Kitabı oku: «Post-Soviet Secessionism», sayfa 4

C. Georgia and Abkhazia

The parties in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict never prioritized economic gains. A rare exception is a hydraulic power station that has been in operation since 1992–1993 for the benefit of both sides; its hydro-technical facilities are located in Georgia and its control panel in Abkhaz territory (Basaria 2011: 18). Trade has otherwise been characterized by confrontation. Abkhazia has forbidden trade with Georgia since 2007, whereas Georgia’s 2008 law on occupied territories made all economic activities with and in Abkhazia without Tbilisi’s authorization illegal. However, the authorities on both sides have turned a blind eye to several forms of trans-border commerce, including the “suitcase trade” by local inhabitants. In 2015, the overall volume of trade was estimated to be in the range of 7 to 15 million U.S. dollars (Mirimanova 2015b: 12, 15). Abkhazia’s economy is marginal for Georgia, except for the Georgian regions along their common border. Abkhazia’s commerce with Georgia is less important than its trade with Russia, but still substantial for its economy, despite the fact that it is not legally regulated.

When Russia applied for WTO membership, it had to obtain the agreement of Georgia—a WTO member. Both parties agreed in 2011 on a complex set of regulations, where both contested territories were turned into “trade corridors” for Russian and Georgian goods. A Swiss company accountable only to the Swiss government would monitor the movement of goods. This was in line with Georgia’s objective of having international mechanisms put in place to control trade with the breakaway entities (Jamnews 2018). Neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia were given any active role in negotiating this agreement. The two territories were defined through a set of geographic coordinates, which led to firm protest in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Mirimanova 2015b: 14). They did not consider this lack of legal status acceptable and considered the fact that their territory was turned into a trade corridor an insult to their national identity—and this not only by their adversary, but also by their closest ally.17 They demanded full participation and equal status in negotiations on the creation of trade routes through their territory.

The idea of restoring rail links between Russia and Armenia through Abkhazia and Georgia has been widely discussed over the years, including in terms of economic costs and benefits (Mirimanova 2013). This would necessitate a specific compromise on customs and border controls, which is difficult to achieve in the framework of the non-recognition policies of the two conflicting parties. They define the benefits of such cooperation mainly in terms of relative, not absolute, gains. The Abkhaz authorities fear, for instance, that asymmetric trade patterns would make them politically dependent on Georgia.

The question of trade regulation has continuously been put on the agenda in Georgia and Abkhazia, but it meets with political resistance on both sides. Abkhazia does not consider the increase of its trade with Georgia a good political option, as this would make it more dependent on Tbilisi. The lack of trade regulation is largely explained by the fear of becoming economically dependent on Georgia, which may later force Abkhazia to make political concessions in exchange for economic benefits.

From the Georgian perspective, there is a readiness to give products from Abkhazia access to Georgian markets. However, Abkhaz producers then would have to accept trading with documents issued by Georgia. These documents would not indicate any country of origin but still include a minimum amount of information regarding the personal identity of the producer (full name and city). The Georgian authorities presented such a procedure as “status-neutral labelling” (OC Media 2018). The Abkhaz goods exported to the EU would, however, receive a Georgian certificate of origin. This plan—which was unveiled in April 2018—is fully in line with the Georgian recognition and non-recognition policies. It recognizes the right of individual Abkhaz producers to trade internationally and also their right of not having to choose the Georgian nationality to do so. This is made possible by these so-called neutral documents—documents delivered by the Georgian authorities without mentioning nationality. This procedure does not involve the Abkhaz authorities. However, the Abkhaz authorities deny that such status is “neutral,” as it is granted by Georgia.18 They rejected this proposal.

The regulation of trade implies a resolution of certain status questions, but it also addresses problems of identity. Abkhaz and Georgian entrepreneurs both see certain advantages in trade regulation, including the strengthening of their respective national identities. Abkhaz businesspeople are of the opinion that the regulation of trade would improve the political relations of their state with its neighbor. This would strengthen its security and independence. Georgian traders, in contrast, are convinced that Abkhazia's trade with the economically more advanced Georgia could convince them of the need for reintegration and help to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity (Mirimanova 2018: 4 & 10). Thus, both parties expect that the mutual recognition of Georgia and Abkhazia as trade partners would best serve their respective political objectives.

6. Comparisons and Conclusions

The ceasefire agreements analyzed in this chapter have ended open violence in military conflicts involving “non-state armed groups”—as they are designated in international humanitarian law—or “contested states” —as they are designated in this political analysis. The contested states did not have the same military weight in the different cases analyzed. The non-state armed forces fighting for the Abkhaz cause against pro-government troops in 1992–1993 were in the vast majority constituted by Abkhaz, but also included volunteers from the North Caucasus. The role of non-state armed groups fighting against the central government was likewise substantial in the Transnistrian war of 1990–1992, even if the Russian military forces stationed in the territory remained militarily predominant (Hill 2012: 51–52). The Abkhaz troops were effectively operating on their own territory in the case of the Georgian-Russian war of 2008. In contrast, Turkish Cypriot armed forces played a marginal role in supporting the offensive of the Turkish troops in Cyprus in August 1974.

