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Radical Right Voters and Democratic Support
Nicolas Bichay
The rise of radical right parties is considered by many to be one of the largest modern threats to liberal democracy.1 There is a strong pattern of populist and radical leaders eroding constraints on the executive,2 diminishing press freedom,3 and harming the quality of elections to benefit themselves.4
But what about these parties’ voters? Do radical right voters exhibit overtly anti-democratic rhetoric? In other words, do voters of radical right parties knowingly hold and agree with anti-democratic attitudes? Or, rather, do they support these parties for other ideological reasons, while disagreeing with their anti-democratic tendencies?
On the one hand, it may simply be the case that voters support a radical right party for their policy proposals, for example their attention to immigration, the global economy, and promise of removing corrupt elites from government that, in their mind, other mainstream parties ignore. In such cases, cognitive dissidence may play a role in their determination that such parties are not really a threat to democracy and claims to the contrary are simply “fake news”. Or perhaps voters do believe these claims yet dub them a “necessary evil” worth the cost to restore the country to its “rightful place”.
On the other hand, there is a possibility that voters acknowledge the harms to democracy caused by the party they support and agree with these anti-democratic positions. The rhetoric of these parties is often categorized as anti-pluralist,5 with both voters and candidates believing that their party is the only one capable of solving the nation’s current problems. Thus, voters may be interpreting this situation as one which necessitates removing any limitations to the party’s rule. This scenario surely constitutes the more dangerous situation.
Public opinion data
For all the work done examining the relationship between the radical right and democracy, this important aspect of voter opinion still remains unclear. In fact, recent work has suggested that radical right voters are actually more supportive of democracy than their centrist counterparts,6 further complicating the issue. However, there is some anecdotal evidence that voters may indeed knowingly hold anti-democratic views. For example, the 2017 referendum that greatly consolidated executive power7 in Turkey held very high support from voters of the ruling populist right Justice and Development Party (90%), while maintaining overwhelming opposition from supporters of all other parties.8
To gain more insight on this important question, I analysed public opinion data from the European Value Survey (EVS). The EVS is a large-scale public opinion survey that has been conducted every nine years in Europe since 1981. It asks several questions with regard to democratic support on topics ranging from the importance of free and fair elections to the appropriateness of the military seizing power. I used these questions as a way to measure democratic support amongst respondents. Following Rooduijn et al.’s classification of what constitutes a radical right party,9 I outline the differences in opinion on democracy between EVS respondents who supported a radical right party, compared to supporters of all other parties below.
| Question | Non-Radical-Right Support | Radical-Right Support |
| Having a democratic political system is “very good” | 60% | 45% |
| Having a strong leader who doesn’t bother with elections or parliament is “very good” | 6% | 7% |
| Free and fair elections are an “essential characteristic of democracy” | 61% | 58% |
| Having the army rule the country is “very bad” | 65% | 46% |
| The army takes over when government is incompetent is an “essential characteristic of democracy” | 5% | 9% |
It seems evident from EVS survey data that, at least in some cases, radical right voters tend to hold more anti-democratic views. Overall, radical right voters are 25% less likely to classify a democratic system as “very good”, vis-à-vis their non-radical right counterparts. Digging deeper, in many cases, the results point to radical right voters seemingly approving an authoritarian consolidation of power and ignoring checks and balances, while simultaneously maintaining support for free and fair elections. For example, while radical right voters were nearly as likely to maintain the essentiality of free and fair elections compared to other voters, they were much less likely to decry military coups and rule.
This variation in voter preferences mirrors rhetoric of radical right leaders themselves. Much of the radical right electoral rhetoric focuses on taking power away from the corrupt elite and rightfully returning it to the masses.10 Rarely do radical leaders openly advocate removing people from the decision-making process. Rather, they are more concerned with removing constraints to their ruling, once democratically elected. Take again, for example, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s actions in Turkey. Considered as leading to a breakdown of liberal democracy, his constitutional changes dramatically increased the power of the executive and abolished the office of prime minister. Still, these changes did little to affect voting rights in Turkey (and were even enacted via a popular referendum).
