Kitabı oku: «Operation Danube Reconsidered», sayfa 3

04
Limits of Washington’s Position Towards the Invasion of Czechoslovakia in the Summer of 1968

Slavomír Michálek

Institute of History, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava

In the evening hours of the 20th of August 1968, the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Anatoly F. Dobrynin visited the President of the USA Lyndon B. Johnson. State Secretary Dean Rusk was also present during the meeting.1 The Ambassador Dobrynin claimed to have urgent instructions from his government to inform the president on an extremely serious issue:

The government of the Soviet Union considers necessary to inform president Johnson in person … in relation with further worsening of the situation caused by conspiracies of external powers of aggression against the existing social establishment in Czechoslovakia and against the statehood established by the constitution of this country, Czechoslovak government requested its allies, among them the Soviet Union, for direct help, military power included. The Soviet government repeatedly stresses the fact that the events in Czechoslovakia and around it are of vital importance to the Soviet Union and to the other countries bound by contractual obligations and that, the threat for the socialist order in Czechoslovakia creates at the same time a threat for the peace in Europe and security in the world. Therefore, the Soviet government and the governments of the allied countries have adopted a joint decision to fulfil the request of the Czechoslovak government who asked for indispensable help for the people of Czechoslovakia. Competent Soviet troops received the order to enter Czechoslovakia. Naturally, they will be immediately withdrawn as soon as the threat on security ends and we come to the conclusion their presence is no longer necessary. We want President Johnson to know that our steps, performed on basis of the request of the Czechoslovak government, are completely in accordance with the idea of strengthening the peace and under no circumstances an intention of threat for the state interests of the USA or other countries. We consider these events will not damage the Soviet-American relations, the Soviet government believes their development is, like in the past, of great importance.2

President Johnson thanked Dobrynin for the information and informed him he would consult Dean Rusk and—if he considered it appropriate—give him his answer. After a while, he unexpectedly changed the subject of the conversation and focused on his journey to the USSR. The end of the conversation was held in an almost free and friendly atmosphere, whisky was served and Johnson told Dobrynin funny stories from Texas.3

After the Ambassador’s departure, the president immediately called an extraordinary meeting of the Council of National Security of the USA.4 Those present were surprised at the newest events. The president told them about A. Dobrynin’s visit, and about Dobrynin having informed him that the allied troops had entered Czechoslovakia on invitation of the Czechoslovak government. The event in which troops of one Communist country occupied another, friendly Communist country, was described by Johnson as aggression of one Communist country entering into the territory of another communist country. In his opinion, any kind of aggression is dangerous, and a position was therefore necessary. State Secretary Deak Rusk stated that, due to the fact the CSSR reaction was unknown, the USA did not have many possibilities, especially in the case that Czechoslovakia did nothing. He proposed that—after further conversation with Dobrynin and awareness of Czechoslovakia’s reaction—the USA should adopt a written position. The president eventually approved the following steps: to invite Dobrynin and inform him that the USA would not make any statement on the Soviet offer of negotiations over the peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, they would inform him at the same time that they intended to call the UN Security Council.5

After the meeting of the Council of National Security, there were negotiations during the night between the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin. Rusk informed him that the USA were concerned about Soviet information on the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and did not understand its causes, since those mentioned by the Soviet Union—that the Czechoslovak government had asked the allies for help—were not true and he said there was no threat of an external act of aggression towards Czechoslovakia.6

