Kitabı oku: «Civl society», sayfa 2
3. From the community of citizens to the civil society: The modern era
From the philosophical perspective, the three most important points in the changes from the community of citizens of antiquity to the modern civil society can be portrayed under the concepts of individuality, independence, and society.
(i) Individuality
As previously mentioned, the Aristotelian practical philosophy in general, and its political anthropology, have experienced both acceptance and rejection over the course of history. In modern political thought especially, many Aristotelian positions of his ethical-political symbioses were questioned for their general validity. In the course of political thought, beginning in the modern era, a greater distance was established between ethics and politics in comparison with ancient classical theory. In addition to doubts about the Aristotelian basic constant that humans are by nature community beings, criticism was also expressed of the Aristotelian “practical-political way of life”, the bios practikos kai politikos,18 and its binding necessity for the citizen.
In his philosophy, John Locke had already stressed the possibility of many different lifestyles and provided them with a new individualisation. He anchored these personal possibilities firmly on the basis of the fundamental rights to “life, liberty, and happiness”. However what is modern about the modern era is not the postulation of the “pursuit of happiness” – which Aristotle had already dealt with – but lies in two other details: first, in the definition of this pursuit of happiness as an activity that anybody – not just the free (male) citizen – can organise and determine for him- or herself, and second, all should do as they see fit. According to John Locke, all people look for happiness in the organisation of the way they lead their own lives, but they do not all look for the same kind of happiness or happiness in the same things. John Locke summarised the maxim of the modern individual, when compared with antiquity, in the following way: “Although people choose different things [in connection with the individual lifestyle], they all make the right choice.”19
Accordingly, individual life concepts cannot – or can hardly – be generalized, let alone represented in a single overall picture. John Locke’s – not entirely irony-free – criticism of the practical-political philosophy of antiquity is that it tried to do so anyway and thus had an extremely limited perspective on the conduct of human life. And so, he states that one “might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best relish were to be found in apples, plums, or nuts, and have divided themselves into sects upon it”.20
(ii) Independence
In addition to the growing awareness of the individual in the knowledge of individuality, there was also the need for the independent person, as was the case in the course of the philosophy of Enlightenment most recently. Unlike in ancient philosophy, this now applied explicitly for all people. In a text from 1783, Immanuel Kant answered the question of “What is Enlightenment?” with the following words: “Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another.”21
At this point, the individual person is responsible for himself. In short: independence cannot be prescribed but has to be developed out of the person, the individual. And the individualisation or subjectification of the human mentioned in a first step now demands – in a second step – the independence of the individual, which should be achieved in the course of the history of the political enlightenment, in particular through the equality of all people before the law, and the right to education, freedom of expression, solidarity, separation of powers, etc. That goes hand in hand with the individual’s self-determination of his or her own way of life within the legal provisions of the modern state. But Kant was already aware that the individual’s path to independence is not an easy one – and he also provides possible reasons for this: “Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a portion of mankind, after nature has long since discharged them from external direction (…), nevertheless remains under lifelong tutelage, and why it is so easy for others to set themselves up as their guardians. It is so easy not to be of age.”22
(iii) Society
From the politico-philosophical perspective, individuality and independence, in particular, form two cornerstones of the modern understanding of society in contrast to the ancient political community. Of course, there are also many other aspects that play a role. This makes it clear that the comparison between the community of citizens and our civil society is not merely a semantic project. However, this comparison between community and society had already become a topic of discussion in sociology in the 19th century, indicating that this development thesis is in no way new. In his treatise Ancient Law, published in 1861, the historian Henry Sumner Maine dealt with the development of the political community from antiquity to the modern society as a development “from status to contract”.