Given the above, it appears that not only are radical right voters aware of their anti-democratic predispositions, but these predispositions seem to mirror the traits observed in party leader rhetoric. They are more likely to support the idea of eroding constraints on their rule, yet at the same time are no more willing to castigate the importance of free and fair elections. This may seem a subtle difference but is an important one. When radical right parties demonstrate values counter to democracy, their voters believe them to be a necessary process of which they will benefit.11 As such, they stand for policies that give the party they support more power, at the expense of democracy. When it comes to seizing their own power, however, in the form of fairly run elections, they seem to remain opposed.
Nicolas Bichay is a Doctoral Fellow at CARR and doctoral candidate in political science at Michigan State University.
1 Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz, “How Democracies Fall Apart,” Foreign Affairs, December 5, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-05/how-democracies-fall-apart.
2 Christian Houle and Paul D. Kenny, “The Political and Economic Consequences of Populist Rule in Latin America,” Government and Opposition 53, no. 2 (2016): 256-87.
3 Kareem Shaheen, “Turkish Journalists Accuse Erdoğan of Media Witch-hunt,” The Guardian, May 2, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/02/turkish-journalists-accuse-erdogan-of-media-witch-hunt.
4 “Although Parliamentary Elections in Hungary Offered Voters a Diverse Choice, Ruling Party Enjoyed Undue Advantage, Say International Observers,” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, April 7, 2014, https://www.oscepa.org/documents/election-observation/election-observation-statements/hungary/press-releases-12/2152-2014-parliamenary/file.
5 Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).
6 David Adler, “Centrists Are the Most Hostile to Democracy, Not Extremists,” The New York Times, May 23, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/23/opinion/international-world/centrists-democracy.html?mtrref=t.co&gwh=9094043E46C8EA5E9225B9B7F3611AE3&gwt=regi&assetType=REGIWALL.
7 “Turkey Referendum Grants President Erdogan Sweeping New Powers,” BBC News, April 16, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39617700.
8 Evren Doganc, “Turkish Referendum,” Ipsos, April 20, 2017, https://www.ipsos.com/en/turkish-referendum.
9 Matthijs Rooduijn et al., “The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe,” 2019, https://popu-list.org.
10 Müller, What Is Populism?.
11 Müller, What Is Populism?.
Nationalism and Memory
Grieving Greater Hungary: Trianon, Orbán, and the Hungarian Radical Right
Katherine Kondor
In the Hungarian collective memory, few events evoke as much emotion as the Treaty of Trianon. Referring to the peace treaty signed at the Grand Trianon Palace at Versailles on 4 June 1920, this treaty meant that Hungary lost about two-thirds of its territories. The end of the First World War marked the end of the Austro-Hungarian empire, meaning the federalisation of both Austria and Hungary. With this came the Trianon peace treaty, where Hungary lost most of its national minorities: Slovaks, Romanians, Croats, and Serbs, among others. This treaty meant families were divided along national borders,1 and many ethnic Hungarians now found themselves members of other nation-states. Parts of Northern Hungary went to the Slovaks and Czechs, the South went to the Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenians, and Transylvania became part of Romania. 1941-42 briefly saw a reversal of the treaty and reinstatement of lands as, under the Hungarian regent Admiral Miklós Horthy, Hungary fought on the side of Nazi Germany.
In the 1930s, the extreme right began to centre around Ferenc Szálasi, leader of the newly formed Party for National Will; the party was characterised by militant anti-Semitism and irredentism, specifically seeking to reunite the Hungarian people of the Carpathian Basin under Hungarian leadership. Later, Szálasi’s ideas of “Hungarism” and the reversal of the Trianon treaty became central to the Hungarian radical right, most specifically to the new Hungarian National Socialist Party and later to the infamous Arrow Cross Party and Hungarist Movement. Their ideas were a mix of anti-Semitism and fascism, believing that powers such as Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union should be dissolved, and Hungarians (along with Latin, German, Slavic, and Islamic nations) should become the leading world race.
These ideas of Hungarism and the reformation of “Greater Hungary” are now central to Hungary’s radical right. “Greater Hungary” is recognised in the form of an idea, with the concept symbolising the reunification of all ethnic Hungarians. It can also be represented physically by the image of present day Hungary set within the pre-Trianon borders of the country, which often appears as a form of pan-Hungarism on decals, jewellery, and clothing. In another incarnation, it appears as a common chant used by radical right groups—“Vesszen Trianon!” (“Down with Trianon!”).
