Kitabı oku: «Civl society», sayfa 6
4. Radicalism as an acceptable ferment; extremism as a poison to be eradicated
A radical is a person who gets to the bottom of things, develops an argument until it is absurd, drives a thesis to the utmost exaggeration, and represents a position without any sense of proportion. Radicalism is therefore equally disturbing to moderates and conservatives – and that can even be good and desirable. It is precisely radicalism that drives discourse and political projects forward and presses for those innovations that moderates and conservatives are only too happy to avoid. However, two things are essential if radicalism is not to endanger a discourse-open system. First, rules are necessary that tie radical argumentation to the imperative of logic, radical activity to the leash of non-violence, and radical politics to the chain of the rule of law. Second, it is to be desired that each form of radicalism has its counterforce, and each thesis its antithesis. That is precisely when a dialectic of progress based on trial and error can have the greatest effect.
When all of that is given, radicalism – the risk game of an open society as it were – may develop fruitfully as a ferment of social change. For example, it exists in the form of left or right radicalism, religious or anti-religious radicalism, and there is also a radicalism of liberty, equality, and justice. If, however, there is a lack of either effective rules of the game in radical discourse, or of counterforces to radical positions – and conservatism is an essential component here – radicalism can also become a threat to an open society. It would be likely to drift apart, become polarised, and end in disputes that could go as far as civil war. A stable order, on the other hand, is not only able to tolerate radicalism but also profit from it – especially if conservatives have strong arguments. Put briefly: Although many are disturbed by radicalism, it can do good; although radicalism can be ruthlessly stupid, its fundamental attitude is not reprehensible.
Extremism is a completely different matter. An extremist is a person who – for whatever reasons and no matter where – works towards the eradication of a liberal democratic basic order. According to the famous formulation given by the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1952, this is an order “that, by excluding any form of violence or arbitrary rule, represents a rule of law founded on the self-determination of the people according to the will of the respective majority and liberty and equality. The following, at least, must be counted as belonging to the fundamental principles of this order: respect for the human rights concretised in the constitution, especially the right of the individual to life and free development, popular sovereignty, the separation of powers, the responsibility of the government, the legality of the administration, the independence of the courts, the multi-party principle and equal opportunities for all political parties with the right to form and exercise an opposition in keeping with the constitution.”
Anyone who aims at doing away with this order – for the sake of human dignity or liberty – must be fought against; and that not only going as far as to forbid his political organisation or the forfeiture of his basic rights, but going even further, and using armed force if necessary, as expressly approved in Article 20.4 of the German Constitution. On the other hand, a person whose aim is not to eliminate the liberal democratic basic order, but only do away with individual regulations or institutions of a liberal, democratic state is simply a dissident, or a radical at most, who has got on the wrong track. A person of this kind can only be approached with the normal means of political discussion.
In this context, in its ruling on the prohibition of the German Communist Party, the Federal Constitutional Court expressly stated that a party, and a political position in particular, “is not unconstitutional if it rejects individual positions, or even entire institutions, of the Constitution. Rather it must reject the highest values of constitutional order, the fundamental constitutional principles, which make the constitutional order free and democratic, principles on which, at least, all parties must agree if this kind of democracy is to function meaningfully at all… [A party or political position is] also not unconstitutional if it does not recognise these highest principles of a free democratic basic order, rejects them or counters them with others. Rather, there must be an active, combative, aggressive attitude towards the existing order; it must deliberately impair the functioning of this order and, in the further course, wish to eliminate this order itself. This means that the liberal-democratic state does not act against parties with aims that are hostile to it of its own accord, but merely defends itself from attacks on its basic order. This legal construction of the elements of an offence rules out abuse of the provision in the service of zealous persecution of inconvenient opposition parties.”
