Kitabı oku: «Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)», sayfa 41
The insulting idea said to be conveyed is, that Mr. Smith had a knowledge, at the time of the arrangement, of the incompetency of Erskine's powers, and this because such a knowledge was one of the essential circumstances which could only lead to a disavowal. Now, it does happen that neither Mr. Erskine nor his Government enumerate this knowledge of our Government as one of those essential circumstances. On the contrary, they constantly omit it, when formally enumerating those circumstances. Mr. Canning places the disavowal, solely, on the footing of Mr. Erskine's having "acted not only not in conformity, but in direct contradiction to his instructions." Mr. Jackson, also, in his letter of the 23d, when formally enumerating the causes of the disavowal, says expressly, that the disavowal was "because the agreement was concluded in violation of that gentleman's instructions, and altogether without authority to subscribe to the terms of it." Now, is it not most extraordinary, that after such formal statements, not including the knowledge of our Government among the essential circumstances, that it is on this knowledge the British Government intend to rely for the justification of their disavowal? I simply ask this question, if the British did intend thus to rely on the previous knowledge of our Government, why do they always omit it in their formal enumerations? And if they do not intend thus to rely, in what possible way could it serve that Government thus darkly to insinuate it? But as if it were intended to leave this House wholly without excuse in passing this resolution, Mr. Jackson expressly asserts, in this very letter of the 23d of October, that the information of that fact was derived from him, the knowledge of which, this resolution asserts, he intended to intimate was known at the time of the arrangement with Erskine. For he specifically says: "I have had the honor of informing you that it (Mr. Erskine's instruction) was the only one by which the conditions on which he was to conclude were prescribed." Now, if Mr. Jackson had remotely intended to intimate that Mr. Smith had a previous knowledge of that fact, would he have asserted that he was indebted to him (Mr. Jackson) for the information? Conclusive as this argument is, there is yet another in reserve, which is a clincher. And that is, that this very knowledge which we propose solemnly to affirm Mr. Jackson intimated our Government possessed at the time of the arrangement, it is, from the nature of things, impossible they should have possessed. The idea asserted to be intended to be conveyed is, a knowledge in our Government that the arrangement was entered into without competent powers on the part of Mr. Erskine. Now, the fact that Mr. Erskine's powers were incompetent, it was impossible for our Government to know, except from the confession of Mr. Erskine. But Mr. Erskine before, at the time, and ever since, has uniformly asserted the reverse. So that, besides all the other absurdities growing out of this resolution, there is this additional, that it accuses Mr. Jackson of the senseless stupidity of insinuating as a fact, a knowledge in our Government, which from the undeniable state of things it is not possible they should have possessed. Mr. Speaker, can any argument be more conclusive? 1. The idea is not conveyed by the form of expression. 2. Mr. Jackson, though expressly enumerating the only causes which led to a disavowal, does not suggest this. 3. Mr. Jackson expressly asserts the knowledge that these were the only instructions derived from him; of course it could not have been known previous to the arrangement. 4. Had he been absurd enough to attempt to convey such an idea, the very nature of things shows that it could not exist. I confess I am ignorant by what reasoning the non-existence of an insinuation can be demonstrated, if it be not by this concurrence of arguments.
Before I conclude this part of the subject, it will be necessary to make a single observation or two, on the following passage in Mr. Jackson's letter of the 4th of November, for although our assertion has relation, in the part of the resolution under consideration, only to the letter of the 23d of October, yet this subsequent passage has been adduced as a sort of accessory after the fact. "You will find that, in my correspondence with you, I have carefully avoided drawing conclusions that did not necessarily follow from the premises advanced by me, and least of all should I think of uttering an insinuation, where I was unable to substantiate a fact. To facts, as I have become acquainted with them, I have scrupulously adhered." This the subsequent part of the resolution under debate denominates, "the repetition of the same intimation." But if the argument I have offered be correct, there was no such "intimation" in the preceding letters, and of course no repetition of it here. For if he had, as I think I have proved, in his former letters uttered no such insinuation as is asserted, then all the allegations in this paragraph are wholly harmless and decorous, neither disrespectful nor improper. "But this," says the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Milnor) "is conclusive to my mind, that Mr. Jackson did intend to insult, for if he had not would he have refrained from giving an explanation when it was asked?" That gentleman will recollect that the assertion of this House is as to the idea which Mr. Jackson has conveyed in the letter of the 23d, not as to the idea which he intended to convey. Suppose he intended it, and has not done it, our assertion is still false. But will that gentleman seriously conclude, contrary to so obvious a course of argument, that he has asserted, or even intended to assert, this particular idea, merely because he does not choose to explain it? Are there not a thousand reasons which might have induced Mr. Jackson not to explain, consistent with being perfectly innocent of the intention originally to convey it? Perhaps he thought that he had already been explicit enough. Perhaps he thought the explanation was asked in terms which did not entitle Mr. Smith to receive it. Perhaps he did not choose to give this satisfaction. Well that now is "very ungentlemanly," says the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Milnor.) I agree, if he pleases, so it was. But does that justify this resolution? Because he is not a gentleman, shall we assert a falsehood?