Viktor Orbán and his government have also been often accused of revisionist approaches. Indeed, the Fidesz government instituted the opportunity for Hungarian citizenship2 to all Hungarians living outside of the nation-state’s borders; those ethnic Hungarians granted citizenship from Romania, Ukraine, and Serbia have meant a large electoral boost for Orbán’s Fidesz. Additionally, Fidesz have altered the national curriculum3 to be “more patriotic”, replaced the EU flag4 on the Hungarian parliament building with that of the Szeklers (a Hungarian-speaking ethnic group in Transylvania), openly support autonomy for the Szeklerlands in Transylvania,5 regularly speak at the annual Bálványos Summer Free University and summer camp in the Szeklerlands, and have been financing6 Hungarian-language media,7 football clubs, and churches in Transylvania.
Orbán’s gestures towards the Transylvanian-Hungarian and Szekler minorities have not gone unnoticed by the Romanian government, incidentaly led by their very own (Ludovic) Orban, who reacted in 2020 by declaring 4 June a national holiday8 in Romania. Indeed, the Szeklerlands have become the centre of Orbán’s irredentist crusade, although he himself stated that he is not seeking to reunite all of the lost Hungarian lands.9 One must wonder, then, what his motives are beyond simple ethno-nationalism.
4 June is memorialised annually by the Hungarian government, with the day being commemorated as the Day of National Unity in 2010. Indeed, Trianon is such a crucial part of the Hungarian collective memory that a rock opera was created about it in 2018.10 2020, however, brings particularly special meaning in its centennial anniversary of the treaty; so much so, in fact, that the Hungarian government commissioned a memorial monument in front of the parliament in Budapest in April 2019 to be finished for the centennial anniversary (which it was not).11 Called the “National Unity Memorial”, the subterranean monument features the names of the nearly 13,000 settlements Hungary lost to Trianon.
Outside of the Hungarian parliament, the treaty is memorialised and mourned by the radical right; indeed, 4 June is one of the biggest days of the year for these organisations. In 2020, there is increased anger surrounding Trianon related to the treaty being originally signed for 100 years: a notional expiration date due for the 2020 anniversary. For the centennial, even COVID-19 could not stop the protests and memorials. 5 June saw the annual protest march (the article features a video about the march, with interviews in Hungarian) organised by the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement,12 a radical right youth organisation centred around the reversal of the treaty. The organisation was founded by the leader of the new Our Homeland Movement political party, who also spoke at the event. Videos of the protest show organisation members, various people young and old, and families with children in attendance.
Several radical right organisations made statements in honour of the anniversary. The Hungarian Defence Movement, which portrays itself as a community and family-oriented volunteer organisation, had a week-long commemoration visiting various Trianon memorials around Hungary. The radical right rock band Kárpátia wrote a song for the occasion. Some have voiced a victimisation and portrayal as Trianon as a Hungarian genocide, as did the extremist Outlaw Army organisation who stated, ‘they sentenced us to death, yet we’re still alive’.13 Légió Hungária, a newer Hungarian white power organisation, created a video to commemorate Trianon 100 stating that, ‘Our message on the 100th anniversary of Trianon must be that Hungarian identity and Hungarian land will be kept Hungarian, where for one thousand years Hungarians have been born and Hungarians determined the culture. One thousand years from now should be the same’.14 These organisations have frequently spoken out about ethnic Hungarians across the borders, with the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement even having branches in the Szeklerlands.
Such a parallel between the Hungarian radical right and Hungarian government’s rhetoric is nothing if not cause for concern. It is also questionable as to what the continued tension between Hungary and Romania will mean for the future of the region. At any rate, Orbán’s not-so-subtle nod to Hungarism and Admiral Horthy are worthy of Europe’s attention as the country slips further into its “illiberal turn”.
Dr Katherine Kondor is a Senior Fellow at CARR and research associate on the “Illiberal Turn” project at Loughborough University.
1 “VARIOUS: Ethnic Hungarians Remember How Their Families Were Divided by the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920,” Reuters, June 7, 2010, https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/478169.
2 Lucie Szymanowska, “The iImplementation of the Hungarian Citizenship Law,” OSW, February 2, 2011, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-02-02/implementation-hungarian-citizenship-law.
3 Edit Inotai, “Democracy Digest: Hungary’s Curriculum cCusade,” Balkan Insight, February 7, 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/07/democracy-digest-hungarys-curriculum-crusade/.
