Kitabı oku: «Karl Polanyi», sayfa 3

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Annotation 1

This summary takes into consideration neither online media (such as, for example, orf. at, which has given Polanyi ample credit) nor radio stations like Ö1, a broadcaster that has repeatedly engaged with Polanyi, nor TV series (The German-French TV station Arte reported on Polanyi in a six-part documentary on major economists).

Annotation 2

This summary is intended as non-judgemental. It seeks not to point out the correct or incorrect perception of Polanyi’s ideas, but to depict (in an inevitably inconclusive form) the coverage in consumer publications and newspapers in the German- and English-speaking world over the past five years.

FICTITIOUS COMMODITIES AND THE THREE WAVES OF MARKETIZATION
On the nature of fictitious commodities and how public goods are turned into private capital. Reading and expanding on Karl Polanyi.1

MICHAEL BURAWOY

Following the financial crisis in 2008, various new progressive protest movements emerged around the globe, at least initially. Subsequently, we also saw a rise in right-wing populist forces. Based on Karl Polanyi’s book, The Great Transformation, I analyse ‘marketization’ from the standpoint of the social movements which it engenders. I distinguish between three historical waves of these movements against marketization.

The fictitious commodity: from commodification to excommodification

Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation, first published in 1944, it is a searing account of the threat posed by the over-extended market to the survival of society – a threat so dire that, on pain of death, it would precipitate society’s self-defence. To understand the lived experience of marketization and the possibility of its reversal Polanyi’s concept of ‘fictitious commodity’ is especially useful. In this concept, Polanyi focuses on the destructive character of commodification.

Polanyi contends that labour, land and money – in terms of production factors – were never conceived in order to be bought or sold, and that their unregulated commodification (their transformation into commodities) destroys their ‘true’ or ‘essential’ character. When labour power is exchanged without protection against injury or sickness, unemployment or over-employment, or below-subsistence wages, the labour that can be extracted rapidly declines, and it veers towards uselessness. Equally, when land, or more broadly nature, is subject to commodification then it can no longer support the basic necessities for human life. Finally, when money is used to make money, for example through currency speculation, then its value becomes so uncertain that it can no longer be used as a means of exchange, putting businesses out of business and generating economic crises. Today we have to add a fourth fictitious commodity – knowledge – a factor of production that is not only an essential ingredient of the modern economy but crucial to the production of the other three factors.

How do fictitious commodities partake in shaping the lived experience of marketization? What is it about the commodification of labour, land, money and knowledge that contributes to social movements? Polanyi points to the act of exchange itself as violating the essential nature of land, money and labour. It is true that trafficking of human beings or trading of human organs may arouse such abhorrence that they can lead to social movements, but they are unlikely to be movements of those who are trafficked or who sell their organs. Alternatively, social movements may be a response to the lifting of protections won against commodification, as when welfare benefits are reduced, trade unions are decertified, labour laws violated or withdrawn.

There are, however, other ways of attributing movement responses to commodification distinct from the process of exchange itself. Polanyi devotes little attention to the processes through which entities are turned into commodities, processes of disembedding the commodity from its social integument. Marx’s original ‘primitive accumulation’ focused on land expropriation for the creation of a labour force dependent on wage labour. Today the dispossession of peasantries is designed to commodify land rather than create a dependent labour force. Whatever the goal, land expropriation has generated much determined resistance. Equivalently, the expropriation of knowledge from the craft worker has historically generated much labour protest. Today, however, it is not only the deskilling of the worker that is at stake, but the appropriation and commodification of the product, namely knowledge itself. In the privatization of universities, for example, dispossession involves turning knowledge from a public good into a sellable asset. This, too, is the source of much protest.

Fictitious Commodities as Sources of Social Movements


Inequality
Ex-Commodification LABOR (precarity)
Commodification MONEY (debt)
Dispossession
Ex-Commodification NATURE (destruction)
Commodification KNOWLEDGE (privatization)

In addition to the dispossession that produces the commodity, another source of social movements is the growing inequality that follows from commodification. For example, in the sale of labour power ‘precarity’ or insecurity has become the dominant experience of increasing proportions of the population. The commodification of labour power has been compounded by the commodification of money, making money from money by gambling on debt.

