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To retain the British provinces as an indemnity for our losses, is an event which I cannot wish, because I can see no possible benefit resulting from it. Have we not already territory enough? Is it desirable to incorporate with us a people composed of heterogeneous materials, who are not only unaccustomed to our institutions, but many of whom entertain an unconquerable hatred for them? I believe it would have been better had we never acquired any foreign territory at all. If we had been contented with the limits embraced by the old thirteen United States, the prospects of remaining a united people, and preserving our free institutions, would, in my conception, be much more flattering. I am, therefore, opposed to new acquisitions. But it is repeatedly urged that the possession of Canada is necessary to secure us from the hostilities of the savage tribes on our northwestern borders; was this the fact, I might yield my assent to prosecute the war to attain that object. But experience has shown that we can have peace with them, though Canada is in the possession of a foreign power. For seventeen years after the Treaty of Greenville we were entirely exempt from Indian hostilities; and not until we waged war ourselves, did they become troublesome upon our frontiers.
My apprehensions are not solely confined to the danger resulting from military power; there are other consequences equally to be dreaded, which I fear may overwhelm us, should we continue in this course. There is one peculiarly delicate, but equally important – so delicate, that gentlemen have supposed it ought not even to be mentioned. Sir, shall I not be permitted to point to the yawning gulf beneath? Shall I not attempt to arrest your progress in the path where lies a serpent that will sting you to death? I deprecate disunion as an event pregnant with every evil. The moment it happens, civil liberty is banished from this country. I feel deeply interested that it should not happen. Permit me, however, to observe, that a union is connected by a consciousness which is felt that the various interests of the different sections are consulted and protected, and not by force. If you wish to perpetuate the Union, you must preserve that opinion. The moment that it shall no longer exist, the ties that bind us together become feeble indeed. The present war, though ostensibly waged for principles in which the Northern and Eastern people have a deep interest, is considered by them – and they certainly understand their interest best – as calculated to prostrate it. They feel the evils of your measures daily, and they see no prospect that they ever will be benefited by them. The physical power of the country is in their hands, and it requires nothing but public sentiment, which quickly follows public interest, and you ripen them for a state of things most of all to be deprecated. I hope we shall avert the evil by banishing the cause of discontent.
Besides the immediate physical evils which present themselves as probably resulting from our measures, there are other moral evils which I must dread. Our Government was made to secure the happiness of the people, and every thing which even remotely is calculated to impair their moral sense, will have an effect upon their situation. When the people shall become attached to principles inconsistent with morality, or with their tranquil, civil pursuits, their prosperity and their freedom are at hazard. The spirit of conquest and of military glory, however fascinating, is baneful to the prosperity and liberty of every country. This spirit has shown itself in our country, of late, in an unusual degree. We have become tired of the peaceful character of our pursuits; and we want nothing but success on this first attempt to encourage us to become a great military nation, attempting conquest in every quarter. Whenever that happens, we shall share the destiny of other nations. When the same spirit and the same councils prevail, the misery of the mass of the people is the support of the national glory.
One of the evils which I dread, as attending the war, and in my opinion not the least, Mr. Chairman, is, that we have united our exertions with the efforts of the great destroyer of mankind, who, having prostrated the independence of almost every nation on the continent of Europe, has drawn us into our present situation, to assist him in humbling his remaining enemy, whose destruction is, above all others, nearest his heart. I do not believe that gentlemen are so far lost to all sense of their country's interest, as designedly to unite the destiny of this nation with him, who lives only to destroy. I believe them, when they declare that such is not their intention. But we are united in fact. His ostensible object is the liberty of the seas: so is ours. His successes are our successes, and his defeats are our defeats. Being thus associated in fact – having one common object – if the war continues any time, we shall be associated in name also. When pressed beyond our present expectation by our enemy, we shall not make any difficulty in submitting to arrangements which may appear to us advantageous, but which are calculated to fasten us to the car of the conqueror. We may want men to enable us to obtain the object of our offensive operations in the North; France can furnish them. We may want ships to defend our coast; we can obtain them from the same quarter. But, for these things, we must stipulate an equivalent; and what can that be, but to unite in striking England from the list of independent nations?
Mr. Robertson. – Mr. Chairman, I am well aware that the House will listen (if it listens at all) with much reluctance to a further discussion of the subject under consideration. Nevertheless, it is my intention explicitly, but concisely to state some of the reasons, which influence me to support the measure proposed; some of the views connected with them, which command my approbation, and induce my aid. Sir, I propose to make a few remarks on the bill itself, and subsequently, without following gentlemen in the wide and expansive range of argumentative, declamatory, and defamatory eloquence, in which they have thought fit to indulge, to reply to some of the observations which struck me with most force, and which my memory still retains.