In all these three cases, the state opposing secession was severely defeated. However, the contested states did not contribute to these defeats to the same degree. The role they played in the military operations—as compared to that of their patron states—differed greatly, and this difference was reflected in the way they were included in the ceasefire negotiations and agreements. Inclusion took place in three different ways. The first type was full participation in the ceasefire negotiations, as representing one of the sides in the armed conflict. In the second type, the contested state did not participate in the negotiation of the ceasefire agreement but, instead, gave its formal support through its signature. In the third type, the contested state did not participate in the negotiations and did not have an opportunity to express its support for the agreement through its signature, but still fully participated in the mechanisms for its enforcement.

Each of these roles expresses a specific power differential among the conflicting parties, is attached to a different status in the negotiations and in the agreement and is linked to different rights and obligations in its implementation, as well as different forms of recognition and non-recognition.

This typology can be applied to the three cases under consideration. The first type applies to the 1994 ceasefire agreement in Abkhazia. This was, in legal terms, an agreement negotiated and signed by the representatives of the non-state armed forces on an equal footing with the representatives of the state from which they were breaking away. The contested state was not part of the mechanisms to monitor its implementation or restore security in case of violation of the ceasefire. The Georgian authorities failed to impose the participation of representatives of a “legitimate” Georgian government of Abkhazia as an autonomous actor in the negotiations.

The second type applies to the ceasefire agreement that ended the Georgian-Russian war of 2008. Georgia was defeated for a second time in 2008 and expelled from the Kodor/i gorge—the small bit of Abkhaz territory it still controlled—but this happened in a military conflict with Russia, an interstate conflict where the Abkhaz military forces played a real but secondary role. Abkhazia did not participate in the negotiations leading to its ceasefire agreement, but its signature was added afterwards, in order to bind it to its implementation. As a signatory, it was formally included on equal terms with Georgia. Russia failed, however, to add the question of the international status of Abkhazia to those of security and humanitarian issues in the international negotiations in Geneva, and the ceasefire did not include any clause that would indicate a specific formal status for Abkhazia in the Geneva International Discussions.

The third type applies to the 1992 ceasefire agreement between Russia and Moldova. Transnistria did not negotiate and was not a co-signatory to this agreement, but it was formally granted a position equal to the two signatories in the JCC responsible for its implementation.

The August 1974 ceasefire in Cyprus was unilaterally imposed by the Turkish side. This case cannot be subsumed under any of the three types of inclusive ceasefire agreements described above. It excluded, by definition, any formal involvement by North Cyprus. It was up to the interposing peacekeeping force of the UN to interact with the Turkish Cypriot authorities in order to implement the ceasefire.

Power differentials played a crucial role in determining the status of the contested states in the trade agreements analyzed in this chapter—or, alternatively, in explaining the failure to reach such agreements. Their status is very much a function of their degree of dependence, not only on the state from which they are breaking away, but also on the patron state. In the case of North Cyprus, the authority of its chamber of commerce to issue its own certificates of origin for goods produced on its territory was recognized by Cyprus and the EU in 2004. Such a status has not been granted to any similar institution linked to the authorities of Transnistria or Abkhazia. The Georgian proposal to have Abkhaz traders bring their goods to the Georgian market with “status-neutral” labeling has been rejected by Abkhazia.

The DCFTA and the Green Line Regulation were both designed and implemented by the EU. Transnistria has high economic expectations of the EU, and North Cyprus also has high political expectations. Abkhazia, in contrast, avoids any economic dependence on Georgia or the EU. It has never shown any interest in Georgian proposals to increase its trade with the EU through the DCFTA—proposals that were always linked to concessions in the political field. Abkhazia remains entirely dependent on its Russian ally. It has to accept this dependence, even if Russia may occasionally go against its policies of recognition and non-recognition regarding Georgia. Abkhazia could not avoid the lack of any formal status in the bilateral agreement between Russia and Georgia on the conditions for Russia’s WTO membership—a lack of status that it considered insulting in terms of its own identity.

The involvement of external powers in the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 for Cyprus established international guarantees of its constitutional order. This internationalization of the Cypriot conflict strengthened the position of the Turkish Cypriot community, as it facilitated Turkey’s unilateral intervention. However, the status and identity conflict between the two Cypriot communities was also internationalized through the integration of the island into the EU, which, in contrast, reinforced the position of the Greek Cypriot community.

