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APPENDIX

I

A general court-martial was held at Chelsea Hospital, on Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, on January 28, 1808. Its members included the conqueror of Agra and Lasswarree, and the future hero of Coruña. They were General the Right Hon. Sir W. Medows, General the Hon. Chapel Norton, General Viscount Lake, General Hulse, General Ogilvie, General Cuyler, Lieutenant-General the Right Hon. H. E. Fox, Lieutenant-General Sir James Duff, Knight; Lieutenant-General Harris, Lieutenant-General Viscount Cathcart, Lieutenant-General Dundas, Lieutenant-General Ross, Lieutenant-General Pigot, Lieutenant-General Sir George Nugent, Bart.; Lieutenant-General Loftus, Lieutenant-General Wilford, Lieutenant-General Garth, Lieutenant-General Lloyd, Lieutenant-General Stavely, Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, K.B.

First Charge.—That Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, having received instructions from his Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State to proceed for the reduction of the province of Buenos Ayres, pursued measures ill calculated to facilitate that conquest; that when the Spanish Commander had shown such symptoms of a disposition to treat, as to express a desire to communicate with Major-General Gower, the second in command, upon the subject of terms, the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke did return a message, in which he demanded, amongst other articles, the surrender of all persons holding civil offices in the government of Buenos Ayres, as prisoners of war: that the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, in making such an offensive and unusual demand, tending to exasperate the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, to produce and encourage a spirit of resistance to his Majesty’s arms, to exclude the hope of amicable accommodation, and to increase the difficulties of the service with which he was intrusted, acted in a manner unbecoming his duty as an officer, prejudicial to military discipline, and contrary to the articles of war.

Second Charge.—That the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, after the landing of the troops at Enseñada, and during the march from thence to the town of Buenos Ayres, did not make the military arrangements best calculated to ensure the success of his operations against the town, and that having known, previously to his attack upon the town of Buenos Ayres upon the 5th July 1807, as appears from his public despatch of the 10th of July, that the enemy meant to occupy the flat roofs of the houses, he did nevertheless, in the said attack, divide his forces into several brigades and parts, and ordered the whole to be unloaded, and no firing to be permitted on any account; and, under this order, to march into the principal streets of the town unprovided with proper and sufficient means for forcing the barricadoes, whereby the troops were unnecessarily exposed to destruction, without the possibility of making effectual opposition such conduct betraying great professional incapacity on the part of the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, tending to lessen the confidence of the troops in the judgment of their officers, being derogatory to the honour of His Majesty’s arms, contrary to his duty as an officer, prejudicial to good order and military discipline, and contrary to the articles of war.

Third Charge.—That the said Lieutenant-General did not make, although it was in his power, any effectual attempt by his own personal exertion or otherwise, to co-operate with, or support, the different divisions of the army under his command, when engaged with the enemy in the streets of Buenos Ayres on the 5th of July 1807; whereby those troops, after having encountered and surmounted a constant and well-directed fire, and having effected the purport of their orders, were left without aid and support, or further orders, and considerable detachments under Lieutenant-Colonel Duff and Brigadier-General Craufurd were thereby compelled to surrender; such conduct on the part of the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke tending to the defeat and dishonour of his Majesty’s arms, to lessen the confidence of the troops in the skill and courage of their officers, being unbecoming and disgraceful to his character as an officer, prejudicial to good order and military discipline, and contrary to the articles of war.

Fourth Charge.—That the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, subsequent to the attack upon the town of Buenos Ayres, and at a time when the troops under his command were in possession of posts on each flank of the town, and of the principal arsenal, with a communication open to the fleet, and having an effective force of upwards of 5000 men, did enter into, and finally conclude a treaty with the enemy, whereby he acknowledges in the public despatch of the 10th of July 1807—“That he resolved to forego the advantages which the bravery of his troops had obtained, and which advantages had cost him about 2500 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners;” and by such treaty he unnecessarily and shamefully surrendered all such advantages, totally evacuated the town of Buenos Ayres, and consented to deliver, and did shamefully abandon and deliver up to the enemy the strong fortress of Monte Video, which had been committed to his charge, and which, at the period of the treaty and abandonment, was well and sufficiently garrisoned and provided against attack, and which was not, at such period, in a state of blockade or siege; such conduct on the part of the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke tending to the dishonour of his Majesty’s arms, and being contrary to his duty as an officer, prejudicial to good order and military discipline, and contrary to the articles of war.