The honorable Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs is entitled to the thanks of this House, and of the nation, for the able and lucid exposition he has given, of the plan intended to be pursued by the Government in the prosecution of the war in which we are engaged, and of the objects for the attainment of which an increase of the Military Establishment is deemed necessary. What is that plan, and what are the objects in contemplation? The power of the nation is to be called out; a portion for a defence of our seacoast and extensive frontier; the residue to be sent forth to battle against our implacable foe, to drive him from the American continent, and thus to insure our future peace, if not our Union and independence. These objects are avowed, and efforts and energy are necessary to their success.
The propriety of defending our country can be denied by none. This proposition is clear. Even the gentlemen on the other side of the House (as it is fashionable to speak) do not oppose it. For myself I do not hesitate to say, it presses itself on my feelings with irresistible force. When I take into consideration the exposed situation of the people whom it is my pride and honor to represent, when I view them surrounded by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians, skirted by strongholds in the possession of a nation devoted to our foe, containing in the bosom of their country a class of beings always on the watch to overwhelm them in ruin, I lose sight of other considerations, and am compelled to urge, as I do most earnestly, that no obstacles may be thrown in the way of our complete protection. I have lived for some years in the country to which I have called your attention. I have not been altogether an inattentive observer, nor indifferent to its interests. The neglected state of the militia under the territorial government, its present unorganized and unarmed state, have not escaped my notice. But we must "blame the culture, not the soil." The inhabitants are brave, expert in the management of the horse and in the use of arms. The materials are good. It is unnecessary to dwell on these, or to mention other circumstances of an internal nature. Suffice it to be observed, our situation is insecure. I have stated, sir, that we are surrounded by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians. I will not recount their numbers, nor blazon their powers of doing mischief. Those facts are too notorious to require repetition. I have stated that strongholds in our immediate neighborhood are in the possession of a people devoted to our enemy. The Spaniards on our eastern frontier are under their perfect control. They considered the English as fighting for the independence of Spain, their native country, their religion, and their King. In their towns an extensive British trade is carried on, and from their ports, where they refit, issue forth the armed vessels of that nation to the annoyance of the commerce of our country. The Indians too are excited against us. On my journey from New Orleans to this place, passing through the Creek confederacy, I received certain information that the Spanish commandant at St. Marks had assured them that their friends the British were expected soon in considerable force at that place and at Pensacola, and that they should be furnished with arms and other munitions of war to be used against the Americans. Sir, humanity to that people, as well as the irresistible claims we have to protection, require that a force should be stationed on the Mobile and Mississippi sufficient to prevent the effect of British and Spanish machination, or to throw back on themselves the evils of hostility.
I now proceed to examine some of the objections which have been made, not to the bill, but to the further prosecution of the war. The war is denounced as unconstitutional, cruel, the effect of French influence, and as intended to place James II. on the throne of America. In making the first objection, gentlemen could not have been serious; they could not have expected that it would have been deemed worthy of an answer. The power to make war belongs to all nations; is of the essence of Government; but the Constitution of the United States gives it expressly, in so many words: "The Congress shall have power to declare war, to raise and support armies." Whether the war be defensive or offensive, depends on circumstance and accident, but cannot affect the right. If war be defensive and offensive, still the whole is equal to its parts. But to what does this doctrine lead? Do gentlemen believe it to be true? Then it becomes their duty to move for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the circumstances of the capture of the Macedonian, and if it be discovered that she was taken at more than a marine league from the shore, to cashier the American officer, declare the attack and capture unconstitutional, and restore the vessel to her former master. Then an enterprise, giving rise to a new era in maritime history, and entwining round the brows of the United States a wreath of imperishable laurel, turns out to be a violation of that instrument on the sacredness of which depends the Union and happiness of America. The war is not unconstitutional, nor can it, by any possibility, be so considered.
But it is said that, as the Orders in Council are repealed, the question of impressment is the only one in controversy between the United States and Great Britain; and, on the subject, the honorable gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Pearson,) has, without difficulty, settled principles about which jurists have differed in opinion. He contends that individuals cannot divest themselves of their allegiance; that the right of expatriation does not exist; that the practice of naturalization is wrong. These opinions are as erroneous as they are repugnant to every principle of human liberty, and owe their origin to feudal times and feudal States; times and States, the prolific sources of the vilest principles in politics and morals.
