Kitabı oku: «Economic corridors in Asia : paradigm of integration? A reflection for Latin America»
Economic corridors in Asia : paradigm of integration? A reflection for Latin America / Alexánder Arciniegas Carreño [y otros] ; Soraya Caro Vargas, editor. -- Bogotá : Universidad Externado de Colombia. 2020.
459 páginas : ilustraciones, mapas, gráficos ; 21 cm.
Incluye referencias bibliográficas.
ISBN: 9789587903812
1. Cooperación internacional -- América Latina 2. Cooperación internacional -- Asia 3. Crecimiento económico -- América Latina 4. Crecimiento económico -- Asia 5. Globalización 6. Geopolítica 7. Infraestructura (Economía) I. Caro Var-gas, Soraya, editor II. Universidad Externado de Colombia III. Título
337 SCDD 21
Catalogación en la fuente -- Universidad Externado de Colombia. Biblioteca. MRJ.
junio de 2020
ISBN 978-958-790-381-2
© 2020, SORAYA CARO VARGAS (EDITOR)
© 2020, UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA
Calle 12 n.º 1-17 este, Bogotá
Teléfono (57-1) 342 0288
publicaciones@uexternado.edu.co
www.uexternado.edu.co
Primera edición: junio de 2020
Diseño de cubierta: Departamento de Publicaciones
Corrección de estilo (español): Luis Fernando García Núñez
Corrección de estilo (inglés): Michael Forrest
Composición: María Libia Rubiano
Impresión: Xpress Estudio Gráfico y Digital S.A.S. - Xpress Kimpres
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Prohibida la reproducción o cita impresa o electrónica total o parcial de esta obra, sin autorización expresa y por escrito del Departamento de Publicaciones de la Universidad Externado de Colombia. Las opiniones expresadas en esta obra son responsabilidad de los autores.
Diseño epub: Hipertexto – Netizen Digital Solutions
Quiero agradecer al doctor Roberto Hinestrosa Rey, decano de la Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales por su constante apoyo a esta iniciativa. A las directivas del CIPE por su orientación, a Jerónimo Delgado, Pío García y David Castrillón por hacer parte de la concepción de la idea y su materialización, a Francisco Daniel Trejos, quien como asistente de investigación de CESICAM se preocupó por la adecuada compilación de los textos, y el mejoramiento de las imágenes y de los mapas, a Luz Adriana Gómez por la coordinación desde el CIPE en la edición de esta obra. A la Universidad Externado de Colombia. Un agradecimiento especial a cada uno de los autores, por su dedicación y compromiso.
CONTENIDO
FOREWORD
INTRODUCTION
Soraya Caro Vargas
1.The History of a Multicultural Academic Endeavour
2.The Search for Security vs. Growing Uncertainty
2.1.Methodology and Techniques
3.Theoretical Markers
4.Bibliographic antecedents in the Region and the Relevance of this Initiative
5.Globalizing Precursors and the Resurgence of the Economic Corridor as a Term and Consequence of BRI
6.On the Authors and their Vision of Corridors and BRI
Conclusion
References
1. LA NUEVA RUTA DE LA SEDA: CONTEXTO HISTÓRICO Y ASPECTOS GEOPOLÍTICOS DE LA ESTRATEGIA GLOBAL DE CHINA
Alexánder Arciniegas Carreño
Resumen
Abstract
Introducción
1.Los cambios en la inserción internacional china y la emergencia de Obor
2.Los caminos de la Ruta de la Seda: franja terrestre y ruta marítima; naturaleza, principios, ejes de actuación e institucionalidad
3.Asia central: recursos e importancia estratégica para China
4.Obor el dilema de India
5.Algunas consideraciones conclusivas sobre la proyección internacional de China y su impacto en Latinoamérica y Colombia
Referencias
2. INDIA’S ECONOMIC CORRIDORS AND SUB-REGIONAL CONNECTIVITY: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS
Pankaj K Jha
Abstract
Resumen
Introduction
1.Theoretical Discourse about Economic Corridors
2.India’s Economic Corridors and Highway Networks
3.Developing Port Infrastructure
4.River Interlinking Plan and Promotion of Inland waterways
5.Connecting with Neighborhood and Sub-Regional networks
6.Trilateral Highway Networks-Myanmar-India- Thailand
7.Mekong India Economic Corridor (MIEC)
8.Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC)
9.Transport Corridors –BBIN and BCIM initiative
10.Structural Constraints and Bottlenecks
Conclusion
References
3. CHINESE CAPITAL FLOWS TO AFRICA IN A CONTEXT OF THE SILK ROAD
Alicia Girón
Abstract
Resumen
Introduction
1.Theoretical perspective
2.Behavior of Financial Flows from Chinese Banks and Companies in Africa
3.Constant Growth of the Process of Indebtedness since the Post-Crisis Period
4.Concluding remarks: Challenges facing Africa in the face of financial flows
References
4. DEVELOPMENT CORRIDORS IN AFRICA: FOREIGN POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION STRATEGIES IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
Jerónimo Delgado Caicedo
Juliana Andrea Guzmán Cárdenas
Abstract
Resumen
Introduction
1.Development corridors
1.1.From transport corridor to economic corridor
1.2.Development corridors and Africa
2.Development Corridors as a Foreign Policy and Regional Integration Tool
2.1.Foreign Policy in the Global South
2.2.African Regional Integration
3.Challenges
4.Conclusions
References
5. A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR. MAPPING PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN PAKISTAN: THE CASE STUDY OF THE INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
Ahmad Saffee
Abstract
Resumen
Introduction
1.Situational Analysis of Geo-political Environment
2.Theoretical Framework
2.1.Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
3.Research Methodology
4.Research Analysis – A Critical Thematic Analysis of Discourse
4.1.The Communist Party of China
4.2.Media and Think Tank Community
Conclusion
References
6. RESURGENCE OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION AND CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE IN ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA
Ume Farwa
Ghazanfar Ali Garewal
Abstract
Resumen
Introduction
1.Belt and Road as a Project of South-South Cooperation
2.China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: China as a Locomotive and Pakistan as a Catalyst
3.The Good and the Best
4.The Fix
5.Looking Forward: Lessons for Latin America and Impact on SSC
Conclusion
References
7. THE INFRASTRUCTURE GAP IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE ARRIVAL OF CHINESE INFRASTRUCTURE FIRMS: SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ARGENTINIAN CASE
Leonardo E. Stanley
Abstract
Resumen
Introduction
1.The nature of the firm (or Why Chinese firms are something special that should be considered)
2.The Belt and Road Initiative and Latin America Infrastructure Gap
3.Industry Analysis (with a focus on the Argentinean case)
3.1.Argentina Infrastructure Gap (particular emphasis on roads)
3.2.The entry of Chinese firms and local business groups: competition or cooperation
3.3.Financial Schemes and Governance Issues
4.Conclusions
References
8. EL MERCOSUR EN LA BÚSQUEDA DE ASIA PACÍFICO
Gustavo Cardozo
Resumen
Abstract
Introducción
1.La Nueva Ruta de la Seda y su impacto en América Latina y el Caribe: perspectivas desde el Cono Sur
2.El Mercosur en la búsqueda de Asia Pacífico
Conclusiones
Referencias
9. DEL FORTALECIMIENTO DE LAS FRONTERAS A LA CONECTIVIDAD: LECCIONES PARA EL SUR DE ASIA Y AMÉRICA DEL SUR
Kelly Arévalo
Resumen
Abstract
Introducción
1.Más allá de la geografía política
2.Conectividad hoy: corredores económicos
3.Conectividad en el Sur de Asia
4.Conectividad en América del Sur
5.Conclusiones
Referencias
10. EL SUDESTE ASIÁTICO EN LAS NUEVAS RUTAS TRANSCONTINENTALES ASEAN
Pío García
Resumen
Abstract
Introducción
1.Asean en el núcleo de la integración asiática
2.Asean en los proyectos transcontinentales asiáticos
3.Asean frente a los proyectos transcontinentales: impacto y perspectivas
4.Asean, las rutas transasiáticas y América Latina y el Caribe
Conclusiones
Referencias
11. THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION IN CHINA’S NEW SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT PROJECT
Azhar Serikkaliyeva
Abstract
Resumen
Introduction
1.China’s Interests in Central Asia
1.1.The SCO: Fighting three evils
1.2.Energy
1.3.China’s Peaceful Co-development and Good Neighborly Policy
2.Situating Central Asia in BRI
2.1.Why Central Asia is important for BRI?
2.2.Main BRI projects in Central Asia
2.3.The New Eurasian Land Bridge
3.Economic corridor China - Central Asia - Western Asia
3.1.Response from Central Asia: case of Kazakhstan
Conclusion
References
12. TURKEY AND THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE
Gökhan Tekir
Abstract
Resumen
Introduction
1.Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway
2.Turkey’s Domestic Railway Lines
3.Marmaray and Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge
4.The Turkish Maritime Leg of the Belt and Road
5.Turkey’s Role in Civilizational Connectivity
6.Challenges to Turkey’s Participation in the Belt and Road Initiative
6.1.Volatility in the Infrastructure Sector
6.2.The Xinjiang Problem
Conclusion
References
13. BELT & ROAD INITIATIVE Y SU SIGNIFICADO GEOPOLÍTICO PARA CHINA Y ASIA CENTRAL
Diana Andrea Gómez
Resumen
Abstract
Introducción
1.Alcance del BRI
1.1La tecnología rebasa la geografía
2.Importancia geopolítica de BRI
2.1.BRI en perspectiva doméstica
2.2.BRI en perspectiva regional: el rol de Asia central
3.Grandes desafíos generados por BRI en perspectiva global
3.1.El rol central de las ciudades
Conclusiones y recomendaciones
Referencias
REFLEXIONES FINALES E INVITACIÓN A LA ACADEMIA
Soraya Caro Vargas
Referencias
NOTAS AL PIE
AUTHORS
FOREWORD
Global geopolitics has shifted dramatically over the last thirty years. After the vanishing expectations of a unipolar international system led by the United States, China has gained an increasingly dominant role in areas as innovative as quantum computing, robotics and artificial intelligence.
In the ‘non-digital’ dimension, the eastern superpower has made gigantic investments in its Belt and Road Initiative, which include the development of a massive network of highways, industrial centers, harbors, pipelines and bridges, among many other works of infrastructure. These investments allow for the connection of more than 60 countries worldwide, guaranteeing China’s energetic security, easier conditions for trading goods and services and, perhaps more importantly, a significant influence in the political and economic events of the world.
States with political regimes as diverse as those of Russia and India are part of this growing network; in various cases, in exchange for the benefits associated with being part of it, major concessions were made. By way of illustration, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, among others, given their lack of capacity to pay for some of the works, have agreed to forfeit control of specific areas of their territories.
The new game that arises under these circumstances calls for creativity in devising new models of cooperation between states, companies, citizens and the like. That is, traditional forms of association between rich and poor countries, for instance, must be thought of in a different format: the profits derived from the relationship must be clearly evident to all the actors. Similarly, historical advantages associated with geographical conditions that were explained by so-called ‘spheres of influence’, must be revisited, as new forms of connectivity – both physical and digital – are shifting at a speed not seen before.
South-south cooperation, as well as the exchange of knowledge and experience between actors who have not traditionally been leaders in their fields, is expected to play an increasingly critical role in the years to come. As in the case of concessions in sovereignty, the nature and breadth of the nation state could also be in question, insofar as deeper interests of key actors – those in power, the private sector, as well as marginalized communities – could determine modes of association that were not thought possible a few years ago.
There is a wide variety of opportunities for countries all around the world, and Latin America is not the exception to this; the success of China and India in bringing millions of people out of poverty and destitution is an experience that is appealing to many policy makers in different latitudes, despite the many other remaining challenges. These countries have recently grown at formidable rates, and it has resulted in better living conditions for large sectors of their societies. Compared to the challenges faced in the West by policies that could not prevent the collapse of the economic systems of some countries, and convulsed political systems, the policies adopted in that part of the world seem substantially more resilient.
Nevertheless, all this comes with a catch (caveat?). The emphasis on “the East model”, and particularly that of China, is not on liberty or on the protection of rights, but on having ‘the right government’. This makes some in the West uncomfortable when addressing the inevitability of a new paradigm in the international global order but, at the same time, makes the discussions about the opportunities and implications of it more urgent.
‘Asian Economic Corridors: Paradigms of Integration? A Reflection for Latin America’ is a comprehensive study aimed at addressing some of the most challenging questions of this new reality: What is the reach of the new silk road for the global south in terms of capital flows? What is its impact on regional integration strategies in the global south? Which lessons for Latin America can be learnt from the experience of other regions’ relationships with China? What opportunities in terms of development of infrastructure does this new reality have in store for Latin American countries? What are some of the costs?
The emphasis of the book on the corridors, not only illustrates the fast developments in infrastructure and connectivity initiatives coming out of Asia, but also the implications they have for topics as diverse as foreign policy, integration programs, public discourse and the adoption and contagion of new production strategies, among others.
By bringing together an important number of scholars from both, multiple disciplines and different regions, this book offers a thorough analysis of the challenges and opportunities posed by the changing global order resulting from the efforts led by China.
This is also a timely book. The deteriorating leadership in the West demands opening the public arena for discussions that cover a wide range of topics, from new models of growth and development to the opportunities and risks associated with them. These are precisely some of the discussions the authors of this book bring to the table, and the ones that will be at the frontline of political economy discussions in the near future.
JULIÁN ARÉVALO
Dean, School of Economics
Externado de Colombia University
INTRODUCTION
SORAYA CARO VARGAS
1. THE HISTORY OF A MULTICULTURAL ACADEMIC ENDEAVOUR
For a decade now, the Rectorate of the Externado University of Colombia and the School of Finance, Government and International Relations (FIGRI), have given a fillip to the promotion and strengthening of ties between their students and teachers and the countries of Asia and Africa. Some expressions of this commitment are: the creation of the Centre of Contemporary Studies on India and South Asia (Cesicam) in 2013, groups of scholars engaged in the systematic study of countries like China and Japan and the recent establishment of the Centre of Turkish and Caucasian Studies, with the support of internationally recognized partners such as business experts, academics and diplomatic missions.
In order to forge links with networks of specialists, during 2017 and 2018, CESICAM approached universities and think tanks in Eurasia, such as the Technical University of the Middle East METU in Ankara, the Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies, (ISSI) in Pakistan or Jindal Global University in India, which have all been active participants in the connectivity debates and on the implications of the China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). CESICAM scholars also attended international conferences which engaged with trends in connectographic studies like the one organized by the Leuven Center for Global Studies in August 2018, The Belt and Road Initiative and Global Governance (BRIGG).
Since there was a paucity of comprehensive academic analyses on the evolution of the BRI project in Colombia, researchers from the Centre of Specialized Studies (CIPE) and CESICAM, located in Ankara, Bogota and Johannesburg, decided to design an interdisciplinary research project in March 2018, in which scholars from different areas would present their findings on the state of the art of BRI in their lands, as well on the existence of other transregional routes and modes of integration, in such a way that, those visions became a reference point to Latin American governments, that were already invited by President Xi Jinping to be part of the BRI. Researchers from Turkey, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, India, Paraguay, Argentina, Colombia, Brazil and Mexico participated in the initiative. This publication is an academic journey through a multicultural and multidisciplinary corridor; an experience of collaborative work and thematic construction by a non-formal group of researchers from different latitudes, who share their concern about the profound changes that the accelerated physical and technological connectivity in the world will signify for the study and exercise of international relations in the near future, and in the definition of the foreign policy of States.
2. THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY VS. GROWING UNCERTAINTY
Global production, information flows, the supply of basic resources, national security, the provision of services across borders, education, after sale services, the movement of people, telecommunications and freight transport are all linked to the networks of functional connectivity which provide the necessary physical and digital infrastructure for competitive connections between suppliers and consumers. Connectivity is a sine qua non in the dynamics of integration, internationalization and development. With this in mind, the present volume tries to find answers to two questions: What are the effects of these new routes on the national sovereignty and economic and social development of the people whose lives they crisscross and for the consolidation of a new regionalism and multipolar world? How will the economic corridors between Asia, Europe and Africa become reference points for Latin America in the immediate future?
The authors give us their vision on the different stages of the corridors in Asia and Africa. They offer recommendations on how to advance discussions on the socio-economic reach of the routes and they explain the delicate situations which must be handled for their existence or, they analyse the impact of the so called “connectography” (Khanna, 2014) in the design of national development policies in regional groups and global governance. The results fill a vacuum. Of course, Latin America has been a late arrival to the study of the implications for global connectivity and these new routes. The contributions of the researchers have become a relevant tool of analysis which fulfills a historical need and aims to provide scholarly inputs for governments, businessmen, communities and decision makers.
2.1. Methodology and Techniques
The implicit message to the researchers in our call for proposals was that their contributions dwell on the possible economic and social effects of the routes and economic corridors in their regions giving inputs and references to Latin American scholars. From the perspective of their specializations, they used deductive and analytic methods during their process of production of knowledge. (Muñoz, 1998, pp. 192-193). They used primarily sources to analyse events such as the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, (strategically the most important segment for China of the BRI initiative for the outlet it gives to the Arabian Sea without touching Indian soil1) or Narendra Modi’s, Sagarmala Project (which aims to unite the four cardinal points of India2) and the study and compilation of secondary sources (reports, analysis statistics, government declarations, research articles etc.), devoted themselves to the task of describing historical movements, economic and social impacts, the important actors involved, their foreign policy interests and strategies, in order to later critically show the way in which the new kinds of connectivity and the failure or success of infrastructure megaprojects affect vectors such as South-South Cooperation, finance and debt mechanisms, internal growth, national security, the deepening of connectivity gaps or flow of information etc. Finally, the scholars gave recommendations or useful tips to the establishment in Latin America.
3. THEORETICAL MARKERS
The economic corridors in Asia and Africa are realities that at times, seem to advance faster in comparison to rearguard or conservative theories. The BRI initiative has exponentially accelerated investment in megaprojects and their implementation, even though the objectives of these corridors change according to the needs of the proponent and the beneficiaries. Since the issues raised above are closely related to economic and social development through functional connectivity, the scholars clearly or implicitly use theories related to spatial development. The Development Axes Theory (DA) is a term coined by Pen Pottier (1963), and later used as an alternative theory of growth by writers such as Hilhorst (1972) Paelinck Nijkamp (1975), (1978), Richardson (1978), (2011) Heru Purboyo, Eko Budi Santoso and Dewi Sawitri (2012). In their essay, “The Development of Local Nodes along Transportation Corridors: A Review of Development Axes Theory”, they have tried to analyse whether the flow of goods and people along the axes is a determining factor for the increase of transport infrastructure which will connect the centres. The researchers of this book refer to them in their theoretical framework.3
The terms Development Corridors or Economic Corridors, referred to in this publication have as their premise the territorial approaches outlined in the Spatial Development Initiatives (SDI), which have gained currency as development strategies in medium and emergent economies. The States design programs and investment frameworks in order to develop territories or unify regions and countries through routes with infrastructure as Healey (2004), mentions in his article “The Treatment of Space and Place in the New Strategic Spatial Planning in Europe”. Other spatial approaches have been developed by Whebell (1969), who discusses the importance of corridors in the metropolitan framework for the urbanization and population of spaces without elaborating on sub-urban areas. Brahmawong (2010) calls our attention to the negative effects of corridors such as the poor use of natural resources, the exclusion of certain communities or the effects on the quality of life of the inhabitants. He also lays emphasis on the importance of human capital on the routes, investment flows and entrepreneurial capacities. For the analysis of corridors from the so called financial geography,4 authors used the work of Rosa Luxemburg, the theoretical perspective of Hilferding (1914) and (1973), and Dimsky’s financial instability hypothesis (2017) to explain the internationalization of Chinese Banks and corporations during the last 20 years. As Alicia Girón states in her chapter, “It is necessary to rethink the categories of capital concentration and centralization and the importance of an economic bloc in order to understand why certain countries and not others grow in an equitable manner in the framework of the internationalization of capital”.
Those who approach the network of corridors in Africa from the perspective of regional development and integration take recourse to Kleynhans (2001), Elshahawany (2017) who have described the corridors of development as spaces for cooperative projects which would facilitate the development of infrastructure and connectivity in the continent. The Guide to Economic Corridors (2015) by Albie Hope and John Cox was commissioned by the Department of International Development, in which he argues for the existence of different kinds of corridors and the need to take their physical and functional dimensions into account, as they are complex structures that do not necessarily evolve in the same way.
On the other hand, the regional development banks and the international consultancies have been prolific in studies and manuals on the construction of corridors. Their publications elaborate on the geographical reach, specializations and the objectives of sectorial development, or on mechanisms of governance. They seek to highlight the social and environmental factors, effective implementation and the institutions that should be involved. Hans-Peter Brunner (2013) published a working paper with the Asian Development Bank, in which he divided the indicators for corridor analysis into three groups, according to their characteristics: structural characteristics that are mainly connected with commercial interests, those related to geographic cohesion and networks, and others related to corridor access. Finally, the challenges of economic corridors in Asia are elaborated. There are also bench marks for the analysis of these connectivity channels carried out by the specialized centres of research, like those of the Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) and the European Center for Development Policy Managment in 2015 for the study of space initiatives of development and growth of agricultural corridors: “Agricultural Growth Corridors and Agricultural Transformation in Africa: Research Needs for Impact, Implementation and Institutions”. One of the objectives of the initiative was to analyse the implications that would have on agriculture research investments highly focused in private and/or public sectors especially in the African continent. In his chapter, Ahmad Saffee, uses the critical discourse analysis method and takes recourse to the work of Fairclough, who through the analysis of a written text, discourse and through discourse as practice, tries to show the connection of language with power and the making of ideas in society. With digital support, the author analyses the texts on economic corridors, the China –Pakistan one in particular, under the aegis of the Institute of Strategic Studies of Islamabad (ISSI).
Other authors describe and make exploratory studies on the impact of BRI in their countries and regions. In these chapters the writers bolster their analyses with help from other studies by expert colleagues, through the written press, which gives news on the evolution of projects and its implications, through government briefs and reports and in their own observation of the dynamics of their environment. The publication edited by Marlene Laruelle (2018) for the Central Asia Program in George Washington University: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Its Impact in Central Asia, is an important document which will benefit those who study the different vectors of the package that China offers to its neighbours in Central and South East Asia and for those who analyse the focus of Latin America on the infrastructure gaps that affect the region. For this reason, in the analysis over the convenience or otherwise of the Chinese offer of widening the initiative of the margins and the route in the American continent, the reports of regional groups, development banks, country reports are used as sources without any adherence to a theory but instead to qualitative and exploratory analysis methods.
4. BIBLIOGRAPHIC ANTECEDENTS IN THE REGION AND THE RELEVANCE OF THIS INITIATIVE
In Latin America, the closeness to Asia and its emerging economies carries relative weight and depends on the historic relations of each particular country with the region. In general, the interest of the academy is focused on China, followed by Japan, South East Asia and India. There is not much literature available on the China BRI initiative, nor on the Chinese investment in the region. A rigorous analysis on the main infrastructure works in which China has played a role or tried to do it, was published by Enrique Dussel Peters, Margaret Myers and Shoujun Cui (2018), Building Development for a new era: China’s infrastructure projects in Latin America and the Caribbean. In the book, they gathered acknowledged experts on China from the entire continent such as Leonardo Stanley, Monica de Hart, Diana Castro and Paulina Garzón. The publication details the impact and influence of Chinese financing in Latin America, the realization or otherwise of infrastructure works, as well as the particular characteristics of the commercial relations between economies which depend on this Asian country rather than on others which are prudent or timid in their approach to Asia.
“China’s discourse on the new model of relations between the big powers and its relations with the US under Bush and Obama”, is an article published by Manuel de Jesús Rocha Pino (2018) in the Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales of the National Autonomous University of Mexico. The author analyses China’s proposal to the United States in 2012 for defining a new model of relations between the big powers. In the Mexican journal Foro Internacional, Eduardo Tzili-Apango, Eduardo Palacios-Cabrera y Bernardo Mabire (2018) in their article “The Reactive Multilateralism in Central Asia before China and Russia”, explain how extraterritorial agents in Central Asia have given way to a reactive multilateralism which benefits China and Russia,who are trying to secure their energy resources and the necessary land connections with Europe.
On the other side of the continent, Dietmar Dirmoser published “The Great March of China towards the West” (“La Gran Marcha China hacia el Oeste”) in the Argentine journal Nueva Sociedad Democracia y Política en América Latina (2017), in which he refers to the simplicity with which China proposes such a transformational initiative. Also from Argentina, Marcos Cordeiro Pires and Luis Antonio Paulino (2017), in their article “Reflections on the Hegemony and International Politics of China: the Belt and Route Initiative” (“Reflexiones sobre la hegemonía y la política internacional de China: la iniciativa ‘Cinturón y Ruta”) in the Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, wrote about the strategy of peaceful development. They analysed the evolution of Chinese foreign policy from the beginning of the reform period and concluded that China seeks to create the means in order to reaffirm its pacifist and inclusivist intentions through an integrationist project like BRI. In Colombia Mariano Turzi published “Latin American Silk Road: China and The Nicaragua Canal” in the Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad, (2017), in which he wrote on the current impact of a possible canal financed by China in Nicaragua. Also in Colombia, Dusan Praj and Juan Carlos Restrepo (2017), wrote a piece titled “The Geopolitics of Chinese reform” in the international relations journal, Estrategia y Seguridad, referring to the presence of super powers in the South China sea, the institutionalisation of the BRI initiative, but also pointed to the growing economic interdependence which will ensue in case China manages to get the levels of connectivity that it wants with the West. The book El camino al siglo del Pacífico. Las otras rutas de la seda del siglo XXI (The Road to the Pacific Century. The Other Silk Routes of the XXIst Century) by Eduardo Tzili-Apango, published by the Autonomous Metropolitan University of Mexico, is handy as far as understanding the origin of the new routes which help in explaining what the author calls, “The Century of the Pacific” i.e. the presence of China, Japan, the United States and Russia in the region. Other sources are multilateral reports from some banks and risk rating firms as well as special editions of journals and widely circulated newspapers.
“Relevance”, according to the Dictionary of the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language, is the quality of being convenient, appropriate or amenable to something. Analysing from different geographic and epistemological perspectives the offer that China extends to Latin America in 2018 in order to integrate us naturally to BRI according to its discourse, is a need that besides being relevant is appropriate. It is the right moment to ponder the emotional reactions of our leaders to this tempting offer, a consequence of the tedium and precaution of an international economic system and leaders who for decades have been indifferent to the social and economic consequences of their actions, and also on the tremendous gap our continent suffers in terms of infrastructure.
The novelty of this publication is due to the origin of the authors who are located at different segments of the Eurasian route and participants and actors in Latin America involved in recent and current debates on the relevance, efficacy and appropriateness of the megaprojects and their effects. From this approach to the problem, one can also infer the following: the corridors and their influence on the population and the land, the corridors and their relation with the foreign policy of nations, the corridors and their impact on regional stability and national security, BRI and the new dynamics of South-South Cooperation, BRI and the definition of active policies, in short an integral analysis of the phenomenon, the think tanks, critical discourse and its responsibility in the implementation of the initiative.
The research has a unifying thread: the local, in situ, interpretation of BRI and its relation to the concept of economic corridors. The aim is to serve as a proposed reference point for academia and decision makers in Latin America who have to fully discern the new functional geography, of a new physical reality, which will overcome national borders and traditional diplomacy through special connecting zones, nodes of competitive production and cities which, in some cases, work independent of domestic legislation, resulting in what Keller Easterling (2013),5 calls extra diplomacy in his global conferences, and others like Khanna (2014) term as mega globalization. The authors present special cases. The Turkish people and their famous construction firms do not feel the same way about the BRI initiative as do the Indians, the emulous of China in the region or the central Asian people who need roads in order to reach Europe. The subjects discussed at the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the implications of BRI are not the same as those discussed inside the African Economic Community. Latin America should seek its own integral answers to how it can connect to BRI or to other forms of global connectivity, with what objectives and megaprojects and in which places. Which are the places and regulatory frameworks and financial institutions for the realization of our interests, needs and territorial development?
5. GLOBALIZING PRECURSORS AND THE RESURGENCE OF THE ECONOMIC CORRIDOR AS A TERM AND CONSEQUENCE OF BRI
The last stage of globalization and its moorings to the end of the Cold War has been a general, systematic and irrepressible trend. The main trigger was the elimination of trade barriers, so as to reduce transaction costs within and across borders. The transformation of the means of production, interdependence and the internationalization of the production chains has led to heretofore unseen improvements in the collective welfare of the Asian giants, for example, the prices of goods and services became much more accessible, the consumption patterns changed, inflationary trends were controlled, knowledge flows became rapid and efficient while innovation widened the welfare spectrum (John, 2019).
The trade and financial dynamics were tied to the institutions created in the framework of the international economic system dominated by the powers of that time –the United States and the rich countries of Europe- who were expanding their markets. This multilateralism might have brought a certain stability, but the system tended to defend the interests of developed countries and systematically undervalued the concerns of other members over the yawning gap between the rich and poor and the concentration of the economic power in a few players. In the 1980’s, the West observed how China transformed economically and was determined to become the greatest provider of goods and services on a global scale. The Western powers decided to strategically promote the progressive linkages of this country to the system especially through the World Trade Organization. China wanted this platform for its products to get access to markets, while the United States needed to interact in order to control the intentions of its new rival. China and the United States deepened their commercial, diplomatic and cultural ties, the Americans and Europeans began to relocate their businesses such as engineering and advanced manufacture and innovation hubs to China, the hypothesis being that the internal development of China would lead to a new relationship between their establishment and global partners. China wanted to copy, in order to write its own script and the West waved the banner of free trade, without calculating the boomerang effect of this stale capitalist formula. The positive result was the distributive convergence, thanks to which hundreds of millions of Chinese and Indians would soon rise above the poverty line and this transfer of wealth has made Asia the great player of our times. The multipolar balance improved.