The proceedings of the court-martial on Lieutenant-General Whitelocke fill a volume of 671 pages, from which I give the following extracts:—

In opening the case the Judge-Advocate described it as being “the most important occasion, in the military history of the country, that ever called for inquiry of a nature like the present.” The expedition, he said, had not only totally failed, with the lamentable loss of a great proportion of the gallant army engaged in it, but it ended in the absolute surrender of those valuable advantages which the valour of British troops under another commander had previously acquired in the important post of Monte Video. “By this most unfortunate event,” he said, “all the hopes have been defeated which had been justly and generally entertained, of discovering new markets for our manufactures, of giving a wider scope to the spirit and enterprise of our merchants, of opening new sources of treasure, and new fields for exertion in supplying either the rude wants of countries emerging from barbarism, or the artificial and increasing demands of luxury and refinement, in those remote quarters of the globe. Important as these objects must be at all times to this country, the state of Europe, and the attempts that have been daily making to exclude us from our accustomed intercourse with the Continent, have added to the importance of these objects, and to the disappointment of these hopes.

“The disappointment has been cruelly embittered by the disgrace which such a failure, under all the circumstances, has attached to the British arms. The diminution of our military fame must be felt at all times as a great national calamity, but at no period so severely as in this crisis of the world, when our military character has become more essential than ever, not merely for our honour or our glory, but for the independence, the liberties, the existence of Great Britain. It is, however, a great consolation, that whatever may have been the stain which our military renown has received, the conduct of the troops has had no share in producing it. I believe, the more this attack of the 5th of July is examined, the more clearly it will be found that no troops ever showed more courage; that no officers (with the exception of whatever may turn out to be connected with the subject of these charges, and I hope the result of this inquiry may prove the exception to be undeserved), but, with that exception, that no officers ever displayed more zeal, more conduct, more devotion of themselves to the common cause in the course of the most triumphant engagement, than was displayed by the British officers through the whole of that destructive day.... But it is not upon reports that these charges are founded; they rest upon better evidence. They are taken, not from idle talk or vain rumour, but the orders and despatches of General Whitelocke himself. There is not a fact alleged against him which is not derived from his authority. The character assigned to these facts does, indeed, invoke imputations of the most grave and serious nature; but the facts themselves are founded upon his own account of his own conduct; so much so, that I might be well warranted in contenting myself, on the part of the public, with laying the orders and the despatches of General Whitelocke before you as documents, of themselves, and without any other evidence, abundantly sufficient to call upon him for his defence. He is his own accuser: he has furnished the strongest testimony against himself.”

Copy of a letter from Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, to the Right Honourable William Windham, dated Buenos Ayres, July 10th, 1807.

Buenos Ayres, July 10th, 1807.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of his Majesty, that upon being joined at Mount Video, on the 15th of June, by the corps under Brigadier-General Craufurd, not one moment was lost by Rear-Admiral Murray and myself, in making every necessary arrangement for the attack of Buenos Ayres. After many delays, occasioned by foul winds, a landing was effected, without opposition, on the 28th of the same month, at the Enseñada de Barragon, a small bay about 30 miles to the eastward of the town. The corps employed on this expedition were—three brigades of light artillery, under Captain Fraser; the 5th, 38th, and 87th regiments of foot, under Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Achmuty; the 17th light dragoons, 36th and 38th regiments, under Brigadier-General the Honourable William Lumley; eight companies of the 95th regiment, and nine light infantry companies, under Brigadier-General Craufurd; four troops of the 6th dragoon guards; the 9th light dragoons; 40th and 45th regiments of foot, under Colonel the Honourable T. Mahon; all the dragoons being dismounted, except four troops of the 17th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd.