Another process Polanyi overlooked is the process of excommodification – the expulsion of entities from the market, entities that were formerly commodities but no longer. Excommodification captures the idea that there are lots of useful things that, to their detriment, are expelled from the market. In the face of excommodification, commodification can be a very attractive prospect. In relation to labour, in many places, and increasingly all over the world, expanding reservoirs of surplus labour make it a privilege to be exploited. Vast populations are exiled or confined to the informal sector of the economy where they eke out a hand to mouth existence. In relation to nature it is its incorporation into a capitalist economy that is so wasteful, yet often the absence of the market is responsible for its undervaluation. We are able to plunder nature because it has insignificant market value. Very different are knowledge and money where commodification leads not to waste but to distorted utilization – the production of knowledge is geared to those who can pay for it while the production of different types of money is used to create profit from debt.

Moving beyond the characteristics of fictitious commodities it is important to examine their interrelations in specific historical contexts. Indeed, social movements have to be understood not as a reaction to the (ex)commodification of a single fictitious commodity, but as responses to the articulation of the (ex)commodification of labour, money, nature and knowledge. In the Arab Spring uprising, the intersection of the precarity of labour and indebtedness due to micro-finance proved to be a motive for protest; the student movement can be analysed in terms of precarity of labour and privatization of knowledge production; environmental movements lie at the intersection of the destruction or commodification of nature and the precarity of labour. This framework of fictitious commodities provides an account of the underlying forces driving protest. The articulation of the (ex) commodification of fictitious commodities can also be used to understand different historical periods of marketization.

Polanyi believed that we would never again experiment with market fundamentalism

In truth Polanyi pays little attention to fictitious commodities, more concerned to develop his majestic history that begins with the advance of marketization at the end of the 18th century and ends in the 1930s with a countermovement that brings about new forms of state regulation – both those that advance freedoms, such as the New Deal and social democracy and those that restrict freedoms, such as Fascism and Stalinism. The double threat – on the one hand to the survival of society and, then, to freedom ravaged by the reaction to the destruction of society – led Polanyi to believe that humanity would never again experiment with market fundamentalism. Polanyi was wrong. Beginning in 1973 there developed a new round of market fundamentalism which has had far reaching consequences for the history of capitalism and the specificity of the contemporary period.

Three waves of marketization and the countermovements

Indeed, looking back on the history of capitalism that Polanyi analyses and its development to this day, one can see three waves of marketization, each with their associated, real or (in the case of the third wave) potential countermovement. Referring to English history – the main focus of Polanyi’s analysis – the first wave can be said to begin at the end of the 18th century with the Speenhamland Law of 1795 which became a critical obstacle to the development of a national labour market that would only crystallize with the New Poor Law of 1834. The abolishment of the Speenhamland Law and the unleashing of market forces generated countermovements through which society sought to protect itself: the formation of a working class though the factory movement, cooperatives, trade unions, Chartism and the formation of a political party, factory laws and social legislation.

The second wave of marketization began after the First World War with a renewed ascendancy of the market that included the recommodification of labour, and the opening up of free trade based on the gold standard. This worked very well for imperial countries like the US and UK, but for competing countries such as Italy and Germany the constraints of rigid exchange rates resulted in catastrophic decline in the economy and rampant inflation that led them to break with the international economy and turn to a reactionary regime of market regulation. This redounded back to the US and the rest of Europe with the Depression that was only counteracted by state intervention and market regulation, in this case of a progressive character. With the defeat of Fascism in the Second World War, the more liberal regimes prevailed. Even in the USSR there was a certain liberalization in the 1950s. In advanced capitalism this period was ruled by Keynesianism and ‘embedded liberalism’ in economics and the end of ideology in sociology, only to be burst open by the upswing of social movements in the 1960s.

The third wave, not anticipated by Polanyi, begins in 1973 with the energy crisis, subsequently described as the Washington Consensus with a major impetus from the Thatcher and Reagan administrations in the form of a renewed assault on labour. Over time it has become an era of the recommodification of money with the ascendancy of finance and the deepening commodification of nature, that is of air, land and water. This third-wave marketization led to and was given new energy by the collapse of state socialism. Structural adjustment came to Latin America at the very time it was emerging from dictatorship, prompting experiments in participatory democracy. Indeed, whereas in core countries the waves of marketization have succeeded one another over two centuries, more peripheral countries have had to face these waves in rapid succession, making them all the more explosive.

There have been national reactions to market expansion – whether in the form of Islamic nationalism or shades of socialism in Latin America – but they cannot reverse third-wave marketization as this requires a planetary response to the global reach of finance capital and the looming environmental catastrophe that threatens the whole earth. Indeed, finance capital is the force behind the precariatisation of labour – both its recommodification and, correlatively, its excommodification – as well as the rising levels of debt, not just at the level of the individual but also of the community, the city, the state, and even the region. Finance capital has commodified and propelled knowledge into production and together they have incorporated nature as an accumulation strategy of capital (Smith 2007, pp. 16–36). A countermovement will have to assume a global character, couched in terms of human rights since the survival of the human species is at stake.