I briefly recapitulate the leading points of my argument. When Mr. Jackson asserts "that the substance of the instructions was known to our Government," the expression cannot convey the obnoxious idea, because it is not pretended that, in those instructions, the existence of other powers was excluded. When he says, "you must have thought it unreasonable to complain of disavowal," the time of knowledge implied is confined by the structure of the sentence to the time of a disavowal known, and cannot be limited backwards to the time of arrangement made. It is also absurd to suppose that Mr. Jackson would intimate by implication the knowledge of our Government of Erskine's incompetency of powers at the time of arrangement, as an essential circumstance on which the King's right of disavowal was founded, and yet omit that circumstance in a formal enumeration; and lastly, it is still more absurd to suppose that he would undertake to insinuate a knowledge, which, from the nature of things, could not possibly exist.
I have thus, Mr. Speaker, submitted to a strict and minute scrutiny all the parts of this correspondence which have been adduced by any one in support of the fact asserted in this resolution. This course, however irksome, I thought it my duty to adopt, to the end that no exertion of mine might be wanting to prevent this House from passing a resolution, which, in my apprehension, is pregnant with national disgrace, and other innumerable evils.
Friday, December 29
Another member, to wit, from North Carolina, James Holland, appeared and took his seat.
COL. ISAAC A. COLES
Breach of Privilege
Mr. Taylor, from the committee appointed to inquire into the circumstances alluded to in the letter of I. A. Coles to the Speaker of the House, made the following report:
That, according to that order, they have taken into consideration the subject referred to them; that in making the proposed inquiry they have taken the depositions of the honorable James Turner, a Senator of the United States, and of Mr. Samuel Sprigg, which depositions they beg leave to report to the House.
From these depositions it was established, to the satisfactory belief of your committee, that Mr. I. A. Coles, without any immediate previous altercation or provocation, did assault and strike a member of this House, within the walls of the north wing of the Capitol; that this act was done on Monday, the 27th ult., about one o'clock P. M., and after this House had adjourned over to the following day.
That, from the assertions of Mr. Coles, and from the actual admission of the member assaulted, your committee were satisfied that the provocation or supposed provocation which occasioned the attack did not arise from any thing said or any act done by the member of this House, in the fulfilment of his duties as a Representative in the Congress of the United States.
Your committee are of opinion that this latter circumstance may be received in extenuation, but cannot be admitted in justification of the act done by Mr. Coles; and, from all the circumstances of the case, they are of opinion that said assault and violence offered to the member was a breach of the privileges of this House.
Your committee further report, that they have considered the letter of Mr. Coles to the Speaker of this House, together with another letter from Mr. Coles addressed to the Chairman of your Committee, (which they also beg leave to report to the House,) that these two letters, in the opinion of your committee, do contain acknowledgments and apologies on the occasion, which ought to be admitted as satisfactory to the House. They therefore recommend the following resolution:
Resolved, That any further proceeding in the above case is unnecessary.
To the Hon. John Taylor, Chairman, &c
Sir: Understanding that the declaration which I had the honor this morning to make before the committee, will be more acceptable if put in the written form, I hasten to comply with what I believe to be their wish, in tendering through them, to the House of Representatives, the renewed assurance "that if I could have supposed that the circumstance alluded to in my letter to the Speaker, would have been construed into a breach of the privilege of the House, it would not have occurred at the time and in the place where it unfortunately happened."
With sentiments of great respect, I am your obedient humble servant,
I. A. COLES.
December 28, 1808.
Ordered to lie on the table.
Conduct of the British Minister
The House resumed the consideration of this subject. At four o'clock Mr. Livermore commenced a speech, but gave way for a motion to adjourn which was carried, 53 to 51.
Saturday, December 30
A motion was made by Mr. Dawson, that the report made yesterday, on the occurrence between I. A. Coles and a member of this House, and the documents accompanying the same, be printed for the use of the members: and the question being taken thereon, it was resolved in the affirmative – yeas 76, nays 25. The report and documents were referred to a Committee of the Whole on Thursday next.