4 Csaba Tóth, “President of Hungarian Parliament Orders Removal of EU Flag,” Budapest Beacon, November 17, 2014, https://budapestbeacon.com/president-hungarian-parliament-orders-removal-eu-flag/.
5 For example: Stefano Bottoni, “Szeklerland as the New Crimea?,” Visegrad Insight, May 16, 2014, https://visegradinsight.eu/szeklerland-as-a-new-crimea1652014/; Cristian Gherasim, “Bucharest and Budapest in ‘Autonomy’ Region Row,” EU Observer, May 4, 2020, https://euobserver.com/political/148232.
6 Akos Keller-Alant, “Living Like in Hungary: Orban Bankrolling Romania ‘Ethnic Parallelism’,” Balkan Insight, January 30, 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/01/30/living-like-in-hungary-orban-bankrolling-romania-ethnic-parallelism/.
7 Craig Turp-Balazs, “New Report Reveals Hungary’s Creeping Influence on Transylvania Media Market,” Emerging Europe, July 18, 2019, https://emerging-europe.com/news/new-report-reveals-hungarys-creeping-influence-on-transylvania-media-market/.
8 “Hungarian Press Roundup: Romania Declares Trianon Day a National Holiday,” Hungary Today, May 21, 2020, https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarian-press-romania-trianon-day/.
9 Gergely Nyilas, “Orbán Szerint Emlékezni Kell, De Trianonozni Nem,” Index, January 9, 2020, https://index.hu/belfold/2020/01/09/orban_viktor_sajtotajekoztato_karmelita_kolostor_orbaninfo/orban_szerint_emlekezni_kell_de_trianonozni_nem/.
10 Shaun Walker, “Hungarian Nationalist Rock Opera to Retell 1920s Grievances,” The Guardian, June 22, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/22/hungarian-nationalist-rock-opera-to-retell-1920s-grievances.
11 Nick Thorpe, “The 100-year Wound That Hungary Cannot Forget,” BBC News, June 3, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52903721.
12 Gabriella Dohi, ““Vesszen Trianon!”—így tüntetett a szélsőjobb a száz éve megkötött békeszerződés ellen,” Atlatszo, June 6, 2020, https://video.atlatszo.hu/2020/06/06/vesszen-trianon-igy-tuntetett-a-szelsojobb-a-szaz-eve-megkotott-bekeszerzodes-ellen/.
13 “A Betyársereg üzenete: Ennél őszintébben nem lehet… VESSZEN TRIANON!,” Betyársereg, June 4, 2020, http://betyarsereg.hu/a-betyarsereg-uzenete-ennel-oszintebben-nem-lehet-vesszen-trianon/.
14 “Trianon100—VIDEÓ,” Légió Hungária, June 4, 2020, https://legiohungaria.org/145-trianon100-video.
An “Ambivalent Day”: How the AfD Attempts to Re-frame the 8th May as Day to Commemorate German Victimhood
Sophie Schmalenberger
What was planned as a full state ceremony to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe became a smaller and “lonely” ceremony due to the COVID-19 situation. Keeping a due distance, President Steinmeier and chancellor Merkel came together on 8 May 2020 to lay down a wreath in memory of the victims of war and Nazi tyranny in the heart of a locked-down Berlin.1 In a speech, Steinmeier warned of the ‘temptation of new nationalisms’ and stressed that there was ‘no end to remembering’.2 The AfD, as key mobiliser of such dangerous nationalism, however, used the anniversary to challenge the dominant interpretation of 8 May as marking the liberation from Nazism by coining it as a day that should commemorate German victims. Namely, Nazi supporters as well as bystanders for whom 8 May and its aftermath meant suffering rather than liberation.
This became apparent during the debate on whether 8 May should be made a public holiday in Germany to commemorate the liberation of Europe and Germany from the Nazis as suggested by the chair of the German Auschwitz Committee Esther Bejarano in an open letter3 to Steinmeier and Merkel. The idea quickly gained support and was soon commented on by the honorary chair of the AfD, Alexander Gauland, who claimed that 8 May was no cause for celebration but an ‘ambivalent day’.4 ‘A day of liberation for those in the concentration camps, but a day of absolute defeat for Germans, implying the loss of German territories and possibilities’. Gauland’s statement sparked criticism from the Central Council of Jews in Germany and various politicians.5 Nevertheless, he successfully managed to make a narrative of German victimhood a salient part of the discourse surrounding the 2020 Second World War commemorations, thus challenging the dominant narrative of historical guilt as a corner stone of modern Germany’s self-conception.
