Kitabı oku: «The Radical Right During Crisis», sayfa 8
Does Norway Have a Neo-Nazi Terrorist Problem?
Mette Wiggen
A young man, Philip Manshaus, who carried out the terror attack in Norway on 10 August 2019 was sentenced to twenty-one years “preventative detention”. He was charged with killing his stepsister, Johanne Ihle-Hansen, and an act of terrorism for attacking the Al Noor mosque in Bærum, Norway. At the trial, he showed no remorse, noting that he wished he had done more damage and regretted not having planned the attack better. He had in fact turned up the day before Eid-ul-Adhah to an empty mosque and was tackled and stopped by Mohammad Rafiq and Mohammed Iqbal Javed, the only people there. The prosecutor, Johan Øverberg, said Manshaus had proven to be an extremely dangerous man. There was a racist motive behind the murder: his stepsister had been adopted from China, and the attempted attack of the mosque itself had racial overtones. As noted by the German international broadcaster, Deutsche Welle: ‘in his concluding remarks, the attacker said he expected to be convicted and given a long sentence, “but I would like to point out to the judges that they are accomplices to the ongoing genocide of the European people”’.1
Over the last year the picture of how Manshaus became radicalised has become clearer; he seems to have acted alone and as other right-wing ‘lone wolves’ became radicalised online. He was a great admirer of Brenton Tarrant, who carried out the terror attack on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand on 15 March 2019 and killed fifty-one worshippers, and of another right-wing extremist, Anders Behring Brevik, who killed seventy-seven (mostly young) people in and near Oslo, Norway on 22 July 2011. There is no evidence he was part of a larger network but Manshaus had met with high ranking members of the neo-Nazi organisation, the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM), in a café in Oslo a month before the attack and asked to join the organisation.2 The journalist and author of Nynazister blant oss (Neo-Nazis Among Us), Harald S. Klungtveit, argues the main reason Manshaus wasn’t a member by the time of the attack was not because the NRM didn’t want him, but because of delays in NRM’s membership system as well as internal conflicts and a split of the organisation.3
Luckily, Manshaus’ plans to kill Muslims during prayer were a failure, with him appearing on the wrong day and being apprehended by the only two men who were in the mosque who managed to stop him and contact the police. It took the police a long time to turn up, which looked like a repeat of the police’s reaction to the phone calls about Breivik and has now led to an investigation of the matter by an expert committee.4 The delay has been interpreted as racial profiling according to some, there are also other calls for Bærum police force to be investigated on accounts of racism.5 The Norwegian security service’s (PST) investigation of the police’s delay and behaviour in the Manshaus case was delayed because of the coronavirus pandemic and regretfully the report wasn’t ready at the time of Manshaus’ court case.6
More information has revealed since the trial. Notably, that Manshaus increased his online activities dramatically after he came back from a college gap year in May 2018. He had spent the academic year 2017-2018 at a liberal residential craft school, named Fosen Folkehøgskole, on a peninsula in the picturesque Trondheim fjord. The college’s ethos is about living sustainably and teaches sailing, boat building, farming, self-sufficiency, and organic living. It has a reputation of being a leftist, alternative utopic paradise. The school’s ambitious aim is to ‘guide the world in a more environmentally friendly direction’.7
Manshaus subsequently attended the stream that teaches sustainable living and self-sufficiency. The school is a very tightly knit community with activities and trips on the weekends. Students who knew Manshaus said they had noticed how he had changed during his stay at the college and they had begun to fear that someone would get killed soon: either Manshaus or somebody else. They said he expressed more and more radical views and became increasingly religious (Christian). His head teacher, Arnhild Finne, stated they had little reason to believe that he had been radicalised there but regrets not having acted on a tip from a concerned student and notified the police.8
Fosen Folkehøgskole is not exactly a place you would expect to find a future extreme right-wing terrorist, and police reports from his internet activity show Manshaus’ interest in the radical right, neo-Nazism, and terror grew rapidly in the spring 2019 after he had left the school. He had downloaded a PDF version of Siege by the American neo-Nazi James Mason, but his reading was broad and included the right-wing psychology professor and professional contrarian, Jordan Peterson, as well as Anders Behring Breivik’s manifesto. Manshaus seemed more interested in the “alt-right” than neo-Nazism and terror attacks.