Following in the footsteps of Henry Sumner Maine, the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies made observations on – and divided apart – these two levels in a broader sociological form from the perspective of the period in his publication Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society), which was published in 1887. He distinguishes the community will (if people are in favour of life within the community of the village, in a sports club, or in religion) from the social will (if people approve of taking part in public life, in forms of political involvement, or participation in a stock corporation). According to Ferdinand Tönnies, the difference between community and society lies in the fact that, on the one hand, the community is self-sufficient and can be chosen freely, while on the other hand, society is viewed as an individually applicable instrument that people can make use of or not.
To summarise: No matter to which politico-sociological extent and regardless of all kinds of side effects (even if they are positive), individuality as well as independence have contributed to man, in the course of his individual and varied striving for life, liberty, and happiness, being able to participate in social forms of coexistence, and actively help to shape the political society – or not, if he so chooses. In keeping with one’s own subjective judgement on the one hand and to the extent allowed by the laws of the land on the other, today people are – in principle – free to participate politically or lead a completely apolitical life, in the narrower sense, in our modern understanding and reject political participation in light of their own lifestyle. A fact that in ancient times – once again with the focus on the theory and practice of the classical Greek period – was neither accepted anthropologically nor in the politics of the community.23
4. On the topicality of also thinking of the “civil society” as a “community of citizens”
On no account should the comparison between the ancient community of citizens and modern civil society be overused, especially since there are socio-political and scientific developments between these two perspectives that can hardly be portrayed in a single overview – if at all. But still – first and foremost – the currently acute global COVID-19 pandemic has revealed that, on the one hand, the modern civil societies are possibly more like civic communities than the historical, sociological, and philosophical developments would lead us to expect and, on the other, the individual, independent citizens living in a society – and therefore left to their own judgement as to the extent of their political participation – would like to believe. This is compounded in this time of crisis by the fact that rationalisation, globalisation, and cosmopolitanism have, in no way, made the life of the people and their subjective lifestyles any easier.
Through the rationalisation processes in all areas of life and relationships, globalisation was, and continues to be, an additional thoroughly rational result and that with all its positive and negative consequences. Today, the economy, politics, and science take place in an increasingly global context. And, according to the sociologist Ulrich Beck, this leads to the necessity to alter the perspective from which society (or societies) is observed. Ulrich Beck believes that global problems – such as the pandemic that has had a worldwide impact – can only be solved in a global context.24 Ecological, economic, healthcare, and political crises have long not only had an impact on the country, region, or continent hit by them.
On the one hand, the COVID-19 pandemic shows just how fragile modern societies are in many parts of the world. Ulrich Beck also serves as an interesting point of reference in this case as, faced with the global developments, he spoke about risk societies as early as 1986. Characteristic for these risk societies is that they can easily tip from one extreme to the other due to modernisation and mechanisation – in short, research and development. On the other hand, it can be observed that modern societies are still dependent on a basic level of participation on the part of the citizens – in this current, acute crisis, by paying attention to the health-related development in one’s own country and possibly even beyond its borders, supporting any measures necessary to contain the pandemic, or reducing some personal habits one has become fond of – and which have usually developed out of a certain level of independence – for a certain period of time. All of this makes it apparent that – despite the many developments that have taken place – the civil society, at its core, also means a society of citizens. It would only take the actions of a few people to not only upset the hoped-for effects in the health, economic, and political areas, but – going even further – counteract them.
It can be concluded that, although the developments from the ancient community of citizens to the modern civil society were clearly accomplished through individualisation and independence, and by following the path towards the open societies of modern democracies, the community of citizens is still in existence – or must be. This can be recognised more clearly in times of crisis than in other periods. Evidence of this was provided in the speech given to the Austrian people at the beginning of November by the Federal President Alexander van der Bellen in connection with the regulations on the second corona lockdown in Austria. In his six-minute address, he appealed to “the community” six times and did not speak to or about “the society” even once.25
5. Community policy empathy as a civil right and obligation
And now it is necessary – in a final step – to use five points to compare ancient times with the present; however, all of the aforementioned limitations of the comparison must be taken into consideration.