The extraordinary meeting of the US National Security Council followed the next morning. Dean Rusk spoke about the night meeting with Dobrynin and confirmed that he had informed Dobrynin of the US position not to publish a positive statement on accepting the mentioned Soviet proposal on negotiations on atomic energy. President Johnson stated that the US Ambassador to the UN, George Ball, was given an order to express the American protest against this unjustifiable action in the UN and to insist on observance of the UN Charter.7 The steps of the Administration and the President proved that, apart from verbal protests, the USA would not engage in any way. The US State Department showed an interest in gaining further information on the invasion, confirmed also by the negotiations of the Czechoslovak Ambassador to the USA, Karel Duda, who was invited to a meeting by the Deputy State Secretary and Head of the European Affairs Department, John Leddy. Leddy informed Duda of the President’s night negotiations with Dobrynin, as well as about the contents of the meeting of the US National Security Council, and asked him to add some details on which the USA lacked sufficient information. In particular, the issue of the invitation of the troops, and anti-western propaganda that the CSSR faced the threat of external aggressive forces.8 Ambassador Duda refused the Soviet interpretation about an invitation and about an external threat to Czechoslovakia, as evidenced by a message sent to the Ministry in Prague. The US government, Duda said, expressed its worries over the practice of the USSR and centred on two points in the Soviet statement: in the first place, it did not understand the part about the CSSR government request, because according to the Prague radio, the troops entered the territory without the knowledge of the President, Prime Minister, 1st Secretary of the Central Committee KSČ and the National Assembly; and in the second place, it did not understand what those “external forces” are that are against the order of CSSR, because the US government “does not have any information which would confirm the allegations that any non-socialist countries are involved or considering aggression against CSSR.”9 Both sources, the American as well as the Czechoslovak one, described the negotiations of Leddy and Duda identically.

Another document, describing the Czechoslovak development, was received by the US State Department from Moscow on 21st August. The American Ambassador to the USSR, Llewellyn Thompson informed the State Department on the obtained news, stating also that many diplomats were surprised at the invasion of Czechoslovakia but others expected it even sooner. He also stated that the pro-invasion spirit prevailed in the Soviet Politburo already after the negotiations in Bratislava and there was no doubt it would happen. He described the Bratislava declaration as a tactical compromise, containing such fundamental differences that the Soviet leadership was sure Dubcek’s group was inacceptable. The invasion was thoroughly timed so the maximal psychological and tactical effect of surprise was reached.10

On the basis of information from several sources, the American government issued on August 21, 1968 the official statement on the invasion of troops of five states of the Warsaw Pact:

Tragic news from Czechoslovakia shocked the world. The Soviet Union and its allies invaded a country that did not defend itself, in order to suffocate the recreation of common human freedom. It is sad to see the communist way of thinking that an attempt of freedom in Czechoslovakia is considered a fundamental threat to the safety of the Soviet system. The justification of the Soviet Union is clearly unnatural. Czechoslovak government did not ask its allies to interfere in its internal affairs. Czechoslovakia was under no threat of external aggression. The action of the allies of the Warsaw Pact is a blatant breach of the UN Chart. We are consulting the other participants on what steps must be taken within the UN.11

The USA decried the invasion with this statement, but they merely wanted to consult the steps to be taken through the UN. And everybody knew that even if there were any UN steps, these would be on the verbal level only. The American government met due to the Czechoslovak events also during the next two days—August 22 and 23, 1968. The meeting on August 22 analysed the situation in Czechoslovakia and possible American positions arising from it as well as debated the events of the previous two days.

An employee of the President’s Office, Tom Johnson summed the notes up in several points: they did not expect military intervention by the USA; the Warsaw Pact troops were ready on the borders; Dobrynin’s visit to the President; the National Security Council’s debates; instructions for the Ambassador George Ball; the US resolution of August 21; the USA had no obligation for military intervention; it was not either in their interest or the interest of Czechoslovakia; the Cold War had not ended. In another, more general note, Tom Johnson captured especially the speeches of the Secretaries Dean Rusk, William Wirtz and Clark Clifford. According to Tom Johnson, Dean Rusk said that one of the main reasons why the US did not expect a Soviet military intervention was the fact that the USSR would pay too high a price, especially on a political level. Supposedly, if the US decided on a military intervention, it could cause a world war. He informed the present on the negotiations of the UN Security Council and recommended the US remain active on the issue of Soviet invasion only at the level of statements.12 In connection with similarities between Czechoslovakia and Vietnam, he did not see in the American position any relation. Also, Secretary of Labour William W. Wirtz agreed on the opinion that Czechoslovakia and Vietnam were not related but he stated that people must be confused since many did not see any difference between the invasion to Czechoslovakia and Vietnam. Secretary of Defence Clark Clifford said the US are not bound with Czechoslovakia by any treaties or agreements on mutual help, therefore, they do not have any obligation to interfere on Czechoslovak side13