China became a giant, it took advantage of the agreements signed and through its full or partial entry in regional groups it had access to the markets, to vanguard knowledge and benefited from huge foreign investment thus educated its human capital. Diversification and manufacturing technology were given prime importance and there was strong investment in its commercial and urban infrastructure. China never fully accepted the requisites of Western institutions, even as it underlined the legitimacy of the “Chinese Model”. It even berated the international economic system on its unipolarity and inefficiency and proposed new instruments of inter and transregional cooperation to developing countries, based on the principles of the welfare of all, non-interference in internal matters, respect for sovereignty and large scale flexible cooperation.
The idea of joining China with Europe to soft finance infrastructure megaprojects which would fill the physical connectivity and digital gaps was the result of a series of internal development policies which prioritized the development of productive forces, the strengthening of the Chinese frontier with the West, the development of far flung regions, social stability and the control of religious extremism, besides ensuring vistas for the expansion of Chinese financial and business corporations.6 One Belt One Road (OBOR), or the Border and Road Initiative (BRI), makes public and formalizes China’s advance over the Eurasian landscape, its geostrategic relocation in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. The reclamation of the Silk Route, apart from giving a new narrative to Asia as a continent that is slowly recovering its central position, awakens a hope of more equitable financing alternatives in countries that have serious connectivity gaps. Many Asian and African economies have their own version of this history and remember the induced indebtedness which characterized earlier hegemonies.
BRI forces us to examine the category of development or economic corridors amply described in this book by the researchers Jerónimo Delgado and Pankaj K Jha, in Chapters 2 and 4. Corridors are spatial development strategies that coordinate competitive connectivity efforts in different fields. They bring the strategic points of production, logistics and supply closer to urban centres where there is a secure demand. Megaprojects result in corridors with diverse objectives: transport corridors, storage and logistical corridors, corridors for energy security and maritime and communication corridors amongst others. They link the special economic zones (ZEE) that have proliferated in the world as scenarios of relocation of production with new urban centres, intelligent cities, maritime infrastructure networks, railways and aerospace nets, while new financial flows are privileged. Plurilateralism, territorial development, normative flexibility and hyperglobalisation will take on the world (Khanna, 2017, p. 62).
Five centuries of Western domination have given way to a new power sharing and in this context, the trade war rumbling between the US and China has hit the most important bastion of modern globalization, free trade, threatened by a protectionist backlash led by the big economic powers, a kind of nationalist reawakening, the shielding of borders, but above all a scenario where Latin America has to play the strategic game. In such a scenario which writers analyse from different geographical areas and socio-political perspectives, unconditional affiliations to the West or to China do not hold good anymore. Ideological passion is uncalled for, but so is inactivity. Both extremes take refuge in a weak multilateral scenario, the calls for the implementation of a new world architecture sound like shots in the dark, while big data technologies, artificial intelligence, and connectivity instruments become consolidated like the new weapons and lead to new alignments where principles give way to calculations on a chessboard of temporary coalitions. The higher organs of multilateralism, whose most prestigious trade institutions have come under the scanner are impotent, just like a watery regionalism hindered by the difficulty of obtaining consensus which would allow for a better redistribution of wealth. How is Latin America preparing itself for the new world map? It is a question which we should begin to answer from this moment on and actively face the future, not postpone it for the last and become like spectators who cannot see the stage and have to improvise their own meanings.
6. ON THE AUTHORS AND THEIR VISION OF CORRIDORS AND BRI
Alexander Arciniegas, research professor of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Santander in Colombia, opens this selection of chapters with an historical overview of the political and economic ascent of Communist China to enable the non-specialist reader to contextualize the phenomenon, and understand its geopolitical dimension. Arciniegas describes the China BRI Initiative, in order to evidence this country’s desire to lead the transformation of the international order and influence the balance of power in its natural arena of Central Asia and South Asia where India has been the natural hegemon.
Pankaj K Jha, associate professor of strategic defense at Jindal Global University in New Delhi, has a chapter on “India’s Economic Corridors and Sub-Regional Connectivity Challenges and Prospects”. Here he deals with the evolution of economic corridors in India as a State decision and a national connectivity strategy and the inclusion of the majority in the last decade. Why must the largest democracy in the world focus its efforts on overcoming the functional infrastructure deficit? This question forms the crux of his analysis. After dwelling on the different theoretical perspectives, he calls attention to the industrial development and social inclusion aspirations of the only country in the region which can serve as a counterweight to Chinese aspirations. Jha presents an India in the throes of a complete physical and productive transformation heretofore unknown in the West. He analyses the challenges that have been met through the main megaprojects in the country, road networks such as the Golden Triangle and those that link the four cardinal points of the Indian subcontinent and join the traditional economic centres with those that are new. He presents the Sagarmala project that has advanced with the development of maritime coasts and the modernization of port infrastructure and writes about the construction of rail corridors exclusively to transport cargo adding to riverine connectivity. These stakes in infrastructure, despite the difficulties in terms of implementation and development of adjacent areas, pay dividends in the national and subregional ambits. The connectivity inside the land mass territory of India connects its neighbours to the Indian Ocean and also favors the SAARC group of countries, even as it strengthens India’s position in the deepening of initiatives like the India-Mekong economic corridor, the Indo-Pacific initiative, and those that join Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and China (BBIN) and (BCIN).
In the chapter “Chinese Capital Flows to Africa in a Context of the Silk Road”, Alicia Girón, researcher at the Autonomous University of Mexico, concentrates on Africa and through the capital accumulation theory explains the behaviour of Chinese Banks and the expansion of companies in this region. She presents the effects of the growing indebtedness of the beneficiary African states and the risks that other economies can also prevent if they decide to be part of the BRI initiative. The arguments refer to China’s ability during the 2008 crisis to configure propitious scenarios for the exit of financial corporations from their territory and their metamorphosis into global companies at a time when the international economy was being transformed and a “capitalist model that administered money” today perceived as a parallel financial system was being strongly leveraged but not regulated. By reworking Rosa Luxemburg’s thesis, Alicia Girón looks for the signs of what could be a new cycle of neocolonial domination. The growing Chinese presence in Africa after the fall of the Wall and its entry in the WTO is consolidated with BRI. China, a market economy controlled by the State manages to introduce structural transformations in the geography, political economy and the interests of beneficiary countries in its financial and cooperation projects. Most of the African debt is private and repayment is also ensured through the barter system, a mechanism which acts a counter guarantee based on the supply of raw materials, a costly and subordinated mechanism, dangerous for vulnerable nations.
Jerónimo Delgado also devotes a chapter to Africa in this book. In the joint paper written with Juliana Andrea Guzmán Cárdenas, “Development Corridors in Africa: Foreign Policy and Regional Integration Strategies in the Global South”, the authors put forward various objectives: 1) understanding the meaning of the category development corridors. 2) Analysing the role of these new routes in the African Union through examples that illustrate and give information about connecting megaprojects effective for a few years now to connect African peoples with the ports as well as with the centre and south of the continent. 3) Laying down the challenges that these initiatives encounter in the region especially those related to security and indebtedness. The authors seek to demonstrate how the corridors in Africa have been used by China, India, Japan as a strategy of foreign policy and as a diplomatic tool that serves their interests, even as the people of the African Union employ them as an instrument of continental integration of connectivity and development. Throughout the analysis they use literature which privileges the African continent and this gives the publication an important added value and the reader thus benefits from little known sources of information and analysis.
Ahmad Saffee uses the discourse method of analysis in order to make a narrative around organisms which greatly influenced public opinion, such as think tanks and communication networks around the China-Pakistan (CPEC) economic corridor, the BRI project with the greatest scope in the Eurasia region. For this, he analyses the role of ISSI (Strategic Studies Institute in Islamabad), a highly influential nonprofit institution created in 1973, instrumental in the making of opinion in the country and in the region on sensitive subjects such as regional security, terrorism, conflict resolution, migrations and functional connectivity. The geoeconomic and geostrategic impact of (CPEC) have strong repercussions on Pakistan and its neighbours and for this reason, the Centre has become a storehouse of information for its academic activity, dissemination, debate and research about thought and opinion building on economic corridors and the leadership of China in its implementation from 2013 till 2018. The results of the quantitative and qualitative analysis are an important reference point for Latin America, a late entrant in the debate, in order that it also know first-hand the way in which Chinese intelligence approaches the regions it deems strategic, the construction of an overarching discourse, the prioritization of Chinese and local interests, the prevailing concerns about public opinion and the various projects to overcome the socio-economic impact of BRI in their country. “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Critical Discourse Analysis: Mapping Public Discourse in Pakistan: The Case Study of Institute of Strategic Studies”, is a valuable effort by the researcher in constructing benchmarks and deciphering the trends in the new integrationist narratives.
In their chapter “Resurgence of South-South Cooperation and China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Asia and Latin America”, Ume Farwa and Ghazanfar Ali Garewal construct a narrative based on Chinese and Pakistani institutional reports, discourses of regional leaders, opinion articles and on discussions during academic seminars, in which the participants are those who decide on the formation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and promote the think tanks to which the authors are affiliated, a fact that allows them to measure the tenor of the debate in Pakistan. The article analyses the flagship project of the BRI initiative, the China-Pakistan economic corridor and its impact on the much longed for resurgence of a real South-South cooperation, which according to the authors should function within its own conceptual framework, in a spirit of sustainable cooperation in order to achieve national commitment and interinstitutional cooperation of the countries involved and the assurances of a wide and diverse financing at the global, regional and subregional levels.
In his chapter, “Latin America Infrastructure Gap and the Arrival of Chinese Infrastructure Firms: Special Reference to the Argentina Case”, Leonardo E. Stanley, an economist and research associate of the Centre for the Study of State and Society (CEDES), makes a detailed analysis on the manner in which China approached Latin America as part of its politics of internationalisation (go out) of public and private enterprises in a political scenario which allowed it to leverage the consequences of the extended corruption in the continent, the political and financial instability that affected certain countries in the region as well as the institutional vacuum caused by government indifference, international banks and the private sector in the midst of the evident backwardness of infrastructure and functional connectivity. The researcher takes recourse to relevant primary sources (reports of multilateral agencies, governments, discourses of political leaders, statistics, and experts’ analysis in order to explain the vectors and incentives that enter the reckoning of the government and Chinese companies to make Latin America a strategic partner), to explain the nature of Chinese companies and their particular forms of financing and the way in which they adapt to the business environment of the region.
Paraguayan researcher Gustavo Cardozo, in his chapter “El Mercosur en la búsqueda de Asia Pacífico”, (Mercosur in the Search for the Asia Pacific), Paraguayan researcher Gustavo Cardozo uses a regional South American approach. He views the China BRI project in the framework of a clearer connection between the Pacific Alliance (PA) and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) as they are apt zones for the development of bioceanic corridors and for their relevance and potential in port and logistical matters necessary for strategic sectors such as mining. There are hardly any studies on the Chinese phenomenon and its presence in South America from a regional perspective, and so Cardoso uses studies and primary source information for this analysis produced by these two regional authorities as well as analysis done by multilateral bodies.
Kelly Arévalo, a Colombian researcher affiliated to the Centre of Studies on Contemporary India of the Externado University of Colombia (CESICAM), writes on the “Del fortalecimiento de las fronteras a la conectividad: lecciones para el Sur de Asia y América del Sur” (Strengthening of the Borders to Connectivity: Lessons for South Asia and South America), a comparative analysis in which she privileges the discipline of geography, which leads us to interpret the territory and functional geography as that which explains the new dynamics of interdependence, economic development, regional integration and the exercise of power. From the geographical space of South Asia, she highlights the limitations in connectivity and the consequences on trade and regional cohesion, the development possibilities that can open up corridors identified by regional groups such as SAARC more than a decade ago and India’s responsibility in overcoming these obstacles. For South America, Arevalo presents a similar situation: a precarious physical connectivity, unfinished projects, a weakening of regional structures which result in a slow internationalization, a marginalization of global supply chains and a slow rhythm movement in social cohesion.
Pío García, researcher and professor at the Externado University of Colombia takes a regional, multipolar and critical approach to the phenomenon of the economic corridors in South East Asia. Through an analysis of recent geopolitical history, he explains how the connectivity strategy of the region is also influenced by players different from China, especially India and Japan, nations which have different infrastructure solutions and which besides facilitating the interconnectivity in the region, also introduce a balance of power. In his article “El sudeste asiático en las nuevas rutas transcontinentales: Asean” (South East Asia in the New Transcontinental Routes: ASEAN), García searches for answers to the impact that the two flagship projects of different scope and philosophies, BRI and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor –AAGC, will have on the capacity of building consensus and in the centrality of decisions within ASEAN. Before giving us an informative analysis on the evolution of the grouping and its influence in the rise of other trans Asian initiatives, such as the Trans Pacific Association TPP and its updated version CPATPP, he refers to the forms of insertion of the South East Asian countries in the different mechanisms of cooperation. They are shown as not just searching for benefits in the field of physical connectivity, but also in the productive, social and environmental dynamics. According to García, although Latin America plays a strategic role as a provider of raw materials to China and emergent Asia, its States have lost the capacity to act in a unified manner in regional fora, its groups no longer have the ability to negotiate and are institutionally weak.
With a regional vision, but this time from Central Asia, Azhar Serikkaliyeva, in his chapter “The Role of the Central Asian Region in China’s New Silk Road Economic Belt Project, the Case of Kazakhstan”, analyses how China strategically constructs segmented dynamics in foreign policy, apparent in the diplomatic orientation called “Two Fronts and a Circle” that divides relations with great and emergent powers, as opposed to those that should be constructed in the framework of a peripheral diplomacy. BRI aims to build bridges with developing countries, above all those at the borders and which are strategic for its connectivity objectives. Other regional bodies like the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) created to counter Chinese influence finally engaged with the BRI initiative believing it to be the best option for regional development. The strategic subjects relating to China and its neighbours, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which together with India and Pakistan are part of the Shanghai Cooperation Council (SCO), all engaged at some point of time with the definition of borders and once this was achieved, they have been ensuring strategies that guarantee national security, the supply of natural resources, especially through energy and gas corridors in the region, counter terrorism and the development of trade infrastructure so as to make of Central Asia a logistical bridge that joins China with Europe. The author mainly uses official sources of regional institutions, reports by international bodies as well as studies by Eurasian authours who specialize in the subject.
Gökhan Tekir is a Turkish researcher at the Middle East Technical University METU, from Smyrna, one of the most liberal regions of the Anatolian peninsula. His vision on the strategic albeit sensitive role of Turkey in the successful implementation of the China initiative (BRI) is presented through a geopolitical analysis with the title “Turkey and the Belt and Road Initiative”. The author focuses on how his country’s relation with China affects political stability, and he takes as his reference point one segment of the six transport routes proposed by China for crossing Central Asia. This is the one that avoids the Russian pass on the stretch that joins Baku in Azerbaijan with Tbilisi in Georgia and Kars in the east of Turkey (BTK). The author shows how Turkey’s decision to join BRI is compatible with the infrastructure and connectivity plans which the Turkish government has been putting into effect for more than a decade now. Turkey is the last port of call in Asia in order to reach Europe, and the megaprojects of rail and road transport on land and sea have to go through Istanbul. Modern infrastructure works are being built in the peninsula of Asia Minor and in the Bosphorus. In contrast to other countries within BRI, the Turkish private sector has an important participation in the construction, management and administration of projects as well as in the national banking system. Tekir’s analysis in chapter 12 studies the political risks inside the Turkish nation. Although Turkey’s close cultural and economic ties with the Turk people of Central Asia (who have the same Altaic linguistic roots), guarantees the acceptance of the Chinese presence throughout the region, the plight of the Chinese Muslims is a matter of grave concern to the Turkish side. The government’s closeness to China after the coup attempt against it in 2016, is the subject of intense debates inside political parties and also affects the relations of the government and business community.
