought Cameron not merely the premiership, but more besides: a great opportunity.
Finding it hard to gain even 40 per cent of the vote, the Conservative Party has, for years now, been threatened by the possible emergence of a unified progressive Left. Blair advisers such as Lord Mandelson and Lord Adonis have long seen this. They regard the split in the Left between Labour and the Liberals that took place at the beginning of the 20th century as having ushered in a Conservative century. They are probably correct. That split has been a very important reason for the election of Tory governments, particularly in the past 40 years.
If the Conservatives had won a small majority, it is not hard to imagine them being swept out in five years by an alliance, either explicit or implied, of Labour and Liberal Democrats. Something like that happened in 1997 and produced the Blair landslide. Now a combination of the new maths of the Commons and Cameron’s boldness disrupted this and in doing so, changed politics for years. The Liberal Democrats have been picked up and put down in a different place, partly by Mr Clegg of course, but largely by a Cameron offer of partnership. The anti-Conservative majority is, in an extraordinary political coup, no longer an anti-Conservative majority. Things are more complicated now.
The second part of the opportunity relates to Mr Cameron’s own party. Five years of work to rebrand the party did not change perceptions as much as his team had hoped. But now this. Mr Cameron has the potential to lift himself and the party above normal partisan politics.
And so, after some of the most dramatic days in modern politics, David Cameron found himself waving to the photographers outside No 10, flanked by Nick Clegg. But he has made a huge gamble. Could this move split his party? Might the Liberal Democrats prove not merely prickly partners, but impossible ones?
Unknown, unknowable. But this can be said with certainty. Politics has changed for ever.
Meet the Class of 2010, the new politics in person
Rachel Sylvester
Times columnist
There is a black-belt karate expert, a female football coach, a Mormon, a former television presenter and a bestselling author who has had the film rights to his life bought by Brad Pitt. A total of 232 new MPs were elected for the first time on May 6, 2010, including 147 Conservatives, 67 Labour members, 9 Liberal Democrats and the first representative of the Green Party, Caroline Lucas, who won in the Brighton Pavilion constituency.
They are the novices in the Virgin Parliament, the new boys and girls who were swept into Westminster on the wave of public revulsion that followed the expenses scandal in what was widely perceived to be a House of Whores. Some were elected purely as a result of the swing away from Labour to the Tories that came after 13 years of one party having been in power, but many replaced MPs who had either resigned or been voted out by an electorate angry about the duck houses, moats and mortgages. The turnover at the last election was unusually high. The result is that more than a third of those now sitting on the green benches in the House of Commons are innocent about the wiles of the whips, ignorant of parliamentary tricks and unequipped by the now-abolished John Lewis List. Half the Tory MPs have just been elected for the first time. The Class of 2010 is the physical embodiment of “a new politics”. They are younger on average than in 1997, the last time power changed hands: 34 per cent of the new MPs are aged in their thirties. There are more black and Asian faces on the green benches than ever before: 26 MPs from ethnic minorities and marginally more women. Three Muslim women were elected, including the bright and beautiful Rushanara Ali, who regained Bethnal Green for Labour from the Respect party’s George Galloway.
Matthew Hancock, a former economist at the Bank of England who was an adviser to George Osborne before being elected Tory MP for West Suffolk at the election, says: “I’m 31 and I don’t feel particularly young. There’s a feeling of a huge generational shift.”
Michael Dugher, a former aide to Gordon Brown who is now Labour MP for Barnsley East, agrees. “People are very keen to learn the lessons of the past,” he says. “We are going to do things differently now. It is noticeable that the new MPs are hanging around with each other rather than the old hands. There is a togetherness about the new generation.”
As the new arrivals gathered for training sessions on parliamentary procedure, security and the expenses regime at the start of the new session, it became clear that whatever their party allegiances they were united by a determination to represent a clean break with the dirty past. Nicholas Boles, the new Conservative MP for Grantham and Stamford, who until recently worked for Boris Johnson and is seen as one of the party’s smartest policy brains, says: “Everybody is obsessed about not getting caught up in another expenses scandal. It is not that we are a bunch of selfrighteous men and women in white suits but there is an overwhelming feeling that that was terrible, that we are at the beginning of our careers and the last thing we want to do is to have even the slightest hint of anything improper.”
Among the new Tory and Liberal Democrat MPs there is a sense of excitement about the possibilities opened up by the coalition Government. One session of the induction course took place in the chamber and the two parties’ members drifted to the Government side and sat among each other, intermingled. “We chatted very easily and got on in a way that would have been much more difficult for the old guard on either side,” one Conservative member says.
The Class of 2010 is more professional than previous generations. About 20 per cent of the new MPs are defined as having come into the Commons from politics, having worked either as advisers or councillors, 15 per cent from business, 12 per cent consultancy, 12 per cent law and 10 per cent financial services. Only 6 per cent have come in from charities, 5 per cent from the education sector and 5 per cent from the media.
According to an analysis by the Sutton Trust, an educational charity, 35 per cent of MPs in the new Parliament went to independent schools. More than half of Conservative MPs were educated privately and 20 out of the 306 on the Tory benches went to one school – David Cameron’s alma mater, Eton. On the Labour side, it is rather different. “There are a lot of regional accents, most of us are working class-made-good,” says one new MP. Several union officials won seats, after a successful operation by Unite.
There does, though, also seem to be a hereditary principle at work in the House of Commons across the board. At least nine children of politicians were elected in 2010. They include Zac Goldsmith, the new Conservative MP for Richmond Park, who is the son of the late Referendum Party leader, Sir James Goldsmith; Ben Gummer, elected in Ipswich, the son of John Gummer, the former Tory Cabinet minister; and Anas Sarwar, who took over as Labour MP for Glasgow Central from his father, Mohammed Sarwar. Harriet Harman’s husband, Jack Dromey, joins her in Parliament as MP for Birmingham Erdington and Valerie Vaz, Labour MP for Walsall South, is the sister of Keith Vaz, the longstanding Labour MP for Leicester East. Jacob Rees-Mogg, the son of the former Times Editor Lord Rees-Mogg, was elected in Somerset North East.
The new Conservative members are generally socially liberal and supportive of David Cameron’s modernisation of their party. A few days after the election, the Tory leader held a meeting of all his new MPs and was rather astonished by the attitude he found. “The general mood of the group was that, if anything, we had not gone far enough on modernisation,” one of those present says. “David said afterwards how remarkable it was, he was quite taken aback.”
Like Mr Cameron, most of the new Conservative MPs, are also pretty Eurosceptic. According to George Eustace, the former campaign director of the anti-euro “no” campaign, who is now MP for Camborne and Redruth: “Most think we should be taking powers back from the EU, but the new intake is also very committed to the idea of social enterprises, charities and voluntary groups being involved in public services. The Iain Duncan Smith agenda is where traditional right-wing Conservatism can come together with the more liberal modernising wing of the party.”