More than anybody, Manshaus seemed obsessed with Brenton Tarrant who carried out the terror attack on the mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand. In Manshaus’ notes, the police found a detailed terror plan that was lifted directly from Brenton Tarrant´s manifesto and also happened to be influenced by Breivik. The Norwegian police had Manshaus under observation for a while and his old friends described him as having become radicalised.9 Especially from the summer of 2018, he had become awkward and difficult to socialise with because of his views and as a result he spent more and more time on his own.
In court the police presented their analysis of Manshaus’ activities in the last two years: activities that led to him becoming a Nazi, an anti-Semite, and a terrorist. He had searched for and visited Internet sites with key words such as “Nazi”, “nigger”, “Jew”, “genocide”, “Breivik”, “Holocaust”, “NRM”, “4Chan” and “8Chan”. Manshaus had showed an interest in 4Chan since his mid-teens but his engagement intensified in 2018. In court, he complained that anyone interested in something deviant in relation to the Holocaust or immigration was being subject to a “witch hunt”. Moreover, he had also tried to convince friends of conspiracy theories and Holocaust denial. Furthermore, he had expressed hatred of Jewish people and showed an interest in the school shootings in the US and Finland. He was also fascinated by alt-right Internet culture and had written about race and religion in his diaries and of a ‘psychological war against my people’. The security services say his relation to reality had started to show signs of radicalisation in 2018. Philip Manshaus’ internet activity escalated after the Christchurch attack when he also started searching for weapons for sale and avidly read the bible to find viewpoints against racial mixing. He had also read the racist ideologue David Lane who had been imprisoned a third of his life for murder of a Jewish journalist and used Lane’s “14 words” in court (i.e., “We must secure the existence of our race and a future for White children”).10
In the wake of Breivik’s (successful) and Manshaus’s (failed) attacks, Norwegian society and the security services have their work cut out. There is a relatively small number of neo-Nazi groups and individuals in Norway but, left radicalised by the Internet and international events, they are more likely to carry out violent attacks than before. Klungtveit says neo-Nazism is no longer taboo among the younger generation, but that it is an international phenomenon.11 In Norway, the media, in the name of “freedom of speech”, is facilitating agency and a space for radical right to voices to be heard, helping to normalise them and therefore ultimately make such attacks more likely in the future.
Dr Mette Wiggen is a Senior Fellow at CARR and lecturer in politics and international studies at the University of Leeds.
1 “Norway: Mosque Attacker Sentenced to 21 Years ‘Preventative detention’,” Deutsche Welle, August 12, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/norway-mosque-attacker-sentenced-to-21-years-preventive-detention/a-53771965.
2 Mette Wiggen, “The Nordic Resistance Movement”, CARR Insight Blog, March 24, 2020, https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/03/24/the-nordic-resistance-movement/.
3 Harald S. Klungtveit, Nynazister Blant Oss: På Innsiden av Den Nye Høyreekstremismen (Oslo: Kagge Forlag, 2020).
4 Alf Bjarne Johnsen and Morten S. Hopperstad, “Gransker PST’s Tipshåndtering før Moske-Angrepet,” VG, February 19, 2020, https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/Jo4pyj/gransker-psts-tipshaandtering-foer-moske-angrepet.
5 Dag Herbjørnsrud, “Slik Feilet Bærum-Politiet i Rulleskisaken”, Utrop, May 5, 2020, https://www.utrop.no/plenum/ytringer/216129/.
6 Fouad Acharki, Martin W. H. Zondag, and Victoria Wilden, “Manshaus-Saken—Svært Uheldig at Politi-og PST-Gransking Ikke er Klar,” NRK, May 6, 2020, https://www.nrk.no/osloogviken/gransking-av-politiet-og-pst-koronautsatt-1.15001569Deleayed case
7 Fosen Folk School—Norway’s organic folk school, https://www.fosen.fhs.no/en/.
8 Amanda Nordhagen Walnum, “Rektor: -Ønsker at Vi Varslet Videre,” Dagbladet, August 14, 2019, https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/rektor---onsker-at-vi-varslet-videre/71485857.