In contrast to Azhar Serikkaliyeva’s regional focus in chapter 11 on BRI and Central Asia, Diana Andrea Gómez, researcher at the Institute of Political Studies and International Relations (IEPRI) National University of Colombia in her piece “Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) the Cities and their Geopolitical Significance”, refers to the initiative as essentially a foreign policy strategy which will benefit the backward regions of East China. The national objectives of development, internationalization and security are reflected in the foreign policy of the country that geostrategically elevate border relations to the same status as the relations with the United States. Diplomacy of the periphery, active development policies, Go West, energy diplomacy are some of the policies that have received a boost through BRI. The cities in this new geography play a fundamental role in the development of connection axes, consumers of goods such as energy resource products all of which favors regional stability.
CONCLUSION
China’s ascent is undeniable, even if not sudden and immediate. A unipolar landscape will not be sustainable, although the fall of the United States is just an ideological discourse with little substance. But if there is no balance of power among regions and multipolarity is just cosmetic, we will go from one hegemon to another or face another worrisome scenario. The BRI initiative is part of the Chinese endeavour to internationalise its companies and financial corporations, it is also an efficacious narrative built on the relationship with developing countries. Colombia and Latin America should responsibly define their strategy, because they are being urged to clarify their positions which will impact the new world geography. Academics have to be present in this debate and businessmen should also come out of their comfort zones and become facilitators in matters of integration and connectivity. Those who design development policies should assume their responsibilities as part of one State and not as bureaucrats of a government on duty.
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1. LA NUEVA RUTA DE LA SEDA: CONTEXTO HISTÓRICO Y ASPECTOS GEOPOLÍTICOS DE LA ESTRATEGIA GLOBAL DE CHINA
ALEXÁNDER ARCINIEGAS CARREÑO
RESUMEN
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) es una estrategia del presidente chino Xi Jinping lanzada en 2013 que, desde una fundamentación geopolítica, enfatiza la importancia de Eurasia para consolidar un sistema chicéntrico1. A través de ella, el gigante asiático busca alcanzar sus prioridades nacionales (crecimiento económico, estabilidad de su régimen político, entre otros) y enfrentar sus desafíos geopolíticos. De este modo, logra influir en la nueva configuración del poder internacional. Lo anterior, tiene impacto sobre América Latina.
Palabras clave: Obor, China, India, Eurasia
ABSTRACT
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a strategy of the Chinese president Xi Jinping launched in 2013 that, from a geopolitical foundation, emphasizes the importance of Eurasia to consolidate a Chinese-Centric system. Through BRI, the Asian giant seeks to achieve its national priorities (economic growth, stability of its political regime, among others) and face its geopolitical challenges. In this way, it manages to influence the new international power’s configuration, which has an impact on Latin America.
Key words: OBOR, China, India, Eurasia.
INTRODUCCIÓN
La ascensión económica y política de China es uno de los fenómenos más inquietantes de la política internacional del siglo XXI. Este proceso que tiene como protagonista a un pueblo multifacético, multirregional y multiétnico (Chun, 2013), articulado a través de una identidad plural y dinámica, tiene como punto de arranque las reformas modernizadoras promovidas por Deng Xiaoping a finales de los años setenta y que, desde entonces, se encaminan a concretar los objetivos chinos de largo plazo: la primacía del desarrollo para apalancar el crecimiento económico y la estabilidad de su sistema socialista (Ploberger, 2017).
De allí que resulte crucial estudiar la manera cómo Beijing viene mostrando una mayor asertividad a nivel internacional, en virtud de una autoestima que se basa tanto en su milenario pasado imperial como en el crecimiento de sus actuales capacidades materiales, lo que tiene efectos en el sistema internacional.
Este protagonismo desde 2013 se concreta en One Belt One Road (Obor), hoy Belt and Road Iniciative (BRI), iniciativa bandera del presidente Xi Jinping que combina un componente terrestre que transita e integra Eurasia; al que se suma una ruta marítima que nace en los puertos chinos y alcanza el Mediterráneo pasando por el océano Índico y la costa africana.
Sin embargo, el presente capítulo busca evidenciar que Obor no es simplemente una etiqueta para un plan colosal de inversiones económicas, sino que hace parte de la estrategia china para hacer valer sus intereses políticos y económicos en escala regional y global; dicho de otro modo, se trata de una iniciativa de conectividad y cooperación dirigida a potenciar su influencia en Eurasia a través del control de recursos energéticos estratégicos, impactando así mismo la dinámica política mundial. De allí que sea importante subrayar que la Ruta de la Seda se acompaña de un esfuerzo robusto de China para modernizar y fortalecer sus fuerzas armadas, principalmente su poder marítimo, como lo evidencia el avance de su industria naval que, además de su importancia internacional, ya fabrica sus propios portaviones, o la reciente instalación de la base de Yibuti en el cuerno de África como parte del denominado “Collar de Perlas” (ver figura 4).
De esta manera este primer capítulo busca, a partir de las perspectivas realistas y de la escuela inglesa de relaciones internacionales, describir Obor como parte de una nueva estrategia geopolítica del gigante asiático que, con foco en Asia Central y el Sudeste Asiático, evidencia sus ambiciones de asumir un rol más activo y transformador del orden internacional.
Para los fines de este capítulo, se usa el concepto de poder en el sentido weberiano; es decir, en la capacidad de maximizar la propia voluntad independiente de la voluntad de terceros, es decir, la capacidad de un actor para alcanzar sus objetivos influenciando a otros, lo que conduce a decisiones por parte de estos que no habían sido posibles sin el ejercicio de esta influencia o “dominación” (López, s.f.; Weber, 2014). Coincidiendo con lo anterior, cuando se habla de “esfera de influencia” se alude a una relación de fuerzas en que los Estados que componen una región conceden “deferencias” a los intereses de la “potencia dominante” a la hora de definir sus propias políticas (López, s.f.).
Este capítulo de alcance exploratorio se ha construido a partir de una metodología cualitativa e interpretativa; se fundamentó en una revisión de documentos oficiales, fuentes bibliográficas y periodísticas. Para tal fin se estructura en cuatro partes: en primer lugar se presentan los cambios en la inserción internacional china desde 1949; posteriormente, se detallan los aspectos logísticos, normativos e institucionales de Obor; a continuación se presenta la geopolítica que rodea esta iniciativa con foco en la importancia de Eurasia y su Heartland; por último, se describe el contexto de seguridad que ha impedido una participación de la India en el proyecto en los términos deseados por Beijing. Concluyendo así con unas breves consideraciones generales en las que se resalta que la proyección internacional china también alcanza a Colombia, y al conjunto de Latinoamérica, lo que plantea desafíos en términos de política exterior.
1. LOS CAMBIOS EN LA INSERCIÓN INTERNACIONAL CHINA Y LA EMERGENCIA DE OBOR
En las dos décadas que siguieron a la instauración de la República Popular China, y en virtud del aislamiento internacional a que esta fue sometida, la diplomacia china, conducida por Chu En Lai, hizo de la reinserción del país en el sistema de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) su prioridad (Visentini, 2012). A comienzos de los sesenta la ONU era una “compleja área política” por cuenta de una menor influencia estadounidense, acompañada de cambios en la política internacional como: la détente; la autonomía francesa y china; la recuperación de Japón y Europa occidental; el “nacionalismo latinoamericano”; la descolonización africana y asiática que impulsó la creación de los No Alineados (Visentini, 2012).
El desgaste del maoísmo y los conflictos fronterizos con la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas2 (URSS) en 1969 y, más adelante, la mayor influencia soviética en Asia Pacífico, condujeron a que a partir de 1971 ideas reformistas se abrieran espacio; China se acercó a los Estados Unidos en la llamada “Diplomacia del Ping Pong”, y con ello obtuvo un asiento en el Consejo de Seguridad y el reconocimiento de su régimen por parte de los principales países capitalistas con los que normalizó sus relaciones diplomáticas (Visentini, 2012).
La “alianza táctica” con Washington se fundamentó en la Teoría de los tres mundos de Deng Xioaoping, que enfatizaba la crítica al “social-imperialismo” de la URSS, trajo también ventajas económicas y tecnológicas a China (Visentini, 2012).
Una nueva fase de la política externa china empezó en 1978 con la normalización de las relaciones con Tokio y Washington, para impulsar una estrategia de desarrollo de largo plazo basada en la modernización industrial, agrícola, militar y científico-tecnológica. Ese año tuvo lugar el XI Comité Central del Partido Comunista chino que definió las directrices de la política de Reforma y Apertura para enfrentar la crisis política y económica y el aislamiento internacional, dando prioridad a la reconstrucción nacional (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016). Este esfuerzo modernizador exigió mayor interacción con el mercado internacional y una apertura selectiva del país para captar capital y tecnología del extranjero en las Zonas Económicas Especiales (ZEE), al tiempo que supo aprovechar sus “ventajas comparativas”: razonable base industrial, un sistema de producción energética y de transporte, algunos nichos tecnológicos, estabilidad sociopolítica y una mano de obra barata (Visentini, 2012).
En esta coyuntura, China intensificó su actuación en la ONU aprovechando la recuperación de su “legitimidad internacional”. Con el problema de Taiwán ocupando un lugar destacado y en medio de la inestabilidad internacional creada por la intervención vietnamita en Camboya con apoyo soviético, China se alió a los Estados Unidos y a Europa occidental recibiendo créditos y obteniendo de vuelta Hong Kong y Macao en 1997 y 1999 respectivamente; enclaves capitalistas incorporadas bajo el principio “un país dos sistemas” (Visentini, 2012). La desconfianza frente a las ambiciones de la URSS en Asia Pacífico y las disputas fronterizas con Moscú llevaron a China a aproximarse a los países de la Asociación de Naciones del Sureste Asiático (Asean) (Singapur, Filipinas, Indonesia, Malasia, Tailandia y Brunei), debilitando diplomáticamente a Taiwán y asociándose a la dinámica económica regional (Visentini, 2012).
El fin de la guerra fría y la implosión de la Unión Soviética modificaron el cuadro estratégico en que China había materializado su inserción internacional como instrumento para contener al comunismo soviético. La forma subordinada en que la antigua URSS fue incorporada al sistema mundial generó una convergencia de fuerzas políticas en Estados Unidos (EUA), Taiwán y dentro de China para intentar hacer lo propio con la República Popular China, aprovechando las tensiones sociales derivadas del crecimiento económico del país y la división dentro de su élite política (Visentini, 2012).
En este contexto surge el “movimiento por la democracia” liderado por Zhao Ziyang, en el que participaron estudiantes, jóvenes empresarios y los “ultrarreformistas” del Partido Comunista Chino (PCC) que desembocó en las masivas movilizaciones de Tianamen en 1989 que, aunque contaron con el apoyo de intereses extranjeros y de la prensa internacional en sus demandas de una “democracia liberal”, fueron reprimidos por los “neoautoritarios”, encabezados por Deng Xiaoping, quienes apelaron al ejército (Visentini, 2012).
Así mismo, durante la guerra del golfo, China adoptó una postura diplomática basada en los principios de autodeterminación y regionalmente buscó restablecer relaciones con Vietnam, Corea del Sur, mejorar sus relaciones con India e intensificar la cooperación con Rusia en materia económica y estratégica. Al tiempo que EUA y Europa adoptaban un tono crítico con su estrategia de desarrollo económico, su régimen político y los derechos de minorías étnicas, concretamente del Tíbet; imponiéndole embargos comerciales, financieros y tecnológico-militares. En esa coyuntura y una vez neutralizada la oposición interna, el gobierno chino mantuvo las reformas económicas, el “sistema político socialista” bajo la premisa de este no es incompatible con una “economía de mercado” (Visentini, 2012). La idea de Deng Xiaoping de un socialismo con características propias triunfó en el XIV Congreso del PCC de 1992, al tiempo que la economía creció a tasas superiores el 10% (Visentini, 2012).
A finales de los noventa, ante la reunificación de China y Hong Kong, y en medio de la profunda crisis económica y financiera que afectó a Japón, Indonesia, Corea del Sur y Tailandia, los Estados Unidos promovieron “alianzas antichina” en Asia; revivieron la cuestión de Taiwán y fortalecieron el independentismo en el Tíbet; instalaron un sistema antimisiles en Asia oriental, involucrando a Taiwán, Japón y Corea del Sur (Visentini, 2012).
En la primera década del siglo XXI, China con Hu Jintao continúo la pretensión de los gobiernos anteriores de construir un orden internacional “multipolar” y fortalecer a la ONU. Buscando conquistar el nivel de “grande potencia” priorizó los lazos con América Latina, África y medio Oriente en la búsqueda de recursos energéticos y materias primas indispensables para sostener su crecimiento económico. De allí que aumentara su influencia económica en Latinoamérica, sustituyendo a Estados Unidos como principal socio comercial de países como Brasil (Agencia Brasil, 2017; Visentini, 2012). Las relaciones con Taiwán si bien tuvieron una dinámica más positiva, continuaron atravesadas por la desconfianza en materia de seguridad pues, mientras China amenazó a la isla con misiles balísticos de corto alcance; Washington, en virtud de la Taiwan Relations Act, se convirtió en su principal aliado y proveedor de armamento (Visentini, 2012).
En la esfera regional China ha procurado afianzar sus relaciones con los países vecinos y consolidar su influencia en Asia, lo que despierta el recelo de Japón e India; tensiones que a su vez remiten a las disputas territoriales por las islas Senkaku-Diaoyu y los arrecifes de Okinotori, y por las regiones en disputa en Kashimira y Arunachal Pradesh, respectivamente (Kaplan, 2013; Visentini, 2012). A lo anterior se suma la propia disputa por petróleo y gas para sostener su crecimiento económico y sus objetivos de política externa (Cepik, 2009). De allí que, tanto China como India, hayan modernizado sus fuerzas armadas; mientras la disputa regional se torna más compleja por la presencia de Estados Unidos en Asia, que se ha valido de Japón e India para contener a China (Visentini, 2012).
Mientras tanto, la estrategia de China ha consistido en “ganar tiempo”, fortaleciendo su economía, tecnología y fuerzas armadas para sostener su desarrollo económico y, en el largo plazo, transformar el sistema internacional (Visentini, 2012). Con la llegada de la “Quinta Generación” de dirigentes que tienen como directriz mantener el régimen modernizándolo. Con Xi Jinping, presidente desde 2013, el país ha continuado el proceso de modernización militar con el objeto de aumentar su potencial disuasivo y mantener la estabilidad regional, esto ha conllevado modificaciones doctrinarias, reemplazando el concepto de “guerra popular” y “defensa del territorio” por el de “guerra local”, con la utilización intensiva de alta tecnología. Así mismo, redujo un tercio los efectivos del Ejército. Trasformaciones que apuntan a solventar sus principales problemas de seguridad: los separatismos en el Tíbet y en Xinjiang; la proyección y fortalecimiento de su marina en el mar del sur, garantizando su “seguridad energética”, considerando que el 80% del petróleo que importa pasa por el estrecho de Malaca (Visentini, 2012). Por su parte, Kaplan (2013) sostiene que el fortalecimiento del poder naval chino apunta a recuperar el Pacífico y el Índico como parte de su geografía. No resulta casual entonces que China tenga el segundo mayor gasto bélico del mundo con US$228.000 millones en 2017 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [Sipri], 2018).