After some fatiguing marches through a country much intersected by swamps and deep muddy rivulets, the army reached Reduction, a village about nine miles distant from the bridge over the Rio Chuello, on the opposite bank of which the enemy had constructed batteries, and established a formidable line of defence. I resolved, therefore, to turn the position, by marching in two columns from my left, and crossing the river higher up, where it was represented fordable, to unite my force in the suburbs of Buenos Ayres. I sent directions at the same time to Colonel Mahon, who was bringing up the greater part of the artillery, under the protection of the 17th light dragoons and 40th regiment, to wait for further orders at Reduction. Major-General Levison Gower having the command of the right column, crossed the river at a pass called the Passo Chico, and falling in with a corps of the enemy, gallantly attacked and defeated it; for the particulars of which action I beg to refer you to the annexed report. Owing to the ignorance of my guide, it was not until next day that I joined with the main body of the army, when I formed my line by placing Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Achmuty’s brigade upon the left, extending it towards the convent of the Recolleta, from which it was distant two miles, the 36th and 88th regiments being on its right, Brigadier-General Craufurd’s brigade, occupying the central and principal avenues of the town, being distant about three miles from the great square and fort; and the 6th dragoon guards, 9th light dragoons, and 45th regiment being upon his right, and extending towards the Residencia. The town was thus nearly invested; and this disposition of the army, and the circumstances of the town and suburbs being divided into squares of 140 yards each side, together with the knowledge that the enemy meant to occupy the flat roofs of the houses, gave rise to the following plan of attack:—Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Achmuty was directed to detach the 38th regiment to possess itself of the Plaza de Tauros and the adjacent strong ground, and there take post. The 87th, 5th, 36th, and 88th regiments were each divided into wings, and each wing ordered to penetrate into the street directly in its front. The light battalion divided into wings, and each followed by a wing of the 95th regiment and a 3-pounder, was ordered to proceed down the two streets on the right of the central one, and the 45th regiment down the two adjoining, and after clearing the streets of the enemy, this latter regiment was to take post at the Residencia. Two 6-pounders were ordered along the central street, covered by the carabineers and three troops of the 9th light dragoons, the remainder of which was posted as a reserve in the centre. Each division was ordered to proceed along the street directly in its front, till it arrived at the last square of houses next the river Plata, of which it was to possess itself, forming on the flat roofs, and there wait for further orders. The 95th regiment was to occupy two of the most commanding situations, from which it could annoy the enemy. Two corporals, with tools, were ordered to march at the head of each column, for the purpose of breaking open the doors. The whole were unloaded, and no firing was to be permitted until the columns had reached their final points, and formed. A cannonade in the central streets was the signal for the whole to move forward.

In conformity to this arrangement, at half-past six o’clock of the morning of the 5th instant, the 38th regiment moving towards its left, and the 87th straight to its front, approached the strong post of the Retiro and Plaza de Tauros; and, after a most vigorous and spirited attack, in which these regiments suffered much from grape-shot and musketry, their gallant commander, Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Achmuty, possessed himself of the post, taking 32 pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of ammunition, and 600 prisoners. The 5th regiment, meeting with but little opposition, proceeded to the river, and took possession of the church and convent of Saint Catalina. The 36th and 88th regiments, under Brigadier-General Lumley, moving in the appointed order, were soon opposed by a heavy and continued fire of musketry from the tops and windows of the houses, the doors of which were barricaded in so strong a manner as to render them almost impossible to force: the streets were intersected by deep ditches, on the inside of which were planted cannon, pouring showers of grape on the advancing columns. In defiance, however, of this opposition, the 36th regiment, headed by the gallant general, reached its final destination; but the 88th, being nearer to the fort and principal defences of the enemy, were so weakened by his fire as to be totally overpowered and taken. The flank of the 36th being thus exposed, this regiment, together with the 5th, retired upon Sir Samuel Achmuty’s post, at the Plaza de Tauros, not, however, before Lieutenant-Colonel Burne, and the grenadier company of the 36th regiment, had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, by charging about 500 of the enemy, and taking and spiking two guns. The two 6-pounders moving up the central streets, meeting with a very superior fire, the four troops of the carabineers, led on by Lieutenant-Colonel Kington, advanced to take the battery opposed to them; but this gallant officer being unfortunately wounded, as well as Captain Burrell, next in command, and the fire, both from the battery and houses, proving very destructive, they retreated to a short distance, but continued to occupy a position in the front of the enemy’s principal defences, and considerably in advance of that which they had taken in the morning.