9 Oda Ording, “Venninne Møtte Manshaus Ett År Før Angrepet: - En Dommedagsfølelse,” VG, May 15, 2020, https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/70rzpw/venninne-moette-manshaus-ett-aar-foer-angrepet-en-dommedagsfoelelse.
10 Jon Færseth, “David Lane og de 14 Ordene,” Fri Tanke, May 7, 2020, https://fritanke.no/david-lane-og-de-14-ordene/19.11429
11 Klungteveit, Nynazister Blant Oss.
Canada Filed the First Incel Terrorism Charge. How Do We Combat This Threat?
Cristina Ariza
In May 2020, the police uncovered evidence that the attacker who killed a woman and injured another at an erotic massage parlour in Canada in February 2020 was inspired by incel ideology.1 Since this revelation the attack has been treated as terrorism, making it the first time that terrorism charges are being applied in Canada to a suspect not inspired by Islamist extremism.
Incels are short for “involuntary celibates”, a loosely organized network of men that blame women for refusing to engage in sexual relationships with them. Incels believe there are three main groups in society: the alphas, referred to as “Stacys” and “Chads”, who are deemed the most attractive women and men; the betas, or “normies”, who are average-looking; and the incels, who are portrayed as undesirable to women and are therefore denied sex.2
The movement has not always been violent or misogynistic. One former incel told Vox about how he used to engage in online chats in the 2000s to ask for advice from female users about how to talk to women.3 But in the last couple of years, the movement has embraced clear sexism and misogyny, sometimes culminating in acts of violence.4
Terrorism and violence: how much of a risk does incel ideology pose?
February 2020 did not mark the first time that incels have targeted Canada. In 2018, a man drove his van into pedestrians at a busy street in Toronto, later telling police that he belonged to an ‘incel rebellion’, but he failed to be charged with terrorism.5 The teenager who attacked the massage parlour knew about the Toronto attacker, but also about other key incel figures like Elliot Rodger. Rodger, who killed six people and injured fourteen at a California university campus before committing suicide in 2014, is probably the most well-known figure in the incel movement, to the point that experts have likened his position within the incel community to Anders Breivik’s regarding the wider radical right.6 He too, as Breivik, wrote a manifesto entitled “My Twisted World” in which he vowed revenge against women at sororities for refusing to have sex with him.7
There have been other similar attacks in Oregon (2015), New Mexico (2017), and Florida (2018 and 2019), leaving up to fifty dead in North America.8 Incels have been a target of arrests too: just earlier this year a man was arrested in California for harassing two girls online who had rejected his sexual advances.9 Terrorism experts Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware have warned that the terrorist threat from incels is very real and that it poses specific challenges to security forces, as attackers tend to plot alone and often do not belong to organized groups.10 Likewise, most of these conversations have moved to darker webs and less-policed sites like encrypted chat platform Telegram and gamer site Discord.11
In a sense, the incel movement is the ultimate expression of the decentralized nature of the wider radical right, down to the way the discourse is often driven by memes, jokes and “shitposting” on online forums and message boards. Therefore, banning or targeting a specific group is unlikely to yield success. As such, we require a multifaceted response that understands the nature of the incel threat and how it relates to the dynamics of the global radical right movement.
The difficulty of fighting diffuse ideologies: incels and the radical right
The manosphere—the umbrella term that brings together all misogynistic movements—includes not only incels, but men’s rights activists, “pick up artists”, and the so-called movement “Men Going Their Own Way (MGTOW)”, the latter of whom intentionally avoids contact with women.