En 2013, Xi Jinping, al participar en el XVI encuentro de Asean-China, en un discurso sobre cooperación en infraestructura y seguridad regional en el Parlamento de Indonesia, anunció su principal iniciativa de política exterior: Obor (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016). Esta propone desarrollar dos corredores: Uno terrestre o franja económica que articula a China, Mongolia y Rusia; China-Asia Central; China, Paquistán; China, Myanmar-Bangladesh-India y Asean y China, Corea del Sur y Japón. Y una ruta marítima que va desde la costa china hasta el mar Mediterráneo pasando por el océano Indico y el golfo Pérsico (Concatti, 2017).
Este proyecto de integración transcontinental, planeado hasta 2049 y que ya alcanza regiones como América Latina (Escobar, 2018) y Oceanía; aglutina actualmente el 66% de la población mundial; 75% de las reservas de energía e inversiones del orden de 1.3 trillones de dólares (Concatti, 2017, p. 178).
Sin embargo, los ambiciosos planes chinos en el ámbito de Obor encuentran desafíos importantes: conflictos por recursos naturales, problemas ambientales, activismos de organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG) ambientales extranjeras y sabotaje de grupos extremistas; desestabilización y crisis económicas; inseguridad jurídica e inversiones con retorno de largo plazo (Concatti, 2017; Yiwei, 2016). Esto para no mencionar la dificultad que tiene Beijing para conciliar los intereses muchas veces de los contratantes, de más de seis decenas de países en sus principales focos geográficos Asia central y el sudeste asiático (Ploberger, 2017).
2. LOS CAMINOS DE LA RUTA DE LA SEDA: FRANJA TERRESTRE Y RUTA MARÍTIMA; NATURALEZA, PRINCIPIOS, EJES DE ACTUACIÓN E INSTITUCIONALIDAD
La nueva Ruta de la Seda es una iniciativa que apunta a la integración de Eurasia posicionando a China como “pivó” y que se extiende hasta África, Europa y Medio Oriente (Pautasso, & Ungaretti, 2016; Visentini, 2012). Esto, en un contexto en que Moscú pierde su antigua influencia en el Sureste Asiático; Japón pierde su lugar como polo económico en Asia oriental y Washington concentra su poder militar en oriente medio (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016).
China tiene a favor su peso económico como responsable del 11% del consumo mundial de petróleo; 54% del consumo de aluminio y 45% del consumo de acero (Scherer (2015), citado por Pautasso & Ungaretti, (2016)); un desarrollo que luego de tres décadas se refleja en sus “capacidades estatales”, ello la impulsan a buscar un equilibrio entre sus prioridades internas: crecimiento económico, estabilidad política e integridad territorial y una mayor influencia internacional (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016).
En lo relativo a su papel internacional, aunque el protagonismo chino en las instituciones de gobernanza global viene creciendo desde la apertura económica de finales de los setenta, se ha intensificado en la última década en la medida en que su extraordinario auge económico y la crisis de 2008 abrieron oportunidades para que la noción de “ascenso pacífico”, promulgada en 2003, fuera sustituida por “el sueño chino”, directriz aprobada en el XVIII Congreso del Partido Comunista Chino (PCC) celebrado en 2012 y que se orienta a apuntalar una nueva arquitectura financiera global y la construcción de la nueva Ruta de la Seda (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016).
Concretamente, Obor propone: atravesar Asia, Europa y África conectando Asia oriental con Europa. Para tal efecto contempla el denominado Cinturón Económico que conecta China a Asia central, Rusia y Europa (Báltico); conectando también a China con el golfo Pérsico y el mar Mediterráneo mediante Asia central y Asia oriental; para, por otro lado, conectar a China con el sudeste asiático, Asia meridional y el océano Indico. La ruta marítima, por su parte, integra dos rutas: China a Europa desde el mar del Sur de China y el océano Índico; China, Pacífico sur y mar del Sur de China (CNRD, 2015 citado por Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016).
De acuerdo con estas cinco rutas, y partiendo de la infraestructura logística, actualmente existente un conjunto de ciudades y puertos importantes. Obor pretende potenciar seis “corredores económicos internacionales”: a) China-Mongolia-Rusia; b) New Eurasian Land Bridge; c) China-Asia Central-Asia Occidental; d) Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar; e) China-Península Indochina; f) China-Paquistán (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016). Ver mapa 1.
MAPA 1: CORREDORES ECONÓMICOS INTERNACIONALES
Fuente: Pautasso & Ungaretti (2016)
En última instancia, según Pautasso y Ungaretti (2016), Obor se orienta a crear una red de transportes y a modernizar y crear infraestructura: ferrovías, carreteras, puertos, aeropuertos, gasoductos, oleoductos y líneas de transmisión y comunicación que, además de mejorar la integración en Eurasia, potenciarán un mercado que aglutina 64 países, 4.400 millones de personas, un PIB de 21 trillones de dólares y 29% de la producción global. Al mismo tiempo, Obor revela la “visión estratégica” de Beijing no solo para conducir la integración de Eurasia sino para responder a los siguientes desafíos: limitar la penetración estadounidense en la región a través del Acuerdo Transpacífico en revisión por la administración Trump; limitar amenazas a su seguridad, evitar el separatismo, contener el fundamentalismo y terrorismo de matriz islamita en el oeste chino; al igual que disputas territoriales como las que enfrenta en el mar del Sur de China; consolidar la internacionalización de su economía mediante obras de infraestructura en el exterior y de la creación de bancos multilaterales de desarrollo; y, por último, crear un mercado para su industria, diversificar sus rutas de importación de recursos energéticos y ampliar su suministro (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016).
Para tal fin impulsa “proyectos regionales” de infraestructura. Es el caso del corredor económico entre China y Paquistán (CPEC) en el que sobresale la hidroeléctrica de Karot en el río Jhelum, la explotación carbonífera y la construcción de plantas de energía solar y eólica; la modernización de la ferrovía de Karakoram y la construcción del puerto de Gwadar (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016). Este último considerado “cabeza de puente” de la nueva Ruta de la Seda fue inaugurado recientemente en su primera fase.
También está el corredor Bangladesh-China-India y Myanmar para la terminación de una estructura multimodal de 2800 kilómetros entre Kunming en el sur de China y Kolkata en el noreste de India3. Aparece igualmente el corredor China-Asia Central-Asia Occidental, en él se destaca un tren de alta velocidad entre Urumqi (Xinjiang) en el noroeste chino y Alemania. Así mismo, está el corredor entre China e Indochina que reduce los costos logísticos de Indonesia, Filipinas, Camboya y Myanmar al potenciar la integración económica de la parte continental del sudeste asiático conectándose luego con los “trechos marítimos” y utilizando la plataforma política de la sub región de Gran Mekong (GMS) mecanismo que complementa la zona de libre comercio China-Asean y está compuesto por Camboya, China, Laos, Myanmar, Tailandia y Vietnam (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016; Vov World, 2018).
En la región de Mekong también China ha impulsado la hidroeléctrica de Sambor Dam en Camboya; obra que, de acuerdo con ONG estadounidenses y del gobierno vietnamita, tendría impactos negativos ambientales y sociales (Sputnik, 2018; Vov World, 2018). Al tiempo que la complementación de la red férrea de la región, articulando la Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) y conectando Kunming en China con Singapur. En general, la proyección China para esta región genera cooperación y conflicto con India (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016).
Otros proyectos chinos se encaminaron a la creación y modernización de puertos en Sri Lanka, Myanmar y Bangladesh. En el primer caso, sobresale el desarrollo del puerto de Hambantota. En Myanmar se destaca el puerto de Kyaukphyu que conecta con el océano Índico ofreciendo una alternativa para la importación de energía que hoy debe pasar por el estrecho de Malaca; aprovechando la red de oleoductos y gasoductos existentes entre la costa de Myanmar y Nanning en China. A lo anterior se suma la creación de una Zona Económica Especial en la provincia de Rakhine (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016). En Bangladesh los proyectos más importantes apuntan al puerto de Chittagong y la construcción de autopistas y vías férreas entre China y Bangladesh (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016).
Obor también alcanza la costa oriental de África en donde hay una intensa actuación del empresariado chino. China Communication Construction Company (CCCC) trabaja en la expansión del puesto de Lamu en Kenia; el 23,5% del estratégico puerto de Yibuti en el cuerno de África opera bajo control de China Merchants Holding (International) Company Ltd (CMCH); también China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) trabaja en la construcción del nuevo puerto en Bagamoyo (Tanzania) y en el puerto de Maputo (Mozambique); mientras en la operación del terminal de cargas del puerto de Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) actúa Hutchins Port Holdings Ltd (HPH) (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016; Putten & Mejinders, 2015). Y también en puertos de la costa occidental africana, como: Kribi (Camerún), Libreville (Gabón) y Tema (Togo). Finalmente, la construcción de vías férreas y carreteras conectando occidente-oriente apunta a favorecer el comercio intra-africano y a integrar las economías del continente con la economía mundial y principalmente, con China (LIM, 2015).
De acuerdo con el gobierno chino Obor busca relaciones “win-win” y desarrolla los “Principios de Coexistencia Pacífica”; es decir, en el respeto mutuo por la soberanía e integridad territorial, no agresión mutua, no interferencia en los asuntos internos de otros países, igualdad y beneficio mutuo, que son las bases de su política exterior (Chinese Embassy, 2014). De allí que, como afirma Yiwei (2016) citado por Pautasso y Ungaretti (2016), a diferencia de la globalización tradicional, Obor tendría un carácter más inclusivo que se traduce en los “cinco factores de conectividad”: comunicación política; conectividad de infraestructura; comercio sin obstáculos; circulación monetaria y entendimiento entre personas. Así mismo, es importante advertir que el énfasis de las inversiones chinas prioriza el desarrollo nacional, mientras las políticas neoliberales ponen el foco en el ajuste y acaban profundizando el espiral recesivo y la desigualdad (Bandeira, 2016).
Pese a lo anterior, en países claves dentro de los macroproyectos (González, 2018) hay preocupación por el nivel de endeudamiento con China, lo que constituye un desafío para el Soft Power del gigante asiático (Ebbinghausen, 2018).
En Maldivas el gobierno del presidente Ibrahim Solih ha puesto en el centro del debate este asunto contrastando con su antecesor el prochino Abdulla Yameen, acusado de corrupción en los contratos de infraestructura. En el caso de Pakistán, la cercanía de este país con los intereses chinos no ha impedido que surjan cuestionamientos sobre el desbordamiento de los costos financieros de los compromisos con China, a lo que se agrega la violencia del separatista Ejército de Liberación de Baluchistan (BLA) que combate la presencia china en esa provincia del sudoeste del país, rica en recursos energéticos y donde se asienta el puerto de Gwadar (Hassan, 2018). En Sri Lanka, la inconformidad se expresa tanto frente los niveles de endeudamiento como a la tasa de interés, situación que ha dado lugar a evidentes muestras de descontento frente a Obor, como la que tomó las calles de Colombo en 2015 (Macan, 2019). Este sentimiento de animadversión frente a los proyectos chinos en la población también es fuerte en Camboya (Ebbighausen, 2018), pese a que su primer ministro Hun Sen, en el poder desde 1998, es aliado de Beijing. Algo similar ocurre en Djibuoti, Kirguistán, Laos y Tayikistán (González, 2018).
Para apalancar las inversiones de sus 900 proyectos (Concatti, 2017), en 2014 se creó el fondo para la Obor con 40 billones de dólares. Al mismo tiempo, China se consolida internacionalmente como exportador de inversión extranjera directa (IED), solventando el déficit de inversiones en infraestructura desde la crisis de 2008 en los países en desarrollo. En tal sentido, El Global McKinsey Institute estimó en 2016 que las necesidades de desarrollo en infraestructura de los países emergentes son del orden de US$ 3,3 trillones anuales hasta el 2030 (Díaz, 2017).
Instituciones como el Asian Infraestructure Investment Bank (AIIB), creado en 2008 con la participación de 4 miembros del G-7, sobre el que Estados Unidos no tiene control directo, cuyo común denominador es atender a la demanda de inversión en infraestructura estimada en unos US$800.000 millones anuales en Asia y el Pacífico (ADB, 2016); el China Development Bank (CDB); China-African Development Bank (CADB), New Development Bank (NDB) o Banco de los Brics; son las bases de Obor; pero también de una nueva arquitectura financiera con que Beijing cuestiona las instituciones de Bretton Woods y empieza a perfilarse como un revisionist power en términos de la gobernanza global (Ploberger, 2017; Vadell & Ramos, 2015). De este modo es evidente el creciente papel de China como “pivó” de los procesos de integración en Asia y sus propósitos de conformar un “sistema regional chinocéntrico” a partir del cual, consolidando su influencia en el este de Asia, podría influenciar la nueva configuración del poder mundial (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016). Lo anterior, como ya se anotó, a partir de sus abundantes capacidades en términos de reservas internacionales; industrias básicas concretamente cementeras, siderúrgicas con gran capacidad productiva, y un impresionante know-how en ingeniería en general, que vienen al encuentro de las necesidades de cualquier país en desarrollo en aspectos como infraestructura de transporte, comunicaciones y energía, principalmente en Asia central y sudeste y sur de Asia (Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2016).
3. ASIA CENTRAL: RECURSOS E IMPORTANCIA ESTRATÉGICA PARA CHINA
De modo general, la región de Eurasia es importante en términos geopolíticos por sus recursos energéticos y por su importancia logística (López, s.f.). Dentro de este territorio sobresale lo que Mackinder llamó la Heartland (Dougherty, 2003), que va desde Europa oriental hasta los confines de Asia oriental. De norte a sur se extiende desde la línea del Círculo Ártico hasta los desiertos y montañas del sur de Asia (López, s.f.). Así mismo, Eurasia posee importantes cuerpos de agua como el mar Báltico, el mar Negro, el mar Caspio y el golfo Pérsico. Por su parte, el Heartland o área pivote es una región interior casi inaccesible por medios navales, excepto por los mares Báltico y Negro; protegida por el norte por nieve y hielo y por el sur por desiertos y montañas (López, s.f.).
Según Mackinder, la potencia que controle el Heartland dominará, así mismo, la Isla Mundial que engloba Europa, Asia y África y tendría la mayor capacidad para proyectar poder a nivel global (Dougherty, 2003). De acuerdo con Brzezinski, citado por López (s.f.), los tres frentes claves para dominar Eurasia son el territorio ubicado en el extremo oeste en la división entre Europa oriental y occidental; extremo oriente particularmente, Asia oriental y en tercer lugar el suroeste de Eurasia desde los límites entre India y China hasta Asia central y meridional. Llegando incluso a Irán. De modo que cada uno de estos frentes tiene “Estados pinos” o Estados claves que, en virtud de sus recursos, localización estratégica o influencia política, pero también de sus vulnerabilidades militares o económicas, son atraídos por la influencia de potencias mayores (López, s.f.). De suerte que la articulación de estos Estados en regiones como Asia central o el sudeste asiático impulsan la consolidación de la esfera de influencia china (López, s.f.).