The reasons a person or group has for fighting the liberal democratic basic order, or their political aims, are completely irrelevant for determining extremism if the criteria mentioned above are used. However, it serves to provide desirable information if, for example, right-wing or left-wing extremism, Islamist extremism, or “middle-class extremism” is spoken about. But the use of such a term can never take the place of investigating whether those labelled as extremists really plan to attack and eliminate the free basic order, which is recognisable by its clear criteria. By the way, when assessing the ethical and political worthlessness of opposition of this kind, the source of the motives for extremism is completely irrelevant: whether they come from the middle of society, from the upper or lower classes, from the left, or from the right, or from another edge of the political spectrum does not play a role. This is because extremism always attacks everything that makes a pluralistic democracy possible and so advantageous as an embodiment of political order.
5. Current trends threatening the civil society
It can unfortunately no longer be taken for granted that open public dispute is not only legally possible, but that it is also guaranteed that everyone can represent an opinion in every situation and without fear of being threatened with violence. As has happened so often throughout history, there are now rather strict regulations and restrictions governing political thought and speech. They are assured by creating taboos, censure by oneself or others, as well as the ostracism and condemnation of dissenters. Starting points for the use of political force can always be found along such enforced criteria of political correctness. Their forms begin inconspicuously but soon reach ugly levels of escalation. They are all the more frightening, seeing that political violence is often motivated by unquestionably good intentions.
A starting point for many manifestations of violence that endangers freedom is that one reacts to political positions that one does not like with a kind of “political arachnophobia”. Disgusted and – genuinely or supposedly – driven by fear, the troublemaker is attacked with words and whistles, or other means, although he is generally only aggravating and not really dangerous. Many are motivated to use this kind of behaviour because they feel that grim situations they are aware of from history are looming up on the horizon; that is why they are determined to “nip it in the bud”. This reaction unfolds particularly easily whenever a connection can be made between somebody with a different opinion and National Socialism. It is then usually the case that communication is ruled out and forms of exclusion practiced that, in turn, make use of some subtle – and some very crude – techniques of the use of force.
The techniques employed to ostracise dissidents begin with refusal to question one’s own mindset and not even wanting to attempt to comprehend those connections that are so important to the person with a different opinion. This kind of ostracism goes further when it is considered a sign of special competence to be able to “explain away” everything that has caused the dissident to take his political position. One can make fun of “obviously unfounded” fears or pass them off as being “merely a pretext” – and portray the “real reasons” in appropriately dark colours. It is possible to achieve even more if the opponent is deprived of important terms, or if their use in the public sphere has been prevented or made slightly scandalous by setting “limits to what can be said”. This is intended to show that the distinctions and evaluations that are important for those who think differently can only be put forward against directly expressed contradiction – showing that the opponent is wrong through his choice of words alone.
The next stage of ostracism is reached when it becomes possible to attach labels to the opponent that show that somebody is really a “bad person”. The best way to begin is by judging him to be a “notorious troublemaker” or “political diehard”. A “strategic context formation” of this kind is particularly effective in Germany if it is possible to describe somebody as a “right-wing populist”, “fascist”, or – really popular in recent times – as a “racist”. And, in case the person is not directly recognisable as being evil, speaking of the “extremism of the middle” that the person to be outcast personifies, usually helps. It can also be particularly practical if it is possible to portray the marginalised person as being the incarnation of type that is dangerous to the general public. In that case, the demand for exclusion is no longer specifically directed against a fellow human being, who might even be likeable under different circumstances, or his particular actions, but simply against evil and its embodiment in the enemy. This makes it possible to assert one’s own moral superiority that can no longer be refuted for all practical purposes.
It is highly plausible that anybody who has been branded as being a “latent Nazi” or “populist” will be deprived of any possibilities for public appearances. You cannot provide a platform for a right-wing radical or racist; he can therefore no longer participate in talk shows on an equal footing – and, naturally, also not on discussion podiums and rostrums. The result of this kind of process reaches perfection as soon as the dissident not only shows weakness that justify his exclusion, but also reacts to such pressure by accepting his role as an outsider and, full of defiance, proves himself to be increasingly wrong.
The ostracism can go even further. The aim is to bring the dissident before a “virtual court” – for example, to “finish him off” on a talk show and then post the relevant video clip on the internet. It might even be possible to pin an investigation by the public prosecutor on him; there must be something behind it! The goal has been reached when the person who is to be rejected is regarded as “not to be taken seriously”, when he is no longer seen as a “trustworthy expert” – and maybe not even an “acceptable fellow citizen”. And the exclusion reaches the desired conclusion when the opponent withdraws from the public sphere. In a dictatorship, he might be incarcerated, exiled, admitted to a psychiatric institution, or possibly even murdered.