Other high-profile Tories include Rory Stewart, in Penrith and the Border, a former deputy governor of Iraq and bestselling author. He once walked across Afghanistan and also spent a summer as a tutor to Princes William and Harry. It is his life story that has been snapped up by Brad Pitt. Dan Byles, the new Tory MP for Warwickshire North, is almost as adventurous – he has rowed across the Atlantic and skied to the north pole with his mother.
Mr Goldsmith, the brother of Jemima Khan, will add a touch of glamour to the green benches, but could also clash with the leadership over green issues. Tracy Crouch, Tory MP for Chatham and Aylesford, is the qualified football coach. David Rutley, a former banker who represents Macclesfield, is the House of Commons’s first Mormon. Helen Grant, in Maidstone and the Weald, is the first black woman Conservative MP. Dominic Raab, Tory MP for Esher and Walton, a lawyer by training, has represented Britain at karate.
On the Labour side there is a fighting spirit as well. Those to watch include Tristram Hunt, the television historian who has just been elected in Stoke-on-Trent Central, and Chuka Umunna, the new MP for Streatham, a former lawyer who has been described as a potential British Barack Obama. Rachel Reeves, in Leeds West, is a former Bank of England economist with a reforming zeal, and Gloria De Piero, who was until she became MP for Ashfield a GMTV presenter, is certain to attract plenty of attention. Two former ministers under Tony Blair who lost their seats in 2005 also returned to Parliament: Stephen Twigg in Liverpool West Derby and Chris Leslie in Nottingham East.
One new MP says: “It is nothing like 1997, when lots of people got in who never expected to. Everyone here now has got black under their fingernails from having scraped their way up. They are quite a brutal, hard-headed bunch. They don’t look at the world through the prism of Blair-Brown or Left versus Right. They look at the world through the prism of Labour’s defeat.”
Whatever their party affiliation, those elected this year also look at the world through the prism of the MPs’ expenses scandal. There is the possibility of a really quite dramatic change of culture, brought about by a younger, more independent-minded intake who are all too aware of voters’ anger with politicians. Some of the Conservatives have been chosen in open primaries, which may make them less willing to toe the party line. Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs have used the election campaign to make clear their determination to alter the way in which politics is done. Across the board, the new intake is generally more receptive to constitutional reform, including changes to the voting system, than their parties’ older grandees.
Just as the Blair Babes transformed how the House of Commons looked in 1997, bringing flashes of feminine colour to the rows of grey suits, so the Class of 2010 could alter for ever the way in which politics is conducted. One new Tory MP says: “We get the scale of the public’s anger over the expenses scandal in a way that those who were in Parliament when it broke do not really get. We understand just how much change is needed.”
Women failed to break through
Rosemary Bennett
Social Affairs Correspondent
The 2010 general election was, pretty much, a male affair. Senior women from the main parties were curiously absent from the campaign and silent during the rows that blew up over taxation and spending. Attention was resolutely focused on the three leaders as the TV debates dominated the campaign and, in the end, more column inches were devoted to their wives’ outfits than equality.
At constituency level the story was not much better. In as many as 262 seats the three main parties all fielded male candidates, compared with just 11 seats where the main contenders were all women. The election was just too close to make gender an issue.
Not surprising, then, that there was no great breakthrough in the numbers of women entering Parliament. For all the talk of new dawns, it was old politics as usual when the 2010 intake took their seats for the first time. In terms of the numbers, there were 142 women MPs, compared with 126 in 2005, equivalent to 22 per cent of the total. That puts Britain on a par with the United Arab Emirates in terms of female representation.
The Conservatives made the most headway from their low base of just 18 MPs, 9 per cent of the parliamentary party, when the election was called. They emerged with 48 MPs, 16 per cent of the parliamentary party. Their success did not come easily. It was the result of considerable efforts, not in the approach to the election but throughout much of the previous Parliament, to make sure that a decent number of women candidates ended up in winnable seats.
For a while, they had the controversial “A” list comprising 50 per cent women from which the best seats were required to choose. In the end it was scrapped, such was its unpopularity, but it did help to boost the numbers. There was also a mentoring programme and, of course, plenty of encouragement from David Cameron.
In the end, though, it was not the sea change that the leadership had hoped for and privately senior party figures would admit that there was clearly farther to go.
Campaigners for equality worry that if this was the Conservatives’ best chance to push the agenda then the results look particularly disappointing. “The Conservatives do deserve to be congratulated. They trebled the number of women MPs. But you cannot help being left with the feeling that they could have gone a lot further. They had a new leader, they were ahead in the polls. They might not have such a good opportunity in the future to push this agenda,” Ceri Goddard, chief executive of the Fawcett Society, said.
Labour lost women MPs in terms of numbers, with 81 in the new Parliament compared with 94 in the last. In percentage terms the total rose slightly to 31 per cent from 27, largely owing to the party’s use of all-women short lists in many winnable seats. That is unlikely to change in future elections.
The performance of the two main parties left the Lib Dems looking particularly feeble. They lost two of their already tiny pool of female MPs and now have only seven, equivalent to 12 per cent of the parliamentary party. Their poor record was underlined when the party had no woman MP senior enough to be in contention for the five Cabinet positions offered to the party under the deal.
Ms Goddard said that the Liberal Democrats were left looking very exposed, and had a fundamental problem if they were serious about increasing female representation. The party has an ideological opposition to positive action, a position backed powerfully by younger women in the party despite warnings from grandees such as Baroness Williams of Crosby that they will never get anywhere under existing procedures.
“To be fair to the party, they ran about half and half male and female candidates, but clearly the men were in the best seats. The party consistently refuses to adopt positive action to increase the number of women, which we think is an odd position given they are the party of electoral reform,” Ms Goddard said.
So what do the new women MPs now amassed on the government benches want to do with their power?
Despite the derision of the Blair babes, Labour women used their numbers to push for more maternity leave and pay, and new rights for flexible work, very much bottom-up reforms. Conservative women say that they will push for even grater reform on flexible work so that as many men and women as possible can work part time and, perhaps surprisingly, equal pay. And they may make their presence felt most by opposing a key leadership policy, tax breaks for married couples, that many think is not the best use of money.
They may, however, have to expend their political capital in other ways too. There is already concern that the “new politics” of the coalition is perhaps not so much of an opportunity for women as a challenge. Women were absent from the coalition negotiations with both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats fielding all-male sides. And in the scramble for a workable deal between the parties, the argument for fair representation at Cabinet level was somehow lost.