En este sentido, conforme con Mackinder, la dominación de Eurasia a comienzos del siglo XX se hizo posible en virtud de los avances tecnológicos en el transporte terrestre y fundamentalmente del ferrocarril (Dougherty, 2003). Como se anotó, Eurasia posee importantes recursos energéticos (Ver Cuadro 1) y si a esta importancia estratégica se le agrega una red eficiente de infraestructura y la “proyección de influencia” por parte de Beijing, lo que le facilita a su vez el acceso a los recursos energéticos de oriente medio que ostenta el 48% de las reservas mundiales de petróleo, es posible afirmar que China tiene claro en su estrategia que el acceso de recursos energéticos es un factor de poder y que a esta racionalidad responde Obor (López, s.f.).
TABLA 1: RESERVAS GLOBALES DE PETRÓLEO 2005-2015 EN MILLONES DE BARRILES
Nota: Recuperado de A Nova Rota da Seda: a fundamentação geopolítica e as consequências estratégicas do projeto chinês. Copyright por Ricardo López.
A su vez, Ploberger (2017) afirma que la emergencia de una interdependiente y conectada Eurasia transformaría la política global. De suerte que, Asia central como corazón de Eurasia, es uno de los objetivos cruciales para China (Ploberger, 2017), que como se dijo antes, en virtud de su dinamismo económico busca revivir su pasado de grandeza representado en la figura del almirante Zheng He, desarrollando nuevas ambiciones hacia una mayor proyección global derivadas, en parte, de nuevas “inseguridades” (Kaplan, 2013), pues, por ejemplo, Beijing debe proteger sus inversiones al otro lado del Índico: mercados de petróleo en Sudán, Angola y Nigeria; minas de hierro en Zambia y Gabón; al igual que cobre y cobalto en la República Democrática del Congo (Kaplan, 2013).
Esta necesidad de satisfacer su “interés nacional” la impulsa a establecer relaciones con sus vecinos y con regiones más distantes como el África subsahariana, en procura de asegurar, por ejemplo, acceso al mar del Sur de China y el océano Índico como conexión con el golfo Pérsico, garantizando el suministro estable de los recursos estratégicos para sostener su crecimiento económico (Kaplan, 2013).
Así las cosas, el “área de influencia” china en Eurasia y África viene creciendo mediante una estrategia pragmática basada en la idea de cooperación y desarrollo, compatible con la globalización que contrasta con la “actitud misionera norteamericana”. De modo que, con tan solo solventar sus necesidades materiales, China ha modificado el “equilibrio de poder” en el hemisferio oriental haciendo que su interés por moldear un “sistema regional chinocéntrico” choque con EUA, India y Rusia (Kaplan, 2013).
Es así como actualmente China, en virtud de sus intereses comerciales y de seguridad, compite en Asia central con Moscú que mediante la Unión Económica Euroasiática intenta mantener bajo su área de influencia a los Estados herederos del imperio Timurida (1370-1607) y de la Unión Soviética, que hoy están en un proceso de construcción de Estado-nación (Ploberger, 2017).
De suerte que, desde antes de Obor, ya Beijing venía aumentando su influencia en esta región con la construcción de un oleoducto que transporta petróleo desde el mar Caspio, pasando por Kazajistan hasta Sinkiang, la provincia más occidental de China; y un gasoducto que lleva gas natural desde la frontera con Turkmenistán y Uzbequistán hasta Sinkiang, atravesando por Uzbekistán y Kazajistán (Kaplan, 2013).
La estabilización de las fronteras continentales de China ha resuelto, en buena medida, una de las tradicionales preocupaciones de seguridad, como cuando sufría la presión del ejército soviético en Manchuria o las invasiones terrestres que en la antigüedad llevaron a la construcción de la Gran Muralla (Kaplan, 2013); esta mayor estabilidad, le ha permitido direccionar sus recursos hacia la transformación de sus Fuerzas Armadas y al fortalecimiento de sus capacidades navales, concretamente al mar del Sur de China y al océano Índico, como ya se ha podido señalar.
4. OBOR EL DILEMA DE INDIA
Cepik (2009) aborda la cuestión de la distribución de poder en las distintas regiones del planeta partiendo de los complejos regionales de seguridad identificados por Buzan y Waever, en el sur de Asia (subcontinente indio) las capacidades militares de India y Pakistán definen una distribución regional de poder bipolar, aunque se trata de una bipolaridad asimétrica. De allí que, en esta región, las principales dinámicas de seguridad son interregionales, pues desde el fin de la guerra fría, y en virtud de su acelerado crecimiento económico, la mayor preocupación de la India es consolidarse como potencia regional; aspiración que, desde el punto de vista logístico, le exige resolver cuestiones como: el acceso a los mercados del este asiático; controlar el paso por el Índico; acceso al petróleo del medio oriente y la expansión del uso de energía nuclear (Cepik, 2009). De allí que, India busque mantener relaciones comerciales con Rusia en materia de equipos bélicos; negociar acuerdos con los países de Asean; evitar una disputa directa con China; y mantener alianzas con Estados Unidos y Japón orientadas a “contrabalancear” a China y Pakistán (Cepik, 2009; Ploberger, 2017).
Este es el contexto de seguridad en el que deben ser entendidas las críticas de India en relación con Obor argumentando que socava su soberanía e integridad territorial, The Times of India (2018) impulsa una conectividad “unilateral” y no es suficientemente transparente en términos de los detalles operacionales (Concatti, 2017, p. 180).
Al mismo tiempo, India es quizás el mayor ejemplo de los desafíos enfrentados por la Obor, a pesar de las oportunidades que el proyecto ofrece para sus socios en términos de infraestructura y desarrollo económico. En especial, tomando en cuenta las propias ambiciones geopolíticas. Por esto la participación de este reluctant partner dentro de la Ruta de la Seda tiene varias razones: India ve con recelo que Obor incremente la influencia China en el sur de Asia, “área geográfica”, que Nueva Delhi percibe como parte de su “área de influencia” (Ploberger, 2017, p. 299) lo que conduciría a una alteración de la dinámica geoestratégica y del statu quo en Asia (Concatti, 2017).
Parte de esta desconfianza apunta al corredor marítimo de Obor, pues sus costas sobre ambos lados del océano Índico, una de las zonas de vital importancia para China y razón por la cual proyecta construir una red de puertos a través de los cuales vincular el noreste, sudeste y sur de Asia con la península arábiga, el golfo Pérsico, África oriental y el Mediterráneo (Concatti, 2017). Siendo conveniente retomar el hecho de que como se advirtió más arriba, el principal interés de Beijing responde a proyectar poder naval para fundamentar la seguridad regional; una de las razones por las que, en el futuro cercano, podría disputar el control del Pacífico con Estados Unidos (BBC News Mundo, 2017).
Un buen ejemplo de esta proyección estratégica china es la base de Yibuti, localizada en el cuerno de África y que tras ser inaugurada en 2017 constituye su primera base militar en el extranjero (Fontdegloria, 2017). Con unos 10.000 efectivos, Yibuti es el mayor complejo militar en toda el África occidental y entre otras capacidades, posee condiciones para operar sistemas no tripulados Wing Loong con alcance en todo el golfo de Adén, el cuerno de África y la península Arábiga. La construcción de esta base respondió a los ataques terroristas en Mali y a la crisis en Libia en 2011; pero principalmente, busca asegurar la estabilidad en la región de Adén debido a los intereses económicos y energéticos de Beijing en el golfo, es decir: proteger sus inversiones en la región; proyectarse económicamente en África occidental y salvaguardar la libre navegación por el estrecho de Bab el Mandeb. Del mismo modo, Yibuti es parte del denominado “collar de perlas” (Fontdegloria, 2017) con que China extiende su presencia militar a lo largo de las rutas de transporte de petróleo del océano Índico y el mar del sur de China y a la vez complemento de Obor en el propósito de conectar Europa y China por Asia central y África (Sánchez & Palacian, 2018; Zhou, 2014). Ver Mapa 2
MAPA 2: CHINA CONSTRUYE UN COLLAR DE PERLAS EN EL SUBCONTINENTE
Fuentes: Elaboración propia a partir de Sánchez y Palacian (2018).
Otra cuestión problemática para India en relación con Obor alude a la estrecha relación entre Beijing e Islamabad y, en particular, al corredor económico China-Paquistán al que se hizo referencia más arriba y que atraviesa territorios en disputa: Cachemira, Gilgit-Belistan y Balochistan ocupados por Pakistán (Concatti, 2017). Este corredor se localiza en un paso estratégico que tensa las históricamente conflictivas relaciones con Paquistán.
Vale recordar que como señala Cepik (2009) en el plano regional a pesar de la debilidad relativa de Pakistán las guerras indo-pakistaníes de 1947, 1965 y 1971, y las frecuentes disputas “militarizadas” indican la continuidad de esta rivalidad como la principal fuente de tensión en el subcontinente indio. Mientras Pakistán presiona militarmente a su vecino en Cachemira, desarrolla armas nucleares o apoya guerrillas maoístas (Naxalitas) que operan en el nordeste y este de la India. Nueva Delhi hace lo propio, poniendo en alerta sus fuerzas armadas, desarrollando armas termonucleares o apoyando grupos insurgentes separatistas en Sind, Baluchistán y Waziristán (Cepik, 2009). Aunque China argumenta que el corredor con Pakistán permitiría también mejorar su conectividad con India en el oriente, este país ve con inquietud que las inversiones chinas por unos 46.000 millones de dólares para la construcción de infraestructura como el puerto de Gwadar (France 24, 2017), podrían darle a Pakistán una posición de superioridad en materia logística al paso que Beijing conseguiría otra ruta para sus exportaciones hacia Europa y África (Concatti, 2017). Gwadar no solo es estratégico para China en términos del comercio internacional de petróleo y gas, pues también le garantizaría una presencia naval permanente entre el occidente del océano Índico y el golfo de Omán (Concatti, 2017), por donde circula el 30% del petróleo (Espinosa, 2010) que se comercializa en el mundo, lo que también es motivo de desconfianza para India, máxime si se considera el peso histórico de su conflicto con China en 1962. A este factor de largo plazo se suma que tras la llegada del nacionalista Narendra Modi al gobierno en 2014 la desconfianza hacia su vecino ha aumentado considerablemente (Concatti, 2017).
Un importante incentivo para India, en relación con Obor, es el acceso a importantes inversiones en infraestructura con los que podría desarrollar económicamente su región noreste, territorio relativamente pobre y donde se sitúa Arunachal Pradeshen disputado con China (Lima, 2018), que se beneficiaría mediante el corredor económico Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (Ploberger, 2017). En el nordeste indio, China invertiría 22.000 millones de dólares en la construcción de un puerto en Calcuta impulsando la apertura económica de esta región (Concatti, 2017).
En el marco de Obor, China tiene intenciones de explotar en India sectores como infraestructura ferroviaria; construir una red eléctrica ligando Tíbet, Nepal y la India; impulsar el sector inmobiliario, manufacturas y comercio electrónico. Por ello, mientras el gobierno intenta maniobrar entre las presiones y la persuasión de los chinos, su empresariado parece más receptivo a aprovechar las oportunidades que surgen con la Franja y la Ruta en áreas como ingeniería ligera, bienes de consumo, servicios profesionales y energías renovables (Concatti, 2017, p. 184).
Adicionalmente, hay que advertir que las inversiones chinas mejorarían la conectividad entre India y Asean coincidiendo uno de los objetivos estratégicos de Nueva Delhi (Ploberger, 2017). Como quiera que sea, India tiene en el sudeste asiático un “compromiso económico y una presencia” importante de tiempo atrás en áreas como comercio, cultura y conectividad; relación que ha venido aumentando su perfil desde 2012 cuando alcanzó el nivel de Asociación Estratégica (Concatti, 2017, p. 181). Esta relación con Asean tal y como también ocurre con China, continua ganando intensidad a medida que se profundiza el proteccionismo de la administración Trump (Almoguera, 2018). De hecho, para la India tal acercamiento busca ampliar el Acuerdo de Libre Comercio vigente con Asean, incluyendo servicios e inversiones (Ploberger, 2017).
Esta aproximación se tradujo en un cambio en la política exterior india, pues la antigua Look East policy cambió para una compleja estrategia que contempla, tanto la dimensión bilateral como multilateral que el gobierno Modi formalizó bajo la “Act East Policy”, respondiendo al hecho de que el comercio de la India con el este y sudeste asiático ahora supera los intercambios con Estados Unidos y Europa (Ploberger, 2017).
A pesar de la importancia de las relaciones con Asean, cuando se observa la postura de India frente a Obor, es importante advertir que su prioridad se dirige a garantizar la estabilidad en el sur de Asia, región en donde China ha tenido una exitosa inserción; mientras su proyección hacia el Este asiático tendría carácter secundario, en el evento que la situación en el sur de Asia se deteriore (Ploberger, 2017). Los recientes incidentes militares en Cachemira y sus consecuencias, junto a su limitado poder económico, son factores condicionantes de su potencial avance indio hacia el este (Ploberger, 2017).
Finalmente, la ambivalencia de India frente a Obor alude, por un lado, a evitar una participación subordinada a los intereses de China, pero al mismo tiempo a que si opta por marginarse, y Obor tiene éxito, comprometería tanto sus ambiciones en relación con Asean e incluso su mismo rol dentro del sur de Asia, su espacio geográfico por excelencia (Ploberger, 2017).
5. ALGUNAS CONSIDERACIONES CONCLUSIVAS SOBRE LA PROYECCIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE CHINA Y SU IMPACTO EN LATINOAMÉRICA Y COLOMBIA
Desde 2013, China muestra una postura más activa en el escenario internacional y una estrategia de largo plazo que parte de la importancia del Estado nacional y que amalgama sus propósitos nacionales a una retórica globalista por parte de sus autoridades, para aprovechar la actual coyuntura en favor de una diplomacia afincada en los principios de coexistencia pacífica, pero remozada por el nuevo pensamiento sintetizado en el “Sueño chino”.
Este capítulo ha pretendido mostrar que el ascenso chino tiene bases que se remontan a las reformas modernizadoras de finales de los años setenta; describe la manera en que Beijing pretende integrar África, Asia y Europa consolidando su conectividad e infraestructura, y usar en su beneficio la importancia logística y estratégica de Asia central. Propósito que, como se mostró, no está exento de obstáculos tanto económicos como políticos. De esta manera, Obor se constituye hoy en la principal guía de inserción externa de China con claros objetivos de orden doméstico, articulados a su proyección geoeconómica y geopolítica que es lo que genera recelo y conflictos con terceros países, como sucede con la India.
Hoy el gigante asiático tiene la voluntad y las capacidades materiales para concretar su going abroad, buscando internacionalizar sus empresas públicas y privadas; crear una demanda externa para sus enormes excedentes industriales, tecnológicos y de capital; fomentar mercados en regiones como Asia central. Cuatro décadas de sólido crecimiento le permiten jugar en varios niveles, desde impulsar Obor con sus corredores terrestres y ruta de navegación conectando el nordeste de su territorio hasta Holanda, pasando por oriente medio y el oriente de África; afianzar su peso político con la integración de Eurasia; crear nuevos mecanismos de financiamiento internacional y regional encabezados por instituciones como AIIB, CDB y el NDB, todo esto acompañado de un fortalecimiento y modernización de su marina para desarrollar un despliegue en el mar de China y el océano Índico a través del dispositivo militar del “collar de perlas”, garantizando seguridad a su comercio y flujo de recursos energéticos desde Hainán hasta el cuerno de África.