All of these steps can be rounded of perfectly with schadenfreude towards the “bad guys” and with self-celebratory symbolic actions by the “heroes”. This becomes particularly effective when this schadenfreude is not only accompanied by serious threats, but when these are put into practice in an exemplary fashion: from preventing public speeches to rededicating cakes to be used as accusatory projectiles, from discourse-preventing chants and throwing stones at demonstrations to attacks on offices, vehicles, and people. All of these activities have now become a mutual practice that damages an existing civil society from within and undermines the foundations of its pluralistic democracy.
6. Lessons to be heeded
It will only be possible to enjoy the advantages of a civil society as long as desirable argumentativeness or radicality does not result in violence, or the respective opponent – even if he is a radical – is not confronted with violence. That makes it absolutely essential to accept and adhere to the following rules. First, violence that is against the law must be categorically rejected – regardless of who it is aimed at, and independent of all motives except self-defence and in an emergency. Police action must be taken against any actually executed violence. Second, violence is to be rejected even more strongly as a means of internal politics – this also applies to violence in the form of intimidation although it might still be within the framework of law. Concern about the consequences of substandard politics or indignation about the arrogance of the political opponent never justify violence or the threat of it.
We would be well advised to not only draw up such principles for the functioning of a civil society in the abstract, but also to consider their concrete consequences, and take them to heart in practice. That is why we should attempt to relate these principles to the issues of immigration and integration, which will definitely remain with us for some time to come, and – specifically – to the recurring attacks on refugees and their accommodation. Although this example is substitutable, it is particularly instructive in the present situation. No matter how radical the political disagreement, it must be handled in this way: It is unjust to come down on civil-war refugees and asylum seekers, foreigners living in the country, and fellow citizens with a different appearance, just because one is dissatisfied with the deficiencies in migration and integration policies.
This makes refugee and asylum seekers’ accommodations absolutely the wrong places to protest against migration and integration policies. It is deplorable to try to get attention by organising demonstrations of this kind in places where those people, who can do nothing at all about the conflict that needs to be fought out in a country, become the target of aggression. It is also unjust to translate concerns and indignation resulting from the inadequacies and flaws in immigration and integration policies into hostility against overtaxed mayors and district executives, and even against those police officers who have to maintain public order and secure the rights of everybody to demonstrate under such difficult circumstances. And the fact that somebody looks different or has been socialised by a culture different from one’s own does not in any way justify belittling or despising others and treating them accordingly. Anyone who does this, anyone who acts in a racist manner, has a damaged moral compass or bad character. And anyone who – despite willingness to engage in a dialogue – cannot be won over to humane coexistence must, quite simply, be excluded from the acceptable political discourse.
Put in a nutshell: For the sake of the continued existence of a civil society and its pluralistic democracy, it is necessary to fight violent radicals and all extremists – then, thanks to the self-evident assertion of non-violence, one will be able to afford the radicality that is so important for political educability and make the pluralistic democracy especially educable in this way. Of course, this is a complex view, and often an emotionally difficult attitude. However, without accepting the necessary intellectual and emotional costs, it will quite simply be impossible to benefit from the great value of the civil society and its pluralistic democracy.
The Phenomenology of the Civil Society
Manfred Prisching
Summary: There is no single civil society – there are only civil societies in the plural. There are numerous, different phenomena, entities, groups, institutions, mental attitudes, and activities collected under this label. The heterogeneity of the concept of the “civil society” creates difficulties, seeing that the institutional can conflict with the normative localisation; the organisation with the mental attitude. One thing is certain: It is not possible to protect, generate, guarantee, or develop community spirit through institutional measures. However, it is possible for institutions that allow, make possible, promote, and strengthen private activities to grow through community spirit. There can, therefore, be no civil society without citizens.