The first coalition Cabinet had just four women, and only one running a big department, with Theresa May at the Home Office. Analysts say it was not a great start. “Cameron and Clegg were acutely aware they have very few women on which they could credibly draw,” said Colin Hay, Professor of political analysis at the University of Sheffield. “The politics of the past was gender discriminatory. The irony, in a way, is that the Cabinet remains a sort of last bastion of that old order.”
Bad news for big spenders: money can’t buy you votes
Sam Coates
Chief Political Correspondent
For donors thinking of filling the coffers of Britain’s political parties, there could be few worse advertisements than the previous Parliament. Three of its five years were stained by continuing police investigations; Scotland Yard interviewed a sitting Prime Minister for corruption offences; and more than half of its MPs had to hand back money after claiming for expenses they were not rightfully owed. Trust in politicians dropped to levels never seen before: only one in ten people thought MPs told the truth. Public antagonism was stoked by an often hostile media and insurgent blogosphere picking over the personal lives and motivations of public figures, especially donors who were often treated as if they had already been found guilty of paying for access to power.
Given the contempt with which so many politicians came to be held – one utterly blameless Lib Dem quit the Commons after his wife was spat on in the street – it is perhaps a surprise that just so many moneymen kept their faith and continued to write their cheques, mainly to the Conservatives. Over the course of the Parliament donors gave money to David Cameron at rates never seen before in British politics.
In his four years as Leader of the Opposition, from January 2006 to May 6, 2010, a record £122 million went through Tory coffers, by any international political yardstick an extraordinary amount. Barack Obama’s presidential campaign committee in 2008 raised £450 million. That was to fund a campaign that won decisively in a country where campaigns hinge on TV advertising and with an electorate five times the size. In domestic terms this figure is also striking: Labour’s income was £71 million over the same period, although £22 million of this came while Tony Blair was still in office. It also beats sums raised in previous Parliaments: the Tories’ income was £49 million and Labour’s £61 million between 2001 and 2005.
Perhaps more intriguing is the limited impact that this vast spending appeared to have. By Mr Cameron’s own yardstick, set in a Spectator interview shortly before polling day, his own campaign was a failure. The Conservative vote increased by 3.8 percentage points on its 2005 vote: an increase of 2 million votes net, or, taking into account the higher number of votes received by rival parties, 1.1 million more than last time. In other words, every additional vote cost the Tories £111.
What is more, for the shrewd financial investor, the archetype of the modern Tory donor, the way the Conservative Party operated under the stewardship of Andy Coulson, Steve Hilton and ultimately George Osborne as general election co-ordinator, must have seemed horrific. At a national level, half a million pounds was gambled on cinema advertisements that were never shown, £400,000 on a January 2010 “cut the deficit not the NHS” poster campaign later disowned by some senior figures. About half a million was spent on a much-ridiculed “don’t be a tosser” campaign on the national debt and the same sum again on a national newspaper campaign to recruit internet “friends of the Conservatives”, which was never mentioned again by the leadership.
The previous Parliament brought the downsides of political giving into sharp relief. Of these, the loans-for-peerages saga, which overshadowed Mr Blair’s final year in office, was perhaps the most seismic, involving the Prime Minister and senior staff, 136 people questioned by Scotland Yard’s Special Crime Division, 6,300 documents handed to the Crown Prosecution Service and four people arrested, including a Downing Street aide at dawn. At its heart was an allegation, never tested in a court and strongly denied by all those involved, that Labour figures seduced wealthy donors with promises of peerages in return for vast secret loans to bankroll the party through the 2005 election campaign.
It came to light in 2006 after it emerged that four Labour supporters had been turned down for peerages by the House of Lords Appointments Commission. Chai Patel, the founder of the Priory healthcare group, publicly complained after his application was leaked to a newspaper, then rejected. It soon emerged that three other businessmen were put forward for peerages – Sir David Garrard, Sir Gulam Noon, and Barry Townsley – having all made huge loans to Labour before the election at the behest of Lord Levy, Mr Blair’s gregarious fundraiser. Sir Gulam even revealed that he had been told by Lord Levy to remove references to his £250,000 loan to Labour from his peerage application form.
Despite an ignominious political tradition of peerages for donors, epitomised by Harold Wilson’s Lavender List, opposition MPs started complaining that there had been a breach of the Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925, introduced after David Lloyd George sold honours for cash. An initial inquiry by the Public Administration Committee was halted after Scotland Yard agreed to investigate a complaint by Angus MacNeil, a Scottish Nationalist MP. The police investigation was initially treated lightly by Downing Street, until a number of arrests culminating with that of Lord Levy, who was brought in for questioning. Ruth Turner, an aide to Mr Blair, was arrested at dawn and questioned under suspicion of perverting the course of justice. The inquiry had reached the heart of No 10. In December 2006 Mr Blair became the first serving Prime Minister in history to face a police interrogation, seeing officers three times in Downing Street.
Mr Blair’s staff had raised the stakes, warning Scotland Yard that the Prime Minister would resign if he was arrested while in office. In fact, Mr Blair left office before the investigation was complete. After 16 months, the inquiry was dropped without charges by the Crown Prosecution Service. The CPS said that it had never intended to go to court unless there was “unambiguous agreement” between two people that a gift would be made in exchange for an honour, adding: “There is no direct evidence of any such agreement.”
Officers in the Speciality Crime Unit, which had pursued the case, were unhappy. They believed that they had two strong pieces of evidence: the diary of Sir Christopher Evans, who loaned money to Labour and was later arrested, which detailed conversations with Lord Levy. Detectives believed that this provided “spectacular” evidence of what they interpreted as an agreement for Sir Christopher to be ennobled in return for the loan. Detectives had also discovered that Downing Street officials initially drew up a plan to give peerages to eight of the twelve businessmen who secretly bankrolled Labour’s 2005 general election campaign: four more than had been thought.
The reason for the CPS decision, apparently late on in the investigation, to demand “unambiguous” evidence as the basis of a criminal case and thus rule out the use of the two strongly circumstantial pieces of evidence in police hands remains a mystery. The investigation, which spanned the transition of power from Mr Blair to Gordon Brown, highlighted the culture clash between politicians and police, with the friction between both sides often played out in the media. It highlighted the levels of ignorance among many officials about the electoral reforms Labour had brought in during the first Parliament but now showed little sign of bothering with. It also came as the Labour Party was adjusting to life without large numbers of individual donors, forcing a return to a reliance on trade unions.