Todo lo anterior, se orienta no a substituir súbitamente a Estados Unidos como primera potencia mundial, sino a consolidar su hegemonía en el este de Asia, tarea nada fácil considerando la presencia estadounidense y los intereses de Japón, Corea del Sur, Australia e India.
En este contexto, cobra especial importancia la invitación del presidente chino a los países latinoamericanos para sumarse a Obor; propuesta que no solo se promueve como mutuamente beneficiosa en términos, por ejemplo, de la interconectividad de infraestructuras, desarrollando líneas de transporte que articularían los litorales chinos con las costas suramericanas. Invitación que ya ha sido aceptada por Panamá, Antigua y Barbuda, Trinidad y Tobago, Guyana y Bolivia, esta última con la expectativa de un corredor bioceánico que pasaría por su territorio (Lissardy, 2018).
En el caso de Colombia y como plantean Cepero y Moreno (2013), las relaciones comerciales han mostrado un reciente dinamismo lo cual se traduce en un intercambio que alcanza los 12,9 miles de millones de dólares (Embajada de Colombia en China, 2019); que, sin embargo, coexiste con una balanza comercial desfavorable y una oferta exportadora limitada al petróleo y el carbón (Clavijo, 2018).
Este dinamismo tiene ejemplos palpables como el caso de “convergencia cultural” de la multinacional Mansarovar Energy (integrada por Sinopec de China y ONGC Videsh de India), la quinta compañía más importante del sector, con proyecciones de triplicar su producción petrolera en el país llegando a 130 mil barriles diarios en 2020 (Pinto, 2016; Portafolio, 2015).
Paralelamente, Colombia podría beneficiarse con inversiones chinas actuando como plataforma exportadora del país asiático hacia Estados Unidos con cero arancel y menores costos de transporte en sectores como calzado, productos metalmecánicos, manufacturas plásticas, artículos de cuero, utensilios de cocina, papel, autopartes y muebles (Portafolio, 2012).
Así mismo, en el marco de la Alianza Pacífico, y en el plano bilateral, puede buscar desde dinamizar y equilibrar su comercio, hasta acceder a capital y tecnología para desarrollar la pobre infraestructura del Pacífico, lo que incluye desarrollar la logística del transporte multimodal. De esta manera, a través de una política exterior más asertiva y diversificada, Colombia podría posicionar su interés nacional en el marco de la estrategia compleja y parsimoniosa con que China viene posicionándose en el este asiático y transformando el juego de poder internacional.
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2. INDIA’S ECONOMIC CORRIDORS AND SUB-REGIONAL CONNECTIVITY: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS
PANKAJ K JHA
ABSTRACT
India’s economic approach, particularly after adopting liberalized economic measures in the early 1990s, was aimed at liberalizing markets and promoting private investment and industrial production. In the last decade (2008-2018) the focus has been on building economic linkages and developing regional and intra-regional economic corridors, so that the benefits of development, trade and investment can reach a greater number of people. This would also promote consumption and employment. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, Narendra Modi had also proposed issues related to integrating manufacturing and production centers across India and also promoting development of small airports, ports and highway networks so that production and manufacturing can be accelerated. The proposals such as Security and Growth for All in the Region (under the acronym SAGAR) and also the integration of ports through Sagarmala (String for Oceans) within the country are aimed at envisaging India as one economic entity under similar development patterns. Among the other integrated highway networks, Golden Quadrilateral (connecting the four corners of the country through a highway network), river linking plan to promote inland waterways, and also sub regional integration with neighbors through the BCIM1, India-Thailand, Myanmar Trilateral Highway network, BBIN2 transport network. Promoting the Special Economic Zones and Export Processing Zones includes developing Greenfield airports, dry inland ports, storage and warehousing facilities and the projection of a futuristic economic development plan. Additionally, the vision for integrating the Indian production centers as well as integrating regional value chains is meant to promote Indian exports and enhance border trade with the neighboring countries. This paper outlines the initiatives and the challenges that need to be addressed in this context.
Key Words: Economic Corridors, India, South Asia, Sub-regional Connectivity, Infrastructure.
RESUMEN
El enfoque económico de la India, después de adoptar medidas de libertad económica a principios de la década de 1990, tenía como objetivo abrir el mercado, promover la inversión privada y la producción industrial. En la última década (2008-2018), el énfasis se ha puesto en la creación de vínculos económicos y en el desarrollo de corredores económicos regionales e intrarregionales, de modo que los beneficios del desarrollo, el comercio y la inversión puedan llegar a un mayor número de personas. Esto también promovería el consumo y el empleo. Además, el primer ministro Narendra Modi propuso temas relacionados con la integración de los centros de producción en toda la India y también el desarrollo de pequeños aeropuertos, puertos así como de vías para que la producción y la fabricación puedan acelerarse. Las propuestas como seguridad y crecimiento para todos en la región (con el acrónimo de Sagar) y la integración de los puertos a través de Sagarmala (cadena para los océanos) dentro del país, tienen como objetivo visualizar a la India como una entidad económica sin ningún patrón de desarrollo diferencial. Entre las otras redes de carreteras integradas, están: el Cuadrilátero Dorado (que conecta las cuatro esquinas del país a través de la red de carreteras), el plan de enlace fluvial para promover las vías fluviales y la integración subregional con los vecinos a través de la red de Carreteras Trilaterales de BCIM3, India-Tailandia, Myanmar, Red de transportes BBIN4. La promoción de zonas económicas especiales y zonas de procesamiento de exportaciones incluye el desarrollo de aeropuertos Greenfield, puertos secos interiores, instalaciones de almacenamiento, y proyecta un plan de desarrollo económico futurista. Además, la visión para integrar los centros de producción de la India, así como para integrarse en las cadenas de valor regionales, busca promover las exportaciones y mejorar el comercio transfronterizo con los países vecinos. El documento describe las iniciativas y los desafíos que deben abordarse en este contexto.
Palabras clave: corredores económicos, India, Sur de Asia, conectividad subregional, infraestructura.
INTRODUCTION
Economic corridors are a means for promoting investment, optimally utilizing resources and accelerating economic development within the national and sub-regional geography. It can be functional through developing ports, highways, freight corridors and an efficient transportation system. The primary objective of economic corridors is to provide facilitating mechanisms for promoting competitiveness and efficiency which includes reduced distribution costs and addressing land procurement complexities. Economic corridors promote industrial development through identifying the underutilized zones and exploiting the potential to meet development challenges within a target region. Therefore, economic corridors are the lifelines of a nation’s growth capacity as well as a promotion plan for future exports. For India, which has had a socialist welfare economy since its independence, the last three decades have shown a slow transition to a liberal market economy. Therefore, for the growth of the manufacturing sector, economic corridors are prerequisites to long-term growth.
According to the Economic Survey of India 2017-2018, the services sector accounts for 54.40 per cent of India’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while the industrial sector contributes 29.73 per cent followed by the agriculture and allied sector’s share of 15.87 per cent (statisticstimes.com, n.d.). Economic corridors create the necessary foundation for the focused growth of manufacturing and production centers through facilitating measures such as tax breaks, cheap land and easy import procedures to set up the industrial zones. Furthermore, they create the necessary economic super structure with ancillary units and a seamless connectivity between centers of economic activity, so that maximum capital and labor efficiency can be achieved.
Therefore, the question arises as to whether India needs to focus at this juncture on economic corridors and the reasons for this. India has been witnessing a better than average growth of 6.5-7.5 per cent for the last five years (2014-2018) (IMF, 2018) and given this momentum, it has become imperative for India to explore its export-led industrialization possibilities and also facilitate Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from both private and institutional investors. In the past, the common reasons for slow investment in India and also the concentrated FDI in select states, cities or Union territories such as Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore, Chennai, Ahmedabad and Hyderabad attracting 75 per cent of total FDI (Department of Industrial Policy and Planning, n.d.) was due to the comparative development pattern and ease of access to the resources and bureaucracy. This is because of a relatively better infrastructure as well as legal and other aspects which have made these regions a more preferred destination. In order to address this lopsided development, making the development of an infrastructure a priority as well as addressing the challenges involved with the environment, acquisition of lands and the time-bound process of development. . There has been due stress within the Indian establishment (Niti Aayog, 2018) to integrate land use and infrastructure connectivity within India and its integration with its immediate neighbors (NITI Aayog, 2015) as a means of benefitting the region and integrating India into sub-regional networks. India has been focusing not only at land-based physical infrastructure development but is giving due consideration to digital connectivity and maritime connectivity and has embarked on such projects with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) countries. Before discussing the role of economic corridors in the Indian context, it is important to evaluate it from a theoretical perspective.
1. THEORETICAL DISCOURSE ABOUT ECONOMIC CORRIDORS
The economic aspects of corridors have been amply covered in the theoretical constructs. Whebell (1969) proposed a corridor-centered economic landscape and stated that it is a useful instrument for urbanization as it creates sustainable methods for populating the space followed by commercial agriculture and thereafter a surge in communication and connectivity, leading to the emergence of metropolitan centers (Whebell, 1969; pages. 1-26). Whebell while applying his argument primarily through metropolitanism, had failed in terms of the development of sub-urban landscapes and the development of satellite townships which form the bed rock of production, services and investment. Kathy Pain, while arguing for the development of corridors, puts cities, corridors and transport into one economic space with each influencing the other (Pain, 2002). There is another argument to the economic corridor which debates it in the context of Development Axes (DA) theory. DA theory proposed by Hilhorst (1972), defined it as connecting and integrating two or more growth poles or centers across continents, trans-national or sub national levels (Hilhorst, 1972). While furthering the Hilhorst argument, Richardson (1978), discussed that this network would facilitate economic agglomeration, bring about price parity and cut down on freight costs and in turn trigger economies of scale of activities (Richardson, 1978, pp. 133-152). It will put the place/node/city along the axes in higher levels of efficiency and will strengthen each endpoint. Stephanie Petrella (2018) proposes an economic space which includes transport corridors, adjoining production centers, and cities. These three economic spaces provide technology, labor, consumption and innovation which is critical to sustain economic growth (Petrella, 2018). Ron Martin (1999) has argued that economic geography plays a critical role for the development of any region be it international, regional or at the local national level because of mathematical economics of imperfect competition, increasing returns to investment and multiple equilibria, leading to agglomeration of economic activity in select regions (Martin, 1999; pp. 387-391). This paper draws from the Ron Martin concept and argues that the development of corridors at the national level does have its utility at sub regional levels also.
Brahmawong (2010), however, raised caution regarding the role of transport and economic corridors and advocated that economic development as a result of economic corridors might help in economic growth and raise national income but would also result in the depletion of natural resources, adverse environmental conditions and diminished livelihood (Banomyong, 2010). While the narratives related to economic corridors do endorse the need for agglomeration of resources and the utility of urban spaces so that economic production and consumption can be facilitated, they argue nevertheless that, economic corridors must be complemented by issues such as labor availability, capital investment and entrepreneurial capabilities so that the development can be comprehensive and reach the larger population.
India has embarked, with this objective in mind, on an ambitious project of development and bringing about the effective utilization of resources. Therefore, various initiatives have been undertaken to integrate production centers through highways and ports while also facilitating transportation so that labor can move without impediments. However, the projects are expected to face challenges which will be discussed later in the chapter. This paper uses empirical data and evaluates it for its efficacy and utility. It further assesses it based on the available documents about the prospects and challenges involved. This paper is based on primary documents and not on field interviews.
2. INDIA’S ECONOMIC CORRIDORS AND HIGHWAY NETWORKS
India has vast networks of highways covering the length and breadth of the geography which have helped in developing the industry and also providing employment opportunities. Since the liberalization of the economy in 1990s, it was felt that there was a need to emulate the export-ordinated industrialization through liberalized procedures and improvements on the ease of the business economy. To meet the infrastructure deficit, a number of initiatives were taken by previous governments and subsequently, India has embarked on the Golden quadrilateral project to promote seamless connectivity across the north, south, east and western regions of India. Given the fact that there have been issues related to the cost efficiency, hidden costs and also challenges with regard to available skilled labor, it was imperative for India to bring the different economic centers including the older ones such as Surat and Kolkata and integrate them with new centers such as Bangalore, Hyderabad and Kochi. This seamless integration through the highway network would create a lifeline and also help in the equitable distribution of resources, manpower and industries.
In order to promote the industrial sector and also work on the integrated inland and highway networks, India has started work on building highway networks, and also developing ports. As part of this project, it has announced the Sagarmala project. However, the earlier Sethusamudrum project was proposed between India and Sri Lanka so that the Indian ports could be engaged for the transit shipment which was destined for East Asia. The project was criticized because of religious aspects as it was believed that construction of such a project would destroy the Setu (bridge) which was built by Lord Rama while attacking Lanka and fighting the war with Ravana who had kidnapped Rama’s wife –Sita. The project was shelved because of concerns from both countries regarding the viability and economic sustainability of such a project.
Following the debacle of the Sethusamudrum project, India under the new regime of Modi proposed the Sagarmala project. This project is aimed at building small and medium size ports along India’s coastline. The conceptualization was achieved in 2015 and reference was made under the National Perspective Plan (NPP). The objective was to undertake comprehensive development of India’s coastline and maritime sector through sustained efforts which included foreign investment, Public-Private partnership as well as the participation of the private sector in the development plan. According to rough estimates and the volume of exports, 95 per cent of India’s trade (excluding oil imports) is undertaken through sea ports. The economic zones have been created or are in the developmental phases to promote economic activities including services in ports such as Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT), Sikka Port, Mundra Port, and Hazira Port, etc. (Sagarmala Project, n.d.).
MAP 1: NATIONAL HIGHWAY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Source: Created by author based on the Ministry of Surface Transport and Shipping website (n.d).
These efforts are meant to address structural challenges but there are challenges with regard to labor efficiency, skill and wages. For instance, the operational efficiency of Indian ports lags in terms of the global average as it is four days of turnaround time required for offloading or loading of cargo while the international average is 1-2 days. A few select private sector ports like Gangavaram and Mundra have clocked a turnaround time of 48 hours. Another challenge that the port infrastructure faces in India is with regard to connectivity to the last mile. More than 87 per cent of Indian freight have to face ‘idle time’ (time between offloading and transit) because of capacity constraints and the lack of connectivity between production and consumption centers. Along the coastline the transport and ferry services are still better, and freight transport have also improved, but its share is only six per cent of the transport. Freight costs can be reduced through ‘shifting movement of industrial commodities like cement, coal, iron ore, and steel to coastal and inland waterways’ (Sagarmala Project, n.d.).