The question arises where exactly we are on the curve of third-wave marketization. Optimists have argued that third-wave marketization has already begun to reverse itself and that we are climbing towards the confinement of marketization. Others think that commodification has been far from halted. Many, including myself, thought that the economic crisis of 2008 and the reshuffling of world power offered an opportunity for a countermovement, but this proved to be illusory. It is possible that the countermovement is still in the distant future just as it is also possible that there will never be a countermovement with the aim of limiting marketization.

References

Burawoy, Michael (2015): Facing an unequal world. In: Current Sociology, Vol. 63(1), pp. 5–34.

Smith, Neil (2007): Nature as accumulation strategy. Socialist Register Vol.43: Coming to terms with nature. pp. 16-36.

II The Personal and the Historical

‘WHEREVER MY FATHER LIVED HE WAS ENGAGED IN WHATEVER WAS GOING ON’
Shaping The Great Transformation: a conversation with Kari Polanyi Levitt.1

MICHAEL BURAWOY

Karl Polanyi has become a canonical thinker in sociology and beyond. His book The Great Transformation, has become a classic that touches on almost every subfield of sociology. Its influence extends far beyond sociology to economics, political science, geography and anthropology. Being a critique of the market economy for the way it destroys the fabric of society, it has gained ever more followers over the last four decades of neoliberal thought and practice. The book is simultaneously an investigation of the sources and consequences of commodification and an account of counter-movements against commodification – movements that gave rise to fascism and Stalinism as well as social democracy. Hence it has obvious relevance to our present global context. In this interview with his daughter Kari Polanyi Levitt, she describes the life of her father, and the influences leading to The Great Transformation. She also points to the special relation her father had with her mother, Ilona Duczynska, herself a lifelong political activist and intellectual. Here Kari Polanyi Levitt traces the four phases of Karl Polanyi’s life (1886–1964): the Hungarian phase, the Austrian phase, the English phase and then the North American phase. Kari Polanyi Levitt is an economist in her own right, living in Montreal, author of numerous publications, including From the Great Transformation to the Great Financialization (2013), and the edited collection The Life and Work of Karl Polanyi (1990).

Michael Burawoy: Let’s start at the beginning. We are used to thinking of Karl Polanyi as Hungarian, but he was actually born in Vienna, right?

KARI POLANYI LEVITT: Yes, that’s right. Interestingly, my father and I were both born in Vienna and my mother was born in a small town not far from Vienna – which of course was the great centre of intellectual life, the great metropolis of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The family, that is the mother and father of Karl Polanyi, started in Vienna. Karl’s mother, Cecilia Wohl, was sent by her father from Vilna, then in Russia, to Vienna to learn a trade. As a result of her education she spoke Russian and German. She met Karl’s father, a young Hungarian Jewish engineer – Mihály Pollacsek – in Vienna. He spoke Hungarian and German. So the family started as a German-speaking family.

And, not that long ago, I learned from correspondence that my father never learned Hungarian until he entered the Gymnasium in Budapest. My father’s Hungarian period, which is of course very important, was also shaped by a Russian influence – that came politically through Russian socialists, very different from the social democrats of that time. It was a socialism more oriented toward the countryside, the peasantry. It had anarchist elements. Communes, of course, were very much part of that political formation. And I would have to say that this Russian influence was balanced on his father’s side, who was an anglophile. And if there were two important literary figures in the life of my father it was Shakespeare – he took a volume of his collected English writings with him to the war – and, of all the great Russian writers, I would say Dostoyevsky.

And then there was the influence of Russian émigré revolutionaries, among them a man called Klatchko.