By the end of the Parliament, notions of abandoning the union link, once aired by Blairites such as Alan Milburn, seemed fanciful. At the lowest point in its popularity early in 2008, union funding accounted for 92 per cent of donations to Labour, amid claims that the party was solvent only because of a guarantee from Unite, the super-union, that it would never allow it to go bust. In November 2007, it emerged that Labour’s third biggest donor, David Abrahams, had concealed his identity and given hundreds of thousands of pounds in the names of his secretary and a builder, illegal under electoral law. Mr Abrahams, a colourful Tyneside lawyer, said he had done so to avoid the limelight. Facing a police investigation, Mr Brown fired the Labour general secretary, Peter Watt, who carried the can for the arrangement set up by his predecessors. In May 2009 the CPS decided again that there was insufficient evidence for any prosecution.
The police also investigated the admission in December 2007 by Peter Hain that some donations to his own campaign to become Labour’s deputy leader “were not registered as they should have been”. The police inquiry, at the request of the Electoral Commission, cost him his post as Work and Pensions Secretary. He was cleared 11 months later, however, after prosecutors questioned the watchdog’s interpretation of the law, suggesting that no one involved in Mr Hain’s campaign could be prosecuted.
This was one of several uncomfortable moments for the Electoral Commission. In its first full term between 2001 and 2005 the watchdog, which oversees money in politics, was regarded as a largely benign if somewhat bureaucratic body. But its failure to see that political parties were taking out huge secret loans led to accusations that it was unfocused, too passive and failed to use its powers to investigate allegations of wrongdoing. It defended itself vigorously, saying that it could only act using the laws passed by Parliament. Nevertheless, the commission strengthened its investigative capacity and started casting its spotlight elsewhere, bringing its own complications when it started picking over the donations by Lord Ashcroft to the Conservatives.
Lord Ashcroft, Tory vice-chairman, businessman and philanthropist, had long been a Labour hate figure whose funding they blamed for losing their party a number of seats in 2005. He revelled in his pariah status. After receiving his peerage in 2000 from William Hague, then Tory leader, he attempted unsuccessfully to become Lord Ashcroft of Belize, reflecting his dual citizenship. He stopped donating to the Conservatives under his own name in November 2001, fuelling suggestions, which he never denied, that he was no longer on the electoral register and giving instead through a small company, Bearwood Corporate Services.
In 2009 the Electoral Commission began examining suggestions that millions given to the Tories by Bearwood originated in Belize, possibly making the donations against electoral law. The money was reported to have been moved from Stargate Holdings based at Lord Ashcroft’s bank in Belize City through two British holding companies and then to Bearwood Corporate Services. In a 15-month investigation, however, the watchdog was unable to discover what, if any, business the secretive Belize City-based Stargate conducted, and how it was financed. Lord Ashcroft was cleared.
He still ended up causing the party much embarrassment on the eve of the election, when it emerged that he had accepted his peerage on the understanding that he would pay full tax in Britain, only to remain secretly non-domiciled for tax purposes for a decade. This allowed him to save an estimated “tens of millions” of pounds of British tax on his overseas earnings while retaining his ermine.
Yet for all the fury directed at Lord Ashcroft, it is not clear that the marginal seats campaign he ran once he became the Conservatives’ deputy chairman had the impact that many Conservatives had hoped for. His blueprint, outlined in a 2006 pamphlet Smell the Coffee, involved early candidate selection, relentless leaf-leting, repeated canvassing, candidate performance polling and targeted advertising as the key to winning marginal seats. Constituencies such as Hammersmith, Cheltenham and Bolton followed to the letter the Ashcroft plan yet all remained in Labour or Liberal Democrat hands. Indeed, research suggests that the spending advantage in the marginal seats helped the Tories to win at most an additional 14 seats above those that would have fallen anyway on the 5 per cent Labour to Tory swing.
Much analysis on the 2010 general election is yet to be done but the early indications suggest that it was one where, refreshingly, big money still failed to have a decisive impact on the result.
Little joy for the smaller parties
Jill Sherman
Whitehall Editor
The election of the Green Party’s first MP as dawn broke on May 7, 2010 was one of the highlights of a long, unpredictable night. Caroline Lucas’s breakthrough in Brighton Pavilion was some compensation for an otherwise disappointing result for the minority parties, who failed to exploit the disaffection with mainstream politics. Dr Lucas, leader of the Green Party since 2008, capitalised on her own popularity and activists’ hard work for years in southern England to achieve, finally, a foothold at Westminster.
In the final stages of post-election negotiations between the parties after the inconclusive result, Dr Lucas, an MEP for the South East since 1999, briefly found herself being counted as part of a “progressive alliance” as the arithmetic meant that every additional seat was crucial. The plans fell apart but Dr Lucas turned her suitors down anyway, saying that she was interested in cooperation but not a formal coalition.
The Greens made their biggest push in a general election by fielding 335 candidates and spending £400,000 on their campaign. They had particularly high hopes in three target seats: Brighton Pavilion, Norwich South, and Lewisham Deptford. By early morning the day after the election, however, it became clear that Dr Lucas, a charismatic former CND-protester, was the only victor and the party’s overall share of the vote fell slightly by 0.1 per cent from 2005.
The party argues that the decline was a result of a highly targeted election campaign in which it pooled most of its resources into those key seats, with busloads of Green activists brought in to campaign along the seafront each weekend. In the end, the tactic was vindicated, but it was a close race: despite being favourites to win the seat, after a nail-biting count the Greens eventually won with 1,252 votes.
While disappointing for Adrian Ramsay, the party’s deputy leader, who lost in Norwich South, and Darren Johnson, who failed to make much headway in Lewisham Deptford, the most important thing for the party, was winning its first seat. As Dr Lucas said in an interview with The Times, she hopes she won’t be there on her own for too long.
Most of the minority parties failed to recapture their success in the European elections the previous year. In 2010, squeezed out of the running by the three-horse race of the main parties, the smaller ones retained their 14 Westminster seats but took a smaller overall share of the vote, 11.9 per cent, than the previous year. It was, however, up 1.6 per cent from the general election in 2005, mainly because the parties fielded more candidates. The results were particularly disappointing because many of the smaller parties had looked likely to benefit more from the backlash against the main parties over MPs’ expenses the previous year. The scandal may have stopped people voting for those individuals who had been at the centre of the expenses storm but in the end the minority parties failed to reap what should have been easy pickings.
The UK Independence Party, which had seen its popularity soar during the European elections, in which it took second place and 16.5 per cent of the vote, again failed to win a Commons seat. At one stage it looked as if Nigel Farage, the party’s former leader, could be out of the race altogether when a light aircraft in which he was being flown crashed on the eve of the election. He was fortunate to escape without serious injury but was unable to oust John Bercow, the Commons Speaker, in Buckingham.
The British National Party also failed to make the breakthrough that many had feared after the party’s shock success in 2009 when it won two European seats. It did, however, increase its share of the vote by a whisker, from 1.2 per cent in 2005 to 1.9 per cent. Nick Griffin, the party chairman and an MEP, raised his profile after appearing on Question Time on BBC One in autumn 2009, when he faced a barrage of criticism from other panellists. He was humiliated in the general election in Barking, where he stood against Margaret Hodge, the Labour incumbent, who increased her majority.