Similarly, the internationalization of the conflict over the status of Abkhazia changed the relationship between the two parties. Both parties hoped that the peacekeeping role granted to the international organizations (the CIS and UN) in the 1994 ceasefire agreement would enhance their own position. However, it was Abkhazia that managed to gain the most from the presence of Russian peacekeeping forces on its territory, and it managed to get its independent status recognized by Russia in 2008. Georgia, on the other hand, has tried to gain some leverage over the Russian military and economic presence in Abkhazia through the deployment of the EUMM along the boundaries with Abkhazia and through the creation of international mechanisms to monitor the movement of goods over the Russian-Abkhaz border.

Transnistria and Moldova are also making use of international support to foster their policies of recognition and non-recognition. Moldova had to accept equal status with Transnistria in the JCC that oversees the peacekeeping forces in Transnistria. By contrast, Transnistria had to accept a subordinate status to Moldova in order to be part of the DCFTA, although it did not have to publicly acknowledge the disparity. Regarding the internationalization of these three conflicts, the contested states can count on military support from their patron states to strengthen their status and identity, whereas the states confronting secession can count on the EU’s trade policy in advancing their policies of recognition and non-recognition. The small size of the contested states analyzed in this chapter means that they do not have sufficient political clout to push for membership to any international economic organization. For Abkhazia and Transnistria, this is even the case for economic organizations that are dominated by Russia, such as the Eurasian Economic Union.

As already indicated earlier, one of the conflicting parties may have to accept a particular status or identity for itself or for the other party, even if it considers that status or identity unjust, or even if it contradicts its policy of non-recognition. Such a concession does not negate the possibility of countering such a status or identity at a later time. Each of the three cases here illustrates these kinds of shifts in the conflictual process on status. The contested states Abkhazia and Transnistria were, for instance, able to impose equal status in a ceasefire agreement or its implementation, but the state they were confronting would not allow them to reach such status in agreements on trade regulation.

It may be concluded that the concept of recognition, together with non-recognition, is well suited to describe the disputes among conflicting parties regarding their status and identity. The analysis of the ceasefire agreements in this chapter has shown that a constitutive approach to statehood has to take into account its intrinsic characteristics—such as the degree of control over a territory and its population—in analyzing the conditions under which particular forms of recognition take place, as well as the power differential which results from external support, among other things. The fact that Abkhazia was granted equal status to Georgia in the 1994 ceasefire has to do with the high degree of control it had achieved over the Abkhaz territory and its population—a degree of control that was higher than Transnistria achieved in 1992 or the Turkish Cypriots in 1974.

The formal character of the status question allows for a direct comparison among all three cases, as is also the case regarding the military role of contested states in achieving victory, or the degree of economic dependence in assessing the relationship of forces in trade agreements. Such a comparison is far more difficult to achieve on the level of identity, which is largely a question of self-awareness and self-description.

The number of cases in this study is limited. A broader selection of cases would surely enrich the comparison with new descriptive analysis. The 1994 ceasefire that ended the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh was signed by the representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as by the military commanders of the breakaway entity. This is, to a certain extent, similar to the ceasefire between Russia and Georgia in 2008. The 1992 ceasefire in South Ossetia had the same formal character as the one signed the same year in Transnistria: an interstate treaty (in the former case, between Russia and Georgia) that did not bear the signature of representatives of the contested state and that regulated its involvement in the control of its implementation. The second Minsk agreement of 2015 on Eastern Ukraine carried the signatures of representatives of the contested states. Regarding the 1999 war in Kosovo, the NATO-led peacekeeping Kosovo force KFOR made a specific ceasefire agreement with the Kosovar Liberation Army on June 20, 1999, in order to guarantee its demilitarization (NATO 1999).

In contrast to Cyprus and Transnistria, there was no formal regulation of trade through an agreement in any of these other cases—and there is not even any trade between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. A major exception is the role of trade agreements in the Kosovo conflict, in the framework of Serbia and Kosovo’s integration within European structures, and with far reaching implications for their respective status and identities. In that case, Serbia had to accept equal status with the contested state of Kosovo as a condition for its further integration with the EU. This acceptance goes against its non-recognition policy, as was also the case for Transnistria and North Cyprus when they had to accept a subordinate status in trade agreements to reach the same goal. In addition, there were intensive trade relations between Georgia and South Ossetia up to the 2003 Rose Revolution, although without any formal regulation.

Each of the parties involved in these conflicts has its own recognition and non-recognition policies to address these issues. Georgia, which has been fighting on two fronts against secession, even developed simultaneously yet different recognition and non-recognition policies in regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A comprehensive and detailed analysis of the kind of mutual recognition achieved in these cases and the kind of recognition and non-recognition policies pursued by the parties would not challenge the thesis of the contested nature of recognition in secessionist conflicts, but rather enrich its understanding.

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