The Hanau shooter, who in his manifesto said that he had a very high standard for choosing women and that he avoided entering into relationships with them because they were a “temptation”, was initially labeled an incel, although he was later better described as belonging to the MGTOW movement.12 Several experts on the subject of misogyny and the far-right have argued persuasively that labelling every misogynistic violent attack as incel only muddies the discussion about the consequences of misogyny as a whole.13
Even then, some voices have challenged that the Hanau shooter fit neatly into the MGTOW category, as he was also displaying strong paranoia and white supremacy sentiment.14 This debate over the different strands of the manosphere and how the borders between categories can be diffuse is illustrative of the wider difficulty in determining what is “radical right” or “white supremacy” and how that interlinks with other ideologies. Scholars Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware have noted how incel ideology is getting interwoven with typical white supremacist ideology, which can be emboldening for members of the incel movement.15 This can go on both directions, as several memes incorporating incel language and depicting terrorists like the Christchurch shooting as “Chads” made the rounds in online radical right forums in the aftermath of attacks last year.16
Aside from the porous borders between different strands in the radical right, other variables can further add to the confusion on what constitutes radical right ideology. There was a heated debate after the Hanau shooting on whether the mental illness aspect of the case disqualified it as a terrorist incident, which experts such as Cynthia Miller-Idriss found problematic for risking glossing over how people are being radicalized and the role of white supremacy ideology in this process.17
Many differing, and often contradictory, extremist movements are covered under the term “radical right”. From the manosphere to accelerationists, through anti-government patriot militias and anti-Muslim protest movements all the way to Russian ultranationalists and Satanic-inspired neo-Nazis; it is not always clear-cut that these movements share a common ideological ground. As such, the battle against a diffuse threat with no clear leaders and high levels of infighting ends up being reactive and fails to keep up with how the threat develops.
Yet, seeing as how the incel threat continues to wreak havoc, it is imperative that we start to understand more about how terrorism materializes in the radical right, including what ideological trends are connected to acts of violence, how do strands relate to each other, and how attackers radicalize and mobilize for action.
Cristina Ariza is a Policy and Practitioner Fellow at CARR and an analyst at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.
1 Stewart Bell, Andrew Russell and Catherine McDonald, “Deadly Attack at Toronto Erotic Spa Was Incel Terrorism, Police Allege,” Global News, May 19, 2020, https://globalnews.ca/news/6910670/toronto-spa-terrorism-incel/.
2 Joana Cook, “Incels,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology Insights, January 20, 2020, https://gnet-research.org/2020/01/20/incels/.
3 Zack Beauchamp, “Our Incel Problem,” Vox, April 23, 2020, https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/4/16/18287446/incel-definition-reddit.
4 Beauchamp, “Our Incel Problem”.
5 Bell, Russell and McDonald, “Deadly Attack at Toronto Erotic Spa Was Incel Terrorism, Police Allege”.
6 Colin Clarke and Lilianna Turner, “The ‘Incel’ Ideology Continues to Build a Strong Following in the Online ‘Manosphere’,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology Insights, April 22, 2020, https://gnet-research.org/2020/04/22/the-incel-ideology-continues-to-build-a-strong-following-in-the-online-manosphere/.
7 “Elliot Rodger: How Misogynist Killer Became ‘Incel hero’,” BBC News, April, 25, 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-43892189.
8 Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware, “Incels: America’s Newest Domestic Terrorism Threat,” Lawfare, January 12, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/incels-americas-newest-domestic-terrorism-threat.
9 Bell, Russell and McDonald, “Deadly Attack at Toronto Erotic Spa Was Incel Terrorism, Police Allege”.
10 Hoffman and Ware, “Incels: America’s Newest Domestic Terrorism Threat”.
11 Hoffman and Ware, “Incels: America’s Newest Domestic Terrorism Threat”.
12 “Far-Right Terrorist Attack Puts Germany on Edge,” The Cipher Brief, 2020, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/far-right-terrorist-attack-puts-germany-on-edge
13 Greta Jasser, Megan Kelly, and Ann-Kathrin Rothermel, Male Supremacism and the Hanau Terrorist Attack: Between Online Misogyny and Far-Right Violence (The Hague, Netherlands: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2020), https://icct.nl/publication/male-supremacism-and-the-hanau-terrorist-attack-between-online-misogyny-and-far-right-violence/
14 Jasser, Kelly, and Rothermel, “Male Supremacism and the Hanau Terrorist Attack”.
15 Hoffman and Ware, “Incels: America’s Newest Domestic Terrorism Threat”.
16 Ashley Mattheis, “Manifesto Memes: The Radical Right’s New Dangerous Visual Rhetorics,” openDemocracy, September 16, 2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/manifesto-memes-the-radical-rights-new-dangerous-visual-rhetorics/.