The left division of Brigadier-General Craufurd’s brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pack, passed on nearly to the river, and, turning to the left, approached the great square, with the intention of possessing itself of the Jesuits’ college, a situation which commanded the enemy’s principal line of defence; but, from the very destructive nature of his fire, this was found impracticable; and after sustaining a heavy loss, one part of the division throwing itself into a house, which was afterwards not found tenable, was shortly obliged to surrender, whilst the remaining part, after enduring a dreadful fire with the greatest intrepidity, Lieutenant-Colonel Pack, its commander, being wounded, retired upon the right division, commanded by Brigadier-General Craufurd himself. This division having passed quite through to the river Plata, turned also to the left, to approach the great square and fort, from the north-east bastion of which it was distant about 400 yards, when Brigadier-General Craufurd, learning the fate of his left division, thought it most advisable to take possession of the convent of Saint Domingo, near which he then was, intending to proceed onwards to the Franciscan church, which lay still nearer the fort, if the attack or success of any other of our columns should free him, in some measure, from the host of enemies which surrounded him. The 45th regiment, being further from the enemy’s centre, had gained the Residencia without much opposition; and Lieutenant-Colonel Guard, leaving it in possession of his battalion companies, moved down with the grenadier company towards the centre of the town, and joined Brigadier-General Craufurd. The enemy, who now surrounded the convent on all sides, attempting to take a 3-pounder which lay in the street, the Lieutenant-Colonel with his company, and a few light infantry under Major Trotter, charged them with great spirit: in an instant the greater part of his company and Major Trotter were killed, but the gun was saved. The Brigadier-General was now obliged to confine himself to the defence of the convent, from which the riflemen kept up a well-directed fire upon such of the enemy as approached the post; but the quantity of round shot, grape, and musketry to which they were exposed, at last obliged them to quit the top of the building; and the enemy, to the number of 6000, bringing up cannon to force the wooden gates which fronted the fort, the Brigadier-General having no communication with any other columns, and judging from the cessation of firing that those next him had not been successful, surrendered at four o’clock in the afternoon. The result of this day’s action had left me in possession of the Plaza de Tauros, a strong post on the enemy’s right, and the Residencia, another strong post, on his left, whilst I occupied an advanced position opposite his centre. But these advantages had cost about 2500 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The nature of the fire to which the troops were exposed was violent in the extreme. Grape-shot at the corners of all the streets, musketry, hand-grenades, bricks and stones from the tops of all the houses. Every householder, with his negroes, defended his dwelling, each of which was in itself a fortress: and it is perhaps not too much to say, that the whole male population of Buenos Ayres was employed in its defence. This was the situation of the army on the morning of the 6th instant, when General Liniers addressed a letter to me, offering to give up all his prisoners taken in the late affair, together with the 71st regiment, and others taken with Brigadier-General Beresford, if I desisted from any further attack on the town, and withdraw his Majesty’s forces from the river Plata; intimating at the same time, that from the exasperated state of the populace, he could not answer for the safety of the prisoners, if I persisted in offensive measures. Influenced by this consideration (which I knew, from better authority, to be founded in fact), and reflecting of how little advantage would be the possession of a country, the inhabitants of which were so absolutely hostile, I resolved to forego the advantages which the bravery of the troops had obtained, and acceded to the annexed treaty, which I trust will meet the approbation of his Majesty.

I have nothing further to add, except to mention, in terms of the highest praise, the conduct of Rear-Admiral Murray, whose cordial co-operation has never been wanting whenever the army could be benefited by his exertions; Captain Rowley, of the royal navy, commanding the seamen on shore; Captain Bayntun, of his Majesty’s ship “Africa,” who superintended the disembarkation; and Captain Thomson, of the “Fly,” who had the direction of the gun-boats, and had previously rendered me much service, by reconnoitering the river, are all entitled to my best thanks.