A milestone for the modern German perspective on World War Two is the speech by former President Richard von Weizsäcker on 8 May 1985 in the Bundestag. Weizsäcker claimed that German´s had ‘not been defeated but liberated by the Allies from the inhuman system of Nazi tyranny’.6 While this statement is historically wrong, it became the dominant framing of 8 May 1945 in German memory culture: while hardly experienced as liberating by Germans at the time, in hindsight it gave Germany the opportunity to become better version of itself. Namely, through coming to terms with its dark past, embracing “Never again!” as a central “lesson learned”7 from it, and adopting the identity of a reformed perpetrator. This, however, did not strictly exclude elements of German victimhood or innocence. The liberation narrative invites to attribute historical guilt to the Führer Adolf Hitler and leading Nazis while negating or minimizing the individual guilt of the “average German” and particularly of one’s family members.8 Narratives of innocence and victimhood9 have thus not been the sole focus of, but present within post-Holocaust German memory culture, as is, for example, apparent in the 2013 TV drama Unsere Mütter, unsere Väter (Generation War), a portrayal of Nazi bystanders containing narratives of (passive) guilt, innocence, and moral redemption.10 On occasion of the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, the AfD attempted to make those the key frame for interpreting Germany’s 20th century history.
This becomes even more explicit when examining further AfD statements around the above mentioned debate. Claiming to put forward a balanced account of history, all these contributions indeed aim to highlight German victims and losses connected to 8 May 1945 and urge to remember ‘our mothers and fathers […] who were victims of the biggest crime against humanity in history’.11 In such narrative, a main focus is put on those Germans who were expelled from former Third Reich territory, in what is labelled as the ‘biggest history of expulsion in the history of humankind’.12 This is achieved by showing video material of and stressing family histories of expulsion,13 emphasizing the ‘loss of the homeland of Eastern Germans’14 and mourning ‘irretrievably lost’ cities like Königsberg (Kaliningrad) and Danzig (Gdansk) as former hubs of German culture and history.15 Also, the victimization of millions of raped women and girls and German prisoners of war with mainly Soviet troops as perpetrators is mentioned.16 Here, the AfD mobilizes elements of deflected guilt, as well as narratives of victimhood and innocence that exist within, but are not articulated prominently in official post-Holocaust German memory and public commemoration.
To defy accusations of right-wing extremism, AfD actors formally acknowledge the victims of the Holocaust and guilt of some Germans. They stress, however, that Germans were not a people of perpetrators as many had not even voted for Hitler.17 Attempting to furthermore normalize their positions, they relate their interpretations of history to statements of recognized post-war politicians such as Theodor Heuss, who referred to 8 May as ‘most questionable and tragic paradox in [German] history’.18
Finally, the AfD constructs connections between past and present. Here, Georg Pazderski, head of the AfD fraction in the Berlin state parliament, points out that 8 May brought a new dictatorship, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), upon parts of the German people.19 He then stresses that nowadays, socialists are again gaining dominance in Germany, referring to the Left party as the legal successor of the GDR’s governing party SED together with its ‘leftist-green allies’, the Green party and the Social Democrats. He accuses them of not sincerely remembering the victims, but of misusing commemoration to defame conservative positions and the AfD. His lesson learned from 8 May and its aftermath is ‘Never again Socialism, be it left or right’.20
Moreover, Stephan Protschka, AfD MP in the Bundestag, frames the NS rule as a ‘socialist tyranny’.21 By stating that the loss of freedom of opinion and criminalization of the opposition ‘can still happen today’,22 he alludes to the surveillance of parts of the AfD by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution,23 thus implicitly comparing the Nazi dictatorship with the current administration. An equivalence between Nazi Germany and the Merkel government is constructed even more explicitly by AfD Bavaria, claiming that not 8 May, but ‘Merkel stepping down from office would be a real day of liberation’.24
This attempt to re-frame history on occasion of 8 May is part of a central AfD strategy: to offer an alternative German self-conception that does not deny but relativize the importance of the Holocaust; that demands less reflection on German guilt, instead allowing for patriotism. An interpretation of history that does not see the return of fascism as major danger for modern Germany, but warns against the dominance of what is framed as a socialist-green mainstream. An alternative national self-understanding, thus, that serves as the legitimizing backbone for the AfD’s radical right populist political positions.