17 Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “Stop Calling Far-Right Terrorists ‘Crazy’,” Politico, February 20, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/stop-calling-far-right-terrorists-crazy/.
The COVID-19 Pandemic
COVID-19 Could Be a Harbinger of Authoritarianism
Dan Stone
In his televised 9 April Easter message, the Catholic Church’s spokesperson for the Archdiocese of Bucharest, Father Francisc Dobos, said that the disciples of Jesus ‘feared the Jews, and here in the bracket we should read: feared the virus’.1 It is hardly surprising that anti-Semites have revived one of their favourite, oldest tropes: the association of Jews with disease, both as carriers of disease, deliberate infectors of other groups and, in the most extreme versions, Jews as a disease. As I have noted previously, this language shifts from metaphor to reality all too easily.2
It is true that movements such as PEGIDA in Germany have embarrassed themselves by their response to the COVID-19 crisis; as CARR Fellow Sabine Volk shows, they remain fixated on migrants rather than safeguarding the people they supposedly represent.3 The same is true of right-wing populists in power. Hans-Georg Betz, another CARR Fellow, powerfully argues that the response of populist leaders, especially Trump, Johnson and, most notably, Bolsonaro, exposes the vacuous nature of the populists’ worldview.4 That is quite true: Trump and Bolsonaro blaming the Chinese, with Trump referring to the virus as a “hoax”; Johnson’s programme of “getting Brexit done” now looking irrelevant when it is obvious that the world faces a challenge that does not respect national borders and which demands international cooperation and a reliance on much-derided experts. Yet, whatever idiocy the coronavirus crisis has exposed in the populists’ slogans of national independence, anti-immigration, and disregard for science, the scope for entrenched and institutionalised right-wing populist parties to exploit the crisis remains strong. It is not the radical right movements which do not hold power that we should fear; it is the “mainstream” which does that presents the real threat today.
In the US, Trump has already hinted at delaying the election this autumn. This is a highly unlikely scenario but provides cover for seemingly less extreme measures to slip through. Trump’s announcement, for example, that the president rather than the state governors has the power to decide when lockdown measures will be eased, could have proved highly contentious, possibly even leading to legal action. Even if he performed a remarkable volte-face just one day later, to many Americans his assertion will not have seemed unreasonable.5 His position, however, represents an arrogation of power to the office of president that oversteps constitutional norms. No wonder commentators have been led to remark that the US has a president, not a king.
The most glaring case of opportunist authoritarianism, however, is Hungary. It has long been obvious that Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz was driving Hungary down the road to what Orbán calls “illiberal democracy”, with measures to close the Central European University on the specious grounds that it was not accredited in Hungary, and gradually restricting press and judicial freedoms. The COVID-19 crisis has come at a useful moment for Orbán, when his party has suffered its first serious defeats in ten major cities. The rushed introduction of the new law, “On Protecting against the Coronavirus”, has been called ‘a brazen attempt to establish an undisguised dictatorship’ by the Hungarian Spectrum.6 In that piece and in another by CARR Fellow Vinicius Bivar in Fair Observer, the law, which grants Orbán the right to rule by decree, has been called an “enabling law”.7 This is a stark reference to Adolf Hitler’s so-called “Enabling Law”—the Law to Remedy the State of Emergency of Volk and Reich of 24 March 1933—which gave Hitler the power to rule by decree and thus brought about the end of parliamentary democracy in Germany.