Conduct of the British Minister
Mr. Rhea, of Tennessee – Mr. Speaker, it is not deemed necessary in the observations I will make on the resolution under consideration, to take into view any relations of the United States with Great Britain or France, because it does not clearly appear that any exist, except in this, that the United States are suffering loss and damage. If there be any relations with Great Britain, as they respect the United States, they are negative and suffering; as they respect Great Britain, positive and active. Be they what they may, they are not properly within the range of a discussion on this resolution, which merely respects the conduct of an Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty near the United States. How the relations, if there be any, between the United States and France are connected with the subject of this resolution, will require the greatest civilian, the most wise master of public law, to discover; the consideration of these subjects, except so far as mentioning only circumstances which have existed, will be omitted. Neither does it appear very necessary to recur, in examining this question, in the view I intend to take of it, to writers or authorities, as they are called, on public law or laws of nations, because, if any time heretofore, there was a public law acknowledged and practised by all civilized nations, that law is, in these times, become obsolete and disused; and the great nations of the old world have severally adopted particular systems of law respecting other nations, adapted to their own several existing circumstances, and bottomed on principles different from those which heretofore were denominated principles of public law. When, therefore, in the course of these observations, said Mr. R., I may use the words "public law," my intention is to express thereby an idea of some system named public law, not the law of nature, which, gradually becoming obsolete, has been very little, if any, in use since the commencement of the American Revolution – a system which, notwithstanding it is often appealed to, if ever it did exist, is now only to be found in books, and not in practice. Neither is it intended in this case to draw into notice any diplomatic proceedings many years heretofore transacted, by way of argument, in support of what I may say on the subject of this resolution; inasmuch as the truth and merits of it do rest and depend on the Message of the President of the United States, and the documents accompanying the same, and the other documents relative thereto, which have been received from him since the commencement of this session of Congress, together with some other documents relative to the arrangement of April last, made between the American Government and the honorable David Montague Erskine, late Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from His Britannic Majesty, near the United States.
This resolution is not an answer to a Message from the President of the United States; there are not in it any words of relation between it and a message evidencing an expression or intended direction of that nature; neither are there in it any words manifesting an intention to transmit it to him as an address; for these and other reasons, which, if necessary, might be mentioned, it does not appear that this joint resolution can, with any propriety, be named an answer or response to a Message from the President, or an address to him. It may, therefore, be reasonably expected, that any objection raised against it, on the opinion of its being an answer to a Message from the President, or an address to him, will not prevail.
This resolution is not a declaration of war; it is predicated on a specified conduct of an Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty, near the Government of the United States, and on the denial of the Executive Government of the United States to receive any further communications from him in consequence of that conduct. And it may be observed that, how ancient soever among nations the custom or usage of sending or receiving Ambassadors, Plenipotentiaries, and public Ministers of that kind may be, the custom or usage, it is reasonable to believe, is bottomed only on the great principle of humanity, and does not impose a perfect obligation either to send such minister, or to receive him, or to continue him after being received; therefore, not to send an Ambassador, Plenipotentiary, or public Minister – not to receive such Minister – to recall such Minister – or to refuse to receive any further communications from such Minister, is not a just cause of war; and it follows that the acting or not acting, in either of the cases, is not a declaration of war. True it is, that the resolution states, that "the Congress of the United States do solemnly pledge themselves to the American people, and to the world, to stand by and support the Executive Government in its refusal to receive any further communications from the said Francis James Jackson, and to call into action the whole force of the nation, if it should become necessary, in consequence of the conduct of the Executive Government in this respect, to repel such insult, and to assert and maintain the rights, the honor, and the interests of the United States;" but, it is to be observed, that that pledge goes only to the doing of certain things which may become necessary in consequence of the conduct of the Executive Government in respect to that thing which is alluded to. But if any gentleman is disposed to continue to this resolution the name of an answer to a Message from the President, or address to him, or to call it a declaration of war, he certainly may give it any name he pleases; and I hope, said Mr. R., that I may also have the liberty to give it a name that appears appropriate to it.
[Here Mr. Rhea entered into a close examination of the correspondence between the British Minister and the American Secretary of State, to show, first, the insult to the American Government by charging it with falsehood; secondly, the falsity of that charge by showing that it was founded on false assumptions and continued:]
The whole civilized world is a spectator in the discussion of this resolution; and all the civilized nations in the world are and will be anxiously desirous to know, whether the United States of America, after having hitherto, with impunity, suffered all the aggressions of Great Britain, and after having suffered Great Britain, with impunity, to impress thousands of their seamen, and retain them on board of their armed ships and vessels, and compelling them to fight against nations with whom the United States are at peace; after having suffered Great Britain, with impunity, to murder their citizens, and after having suffered Great Britain with impunity to attack their sovereignty, in case of the Chesapeake frigate, will, after all these outrages and hostile acts, tamely, meekly, and patiently, submit and bow down to the lowest degree of debased degradation, and suffer Francis J. Jackson, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty, with impunity, to abuse their Executive Government, and to impute to it with impunity the detestable charge of untruth.