The government meeting on the next day, August 23, was focused on a new problem—if the next target of the Soviet invasion would be Romania. Head of the CIA, Helms warned that the Romanian were worried of a potential Soviet military action, since Romania presented clear public support of Czechoslovakia. He suggested the US declare clearly it was not a bilateral issue between the USSR and the USA, but an issue of Moscow against the rest of the world. It was only verbal muscle-flexing, confirmed also by Rusk stating that the US did not intend any military action in support of Czechoslovakia, who had not even asked for it. Clark Clifford described the invasion of Czechoslovakia—from the military perspective—as well planned, effective and sophisticated. At the same time, he said the USSR proved it could do the same in any part of its bloc and the Soviets had a costly marine and submarine program. That was also a reason why Clifford appealed to the US responsibility to see the case of Czechoslovakia as evidence of a considerable increase in the Soviets’ military power. General Wheeler reacted to Clifford, who also described the intervention in the CSSR as a fast, effective and long-term planned military operation, and gave as his evidence the detailed and exact movement of divisions in six to ten days around the the CSSR borders. He also mentioned the preparation—military training “Šumava”. However, he identified some military flaws in the Soviets’ approach. In his opinion, too many troops had participated in the operation—more than were necessary. Overall Wheeler came to a fundamental conclusion for the USA regarding the Soviet invasion: that the present situation proved that American could not afford to reduce her armed forces in Europe and they needed to ask their allies to improve their own.14

No matter how little the American administration wanted to be actively opposed to the invasion (for the reasons already mentioned), it still performed some diplomatic activities. It withdrew its ambassador for consultation and on August 25, the US Embassy in Prague issued a note requesting all American citizens to leave Czechoslovakia as soon as possible for safety reasons. The first conversations between the ambassador to Moscow, Thompson, and the State Department in Washington, were of informative nature. Ambassador Dobrynin participated in the next two conversations, on August 23 and 27. According to the memorandum of negotiations (with the participation of Dean Rusk, Llewellyn E. Thompson and Anatoly Dobrynin), issues dealing with Czechoslovakia and broader Soviet-American relations were discussed. Dean Rusk asked Dobrynin to confirm if the American reaction to the invasion was clear to him, as it had been presented in the previous conversations. Dobrynin said the American reaction was predictable and that the decision over the military operation was not easy to reach in the USSR. At the same time, he defended the invasion as a result of internal struggles in Czechoslovakia. Rusk said there had been no evidence from Czechoslovakia that it planned to depart the Socialist camp, upon which Dobrynin replied that Alexander Dubček was weak and had lost control over the situation, a development which had led to an unsustainable sate of affairs within the Warsaw Pact. Rusk at the same time ensured the Ambassador of Kremlin on the US President’s deep commitment to maintain peace. After expressing the hope that President Ludvík Svoboda’s journey to Moscow would be successful, and that Alexander Dubček and the others interned in the USSR would have their safety guaranteed, Rusk changed the subject and asked Dobrynin if the information he had received was true, that there was allegedly an invasion of Romania being prepared. Dobrynin denied this. On the contrary, he said the Soviet leaders have sent cordial greetings to the Romanian representatives on the occasion of their national holiday.15