As his character already stands so high, it is almost unnecessary to state, that from my second in command, Major-General Levison Gower, I have experienced every zealous and useful assistance. My thanks are likewise due to Brigadier-Generals Sir Samuel Achmuty and Lumley, and to Colonel Mahon, and to Brigadier-General Craufurd, commanding brigades. I cannot sufficiently bring to notice the uncommon exertions of Captain Fraser, commanding the royal artillery, the fertility of whose mind, zeal and animation in all cases, left difficulties behind. Captain Squire, of the royal engineers, is also entitled to my best thanks. Nor should I omit the gallant conduct of Major Nichols, of the 45th regiment, who, on the morning of the 6th instant, being pressed by the enemy, near the Residencia, charged them with great spirit, and took two howitzers and many prisoners. Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford, Deputy Adjutant-General, has likewise a great claim to my approbation, as a gallant and promising officer. The officers of my personal staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens, military secretary, Captains Brown, Foster, Douglas, and Whittingham, aides-de-camp, must also be mentioned by me in terms of just regard. The knowledge which the latter possesses of the Spanish language has been eminently useful to me.

This despatch will be delivered to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Bourke, Deputy-Quartermaster-General, who has afforded me that assistance which might be looked for from an officer of his military talents and attachment to the service; to whom I beg to refer you for any further particulars respecting the military operations in this part of the world.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) John Whitelocke,

Lieutenant-General.

The Right Hon. W. Windham,

&c. &c. &c.

Copy of Letter from Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, to the Right Honourable William Windham, dated July 10th, 1807.—Private.

Buenos Ayres, July 10th, 1807.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you, that immediately after my arrival at Monte Video, on the 10th of May, I began to make every possible preparation for the attack of this place, as the first and most essential step towards the reduction of the province. For this purpose sloops of war and other light vessels were sent to reconnoitre the southern bank of the river, in order to fix upon the precise point of debarkation. It was found that the water was too shallow to admit of a landing, under cover of the ships of war, anywhere to the westward of the town of Buenos Ayres, nor nearer to it on the eastward than the Enseñada of Barragon. This bay was, therefore, fixed upon as the point of debarkation, and every arrangement that could previously be made was pressed forward with expedition, whilst I waited anxiously for the arrival of Brigadier-General Craufurd’s corps, and the fleet with which I had sailed from England.

On the 27th of May, Rear-Admiral Murray and Brigadier-General Craufurd arrived at the mouth of the river; but owing to a prevalence of contrary winds, the expedition did not reach Monte Video until the 14th of June. I immediately determined not to wait the arrival of the convoy from England, as by the general voice of the inhabitants, and of those officers who had passed the winter in the province, the months of July and August were represented as most unfavourable to military operations, on account of the heavy and continual rains which prevail at that season. Having fixed upon Colonia as the place of assembly from which the expedition was to proceed, I sent the troops upwards, in small divisions, on account of the intricate navigation, leaving at Monte Video the 47th regiment, the detachments of the 20th and 21st light dragoons, two companies of the 38th regiment, and a corps of militia, formed by the British merchants, in all composing a garrison of about 1300 men, under the command of Colonel Browne, of the 40th regiment; and after much delay, caused by contrary winds, Rear-Admiral Murray and myself arrived opposite the point of debarkation on the 28th ultimo.