Tuesday, January 2, 1810
Another member, to wit, from Pennsylvania, Robert Jenkins, appeared, and took his seat in the House.
Wednesday, January 3
Trade to the Baltic
Mr. Burwell said that he had given to the subject of our foreign relations as much consideration as he was capable of doing, and digested some plan which appeared to him best adapted to the present situation of the country. It would be recollected, however, that they had seen in the papers that France either had blockaded or did contemplate the blockade of all the ports not embraced in the British orders; and they had seen in the papers a paragraph intimating that a project existed to close the northern ports against all vessels but those of France. He conceived it necessary to call for any information which by possibility might be in possession of the Executive on this subject, as such information, if to be obtained, might have some influence upon his mind as to the course proper to be pursued; and therefore moved the following resolution:
Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to lay before this House any information he may possess relative to the blockade of the ports of the Baltic by France, and the exclusion of neutral vessels by Russia, Sweden, and Denmark.
The motion was agreed to without opposition, and Mr. Burwell and Mr. Gardner appointed a committee to wait on the President accordingly.
Conduct of the British Minister
The House resumed the consideration of the unfinished business of yesterday, being the resolution from the Senate approving the conduct of the Executive in refusing to receive any further communication from Francis James Jackson, &c.
The resolution was ordered to be read a third time.
To-morrow was named as the day on which it should be read a third time, and negatived, ayes, 32.
The resolution was then ordered to be read a third time to-day.
Mr. Newton. – Mr. Speaker: It is with regret, sir, I feel myself constrained to offer some observations on the resolution from the Senate now on its passage.
I am not ignorant that I am trespassing on your patience, and that, at this late period of the discussion, I address you to no little disadvantage; but I derive, under such discouragement, great satisfaction in knowing that your politeness and indulgence are at all times the same.
I lament, sir, that the discussion has not been confined to the subject which the resolution presents for consideration, but as I had no control over the debate, I am compelled to pursue it through the meanders it has taken.
As silence on the observations which have been made, though on points foreign to the one in debate, may be ascribed to an acquiescence in their justness, I cannot refrain from apprising you that I hold myself bound to answer such as shall, in my judgment, demand an answer. This course will compel me to discuss points no ways related to the one before the House.
I shall endeavor to atone for taking this range by giving to each subject a separate consideration, and by observing a due regard to brevity. With this apology, I hasten in the first instance to the discussion of the competency of Mr. Erskine's powers to conclude the provisional agreement of the 19th of April last.
I put aside from this discussion the instructions of Mr. Erskine authorizing him to tender reparation for the attack on the Chesapeake, because his power so to act has not been distinctly questioned. The gentlemen who have preceded me on the same side of the question have sustained, I trust to your satisfaction, and that of the House, the competency of Mr. Erskine's powers to make and conclude the arrangement of the 19th of April last. Persuaded, as I am, that they have performed this task with great ability, I will not tire your patience by passing over the same ground, nor by citing the same authorities on which they relied to support their arguments.
I will permit myself only to take up the discussion of the points which terminated their remarks. I will content myself with furnishing some authorities not pressed into service, in support of the positions taken by them. That Mr. Erskine was a Minister Plenipotentiary, cannot be denied; in that character he was received, and in that he acted until he was recalled, is equally true. The propositions made by him in that character were received and acted upon as the propositions of his Government. The Executive of the United States had no control over his private instructions; no right to demand an exhibition of them; they were given for the government of the Minister's conduct. If he acted in contravention of his secret orders, over which his power was absolute, he became responsible to his sovereign for his non-observance of them; but his public acts must necessarily be binding and obligatory, originating, as they must be considered, in the general and avowed powers of the Minister, exercised in conformity to his private instructions. If his secret instructions limit his general commission, he is bound honestly to apprise the Government with which he is negotiating of the fact. He ought to say, to this boundary I can go; beyond it I cannot pass. To illustrate this doctrine, which I hold to be sound and correct, I will give as an instance the chaste conduct of Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, who, previous to affixing their signatures to the treaty concluded by them with the British Commissioners, publicly apprised the Commissioners that they had no authority to bind the Government of the United States, as their instructions did not permit them to conclude a treaty which should not contain stipulations against impressments. The fate of that treaty is known. It was rejected. The British Government could not complain, because it was previously informed that the Ministers of the United States had no power to form such a treaty.