Another Memorandum of Conversation between A. Dobrynin and L. E. Thompson on August 27 only dealt with the newest development in Czechoslovakia. Thompson, thinking about the length of stay of the Soviet troops, asked Dobrynin how he understood the notion of “temporality”. Dobrynin’s answer was clear: “it will depend on how successful the Czechs are in the fulfilment of our agreement. The Soviet would naturally be glad if this period was the shortest possible”.16 Obviously, this did not correspond with the aims and intentions of the USSR to settle in Czechoslovakia. In fact, the Americans protested also on this issue—only on verbal level, without stress, and poorly. The Embassy in Prague was sending to Washington more reports on the occupation of the country but in a more or less disinterested spirit.17

An excellent American diplomat and one of the main advisers to the State Secretary Dean Rusk during this period, Charles E. Bohlen depiected the USA’s dry approach to the Prague Spring and Soviet invasion, in his memoirs Witness to History 1929–1969. The American policy that he called the policy of disinterest, was, in his opinion, a reflection of several factors, including the fact that in Lyndon Johnson’s administration there was not a uniform idea on the position of Moscow in case of an unexpected development in Czechoslovakia. Bohlen in a meeting with the State Secretary described the decision of Soviet invasion as a symbiosis of four elements. The first one was ideological—Czechoslovakia under Dubček’s leadership represented the liquidation of the Soviet system. The second element was the weakening of the satellite zone around the borders with the West. The third one was Ulbricht’s worries that a successful centrifugal movement in Czechoslovakia would cause similar intentions in East Germany. The fourth element or factor stated by Bohlen were Moscow’s worries that this “infection” could spread from the arm—that was Czechoslovakia—Ukraine—right to the heart—the USSR.18

Bohlen’s opinions were well founded. Although he presented them in public ex post as a private person, they contribute to our knowledge of the American Administration of that period.

George F. Kennan, former American ambassador to Moscow and author of the detention strategy, expressed a similar opinion to Bohlen’s. During a private lecture tour in the Scandinavian countries, he stopped at the American Embassy in Copenhagen. There, he expressed serious worries about the irrational Soviet position in the occupied Czechoslovakia. These events obliged him and people of similar thinking to change their political thinking when an incorrect estimation from the past cast doubt on the Soviet reliability. According to Kennan, the whole western world will have to change its political and military construction due to the impossibility of fully revealing Soviet positions. In the light of the development, Kennan expressed the opinion that the American administration should be very cautious in its obligations towards Prague. He considered incomprehensible the compromise from Moscow between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet leaders while the occupation lasted. And Washington should publicly put pressure on Moscow for an explanation—when you have done this in Prague, what are the guarantees you will not do similar things again. Kennan also speculated on how, why and when Moscow reached the decision for the intervention. In his opinion, it was not only about a missing political guarantee from the Czechoslovak Party and government, but it also needed to get into the structures of middle groups and among the workers to gain control over the counterrevolution. In Kennan’s opinion, the Kremlin was responding to the idea of individual freedom as an internal threat to the safety of the system. The loss of internal political control, too, was seen as something that could infect the whole Soviet system.19 On this subject, he held a similar opinion Charles Bohlen.

President Lyndon Johnson presented the basic philosophy of his foreign policy in this period and also of the invasion to Czechoslovakia on 11th September 1968, when he said:

It seems the USSR leaders have decided that the movement towards a human version of Communism in a small befriended country is a threat to their security—in spite of the fact that the Czech remained their allies in the Warsaw Pact. Since this aggressive act, the military and political threats have risen and require a closer and deeper cooperation of the western allies. We have taken undoubtedly clear steps that the use of power or power threats will not be tolerated in the spheres of joint responsibility, such as, for example Berlin.20