I believe that every civilized nation under the sun is in the practice of naturalizing foreigners. The omnipotent Parliament of Great Britain exercises this right. The rights of all independent nations are equal. Whatever course Great Britain pursues in relation to the subjects or citizens of other countries, these countries are authorized to pursue in relation to the subjects of Great Britain. Whatever her admirers may say to the contrary, if she does not acknowledge, she is compelled to act in conformity to this principle. Where is there in her history an example of her punishing as a traitor, a Briton naturalized by a foreign Government, although found in arms against her? If a subject could not divest himself of his natural allegiance; if once a subject always a subject, were true, how is it that Napper Tandy was suffered to escape punishment? Why was he not hanged as a traitor? He was born in Ireland, became a French citizen, served in war against his native country, was taken, tried, and found guilty of high treason; but when a terrible retaliation was threatened by France, in the event of his execution, that nation, which never yields to threats, restored him to his then adopted country.
But gentlemen are opposed to the further prosecution of the war. Do they contend that the causes which rendered it necessary have been removed? Have we obtained the objects for which it was commenced? Is the new and before unheard-of system of blockade abandoned? A system which, under the pretence of being a military measure, was converted into a commercial scheme beneficial to the belligerents, and destructive alone to the rights of the neutrals. Have our citizens been restored to their country? Is any disposition evidenced to omit tearing them from their homes and families in future? What will be the consequence of laying down our arms, of shrinking from our present attitude? We are at the feet of Great Britain: and after having for years attempted in vain to obtain justice, we are to recommence fruitless negotiation. Admit that we are unable to enforce our demands, to support our independence, that we cannot carry on war, that the friends of the British Government in this country (to use their own expression) will not permit us; in such a situation, with such admission, to expect justice would be folly in the extreme. England would return to her habitual spoliations, would re-establish that state precisely the most beneficial to herself, the most injurious to us: infinitely better to her than peace on fair terms, for then the opportunity would be lost of feeding and enriching her navy at our expense; better than war, as the numerous prizes brought into her ports of late very clearly prove. Formerly the losses were exclusively ours. Yes, sir, willingly would she return to, and forever continue, her former career of depredation; and the next ten years would add another thousand to the thousand American vessels already carried into her ports.
Too long did we suffer disgrace and degradation. Peace, with all its blessings, may be enjoyed at too dear a price. But yet, while it was possible to preserve it, we shut our eyes against the most flagrant injuries; we affected not to hear the loudest insults. Peace was congenial to our habits, favorable to the principles of our Government. It was not to be apprehended it would be, nor cannot be now believed that it was wantonly abandoned. Whilst tranquillity prevailed it was wise to dwell on its advantages. Now, that in spite of all our efforts we are at war, it is well to inquire whether circumstances may not grow out of it favorable to our future happiness and prosperity.
The British possessions in America present themselves to our view and invite a conquest. I am struck with the contrariety of opinion which prevails among gentlemen. Some of them speak of the country as barren, the climate as inclement, the inhabitants thereby scattered over the face of the territory. If this be true, it will not be considered as worth defending, and as by its loss Britain loses nothing, the sympathy which she seems to have excited, and the doleful jeremiads to which her anticipated disasters have given rise, are as unnecessary as they are misplaced. But others say, no doubt from its importance to its European sovereign it will be defended to the last extremity; that the United States cannot take it; that the army we propose to send into the field will prove insufficient. When gentlemen differ so widely, no satisfactory conclusion can be drawn from their opinions. Sir, Canada will be defended, and it is from a belief of that fact, and from a knowledge of the force which Great Britain may bring into the field, that the troops now demanded become necessary. We have heard an estimate of that force too often to be again repeated. It has lost nothing of its magnitude and importance. Its valor has received the highest praise, and we are triumphantly asked if we expect to intimidate Great Britain.
Sir, none but cowards calculate on the cowardice of their foe. We do not expect to intimidate her. We expect to meet her armies in the field and to vanquish them. The power of Britain must be extinguished in America. She must no longer be permitted to corrupt the principles and to disturb the peace and tranquillity of our citizens. Our frontier inhabitants must not be kept in dread and danger from her Indian allies. And never shall we be secure among ourselves, and exempt from the mischievous intrigues of Europeans, until European power is expelled across the Atlantic. The gentleman from Massachusetts says, that Canada entered into the scheme of the war. It certainly does now enter into the scheme of the war. Sir, no citizen of the United States would have given his consent to an unprovoked attack on that country merely for the purpose of getting possession of it. But I do, for one, rejoice that, under present circumstances, we thus have an opportunity afforded us, not only to make our enemy feel our power, but to drive him from this continent, and to remove one of the most frequent causes of war among nations – neighborhood and contiguity. The evils of peace, on the terms of gentlemen in opposition, cannot be borne. Let us then, with firmness, persevere in the contest in which we are engaged, until it can be terminated on principles compatible with the rights and honor of the nation.