The BNP also targeted Stoke-on-Trent, where it had previously won a clutch of council seats, but Simon Darby the party’s deputy chairman, was beaten into fourth place after Tristram Hunt, the Labour candidate parachuted into the constituency, won the seat.
George Galloway, the leader of the anti-war Respect party, also had his comeuppance. The colourful Mr Galloway, who made an embarrassing appearance on Celebrity Big Brother, failed to hang on in Poplar & Limehouse, East London, where he came third behind Labour and the Tories. He did not even turn up for his count. Respect’s national share of the vote halved from 2005 to about 0.1 per cent mainly because the Iraq war was no longer a big central issue in the 2010 election.
The march of the independent MPs also came to a halt. In 2005 a record number stood and total votes cast for them reached 141,903. The betting money was on a further surge this year, with a predicted revolt against duck houses and flipped homes. But in the end it was the independents who were driven off the Commons green benches. Richard Taylor, the retired consultant who took Wyre Forest in 2001 on the back of a single-issue campaign to save his local hospital in Kidderminster, failed to retain his seat in 2010. Dr Taylor, who in his professional life wore a white coat, had taken the place of the white-suited Martin Bell, the former independent MP who seized Tatton on the back of the cash-for-favours scandal in 1997.
Dai Davies, who won a by-election at Blaenau Gwent in 2006 as an independent, was also unable to retain his seat. Even Esther Rantzen failed in her well-publicised bid to oust Labour in Luton South. The former That’s Life presenter stood as an anti-sleaze candidate against Margaret Moran, the Labour MP who claimed £22,500 in Commons allowances to fix dry rot in a second home in Southampton. Ms Moran, however, decided to stand down before the election. Her replacement, Gavin Shuker, a 28-year-old church pastor, won 14,725 votes. Ms Rantzen came fourth with 1,872 and lost her deposit.
Only one MP was left holding the flag for the independents: Lady Sylvia Hermon, a former Ulster Unionist. Lady Hermon stood down from her party in March 2010 after the UUP formed an alliance with the Conservatives. Two months later she romped home to retain her North Down seat as an independent.
Don’t emerge as sounding brass or tinkling cymbal
Matthew Parris
Times columnist
That no MP has yet suffered a heart attack in the minutes before making a maiden speech in the House of Commons, is some kind of miracle. The waiting is the worst. Sitting on those green leather benches, dreading the moment when the Speaker first calls your name, yet longing to get it over with as fast as possible, remains one of the most intense short periods of personal anxiety a man or woman can experience outside warfare.
I have parachuted freefall; aged 10 and dressed in a sailor-suit I have waited to launch into a song-and-dance routine of I Whistle a Happy Tune before a packed house in a repertory production of The King and I, as the orchestra struck up. Neither was as scary as awaiting my Commons maiden speech. But once you are on your feet, and you have your trembling hands and shaking notes under control, and you have started to talk, it is fine. You are away.
For me it went well. In light of what I shall tell you next I can tell you now that my maiden speech was considered one of the best of many maidens from the big and unusually talented parliamentary intake of 1979. That speech was a triumph. It was the rest of my parliamentary career that flopped. After my moment of glory I sank without trace in the Commons, never to resurface.
In all the seven years that followed at Westminster I did not say or do or achieve anything that came anywhere close to the success of that first Commons occasion, my maiden speech. My parliamentary career was undistinguished: for me a bitter if infinitely gentle disappointment. Cleverer new MPs than me, yes, but in time stupider ones too, overtook me one by one.
Why? My slow-burn failure baffled me. What had I overlooked? I wasn’t lazy, crazy, or personally objectionable. Even after I had left I did not really understand. Only during the decades since, decades of thinking about politics as a journalist and commentator, has the truth dawned.
The truth is this: you will never get anywhere in the House of Commons speaking for yourself. You are the representative of people’s interests, or you are nothing. There are, of course, ideals to be championed. There are arguments to be explained. There is policy logic to be pursued on its merits as well as its popular appeal. But, in the end, if what you say within that surprisingly small chamber carries no echo in the big country outside it then you are without point, and with discreet and subtle cruelty the very stones and carpets at Westminster will communicate to you that fact.
“Speaking for myself, Mr Deputy Speaker…” is a phrase that, sought in Hansard’s electronic archive, would doubtless yield a generous harvest of instances. Do not be fooled. Whether they know it consciously or not, the most effective parliamentarians are never speaking mainly for themselves. They are inhabited by a kind of animal understanding of the beast that an MP is supposed to be: of what, in that remarkably large assembly of directly elected persons that with unintended accuracy we call the Lower House, an MP is for.
You, the MP, are there for the herd. You are there to speak for substantial groups of citizens with shared interests or desires. By no means are you there for the majority alone – or, necessarily, at all. You can usefully spend your whole career fighting for minorities. Groups for whom you speak may be beleaguered and outnumbered; but they must be groups. They must need and want a voice. You are their voice; they must respond to your voice, adding theirs; and your fellow parliamentarians must hear the noise. Your voice is your own, but if you are not somebody else’s voice too, the place will not work for you.
You, the MP, are mainly there – not only, but mainly – as a messenger. You bring the message; you frame the message; you may have a talent for phrasing and targeting and marketing the message. You may even improve the message. You may have the skill so to express the message that it gathers force among those you represent. But you are seldom there to create the message, and unless and until it has gathered that force, you are the sounding brass or tinkling cymbal of St Paul’s epistle. In the end the message comes not from inside your head but from outside the walls of Westminster, or it does not come at all. You, the MP, are there to carry it.
“Tribune” is an old-fashioned word whose meaning as we move into a new millennium is in danger of passing from the popular understanding. But if the word is out of date, what it signifies is not. Not for nothing have MPs been classically called the tribunes of the people. Their own beliefs and opinions carry most weight, and sometimes only carry weight at all, when they reflect the beliefs, opinions and interests of significant, numerous or powerful groups among the people who have sent them to Westminster.
Edmund Burke missed the point when he wrote: “Your Representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.” Note the sly old propagandist’s selection of the word “judgment” for the MP’s view, and “opinion” for the elector’s. But in rejecting Burke’s advice I am not making a moral judgment. I am describing a dynamic. In our legislature, arguments born of the personal reflections of individual legislators do not prosper. Arguments carried into the chamber from the country outside do. Burke, in fact, knew that well enough, and in terms of his own personal career fared better articulating the external voice than advancing it within the chamber. The Commons is not really about debate, it is about tug-o’-war; and your pull on the rope is a pull-by-proxy, for those not present.