(i) Ancient political theory, as well as large areas of political practice in the classical period, were already aware of the crucial necessity of the political participation of the citizen in the community, in the sense – and for the benefit – of the whole political body (also for the all sections of the polis), and demanded that this be fulfilled. However, this participation was not only considered a political, but also a moral obligation. Nevertheless, the wellbeing of the political community of the citizens of the polis was mostly given priority over that of the individual. Individuality, as well as independence in the modern sense of the word, was not in demand to this extent.
(ii) The developments from the ancient community of citizens to the modern civil society is connected with many significant and constitutive achievements, especially in Europe. They will not be questioned or criticised here – but they include, as mentioned previously, most notably the individuality and independence of the specific person in his life in society. In a subsequent step, this contributed to separating the community and society more clearly from each other than before. In this separation, political participation was transferred to the social area and removed even further from the immediate individual and independent way of life (of course, this did not happen everywhere).
(iii) However, the two aspects mentioned above should not lead to the assumption that the modern civil society does not still preserve a kind of community of citizens at its core. As just shown, how much the human being is a “community creature”, and not merely a social, individualised person in an environment that is completely free of politics, becomes crystal clear, especially in times of crisis. As Aristotle determined: The human being is dependent on his fellow man for his mere survival, on the one hand, and for a good and successful life, on the other. This forms the cornerstone for understanding the human (political) community. And, this perspective is still valid.
(iv) Seen from this politico-philosophical perspective of the human being as an individual, independent “community creature”, it can be further deduced that one cannot be completely indifferent to the life of the other – especially in one’s own state. The foundation of this non-indifference can be expressed with the necessity for a minimum of community political empathy. In the modern understanding of the political, ethics and politics are not as far away from each other as they might seem at first glance when observing current political practice. (Once again: There was already an awareness for the indissoluble symbiosis of ethics and politics in ancient times.)
(v) In the modern understanding, this community political empathy can be classified, from the ethical-political perspective, as a civic right and obligation. On the one hand, the citizens have a right to not be left behind, by politics on one side and their fellow citizens on the other, within the socio-political discourses and developments. On the other hand, it is possible to recognise the ethical-political challenge facing the individual and independent person within a political community, as well as society, of showing consideration for others and, ultimately, also recognise the individuality and independence of the other.
1 Funke, Peter: Die griechische Staatenwelt in klassischer Zeit. In: Gehrke, Hans-Joachim / Schneider, Helmuth (eds.), Geschichte der Antike, Stuttgart 2006, p. 176.
2 Lotze, Detlef: Griechische Geschichte – Von den Anfängen bis zum Hellenismus, Munich 2010, p. 21.
3 Bürgin, Alfred: Zur Soziogenese der politischen Ökonomie – wirtschaftsgeschichtliche und dogmengeschichtliche Betrachtungen, Marburg 1996, p. 30.
4 Cancik, Hubert / Schneider, Helmuth (eds.), Der neue Pauly – Enzyklopädie der Antike, Stuttgart 2001, vol. 10, p. 23, s.v. Polis.
5 Funke, Peter: Die griechische Staatenwelt in klassischer Zeit. In: Gehrke, Hans-Joachim / Schneider, Helmuth (eds.), Geschichte der Antike, Stuttgart 2006, p. 166.
6 Cf. Varga, Simon: Perspektiven kosmopolitischer Menschenwürde in der Philosophie der Antike. In: Sedmak, Clemens (ed.), Menschenwürde – Vom Selbstwert des Menschen, Grundwerte Europas vol. 7, Darmstadt 2017, pp. 118–119.
7 Cf. Aeschylus: Die Perser. Übersetzt vom Emil Staiger, Stuttgart 2015, pp. 242–245.
8 Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik. Übersetzt von Ursula Wolf, Hamburg 2006, X 10, 1181b15.