In the morning the fleet stood into the bay, and before night the whole army, consisting as per margin,¹⁶ was landed, without opposition, on the enemy’s coast. The greater part of the next day was occupied in landing artillery, horses, and stores. Immediately on the landing of Brigadier-General Craufurd’s brigade, and the 38th and 87th regiments, I detached Major-General L. Gower with this force and two 3-pounders, to occupy the heights in my front, about five miles distant; and the next morning I proceeded to join him with the rest of the army, four 6-pounders, and two 3-pounders, the remainder of the artillery not being landed. The same day I directed Major-General L. Gower to precede my march with his advanced corps, substituting the 36th and 88th regiments, under Brigadier-General Lumley, for the 38th and 87th regiments; and I left Colonel Mahon, with four troops of the 17th light dragoons, and the 40th regiment, to protect the guns when they should come up, and cover the rear of the army, being principally induced to break my force into these divisions, for the purpose of more readily procuring cover and fuel. On the 1st of July the advanced corps drove a small party of the enemy from the village of Reduction, and took post about two miles beyond it, whilst I occupied the village with the main body. I was now distant about nine miles from the bridge over the Rio Chuello, on the opposite bank of which I understood the enemy had constructed batteries, and intended to make a stand. I determined, therefore, instead of forcing the bridge, to turn the enemy’s line of defence, by marching from our left, and crossing the river in two columns higher up, where it was represented fordable, and continuing to march until I should have got completely to the westward and northward of the town, appuyed my left on the river La Plata, and opened a communication with the fleet. On the 2nd instant, at nine o’clock, Major-General L. Gower marched with his corps, which should now be considered as the right column, and I marched myself at ten, with the intention of uniting our forces that evening in the suburbs of the town. Major-General L. Gower having crossed the river, his leading brigade fell in with a considerable corps of the enemy, under General Liniers himself, which he attacked with great vivacity, completely overthrew it, taking ten pieces of cannon and some prisoners. The Major-General halted on the ground from which he had driven the enemy, waiting my arrival, and sending, at the same time, a summons to General Liniers (No. 1), which was refused on this occasion, as well as the following day, when I sent to him myself (as per No. 2). Owing to the ignorance of my guide, who conducted me by a considerable detour, I did not reach the Major-General until the next day, when I formed my line by placing one of my brigades under Sir Samuel Achmuty, on the left of Brigadier-General Lumley’s, extending it towards the convent of the Recolleta, distant about two miles; and another under Lieutenant-Colonel Guard, on the right, towards the Residencia, whilst Brigadier-General Craufurd’s brigade occupied the central and principal avenues into the town, being distant about three miles from the great square and the fort of Buenos Ayres. In pursuance of my original design, I intended to march the next morning by my left to the convent of Recolleta, which standing on high ground immediately over the river, I could have communicated with the fleet, and landed heavy guns for a vigorous attack of the town, should General Liniers obstinately refuse to surrender it. Upon consulting, however, with Major-General L. Gower, he submitted to me another plan of attack, which as it promised a more expeditious issue, inasmuch as it obviated the necessity of marching to the left, and the delay which would be occasioned by landing heavy guns and erecting batteries, a delay which I the more dreaded on account of the rains having, to all appearance, set in, and the men being in a great degree exposed to the severity of the weather, from the impossibility of conveying camp equipage. I consented, for these reasons, to change my plan, and adopt what seemed to be generally approved by the general officers under me. Besides, the measure of bombardment, or any other measure which might occasion an indiscriminate loss of life, ruin the town, and irritate the people, appeared to me, upon reflection, contrary both to the letter and spirit of my instructions. I hoped also, by this plan, to be able to dislodge those who opposed the progress of his Majesty’s arms, and by driving them to the bottom of the town, there make a number of prisoners, which might be, in our hands, so many pledges for the return of the 71st regiment and the other troops captured with Brigadier-General Beresford, whilst the peaceable inhabitants, and those best disposed towards us, by remaining quietly in their houses, might escape the danger of the attack. The nature of this attack can be best explained by annexing the General Order (No. 3). The result was successful in the principal points, as I obtained possession of the Plaza de Tauros, a strong post on the enemy’s right flank, 32 pieces of ordnance, and a large depôt of ammunition and provisions, as well as the Residencia, another strong post on the enemy’s left, and four pieces of cannon which defended it. But these conquests were purchased with the loss of 2500 men killed, wounded, and prisoners, and amongst the latter Brigadier-General Craufurd and other officers of rank. The conduct of both officers and men in this action has been gallant in the highest degree, and the severity of the loss occasioned solely by the obstinacy of the defence. The enemy had dug ditches across the principal streets, and placed cannon within them: he occupied the flat roofs of all the houses in commanding situations, and from thence, and the windows, poured a destructive fire of musketry, hand-grenades, fire-pots, &c. upon the columns as they advanced; having likewise had the precaution to barricade the doors in so strong a manner as to render them very difficult to force, though the troops had been provided with instruments for that purpose. Every householder, with his negroes, defended his dwelling; and it is, perhaps, not too much to say, that the whole male population of Buenos Ayres was employed in its defence, which very population in the field would probably not have withstood the attack of two British regiments.