POLANYI LEVITT: Yes, Samuel Klatchko was an extraordinary figure. He lived in Vienna. He was the unofficial emissary connecting Russian revolutionaries with international and European ones. He came from a Jewish family in Vilna and spent his youth in a Russian commune in Kansas. The commune didn’t last very long. It eventually broke up, and they say that he drove 3,000 cattle to Chicago and after that he visited the International Ladies Garment Workers Union in New York. He was an activist. The Kansas commune was named after a Russian figure called Nikolai Tchaikovsky. But when Klatchko came to Vienna he formed a close friendship with the Pollacsek family and he looked after Russian folks who came to buy Marxist literature, or whatever they came to Vienna for. And my father told me – which I have never forgotten – that these men made a huge impression on him, and also on his cousin Irvin Szabo who played an important part in Hungarian intellectual life; he was also a kind of anarchist socialist. Some of them didn’t have shoes and they had their feet tied up in newspapers. My father was immensely impressed by the heroism and the courage of these people. And altogether my father had a… I was going to say ‘romantic’, but in any case, a huge respect for these revolutionaries – and particularly for Bakunin who, I suppose, is the greatest figure of all, a man who broke out of every prison in Europe.

And the social revolutionary sympathy continued throughout his life, which explains in part the ambiguity he would have towards the Bolsheviks.

POLANYI LEVITT: Yes, it continued throughout his life. It explains the antagonistic relationship to the social democrats of Russia, who after all included what would become the Bolshevik majority faction.

Your father was already politically active when he was a student. Is that correct?

POLANYI LEVITT: Yes, he was a founding president of a student movement, known as the Galileo Circle, whose journal was Szabad Gondolat, meaning “Free Thought.” It was against the monarchy, the aristocracy, the church, against the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was not a socialist movement, although many of its participants were socialists. And finally, it included also young people from the gymnasiums, as well as from universities. It gave, I read somewhere, up to 2,000 literacy classes a year. So its main activity was education.

And then there was World War I.

POLANYI LEVITT: He was a cavalry officer in the war, on the Russian front. The situation was horrible. It was equally horrible for the Austro-Hungarians as for the Russians. He contracted typhus, which is a terrible illness. Eventually, he told me, when his horse tripped and fell on top of him, he thought that he was going to die but he woke up in a military hospital in Budapest.

And at the end of the war there was the Hungarian Revolution.

POLANYI LEVITT: The Hungarian Revolution of 1918 ended the war, with the First Republic and Count Karolyi as the first president in the autumn of that year. Therefore it’s usually called the Aster or Chrysanthemum Revolution, or after some other flower denoting autumn. It was then followed by the short-lived Revolution of the Councils, which ended in August of 1919 when it was defeated in a counter-revolution that led Hungarian intellectuals, activists, communists, socialists, liberals into exile in Vienna. Including my father.

So your father left before the end of the revolution, right?

POLANYI LEVITT: Yes, he left before the end.

How did he view the Hungarian Revolution?

POLANYI LEVITT: He was ambivalent, as were many others. I think they initially welcomed the formation of the councils all over the country. But when the councils decided on a wholesale nationalization of business – of everything – I think he thought it was going to have a very bad end. Which it did, in reality.

So the leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party fled from Budapest to Vienna?

POLANYI LEVITT: Yes. The Communist Party in exile had two leaders, Bela Kun and George Lukács. There was a certain rivalry between the two. And here’s a funny story that involved my mother who spent the year 1919 in Moscow, where she – because of her linguistic abilities and education – worked in the office with Karl Radek, organizing the meetings of the Second Communist International. Eventually, when she returned to Vienna, she was given some financial assistance to deliver to the exiled Hungarian Communists there. It was in the form of a diamond, and it was put in a tube of toothpaste. But the interesting thing is that she was to deliver it to Lukács, because as the son of a banker he was perhaps thought to be more reliable than Kun.

But at this point your mother and father had not met. In fact, they would meet in Vienna in the following year, 1920. Is that right?

POLANYI LEVITT: It was a fateful meeting – in a villa put at the disposal of Hungarian communists and leftist émigrés by a Viennese well-wisher. As the darling of this company of young men, according to my mother, no one would have expected that she would be attracted to a gentleman ten years older than her, whose life appeared to be behind him – who was depressed, and scribbling notes in the corner …

But they were very different characters, these two. One is more the activist and the other is more the intellectual; one spends her time in the trenches and the other in the study.

POLANYI LEVITT: Yes and no. You know, my father wherever he lived was engaged in whatever was going on. He wrote articles for the general public, for whomever would read what he had to say – published by whoever would publish whatever it was. In Hungary it was like that. In Vienna it was like that. In England too. So, he was really engaged with the present. He was an intellectual, yes. But he was not an intellectual with an idée fixe, an obsession which they nurture, and who, wherever they go – from one place to another – take the same idea with them. No, no. Not at all. My mother had really started her activities with a very high-profile participation as a remarkable young woman in the Hungarian Revolution: in a way, there was nothing she could do for the rest of her life that quite equalled that. And there was a certain sadness about her. You know, when you achieve at a very early age what you really aspire to do – which is to play an obviously important role in history, in this case, in the communist socialist movement – whatever you do for the rest of your life never quite lives up to that.