The committee now rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again.
Tuesday, January 12
Additional Military Force
The House again resolved itself into Committee of the Whole, on the bill to raise an additional army of twenty thousand men, for one year.
Mr. Emott addressed the Chair as follows:
Mr. Chairman: I mean no common-place remark, when I declare to you, that I address you on the subjects which have been brought into this debate, and as I think properly so brought, with great reluctance. My general deportment since I have been honored with a seat on this floor, is sufficient evidence to you and the committee that I feel an unwillingness to mingle in the war of words which is carried on here. There are causes which add to this repugnance on the present occasion. The debate has been continued for such a length of time, and in part has been conducted with so much asperity, that the minds of all have become fatigued, and the passions of many inflamed. I know, and I duly appreciate the difficulties which, under such circumstances, surround and face the speaker. But, sir, there are considerations of public duty, and individual propriety, which urge, nay, demand of me, to ask your patience, and the indulgence of the House, while I present to you and to them my view of the great subjects involved in this discussion.
Mr. Chairman, I am aware that, in the discussion I am about commencing, I shall render myself obnoxious to the wit of gentlemen who think that, to bring into view other topics than those which arise out of the details of the bill now on your table, is to go beyond the range of legitimate debate. The bill contemplates the raising an additional military force of twenty thousand men; thus increasing the Military Establishment, or the standing army of the country, to upwards of fifty-five thousand men. Now, sir, with the details of this bill I have nothing to do. Nay, I will confess to you that I like the bill as it stands, providing for enlistments for one year only, better than I should were it amended, as has been proposed, by prolonging the terms, precisely for the reason that the force will be less efficient and dangerous, and more under legislative control. I meddle not with the fitness of the instrument. That is the business of other men; but, being opposed to the continuance of the war offensively, as I was to its commencement, I cannot consent to grant any further force to carry it on. The only check, or control, which the Legislature can constitutionally have over a war after it is begun, is in withholding the means; and, in voting the means, either in men or money, every member of the Legislature ought to be satisfied of the necessity of prosecuting the war.
According to my best judgment, sir, this war was improperly commenced, and it is unnecessarily continued; and I shall now proceed to explain the grounds of that judgment by an examination of the causes of the war, as they existed at its commencement, and as they now remain. As this is the first time the subject has been brought into debate, and, indeed, the earliest opportunity which has been allowed, of an open discussion, I am sure I shall be pardoned for going into detail, if I even should be tedious, as I know I shall be uninteresting. It is a right which I think I may claim, to state distinctly my reasons and motives for the votes which I have given, and may give, in relation to the war, after what has been said in this House, and out of it, about the opposition to the views of the Administration.
In making this examination, I shall pass in review, in as brief a manner as possible, the three great subjects of complaint against Great Britain; her orders of blockade, her Orders in Council, and her practice of impressment. But for one or all of these, the war certainly would not have been declared; and I may assume that, for but one or all of these, the war ought not to be continued. I cannot, indeed, but recollect, that the gentleman from Louisiana has mentioned the conquest of Canada, and of the Floridas, as causes for the continuance of the war. As respects the Canadas, I have heretofore understood that their reduction might be a consequence of the war, but never until now did I know that it was to be shifted into a cause for carrying it on. And, in regard to the Floridas, I will not consent that their conquest should, in the existing relations of this country, be either a cause or consequence of war. I will confess to you, that an invasion of the colonies of Spain at this time, under the stale excuses of convenience or necessity, strikes me with abhorrence. It is not only against the genius of our Government, and, as I hope, the character of our people, but, if persisted in, will be a foul blot in our national history.
[Here the speaker entered into an elaborate documentary investigation to show that the Decree of Blockade, and the Orders in Council, were not adequate causes for war at the time it was declared – and that both these causes had since ceased to exist, the Orders in Council having been revoked, and the fictitious, or paper blockades, discontinued.]
Impressment of Seamen. – The injury done to our seamen under the British practice of impressment, was also made a cause of the war, and to the eye, at least, it is the only one which now remains.