How do I know this? I can only reply that it is not a matter of constitutional theory, but of experience. There was perhaps one moment during my seven years when I did, flickeringly, understand in heart as well as head what it meant to be an advocate – and I realised even at the time that it was on an arcane, minor and minority issue. I had become greatly exercised by the brutality and pointlessness of sending women convicted of prostitution to prison. In the event (with Robert Kilroy-Silk, then an MP) I managed to persuade my standing committee, and through them the Home Secretary, to change the law and remove imprisonment from the tariff.
Much of my argument was an argument in logic, but to bolster our case I invited the English Collective of Prostitutes to send down to the Commons a bus-load of their members (waiting for them in the Central Lobby I mistook a delegation on another issue from the Catholic Women’s League for my own invitees, displeasing the League greatly) and led them to a committee room in Westminster Hall, where we addressed the other members of my standing committee, and took questions.
As I spoke, believing in the women’s cause, and with many of them, real people, sitting around me, responding, I understood in the gut as well as the brain, what it means to be an MP.
Democracy as we British know it is not experienced in the intellect but in the stomach. What an MP is for is felt collectively at an unconscious level by a population few of whom could express it even if they cared to try. Popular sentiment is a current. It is a wind. It is a subterranean force. When you are with it – when it is with you – you just know. When you are not, you are that sounding brass or tinkling cymbal.
Time and again I rose to my feet in the chamber with what I thought, and still think, a brilliantly true idea to explain. How sure I was that we should adopt road-pricing in our country: that the economic theory of rationing a scarce commodity by price rather than by queue applied not just to turf or treacle tarts, but to tarmac too. Time and again I made speeches, asked questions, wrote newspaper articles, or argued in my Transport Select Committee, setting out a logical case that I knew, and still know, to be true and in the end inevitable.
Nobody listened. Nobody agreed. Nobody disagreed either. Nobody was interested. Nobody cared. Inevitable, yes: but not in 1986. Twentieth-century Britain was not ready for road pricing.
Or reform of the law on homosexuality. Time and again I argued the case for reducing the age of consent. Persistently I complained about police harassment of gay men. How cogently did I unpick the contradictions and expose the imperfections of the law relating to importuning in a public place. How assiduously did I collect evidence, interview defendants, correspond with the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and question ministers. How patiently I explained all this in the standing committee. How contemptuous I felt when a kindly Labour whip, the late Walter Harrison, took me aside to advise: “You will get nowhere in this place, lad, unless you leave all that alone.” There is not (Walter went on to explain) the feeling for it in the country. How hotly I protested to myself, under my breath: “Well there ought to be.”
Walter and I were both wrong. Public opinion on homosexuality was moving, changing. There existed the beginnings of an interest group among aggrieved gay men, the beginnings of the courage to stand up for themselves in public; and the beginnings of a supporting group of sympathisers among their millions of friends and relatives. HIV-Aids would in time bring all this to the surface. But 1982 was too early. Fifteen years later, Tony Blair, with his cannier instinct for the public mood, judged the moment right to propose change, as I had judged the moment wrong; and laws were duly amended. That was a time when young politicians and soon-to-be politicians such as David Cameron were changing their minds on social issues like these – or under the impression that they were changing their minds. What they were really doing was picking up, instinctively, a message from the people.
Time and again I spoke and wrote and asked Parliamentary Questions about the plight of the Sahrawi people in the Western Sahara, violently dispossessed by the Kingdom of Morocco. I visited them. I saw their plight. I heard their case. I studied their history. I was convinced. The case I made to the Foreign Secretary was unanswerable.
Indeed unanswered. He could not disagree and did not care to agree. Silence, that most eloquent of Commons responses, should have told me what no minister would put into words: the Sahrawi people have no constituency in the United Kingdom; and the United Kingdom has an interest in supporting Morocco. Silence said so; silence says so much at Westminster; but I was blocking my ears to the silence.
It is a funny feeling, speaking in the chamber when your argument carries no resonance outside it. Your fellow MPs do not howl you down. They just talk among themselves, or lope out for a drink or a cup of tea. You notice the Press Gallery above the Speaker’s Chair clearing. Once you have gained a reputation for arguments that are disconnected from popular sentiment or headline news, your colleagues stop coming in when you are speaking. You argue into a void, like someone talking to the birds in a park. You wait for responses to your speech the next morning; but there is nothing, not even a report. And you reflect on that passage in Thornton Wilder’s The Bridge of San Luis Rey, describing an early feminist: “The Abbess was one of those persons who have allowed their lives to be gnawed away because they have fallen in love with an idea several centuries before its appointed appearance in the history of civilisation. She hurled herself against the obstinacy of her time.”
You hear it said, not of yourself but of others like you, that they are “frightfully clever” but “a bit of a loner”. And if not remarkably thick-skinned (which, surprisingly, few MPs are) you become prey to feelings of injustice and self-pity.
They are misplaced. You are overlooking something rather obvious. The House of Commons is not a place where ideas are born and knows in its heart that it is not supposed to be. It is an echo-chamber in which interests and opinions are spoken for, and tested for resonance among more than six hundred other tribunes – and for their resonance, when reported, outside.
Resonance is not the same thing as rationality. During the last Parliament, Joanna Lumley, Nick Clegg and a small band of mostly backbench MPs understood how much more resonant was the case for special privileges for former Gurkhas than it was rational. Towards the end of the last century, Margaret Thatcher and much of her Cabinet failed to understand how much less resonant was the case for the Poll Tax, than it was reasonable. When the last Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, was Chancellor in 2000 he and his Cabinet colleagues were surprised (and threatened with a backbench rebellion) when they failed to anticipate that opposition to an entirely rational 75p per week increase in the state pension (in line with subdued inflation) would carry tremendous resonance outside the counting-houses of Whitehall. The same Cabinet entirely misjudged the (irrational) anger of motorists at (rational) increases in fuel duty, in line with rising prices.
Let us try to construct the profile of a fictional backbencher who made the right call on each of these judgments: the imaginary MP (let us call him Reg Smythe) who found himself on the right side of the argument on Poll Tax, Fuel Tax, pension increases, Gurkhas and Joanna Lumley. Three features, I would submit, stand out in Reg Smythe’s profile. First, he is not unduly troubled by logic. Secondly, he has a keen sense of the importance to voters of their wallets. Thirdly, his ear is well-attuned to waves of popular sentiment.
But I would add this about Reg. He gets genuinely fired-up in the causes to which he attaches himself. His eyes prick with tears as he stands beside Dame Joanna and a cluster of ageing Ghurkhas, and the hard-heartedness of the Ministry of Defence infuriates him. His rage at the 75p pension increase is not synthetic, and he knows many pensioners in his own constituency whose distress is real. He has entirely persuaded himself that fuel-tax increases are wrong not because motorists should not pay their share of environmental costs (Reg is passionate about the environment, too) but because transport is the lubricant of our whole economy, and these increases will hit entrepreneurs, road-hauliers and small business people.