9 Höffe, Otfried: Geschichte des politischen Denkens, Munich 2016, p. 54.
10 Cf. Aristoteles: Politik. Übersetzt von Franz Susemihl, Hamburg 2003, I 2, 1253a7.
11 Cf. Aristoteles: Politik. Übersetzt von Franz Susemihl, Hamburg 2003, I 2, 1253a15.
12 Aristoteles: Eudemische Ethik. Übersetzt von Franz Dirlmeier, Berlin 1984, VII 10, 1242a25.
13 Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik. Übersetzt von Ursula Wolf, Hamburg 2006, X 9, 1170b11.
14 Cf. Aristoteles: Politik. Übersetzt von Franz Susemihl, Hamburg 2003, I 2, 1253a26-29.
15 Cf. Aristoteles: Politik. Übersetzt von Franz Susemihl, Hamburg 2003, VII 4, 1325b36.
16 Cf. Varga, Simon: Vom erstrebenswertesten Leben – Aristoteles' Philosophie der Muße, Boston / Berlin 2014, pp. 183–185.
17 Wolfgang Kullmann finds it “noteworthy” that, within the framework of the state to the best of its ability, there would be the possibility of “withdrawing from political life and living “unpolitically” in manner of speaking.
18 Aristoteles: Politik. Übersetzt von Franz Susemihl, Hamburg 2003, VII 2, 1324a27.
19 John Locke: Versuche über den menschlichen Verstand. Übersetzt von Carl Winckler, Hamburg 2006, Book II, XXI 55. (English: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/10615/10615-h/10615-h.htm#link2HCH0024 – (Book II, 56) accessed 28.11.2020).
20 John Locke: Versuche über den menschlichen Verstand. Übersetzt von Carl Winckler, Hamburg 2006, Book II, XXI 55.
21 Kant, Immanuel: Was ist Aufklärung?, Stuttgart 2002, p. 9. (English: https://resources.saylor.org/wwwresources/archived/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/What-is-Enlightenment.pdf – accessed 28.11.2020).
22 Kant, Immanuel: Was ist Aufklärung?, Stuttgart 2002, p. 9.
23 In the Hellenist era (directly following the Classical period), the various philosophical schools, including the Cynics, Stoics, and Epicureans, had already developed the first approaches to detach the human being from the immediate and categorical necessity of political participation. All of these schools made the attempt to relativise the political in its significance for the personal lifestyle of the individual. A basic tenet of the philosophy of the Hellenist period was that, in the final analysis, the political could not be made solely responsible for the good and successful life of the individual.
24 Beck, Ulrich: Der kosmopolitische Blick – oder: Krieg ist Frieden, Frankfurt 2004, pp. 7–10.
25 Alexander van der Bellen made an appeal to “Austrian men and women, and all those who live here” and asked for their understanding of the new measures “in the name of our community”. He continued by saying that the hardship that were to come as a result of the COVID-19 orders would be “especially difficult for some members of our community” to bear as well as that “community is not just an empty word”. Cf. https://www.bundespraesident.at/aktuelles/detail/tv-ansprache-anlaesslich-der-verordnung-zum-2-lockdown (Accessed: 10. 11. 2020).
The Civil Society and the Bourgeoisie
Ernst Bruckmüller
Summary: The modern formulation of the “civil” or “civic” society describes the common commitment of people in areas outside of their family and professional spheres – and usually outside of politics. “Citizens’ initiatives” can aim at influencing politics and the administration and, in special cases, even at changing the political system (as the občanské forum 1989 – citizens’ forum – did in the Czech part of former Czechoslovakia). This essay poses the question of the extent to which previous concepts of the bourgeoisie and “bourgeois society” have anything in common with the modern phenomena of the civil society. This is because, as a rule, civil-society activity takes place within the framework of legal possibilities, such as the right to personal freedom, the right to carry on a business, the freedom to practise a religion and express oneself, freedom of the press, freedom of association and assembly, the right to petition, etc. that were achieved by “bourgeois” visionaries, pioneers, revolutionaries, and politicians.