Mr. Chairman, the discussion of this subject is attended with adventitious difficulties, growing out of the times and the state of the country. The public mind, in some sections of the Union, is in such a feverish state on this account, from tales oft told of bondage worse than negro slavery, and of condemnation without trial, that the person who is willing to "hear the other party," is at once branded with foreign partialities, and threatened with the trial by mob. Besides, sir, it is intimated that a negotiation is to be had, or may possibly be attempted, which may be affected by an open discussion of the topic. In point of duty, I feel myself called upon to take some notice of the subject, but my view of it will be less perfect than in a different situation I should think desirable.
The President, in the war Message, thus introduces the subject: "British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it; not in the exercise of a belligerent right, founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of a municipal prerogative over British subjects." As this does not present the case in its true light, I shall, for the purpose of fairly bringing to view the conflicting claims of the two nations, give you an extract from the letter of Mr. Madison to Mr. Monroe, of the 5th of January, 1804, containing instructions for a treaty with Great Britain: "With this exception, (persons in the military service of an enemy) we consider a neutral flag on the high seas, as a safeguard to those sailing under it. Great Britain, on the contrary, asserts a right to search for and seize her own subjects; and under that cover, as cannot but happen, are often seized and taken off, citizens of the United States, and citizens or subjects of other neutral countries, navigating the high seas, under the protection of the American flag."
The claim, then, on the part of the British is, that in time of war they have a right to enter neutral merchant vessels on the high seas, to search for and seize their subjects, being seamen. On our part it is, that on the high seas the flag shall cover and protect all sailing under it, whether British subjects or American citizens. These are distinctly the claims of right on the part of the two nations, and I shall so consider them, without regard to practice apart from right.
One or two remarks, sir, before I enter upon the subject. The first is, that I do not mean to moot the point, relative to the rights of our naturalized citizens, or the extent of our duties towards them. But this I will say, that I am willing to give them all the protection which the situation of the country and its true interests will justify. I know that the unruly passions and the meddling dispositions of some foreigners, have raised prejudices in the minds of many persons against all foreigners. But I know, also, and I speak without reference to political opinions or prejudices, that among our naturalized citizens are to be found men, and many men, too, of great worth and respectability, and who are extensively useful to the country. These men have my good will, and it is certainly my wish, that they should be fostered and protected, as far as it can be done, without putting at hazard the great interests and the permanent welfare of the country. But, sir, to this class of our citizens, the claim that they are to be protected on the high seas by our flag, is really of little importance. Our claim never was, and I am sure never will be, that they are to be protected, if they put themselves within the power of their former Sovereign, by going to his ports, or placing themselves on his territories. And yet such is the state of the commerce of the world, that it can scarcely happen in a mercantile voyage, in this or the other hemisphere, that the vessel will not at some time be in a British port, and the crew on British ground; our right of flag will not then save our adopted citizens from impressment. For the slight benefit, therefore, to our naturalized citizens, which can arise under our claim, if established, I am sure the well-meaning and reasonable part of them will not ask the country to continue the war on their account.
Another remark which I wish to make is, that I am most decidedly the friend, nay, sir, if you please, the partisan, of the seamen of the country. I have no doubt that this nation is destined to be a great maritime power; and that, in times not very far distant, we are to owe our prosperity, as a commercial people, and possibly, under Providence, our security, to our seamen. I am therefore a friend to "seamen's rights," properly understood and fairly enforced; but this shall not blind me to the rights of others. Besides, in a war to be carried on for seamen alone, and that, too, on the abstract question of the right of flag, I can see great danger to the seamen in their just claims to protection; and, I must beg their friends, in and out of this House, to reflect before they act. As surely as the war is continued on this ground alone, so surely will seamen become unpopular, and their rights be neglected. When the evils of the war press upon the country, and press they will; when the many lives sacrificed, and the countless millions expended, shall be brought to view, is it not to be apprehended that seamen and their claim will be remembered, only as the cause of the scenes of expense and blood through which we are to pass? It is not dealing fairly with our seamen, to make them the scape-goats of this war.
The British then claim the right, in time of war, to take their seamen out of neutral merchant vessels on the high seas.
Is this claim a novel one? That the claim is novel, is certainly intimated by the Committee of Foreign Relations, when they say that the impressment of which we complain, is "a practice which has been unceasingly maintained by Great Britain in the wars to which she has been a party since our Revolution." Indeed, it has been most roundly asserted, and by many it is believed, that the British claim was made for the first time after our war; that it originated in views hostile to our commerce and maritime rights; and that in practice it is only brought to bear upon us. In truth, however, whatever may be the justice of the claim, it is not a recent one. It has, in a greater or less degree, been practised on in all the wars in which England has been engaged for the two last centuries.