And one further and most important remark. Not all these causes, and by no means all the arguments to which a dedicated tribune of the people may devote his energies, are majority causes. Some will be as unpopular among some voters as they are popular among others. Great parliamentary careers have rested, often enough, on the dogged association of an MP with a small but defined interest group, whose self-appointed guardian angel he becomes. He brings to the table that group, their concerns, and their potential support, and may not distract himself with larger causes. He is their man – or she their woman – and the MP the Chancellor takes aside for an anxious chat whenever the issue looks like trouble. An MP, in short, can fight for minorities all his life, while staying in tune with the type of democracy that energises a British parliamentary career.
In 1981 I was lucky to be among the seven backbenchers whose names were drawn from a hat, and who were invited to attend the Prince of Wales’s wedding to Diana Spencer. Sitting among the huge congregation in St Paul’s Cathedral I heard, over the loudspeakers, the questions – “Do you take this woman?” – and the responses. At each “I do” there came into the Cathedral, faintly but audibly, the distant-sounding roar of the crowds of tens of thousands, like the faint rumble of an ocean lapping at the steps of St Paul’s.
That echo was for me the most moving thing of all. I wish I had followed its logic down Fleet Street, the Strand and Whitehall, to Westminster, and understood then what I understand now: that unless when you advance a case at Westminster you can hear in your imagination, and your fellow MPs can hear in theirs, that faint roar of approbation from the sea of public opinion, then prepare for the kindly obituaries many decades hence, after your knighthood and your sobriquet “veteran backbench MP” have long been earned. From the obituarist’s phrase book will come those old favourites “brave thinker”, “keen intellect”, “gadfly”, “never really a team player”, “maverick”, “radical theorist”, “principled debater”…we can almost hear the chamber emptying as we read.
In less smart phraseology than the famous passage quoted above, Burke expressed the opposite view, but a truer one, when he wrote: “To follow, not to force the public inclination; to give a direction, a form, a technical dress, and a specific sanction, to the general sense of the community, is the true end of legislature.” Matthew Parris was Conservative MP for Derbyshire West from 1979 to 1986 and is a former parliamentary sketch writer for The Times.
The old era
The man who detoxified the Conservative brand
Francis Elliott
Deputy Political Editor
David Cameron best reveals his character and that of his political project at moments of defeat. He felt the blow of losing his first attempt at becoming an MP keenly in 1997, analysed correctly the reasons for the Tories’ abject performance in 2001 but then misjudged why Michael Portillo’s subsequent leadership bid fell short. The failure of Iain Duncan Smith’s leadership forced him to reconsider his attitude to modernisation and his last doubts were extinguished by the third successive Conservative defeat under Michael Howard.
During his own period as Leader of the Opposition, Mr Cameron was at his best when he faced the greatest danger, tacking and trimming and finally outmanoeuvring Gordon Brown in the autumn of 2007 to scare the new Labour leader off an early election. When at last the poll was called in May 2010, Mr Cameron best showed his political gifts not during the campaign but in the days afterwards, converting an inconclusive result into a decisive outcome.
But if defeat best reveals the nature of the man and his project, it is in success that his closest friendships and alliances have been forged. The first of these is his relationship with Steve Hilton, whom he first met in the late 1980s when both worked for what was then Conservative Central Office. Their decades-long conversation about the Tories, their strengths and weaknesses, their prejudices and favourites, is the dialogue that most drives the project. At first sight the two men could hardly be more different. Mr Cameron’s privileged background, social assurance and cultural Conservatism fitted him smoothly for the Conservative Research Department in the Tories’ old HQ in Smith Square. Mr Hilton, the son of Hungarian immigrants and a scholarship boy who became a Conservative only at university, was less obviously a CRD Tory boy. Mr Cameron favoured red braces; Mr Hilton was known to wear a “voluminous poncho”.
It is what they share, however, not what they do not, that most influences the modern Conservative Party. A passionate belief in the primacy of the individual over the collective – open in Mr Hilton’s case, partly shielded from view in that of Mr Cameron – is their first shared value. Mr Hilton, whose family endured the Communist repression of Budapest in 1956, has a visceral dislike of the statist mindset.
Neither, however, is a straightforward economic liberal. The purpose of freeing individual action is so that people can better deliver social goods. And the State has a role in fostering and encouraging those other institutions, such as marriage, that help people to share responsibility for one another. The pair have tried a number of attempts to rebrand these strands of right-wing philosophy during their period at the helm of the Conservative Party. It has been known variously as “modern, compassionate Conservatism”, the “post-bureaucratic age” and finally “the Big Society”. For the second big thing that Mr Cameron shares with his closest ally is an abiding interest in and facility for political communication. Both schooled according to the exacting standards of a Margaret Thatcher-era CRD, they write crisply and without jargon or cant. In the run-up to the 1992 general election the pair were selected to manage the relationship with the Tories’ advertising agency, Saatchi & Saatchi.
There is one final shared attribute: their age. They were part of a Smith Square “brat pack” in 1992 and were still young enough to weather the wilderness years so that they could emerge as part of the “next generation” just as new Labour was running out of steam.
In Stafford Leisure Centre in the early hours of May 2, 1997, however, those years outside power were just beginning. By then 31, the Conservative candidate, left hanging around as a loser at the count, knew that losing was no personal disgrace and certainly not a career-ending moment. Nonetheless, he felt it keenly when an elderly woman approached him in tears as the scale of the Tories’ national defeat became clear. “I don’t want to die under a Labour government,” she said. The misery of that exchange still lingered when he wrote of it many years later.
Mr Cameron has suffered personal setbacks. The influence of the birth, life and death, aged 6, of his first son Ivan is well known. It is fair to say, however, that he has suffered less in the way of professional reverses than many other senior members of the Conservative leadership. After defeat in Stafford Mr Cameron went back to a well-paid City job as director of communications for the media company Carlton. It was a younger generation of Conservative staffers who tasted the most bitter fruits of opposition, and started to do the most original thinking about how to return to power.
Although they overlapped while the Tories were in government, Mr Cameron did not really know George Osborne until both were elected in 2001. He was not in Smith Square as Mr Osborne and a handful of other young staffers, including several defectors from the Social Democratic Party, began to think deeply about how to decontaminate the Conservative brand. Figures such as Andrew Cooper and Rick Nye, who went on to set up the polling firm Populus, began pointing out that voters tended to like Conservative policies, until they found out that they were Conservative policies. It was not the policies that were the problem.