Sophie Schmalenberger is a Doctoral Fellow at CARR and doctoral candidate in global studies at Aarhus University.
1 Elisabeth Schuhmacher, “German President Marks ‘Lonely’ World War II 75th anniversary,” Deutsche Welle, May 8, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/german-president-marks-lonely-world-war-ii-75th-anniversary/a-53368453.
2 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the 75th anniversary of the liberation from National Socialism and the end of the Second World War in Europe at the Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Victims of War and Tyranny (Neue Wache), May 8, 2020, https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Reden/2020/05/200508-75-Jahre-Ende-WKII-Englisch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
3 Esther Bajarano, Offener Brief an die Regierenden und alle Menschen, die aus der Geschichte lernen wollen., January 26, 2020, https://www.auschwitz-komitee.de/offener-brief-an-die-regierenden-und-alle-menschen-die-aus-der-geschichte-lernen-wollen/.
4 Jan Sternberg, “Gauland gegen Feiertag am 8. Mai: ‘Es war auch ein Tag der absoluten Niederlage’,” Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland, May 8, 2020, https://www.rnd.de/politik/feiertag-am-8-mai-darum-ist-alexander-gauland-afd-dagegen-DGQCKQIZ5RDVJKY27ZASXC27XI.html.
5 “Gauland provoziert mit Aussagen zum 8. Mai,” Jüdische Allgemeine, May 6, 2020, https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/politik/gauland-provoziert-mit-aussagen-zum-8-mai/.
6 Richard von Weizsäcker, Rede zur Gedenkveranstaltung im Plenarsaal des Deutschen Bundestages zum 40. Jahrestag des Endes des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Europa, May 8, 1985, https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Richard-von-Weizsaecker/Reden/1985/05/19850508_Rede.html.
7 Bernhard Forchtner, Lessons from the Past? Memory, Narrativity and Subjectivity (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
8 Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller and Karoline Tschuggnall, Opa war kein Nazi. Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2014).
9 Samuel Salzborn, Kollektive Unschuld. Die Abwehr Der Shoah Im Deutschen Erinnern (Leipzig: Hentrich & Hentrich, 2020).
10 Wulf Kansteiner, “Fantasies of Innocence: The Holocaust Bystander as German Television Star,” in Völkermord zur Prime-Time: der Holocaust im Fernsehen, eds. J. Keilbach, B. Rasky and J. Starek (Wien: New Academic Press: 2019), 23-45.
11 Stephan Protschka, “8. Mai: (K)ein Grund zum Feiern?”, YouTube video, 2:50, posted on May 7, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HSvqtx5Kh8w&feature=youtu.be.
12 Protschka, “8. Mai”.
13 Stephan Protschka, “8. Mai: (K)ein Grund zum Feiern?,” AfD Kompakt, May 8, 2020, https://afdkompakt.de/2020/05/08/stephan-protschka-8-mai-kein-grund-zum-feiern/
14 Felix Krautkrämer, “Gauland: Der 8. Mai ist kein Freudentag,” Junge Freiheit, May 7, 2020, https://jungefreiheit.de/debatte/interview/2020/gauland-der-8-mai-ist-kein-freudentag/.
15 Krautkrämer, “Gauland”.
16 AfD Fraktion Brandenburg, “Der 8. Mai 1945 war das Ende des zweiten Weltkrieges in #Europa,” Facebook, May 8, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/afdfraktion/photos/a.1482727218676-491/2641414492807752/?type=3&theater.
17 Krautkrämer, “Gauland”.
18 Georg Pazderski, “Bundespräsident #Heuss fand einst bis heute gültige Worte: „Im Grunde genommen bleibt dieser 8.5.1945 die tragischste und fragwürdigste Paradoxie für jeden von uns,” Facebook, May 8, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/Pazderski.Georg/videos/582273155724817.
19 Pazderski, “Bundespräsident”.
20 Pazderski, “Bundespräsident”.
21 Protschka, “8. Mai”.