So they both had their sad experiences but then in 1923, something very special happened. You were born! And your parents were rejuvenated.

POLANYI LEVITT: Yes, according to his own account, my birth helped to pull my father out of depression, which was, like all such things, a private experience. Nevertheless, he wrote a lot about it. He wrote about what he felt was the responsibility of his generation for all the awful things that had happened, particularly the terrible, meaningless, stupid war. He wrote a lot about the First World War – how it really changed very little. It was never very clear – according to him – what it was really about. It was just a terrible massacre. A human disaster. And he felt the responsibility of his generation. And that sense of responsibility – social responsibility for the state of the world, the state of the country – I wonder whether it was an attribute of that generation, and whether that sense of responsibility has passed. Do we still have people – including intellectuals – who bear a sense of responsibility for our society, in the way he and many others of his generation did?

This was a very special generation, indeed, and for many reasons. But one of the reasons was Red Vienna – the socialist reconstruction of Vienna from 1918 to 1933, overlapping the years that your father was also in Vienna.

POLANYI LEVITT: Yes, Red Vienna was an amazing episode in history – a remarkable experiment in municipal socialism. It was really a situation in which workers were privileged, and were privileged socially – in terms of the services, in terms of the wonderful collective tenements that were built; Karl-Marx-Hof, of course, being the outstanding example. But not only that. The atmosphere and the cultural level were very unusual, marked by the fact that somebody like Karl Polanyi, who had no status and was not employed by any university, gave public lectures on socialism and other matters. He could challenge the market-oriented thinking of Ludwig von Mises in an established financial journal. Mises would reply, and my father would respond. There was an intellectual life outside the university, in the community.

What do you remember of this period?

POLANYI LEVITT: I was only a child, but I do remember the wonderful summer camps in the most desirable lakes in Salzburg that were all organized by the socialist movement. And the people came from all over the world to look at Red Vienna, as an example of modern urbanism at its best. Although neither of my parents had great affection for social democracy, both of them conceded later in life that those years in Vienna – so-called Red Vienna – were remarkable, and laudable. It was the only time I ever heard my mother say anything laudable about social democrats. My father, as a matter of fact, was no big enthusiast either.

In 1922 your father wrote his famous article on socialist calculation, which is a sort of celebration of another vision of socialism – Guild Socialism – that was also influenced by Vienna’s municipal socialism.

POLANYI LEVITT: Well, look. At that time there was no country in the world that had a socialist economy, right? Russia was emerging out of a brutal civil war. So, there was an intellectual debate on the possibility of organizing a socialist national economy. And Mises fired the first shot. He was the one who wrote the article to say that this was impossible – because without price making markets, there was no rational way of allocating resources. I’m sure most of you who study economics are familiar with this argument. And then Polanyi challenged this with a model of associational cooperative socialism, based partly on Otto Bauer, and partly on G.D.H. Cole.

What was your father’s view of the Russian Revolution of 1917, when he was in Vienna?

POLANYI LEVITT: Well, first of all, the first Russian Revolution in 1917 – the February Revolution – was the one that ended the war. His view was that this was wonderful, because like just about everyone in Hungary he wanted the war to end. The war was extremely unpopular. Then the war finished. The initial Russian Revolution was welcomed, I think.

What about the October Revolution?

POLANYI LEVITT: For Polanyi both the February and October Revolutions were bourgeois revolutions. They were the last wave that followed the French Revolution and had crossed Europe – and had finally reached the most backward country in Europe, which was Russia. So that’s how he put it.

So the true revolution comes later with the move toward collectivization and five-year plans?

POLANYI LEVITT: Yes. I think he would say that socialism came only with the Five-Year Plan, after 1928 or 1929. Prior to that, Russia was a predominately peasant country, an agricultural country. We now have an interesting article written in Bennington in 1940, which has recently come to light. There he talks about Russia’s internal dilemma. To put it simply: the working class, which was the basis of the Communist Party, controlled the cities and was dependent on the peasantry, who controlled food supply in the rural areas. But then there was an external dilemma: it was not possible for Russian peasants to export their grain because international markets had collapsed in the Great Depression, grain being the principal export commodity of Russia at the time. This contributed to the decision to undertake the accelerated industrialization of Europe’s most backward country – and to undertake it as a socialist project of nationalization – not only of industry, but also of agriculture.

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