Just as Europe divided the party during its previous years in power, so the question of “de-toxifying” the Tory brand fractured it in opposition. The modernisation of the Tories, started under William Hague, slowed as it became entangled in the Tories’ kultur war over social issues such as gay adoption and marriage. Throughout it all Mr Hague’s political secretary, Mr Osborne, had a ringside seat.
Mr Cameron, as he now privately admits, had a slower conversion to the modernisers’ cause than some of his most senior allies. Less than a week after being elected in 2001 (having been selected for the safe seat of Witney) he was asked how the party should change. His answer is telling since it dwells on questions of presentation, not substance. “[The Conservative Party] needs to change its language, change its approach, start with a blank piece of paper and try to work out why our base of support is not broader. Anyone could have told the Labour Party in the 1980s how to become electable. It had to drop unilateral disarmament, punitive tax rises, wholesale nationalisation and unionisation. The question for the Conservative Party is far more difficult because there are no obvious areas of policy that need to be dropped.” Almost as an afterthought, he then added: “We need a clear, positive, engaging agenda on public services.”
Later, when he was leader, Mr Cameron was often asked when he would have a Clause Four moment, a reference to Tony Blair’s totemic defeat of party critics. His answer was always a version of that first, raw, draft. The riposte might be caricatured as: “We’re right, it’s just that the voters don’t realise it yet.”
Although he backed Mr Portillo, the modernisers’ candidate in the 2001 leadership election, the support was hesitant, even knowing. When Mr Portillo lost in an early round, the new Witney MP opted for Mr Duncan Smith over Kenneth Clarke. “What went wrong?” Mr Cameron mused in an online column. “Here was a leadership contender with buckets of charisma, a CV that included experience at the highest level of government and genuine cross-party appeal. Our man had offered leadership, radical change and ideas that challenged the party both in Parliament and the country. They simply weren’t ready for it. In many ways it is view that I share.”
Mr Cameron’s early career as a backbencher is not littered with examples of him acting as a spokesman for the need for the party to broaden its appeal. He was, for example, a passionate defender of fox-hunting. (In fairness, he also took a brave and principled position on the decriminalisation of drugs.) Gradually, however, and partly as a result of a developing friendship with Mr Osborne, Mr Cameron started to think more deeply about what was needed, and in particular what a “clear, positive, engaging agenda on public services” might look like.
At the same time, Mr Cameron was receiving firsthand experience of the NHS as it cared for his son, who was born with Ohtahara syndrome, a serious neurological condition. If the Tories were really going to modernise, Mr Cameron came to realise, they had to embrace properly funded, high-quality, universally available public services. Michael Gove, then a journalist with The Times, Mr Hilton, Mr Osborne and others began to meet regularly in a Mayfair restaurant to plot a Conservative future.
There was still time to test to destruction the alternative model. Mr Howard, who replaced the ousted Mr Duncan Smith in 2003, flirted with a full-throated modernisation but came to view it as unauthentic, at least in his mouth, and opted like Mr Hague for a safety-first “core-vote” strategy in the 2005 election.
Mr Cameron, who with Mr Gove helped to patch together the party’s manifesto, saw at first hand the consequences of limiting Tory appeal to existing supporters. Mr Cameron, then, emerged from another election disaster surrounded by two long-term friends, Mr Hilton and Mr Gove, and one newer ally, Mr Osborne. It was, however, someone he had known longer than any of them that pushed him hardest to run for the leadership. Andrew Feldman, a friend since Brasenose College, Oxford, set up the key meeting with Lord Harris of Peckham, a former Conservative treasurer, that helped to convince him to contest the leadership. Mr Feldman, who was later appointed chief executive of the party and then co-chairman, is an important, although non-political, member of the inner circle.
There were others who might have led the modernisers’ charge against David Davis in 2005. Andrew Lansley, David Willetts, Francis Maude, even Oliver Letwin, had all, at various times, held the mantle. Mr Osborne, had he been a little older and a little more confident, might have challenged Mr Cameron’s right to present the case. But he could see that Mr Cameron was exactly the reassuring figure that the party’s grassroots would trust to carry out the sort of radical changes that were needed to restore the party’s electoral fortunes. Together with Mr Hilton, the pair crafted a leadership campaign that balanced the modernising creed with a traditional message on the family. It was Mr Cameron’s star performance in hustings at the Conservative Party conference in Blackpool, however, that landed him the job. He beat Mr Davis by a margin of two to one: 134,446 to 64,398.
Veterans of the early days of Mr Cameron’s stint as Leader of the Opposition wonder, however, how they avoided disaster. It was not that the Tory leader lacked a solid backroom team: he had in Ed Llewellyn and Catherine Fall two long-term friends for his chief of staff and deputy chief of staff, and another former colleague reporting for duty was George Bridges. It was that the sheer, exuberant energy of the creative talents of Mr Hilton and Mr Letwin, coupled with Mr Cameron’s own inexperience and a general lack of organisational clarity, led to some hair-raising scrapes.
A fascinated and largely supportive media did not seem to notice, at least at first, as it lapped up the youthful leader. The environment provided the theme and the backdrops for an initial repositioning. Carefully crafted photo-opportunities, the most famous involving dog-sledding in the Arctic Circle, challenged voters’ preconceptions about what a Conservative leader looked like. Even the party’s slogan in the 2006 council election – Vote Blue, Go Green – seemed designed to blur former associations.
The Conservative grassroots were a tougher audience, particularly on the sensitive issue of candidate selection. Local associations had seen off previous attempts to dilute their power to select representatives but the new leader knew that, if he was to make the party look more like modern Britain, this was a battle he had to win. His first attempt, the creation of a 100-strong “A-list” of preferred candidates, was a crass but ultimately effective opening gambit. In the new Parliament there are 48 women Conservative MPs and 11 who are black or from other ethnic minorities. In the previous Parliament there were just eight women and two non-white MPs on the Conservative benches.
But while candidate selection was a fight that Mr Cameron knew he had to have with his grassroots, the defining battle of this period was one that he did not mean to pick. Ill-judged briefing around the issue of grammar schools in May 2007 brought resentment over Mr Cameron’s leadership to the surface among activists and MPs. That an Old Etonian was setting his face against state-funded selective education provided the first opportunity for critics to wheel out the issue of his class. Mr Cameron first tried to escalate the crisis making it a “key test” to establish whether it wanted just to be a “right-wing debating society”. When the backlash grew fiercer, Mr Cameron made a tactical retreat. It was the start of an uncomfortable summer, the low point of his leadership in opposition. An increasingly restive party, Mr Brown’s arrival in No 10 and the threat of an early election pushed the Tory leader to the right. Issues such as crime and immigration, deliberately ignored for two years, were foreshadowed.
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