I intend to approach the matter using a linguistic-empirical method. The vocabulary employed to speak about the phenomenon that is described as the civil society or civic society (van den Brink et al. 1995; Jessen et al. 2004) includes the following concepts: active participation, commitment, legitimation, social resource, participation practice, dialogue (among the administration, politics and the citizenry), projects, public benefit, general welfare, volunteer work, responsibility, citizenship, social responsibility, associations and unions, federations and foundations, philanthropy, sponsorship, democratic public opinion, locality, fragmentation, basis activity, self-organisation, self-regulation, activation, protest, criticism, democracy, publicity, and social capital. Factual and normative, descriptive and desired, institutional, ideal, and practical phenomena are described in this way and, not so rarely, all in a muddle. Jürgen Kocka says, “There are social-science concepts that spread like epidemics, that degenerate into slogans of political rhetoric, and whose upsurge is purchased through fuzziness” (Kocka et al. 2001, p. 4). That does not sound good. But Kocka continues, “On the other hand, you have to ask yourself what makes the concept [civil society] so attractive. Protesters in Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest rediscovered it in the 1980s and made it the core of their indictment of the Communist dictatorships in their countries. The concept had already started to play a certain role in the politico-scientific discussion in Latin America and South Africa. Communitarian and liberal authors in the West soon started to resort to the concept when they took a stand for minority groups or economic deregulation, against the alleged domination of the patronising state. In the left camp, the concept was used to claim the right to public space as a medium for democratic self-fulfilment and to stress the rights of the self-determining society of discussing, responsible citizens against the constraints of the apparatuses of the market and state” (Kocka et al. 2001, p. 4). This shows that there are completely different contexts (and probably also different contextual accentuations) connected with the civil or civic society. We are the people. We are community. We are the entrepreneurial society. We are “the” society. We are the critical. We are democracy. But here we notice some contradictions. The concept can imply being left in peace or actively participating. It means the private or public sphere. It entails the free market or is non-market. It alludes to political involvement or distance from the state. Hans Joas formulated it in this way: “Which social forces can assure that the market and state, as the two dominating mechanisms of modern socialisation, can be relativised and modified by a third principle so that we are not faced with the alternative of either simply passively accepting the consequences of unregulated market activities or, conversely, relying exclusively on intervention by the state to overcome them with the risk of a stifling bureaucratisation of social life?”1
The civil society or civic society2 is usually spoken of in a positive way, the concept (similar to “democracy”) augmented with all desirabilities, even though the real phenomena that are labelled in this way are completely different. There is a loose connection with a conceptual world that has been tagged the bourgeois society (comprising the moyenne and haute bourgeoisie, educated middle classes, and a bourgeois lifestyle) (Riedel 2004); however, seeing that this society has faded away, the content of the concept has also shifted even though the aftereffects of the formerly effective attitude can still be felt. The concept is nuanced in a variety of ways internationally, and there are also historical shifts. Certain discussions – such as the debate on communitarianism – blanket themselves with the concepts.
First of all, this indicates that: There is no civil society – there are only civil societies in the plural. Numerous, different phenomena, entities, groups, institutions, mental attitudes, and activities are collected under this label. It is difficult to compare a voluntary fire brigade with the squatters occupying an autonomous centre, the Caritas and Volkshilfe social organisations with populist groups from the right, university professors who sit on the advisory board of their institution with the members of a village choral society or the uprising in Belarus with demonstrations by the AfD (Alternative for Germany) in the West. Beatrix von Storch (AfD) also actually made use of the term in her criticism of the migrants’ riots in 2020: “If injunctions forbidding entering public squares and streets on weekends are issued, as happened in Frankfurt, we will lose our struggle for the public space in Germany. That is the beginning of the end of a free civil society.”3
Even if one makes an attempt to only compile a list of the various concept-clusters, one notices that the variants of the concept of the “civil society” are always twofold: positive contextual definition and negative distinction, force and counterforce, stance and anti-stance. If one makes a mental effort to amalgamate all of the central elements, the result is a – albeit somewhat hazy – contour of a civil society in the singular. We will now take a look at the ambivalences of the term and then probe the conceptual meaning.