Mr. Erskine never entertained a doubt but that his powers were competent to the formation of the arrangement of April last. He unhesitatingly declared, in submitting his propositions for suspending as to the United States the operation of the Orders in Council, that he was commanded by his Majesty to submit them to the consideration of the Executive of the United States. I will prove this statement by his letter of April 18, 1809, and others, addressed to the Secretary of State. He says:
"The favorable change in the relations of His Majesty with the United States, which has been produced by the act usually termed the non-intercourse act, passed at the last session of Congress, was also anticipated by His Majesty, and has encouraged a further hope that a reconsideration of existing differences might lead to their satisfactory adjustment. On these grounds and expectations, I am instructed to communicate to the American Government His Majesty's determination of sending to the United States an Envoy Extraordinary, invested with full powers to conclude a treaty on all points of the relations between the two countries. In the mean time, with a view to the attainment of so desirable an object, His Majesty would be willing to withdraw his Orders in Council of January and November, 1807, so far as respects the United States, in the persuasion that the President would issue a proclamation for the renewal of the intercourse with Great Britain, and that whatever difference of opinion should arise in the interpretation of the terms of such an agreement, will be removed in the proposed negotiation."
In another letter, of April 19, he says:
"In consequence of the acceptance by the President, as stated in your letter of the 18th instant, of the proposals made by me on the part of His Majesty, in my letter of the same day, for the renewal of the intercourse between the respective countries, I am authorized to declare that His Majesty's Orders in Council of January and November, 1807, will have been withdrawn, as respects the United States, on the 10th day of June next." (1809.)
The above extracts from Mr. Erskine's letters leave us in no suspense as to the opinion he had formed of his instructions. In this settled belief that he had conformed strictly to the instructions of his Court, we find him so late as June 15, 1809, when he notified to the Secretary of State the new Order in Council issued on the 26th of April last. In this letter he says:
"In consequence of official communications sent to me from His Majesty's Government, since the adoption of that measure, I am enabled to assure you that it has no connection whatever with the overtures (of the 19th of April, 1809) which I have been authorized to make to the Government of the United States, and that I am persuaded that the terms of the agreement so happily concluded by the recent negotiation, will be strictly fulfilled on the part of His Majesty. The internal evidence of the order itself would fully justify the foregoing construction, and, moreover, it will not have escaped your notice, that the repeal has not thereby been made of the orders of the 7th of January, 1807, which, according to the engagement I have entered into on the part of His Majesty, is to be abrogated with the other orders, in consequence of the adjustment of differences between the two countries, and the confidence entertained of a further conciliatory understanding."
Thus it appears that Mr. Erskine, from communications, subsequent to the 26th of April, from this Government, is decidedly of opinion that he acted within the pale of his instructions. His language is free from ambiguity. He says: "In consequence of official communications sent to me from His Majesty's Government, since the adoption of the order of the 26th of April, I am enabled to assure you it has no connection whatever with the terms of agreement concluded by the recent negotiation." Nothing can be clearer than that his opinion was made up on a full consideration of all the instructions received by him from his Government. This must be evident to the most superficial observer on reading the following extract from a letter of the 14th August, 1809, addressed by him to the Secretary of State. It is as follows:
"Under these circumstances, therefore, finding that I could not obtain the recognitions specified in Mr. Canning's despatch of the 23d of January, (which formed but one part of his instructions to me,) in the formal manner required, I considered that it would be in vain to lay before the Government of the United States the despatch in question, which I was at liberty to do in extenso, had I thought proper. But as I had such strong grounds for believing that the object of His Majesty's Government could be attained, though in a different manner, and the spirit, at least, of my several letters of instructions be fully complied with, I feel a thorough conviction on my mind that I should be acting in conformity with His Majesty's wishes, and, accordingly, conclude the late provisional agreement on His Majesty's behalf with the Government of the United States."
The British Government could not, from this view, disavow the act of its Minister without incurring, and that justly, the charge of bad faith. To give support and nerve to this inference, I will read a passage from an author of great celebrity, Burlamaqui. The author says: "If he who has a commission to treat has kept within the bounds of the power annexed to his office, though he acts contrary to his private instructions, the sovereign is to abide by what he has done; otherwise, we could never depend on engagements contracted by proxy." This authority is full, and in point; it covers the whole ground; it leaves no fissures through which crafty politicians can make an escape. On the reputation of the British Government it fixes a blot which nothing short of the power of time can efface.