How was Czechoslovakia, occupied by the tanks of five countries, supposed to decipher this general statement from the first man of the most powerful country in the world? The US accepted the given state but regarded further power expansion from the East as a potential problem, but only in case it did not affect the Soviet bloc. This US position, the position of the whole democratic West, was confirmed in his messages also by Ambassador Duda from Washington. In a dispatch from 20th September 1968 for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague on the reaction of western diplomats to Czechoslovakia’s event, he wrote that among the diplomats of the western countries in the USA there are strong feelings that the West should demonstrate political disagreement with the intervention of the five countries of the Warsaw Pact by selective restrictions in the bilateral relations. On the other hand, the situation of intensive Cold War should not be renewed so as not to break the results of political contacts. According to the message of Ambassador Duda, an escalation of the situation in Europe would result in a smaller space for autonomous Czechoslovak policy. In addition, the American side did not even have an interest in overstepping a certain line in the world power disputes, as it did not want to worsen Soviet-American relations. In addition, the Democrats in Congress confirmed this opinion when they publicly said that the relations between the two world powers were far more important than Czechoslovakia.21 Karel Duda further informed the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the western diplomats prefer the idea of dialogue development between the East and the West in spite of the Soviet intervention in the CSSR.22

The American administration had not set a permanent position on the CSSR by the beginning of October 1968. Its only position was to accept the new reality in Czechoslovakia. The US position was confirmed by a secret dispatch of the Czechoslovak Embassy to Washington on bilateral Czechoslovak-American relations, addressed on October 10, 1968 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague. It stated that the USA adopted a waiting position towards the USSR and the CSSR. Apart from home affairs (the upcoming change of administration), a decisive role was played by America’s insecurity that the invasion of Warsaw Pact troops was not only an isolated, partial step, but part of a broader plan against several countries that would eventually jeapardise West Berlin. As far as Czechoslovakia was concerned, American thoughts were pessimistic as well as optimistic depending on what alternative of Czechoslovakia’s future was foreseen. American opinions on the USSR were also different, depending on if it the invasion was considered a temporary episode or the return to Stalinism. According to the dispatch, the US would certainly try to use the situation in Czechoslovakia for propaganda to discredit Socialism and break the unity of the Communist movement and they already froze the contacts with the countries of “the five”. In case of Czechoslovakia, they would wait further how the situation develops in the near future. For this reason, the US would “have a clear tendency not to undergo nor propose any activities from their own initiative”,23 and reason this passivity by intentions not to worsen the position of the Czechoslovak government.

In autumn 1968, the issue of Czechoslovakia appeared only sporadically in the State Department. The US Embassy telegraph from November 29, 1968 addressed to the State Department, proves this since it was only a brief evaluation of the current status of Czechoslovak-American relations. Ambassador Jacob Beam informed in it that a turn in the Czechoslovak development does not mean a complete end of the reforms and offered proposals for problem solutions that were within the bilateral issues still open and the two countries had a different view of. In the first place, he described the development of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia from the beginning of the year, the new Party leadership, intents of an economic reform, the issues of federation, cancellation of the censorship, freedom to travel, demonstrate and the Action Programme. Regardless to the Soviet motivation, according to Beam the brutal invasion had been a shock for the Czechoslovak society on its way to a new way of life. In spite of the fact that the “socialism with a human face” still lived in the society, Alexander Dubček “has become merely a faded symbol”.24 In his opinion, Czech foreign policy was fully in accordance with the line of the Warsaw ‘five’, which offered Czechoslovakia a minimal space and influence in international issues.

President Richard Nixon’s administration, that took office in January 1969, refused to do anything that would be an intervention in the internal affairs of the Soviet camp in the light of new political world problems of the beginning of the 70’s. The rhetoric of “freeing the satellites” from the 50’s was completely forgotten after August 1968 in Czechoslovakia. Nixon’s administration followed the direction of Lyndon Johnson and went on building bridges with Central Europe—that is, with gradual steps to overcome the division of the old continent and replace the confrontation of the Cold War with cooperation and mutual safety.25