The comparison is instructive, although it is not without dangers. On the one hand, making comparisons such as these makes it easy for the Fidesz spokespersons to scoff at the absurdity of suggesting that Orbán’s government could have anything in common with one of the most reviled and criminal regimes in history. Yet, in March 1933, the Third Reich was not yet a warmongering, genocidal regime, other than in an incipient way (by which I mean that genocidal fantasies had always been present in Nazi thinking, even if there was no blueprint for war and genocide). The comparison is meaningful insofar as we can see that the Orbán government is slowly chipping away at the norms of liberal democracy, attempting to quash opposition, and using this crisis in the way that the Nazis used the Reichstag fire, that is, to criminalise critics, or at least to attempt to do so. And while it might be harsh to compare the EU’s failure of nerve when faced with Hungary’s deviation from its rules to appeasement, in fact both rest(ed) on an inability to face up to the true nature of the regimes in question. That is why the EU is being urged, for example by Márta Pardavi, co-chair of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, ‘to wake up and take action if it wants to prevent the virus of authoritarianism from infecting other countries’.8 Orbán is not Hitler, Fidesz is not the NSDAP—that comparison is absurd. But if he has his way, Orbán will be sure to use the COVID-19 crisis as the harbinger of authoritarianism, dressed up as defending “the people” but ushering in poverty for millions of Hungarians and more deeply-entrenched cronyism for the apparat.
The COVID-19 crisis, as with previous strains of coronavirus, has been brought about by human action. The desire to return to “normality”, which is a basic and hardly surprising response, is inadequate insofar as it was “normality” which caused this virus to appear and to spread in the first place. One of the things that needs to change is that the human race’s need to be fed has to be addressed in a more rational way, with the hugely unequal distribution of resources across the world being addressed as a matter of urgency. What will also need to be addressed with no less urgency is the temptation for demagogues to respond by blaming certain groups for causing the virus, a stance which easily slips into rhetoric in which particular groups of people are themselves figured as a kind of virus. The emergence of fascism in the wake of World War One and the flu epidemic which followed it should be a warning. If the economic downturn which is likely to follow the lockdown is not to lead to a twenty-first century form of fascism, then the voices of scientific experts need to be heeded and governments across the world need to work together to alleviate the hurt being inflicted on millions—possibly billions—of people who will be left unable to maintain a basic standard of living. Man cannot live by bread alone, said Brecht, especially when he has none.
Dr Dan Stone is a Senior Fellow at CARR and professor of modern history at Royal Holloway, University of London.
1 Cnaan Liphshiz, “Senior Romanian Priest Compares Jews to Coronavirus in Easter Greeting,” Jerusalem Post, April 13, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Antisemitism/Senior-Romanian-priest-compares-Jews-to-coronavirus-in-Easter-greeting-624482.
2 Dan Stone, “Trump Needs to Stop Speaking Like a 20th-Century Fascist,” Rantt, August 9, 2019, https://rantt.com/holocaust-historian-trump-needs-to-stop-speaking-like-a-20th-century-fascist.
3 Sabine Volk, “Germany—Is the Covid-19 Pandemic Weakening the Far Right?,” CARR Insight Blog, April 7, 2020, https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/04/07/Germany-is-the-covid-19-pandemic-weakening-the-far-right/.
4 Hans-Georg Betz, “Coronavirus-19’s Victims—Populism,” CARR Insight Blog, April 5, 2020, https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/04/05/coronavirus-19s-victims-populism/.
5 Ben Gittleson and Jordyn Phelps, “Trump’s Stunning Reversal on ‘Total’ Authority Claim over Governors,” ABC News, April 15, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trumps-stunning-reversal-total-authority-claim-governors-analysis/story?id=70160951.
6 “Plenty of Noise on the Western Front, But Will Action Follow?,” Hungarian Spectrum, April 3, 2020, https://hungarianspectrum.org/2020/04/03/plenty-of-noise-on-the-western-front-but-will-action-follow/.
7 Vinicius Bivar, “Will the Coronavirus Crisis Bring Down Hungary’s Failing Democracy?,” Fair Observer, April 14, 2020, https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/vinicius-bivar-hungary-coronavirus-emergency-law-viktor-orban-democracy-news-19722/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=April+15%2C+2020.
8 “What Should the EU Do About Hungary?,” Politico, April 14, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/what-should-the-eu-do-about-hungary-coronavirus-viktor-orban/?fbclid=IwAR03yMO2npKfTkOVftRCMgNL-IX0BWYo_0HkDbL8sUlr4ARb-6IjpL00ps.