American intelligence services followed in detail the Czechoslovak reformation under the leadership of Alexander Dubček from its beginning in January 1968, and during the following months until the military invasion and its end in the summer of 1969. The intelligence service also created extensive, more general rather than analytical materials. A document with the title, Czechoslovakia: problem of Soviet control was created for the CIA Headquarters on January 1970 by the analyst James Ogle, and presented by the head of CIA special research committee John Kerry King. Several analysts from different CIA departments had worked on it. The material described the mechanisms and assumption of the Soviet control over Czechoslovakia, its loss in the period of time between January and August 1968, consequent military intervention and political compromise as well as the creation of preconditions for the renewal of the control from September 1968 until March 1969 and their control from April until September 1969.26 The final evaluation of the memorandum did not contain any new facts or context. The Soviet Union, with the help of the armed forces and support of Czechoslovak conservatives established a regime that turned Prague again into an obedient and model satellite.

As a conclusion, it is necessary to evaluate the facts that influenced the US position to the invasion. Lyndon Johnson’s Administration (as well as the British, French and others in the West) welcomed in the beginning the Czechoslovak reform process. At the same time, it was informed by Kremlin through its diplomatic representatives on the prepared invasion of the Warsaw Pact troops to Czechoslovakia. They also knew it from the information of the intelligence service, as well as from the NATO headquarters that monitored the movement of Soviet and other “befriended” troops. However, they evaluated the situation as a non-breach of American national interests or the US national security. Therefore, apart from verbal condemnation of the invasion, they did not interfere. The US simply refused to cease the fragile, gradual improvement of wider American-Soviet relations represented by the disarmament process and the peaceful use of atomic energy.

Czechoslovak crisis broke out at an inconvenient moment for the West, for the USA. The US were at that time completely engaged in Vietnam and going through a period of internal anti-war mood. In fact, Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration showed clearly in the summer 1968 that it wanted to avoid the errors of Dulles’s policy in the mid 50’s—a policy based on preparing to “end” Soviet hegemony in Central Europe. However, Johnson’s policy of “building bridges” from 1966 was never actually brought into practice. It remained only an empty phrase.

There was improvement in East-West relations in the sphere of commerce, but the US did nothing to considerably improve the situation in Central Europe. Between June and August 1968, the creators of Soviet foreign policy were sure that the US turned its “policy of bridges” into a limited American-Soviet relaxation. Another reason why Johnson’s administration did not want to do anything for Czechoslovakia—not even at the time of real threat of invasion—was the Czechoslovak support (military and economic) of North Vietnam. In that time, Czechoslovakia was, after the USSR and China, the third largest supplier of Vietnam. These were also the reasons of the USA’s unwillingness to support Dubček’s regime. The opinions that such lack of US interest could influence the decision of the USSR to use military sources against the CSSR are not surprising. At the same time, it is not possible to claim that a different US position would have discouraged the USSR from the intervention and it really is questionable if the USA could have done such a step that would have discouraged the USSR from using its power. I believe that at that time there was no power in the world that could have ordered the Soviets of what to do in their bloc.

Just like the February coup of 1948, the invasion of 1968 too became a subject of negotiations of the UN Security Council. And just like the Prague communist coup 1948, the invasion was thanks to the Soviet veto in the UN left unattended. The resolution requesting the departure of the troops was refused. The similarity of both events lies also in the fact that the US as well as the other western powers did not act in favour of Czechoslovakia in the UN negotiations. The USA, NATO and other western structures understood the invasion of five Warsaw Pact members’ troops to Czechoslovakia in the summer 1968 as an internal affair of the Soviet bloc and therefore, not an issue directed against the interest of the West.

1 The study presented is a partial result of the project n. APVV-15-0349 “Indivíduum a spoločnosť—ich vzájomná reflexia v historickom procese,” of the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences/SAV.

2 Foreign Relations of the United States (further FRUS) 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe, Summary of meeting, Washington DC, August 20, 1968, 8:15–8:42 p.m., or, Anatoly Dobrynin, In confidence. Ambassador to America’s Cold War Six Presidents (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1995), 179, or Karel Durman, Útěk od praporů: Kreml a krize impéria 1964–1991. (Praha: Karolinum, 1998), 112.