In order to address these intrinsic bottlenecks and problems in capacity, the Sagarmala program addresses issues such as port modernization and new port development. This involves reducing structural problems, bureaucratic interference, and ‘capacity expansion of present ports and the development of new Greenfield ports. Port connectivity proposes enhancing the connectivity of the ports to the hinterland, optimizing cost and reducing time of cargo movement through multi-modal logistics solutions including domestic waterways (inland water transport and coastal shipping). Port-linked industrialization through promoting port-proximate industrial clusters and coastal economic zones to reduce logistics cost and time of export–import (EXIM) and domestic cargo. Coastal community development is further aimed at promoting sustainable development of coastal communities through skill development & livelihood generation activities, fisheries development, coastal tourism, etc. (Sagarmala Project, n.d.).
Apart from the Sagarmala program, one of the elements of faster connectivity has been the freight corridors. India has been working on a number of freight corridors with economic assistance from Japan. Japanese assistance in terms of soft loans is existent in Ahmedabad-Mumbai High Speed Rail, and $100 billion Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (Mohammad, 2018) parts of Western Dedicated Freight Corridor, the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor with twelve new industrial townships, or the Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial Corridor (CBIC) (Price Waterhouse Coopers -PWC, 2015). ‘In order to accelerate the process Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India (DFCCIL), a special purpose vehicle was established under the administrative control of the Ministry of Railways, to undertake planning & development, mobilization of financial resources and construction, maintenance and operation of the dedicated freight corridors’ (PWC, 2015). The proposal of dedicated freight corridors across the country, marks a strategic turning point in the history of the country’s railway that has essentially run mixed traffic across its network. Once accomplished, the dedicated freight corridors are aimed at improving customer orientation and catering to market requirements. Creation of rail infrastructure on such a scale – unprecedented in independent India – is also expected to drive the establishment of industrial corridors and logistic parks along its alignment (Dedicated Freight Corridor, 2018). ‘The cost for these dedicated freight corridors along the eastern and western routes, spanning 3,360 route km, has been estimated at $ 12 billion’ (Dedicated Freight Corridor, 2018)5.
The Eastern Dedicated Freight Corridor would be of 1,856 km and is proposed to be divided into two sections. The ‘first section covers an electrified double-track segment of 1,409 km from Dankuni in West Bengal (state) and Khurja in Uttar Pradesh (state). The second section would be a single line segment of 447 km between Ludhiana – Khurja – Dadri. The corridor would cover six states of Eastern India and three states from North India’ (Roy, July 2018). The project would facilitate transportation of coal for steel, finished steel, power plants, food grains, and cement. Along with the freight lines, logistics parks have also been planned. In comparison to the Eastern Dedicated Freight Corridor, it is expected to be a ‘1,504-km-long route and the Western Freight Corridor traverses the states of Haryana, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh. It is proposed to converge with the Eastern Corridor close to Dadri. This would facilitate the shipping of food grains, iron and steel, fertilizers, and cement, along with other commodities. Along with it, logistics parks in vicinity of Mumbai have been proposed. Additionally, other parks have been proposed closer to Ahmedabad and Gandhinagar in Gujarat, Jaipur and Delhi-National Capital Region’ (Roy, 2018). So far as per the reports ‘306 kms of Western Dedicated Freight Corridor has been completed and a trial run has been launched’ (The Economic Times, 2019).
With overall progress of over ‘35% achieved so far, these corridors seek to bring a paradigm shift in railway freight operations in the country, thus providing relief to the heavily congested Golden Quadrilateral’ (Make in India, 2018). Furthermore, Indian Railways under its special purpose vehicle has planned on building four more dedicated freight corridors. ‘The DFCCIL has been assigned the task of conducting preliminary engineering and traffic surveys for the proposed projects. Next in line are East – West Corridor (Kolkata – Mumbai) which will be approximately 2,330 route km in length; North – South Corridor (Delhi – Chennai) of approximately 2,343 route km; East Coast Corridor (Kharagpur-Vijaywada) close to 1,100 route km; and the Southern Corridor (Chennai - Goa) of approximately 899 route km’ (Razdan, 2016).
It is expected that nearly 35 per cent of work for these dedicated freight corridors be completed by the end of March 2019. However, the major challenge for these freight corridors has been the issues of land acquisition and also building separate infrastructure to address the bottlenecks with environmental issues and bureaucratic inertia. The problem forced the Indian Railways to build freight corridors along the existing lines of passenger traffic and also these freight corridors pass through existing railway stations. This has both advantages and disadvantages. The extension of railway tracks through the railway station in a way slowed the works but on the other hand the freight corridor existence along the passenger train routes helped in undertaking electrical and related works at a relatively faster pace. Beyond the objective of integrating India’s economic centers, port development is seen as a prerequisite for developing India’s production centers.
3. DEVELOPING PORT INFRASTRUCTURE
Following the vision of the Sagarmala Program to reduce logistics cost and time for the movement of EXIM and domestic cargo, a need was established for the development of port-proximate industrial capacities near the coast. It was felt that the utility component of these dedicated connectivity corridors can be further enhanced through Coastal Economic Zones (CEZs), and Coastal Economic Units (CEUs). To complement these initiatives Port-Linked Industrial & Maritime Clusters and Smart Industrial Port Cities have been introduced.
– ‘Coastal Economic Zones (CEZs): CEZs could be spatial economic regions comprising a group of coastal districts or districts with strong ties to the ports in that region. CEZs are also envisaged to tap synergies within the planned industrial corridor projects.
– Coastal Economic Units (CEUs): CEUs will be specific industrial state projects with a demarcated boundary similar to the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor Project (DMIC) nodes. The CEUs will house the industrial clusters / projects proposed within the CEZ’ (Port-led Industrialization, 2018).
Each CEZ will consist of multiple CEUs and more than one industrial cluster can be housed within a CEU. Within each industrial cluster there can be several manufacturing units. To accelerate the CEU development process, it is planned that CEUs be prioritized in locations where land parcels are available in areas close to a deep draught port and with strong potential for manufacturing (Port-led Industrialization, 2018). ‘For promoting port-led industrialization, 14 Coastal Economic Zones (CEZs) covering all the Ocean-facing States and Union Territories have been identified as part of the National Perspective Plan under the Sagarmala Program. The Perspective Plans for all 14 CEZs to have been prepared in consultation with relevant State Governments and Central Ministries’ (Press Information Bureau, 2018). The industries proposed for development include petrochemicals, cement, furniture, apparel, automotive, refining, steel, food processing, leather processing, power, electronics, shipbuilding and marine processing.
FIGURE 1: THE SAGARMALA PROJECT
Source: (Ministry of Surface Transport and Shipping website, n.d.)
In order to complete the spectrum of connectivity and economic corridors, India has also planned for the inland waterways project given the fact that India has multiple river crises across the entire country. With the exception of a few states, the river water is expected to be used for the inland waterways and cargo shipping.
4. RIVER INTERLINKING PLAN AND PROMOTION OF INLAND WATERWAYS
As was discussed in the earlier section, for better port connections, India has also laid out a plan for interlinking rivers and promoting inland water ways. As part of this initiative ‘the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs, chaired by the Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, had given its approval for the implementation of the Waterways development project which is known as Jal Marg Vikas Project (JMVP) for capacity augmentation of navigation on National Waterway-1 (NW-1) at a cost of Rs 536.918 million rupees with the technical assistance and investment support of the World Bank’ (Press Information Bureau, 2018). The multi-modal terminals are being built as part of the central government’s ‘Jal Marg Vikas Project (JMVP) that aims to develop the stretch of the river Ganga between Varanasi and Haldia for navigation of large vessels weighing up to 1,500-2,000 tonnes. The JMVP entails construction of three multi-modal terminals (Varanasi, Sahibganj and Haldia); two inter-modal terminals; five roll on-roll off terminal pairs; new navigation lock at Farakka; assured depth dredging; integrated vessel repair’(The Economic Times, 2018).
Meanwhile, India has been working on integrating the national economic corridors and also creating a network of industrial cities, smart cities and also select export promotion zones. These initiatives have been complemented with initiatives which are sub-regional in character. The purpose is to integrate the Indian economy and also promote services and manufacturing with dedicated planning for certain sectors in select areas. Furthermore, a river linking plan is also expected to address issues related to potable water, irrigation and maintaining the water table across the country, as a means of addressing challenges related to floods and drought. However, the inland waterways project faces challenges in terms of the development of terminals, low water flow in certain dry seasons leading to difficulty in navigation and additional costs in terms of dredging and cleaning the waterways from encroachments along the riverbed.
FIGURE 2: THE HIMALAYAN AND PENINSULAR COMPONENTS OF NRLP PROJECT
Source: (Prabhu, 2014)
While these initiatives have in a way created a roadmap for infrastructure development in the country, the major issue is regarding the implementation and time bound development of the adjoining areas. However, with the integration at the national level, the dividends can be reaped through sub-regional connectivity.
5. CONNECTING WITH NEIGHBORHOOD AND SUB-REGIONAL NETWORKS
For India, the experience of developing an integrative production center within South Asia has been met with strategic and security constraints with particular focus on Pakistan6. Due to the spurt of terrorism infused through Pakistan and also concerns regarding limited trade possibilities with Pakistan, India started focusing on its eastern periphery and started working with the Southeast Asian countries particularly Thailand and Myanmar. This gave birth to a few economic initiatives which have been embedded under the trilateral highway, Mekong India Economic Corridor (MIEC) and now proposals are also being considered with regard to the Indo-Pacific corridor which is a work in process which would integrate different sub regional initiatives under the nomenclature of Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor.
6. TRILATERAL HIGHWAY NETWORKS-MYANMAR-INDIA- THAILAND
The proposed 1,360 km long trilateral highway envisaged in the year 2003 has been slow but the project would connect Myanmar, India and Thailand through the towns of Moreh, India with Mae Sot, Thailand via Myanmar to boost trade and commerce under the coverage of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area (The Hindu Business Line, 2018). This project has been nearly completed with few road sections and bridges needing to be completed, those different sections of the roads are now being completed with India’s financial assistance and support from international financial institutions. The major challenge for this trilateral highway network has been the movement of road building equipment and the problems in the topography and terrain.
‘With the financial constraints faced by the other two countries –Myanmar and Thailand, India is undertaking construction of two sections of the Trilateral Highway in Myanmar namely,
1. Construction of 120.74 KM Kalewa-Yagyi road section, and
2. Construction of 69 bridges along with the approach road on the 149.70 KM Tamu-Kyigone-Kalewa (TKK) road section’ (insightsonindia.com, 2019).
The construction of these sections has been given on the basis of engineering, procurement and construction modes in May 2018 for the Kalewa-Yagyi section, and November 2017 for the TKK section. It is expected that by 2020 the two sections will be completed and thereby connecting India with the production centers of these two countries. The genesis of the Mekong India Economic Corridor is based on the larger foundation of this trilateral Highway (insightsonindia.com, 2019). The estimated cost of the projects are 145.929 million Rupees for the Kalewa-Yagyi road project and Rs. 37.158 million for the 69 Bridges on the TKK road project (Rajya Sabha, 2018). The trilateral highway project is also critical for the Mekong India Economic Corridor as it would connect regional value chains existing in Myanmar and Thailand with Indian production centers spread across the country.
7. MEKONG INDIA ECONOMIC CORRIDOR (MIEC)
MIEC germinated out of the concept of Mekong Ganga Economic Cooperation, an initiative which launched in 1997 to connect India through trade and cultural networks with its eastern seaboard. With India’s increasing economic clout and the desire to underplay the increasing Chinese dominance in the region, India worked out a start to engage these countries with the objective of sustaining the cultural and historical interaction with a complementary dose of trade and investment. The development of the Kaladaan Multi Modal Transport Project (a project with integration of riverine and highway transport) and the development of a trilateral highway were built on the premise that the two projects would enhance trade and investment between India’s northeast region and the countries of mainland Southeast Asia. However, the two projects took more than 15 years to get completed with parts of the two projects still in limbo. Mekong-India connectivity has been envisaged as a constituent of India’s obligations under the Asian Highway Network. Additionally, the possibility of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) sponsored Trans-Asian Railways might take shape in the near future once the Asian Highway is completed. MIEC would help in connecting India manufacturing with the ancillary industries in the Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) region as well as those in Thailand. This corridor also fits into the Indo-Pacific corridor envisioned by the US government. Indo-Pacific construct works to the benefit of both India and these select countries as Indo-Pacific corridor connects the two regions - South and Southeast Asia together.
8. INDO-PACIFIC ECONOMIC CORRIDOR (IPEC)
As previously discussed, India, for its part in order to give the necessary momentum to the sub regional economic integration and also promote its integration into the regional value chain, promoted MIEC. This economic corridor is meant to promote industrialization in parts of Southern Asia and also better integrate India into this growing region. Capitalizing on the existing infrastructure networks, the US has been working on the concept of the Indo-Pacific economic corridor which is still in the planning stages. ‘The IPEC vision includes physical infrastructure, energy, trade integration, and increased people-to-people ties. This activity will focus solely on economic integration through trade, investment, and private sector engagement. Through a coordinated analysis with other U.S. government departments – such as the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), and the Department of Commerce’ (USAID, 2018). ‘It aims to support the United States’ vision of an Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor that bridges South and Southeast Asia to promote regional stability and economic prosperity. This particular study focuses exclusively on trade integration and considers various ways that the U.S. government can play a more influential role in fostering regional trade integration in South and Southeast Asia’ (USAID, 2018). The IPEC would act as a bridge between the two economies as it intends to bring south Asia and Southeast Asia closer. The transport corridors across the sub-region would help in the easy flow of labor and commodities, even though the structural constraints remain.
9. TRANSPORT CORRIDORS –BBIN AND BCIM INITIATIVE
During his visit to China in May 2015, Prime Minister Modi referred to BCIM as one of the important areas of convergence between India and China and it was also reflected in the Joint Communiqué between the two leaders. Modi has been in favour of opening the BCIM corridor for the benefit of India and the participating countries. However, the sectors and the areas which would be open for cooperation between the four countries would be decided and steered by consensus and dialogue. BCIM is expected to open the trade route, particularly the land route, for India to reach out to its northeastern neighbors and Myanmar. With full implementation of the BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal) transport corridor where the motor vehicle arrangement is seen as a successful homogenization and standardization of motor vehicles, driver licenses and improvement in transport infrastructure. Both these regions (BBIN and BCIM) are critically important for India to generate economic growth and development as well as reduce freight cost on getting more integrated with China; India has accepted their request to participate in the BCIM economic corridor. China has been looking for easy access to the Indian Ocean for its southern provinces and BCIM acts as the structural edifice for achieving this objective. However, there is a caveat to the whole issue and that is that at some point in time, the BCIM should be combined with Mekong India Economic Corridor Initiative and also India’s initiative towards integration with ASEAN.
The BCIM, having a geographical area of 208,000 sq. km (Singh, n.a), has been a unique dialogue forum in many respects. It is one of the very few regional forums in which China and India are more or less equal co-partners, although some Indian observers see it as another Chinese geopolitical design to penetrate South Asia. India and China are the two ‘big economies’ of the region, and their cooperation might hold this regional initiative together. While China and India have comparatively better technology, a more efficient labor force and improved physical and commercial infrastructure, Bangladesh and Myanmar have a large unskilled and semi-skilled labor force as well as basic and intermediate technology. BCIM can be further explored subject to China’s keen intention of furthering economic partnership with India. However, while the routes with Bangladesh and Myanmar would be strengthened, the route connecting India with China has been relatively underdeveloped or limited in development which means only a two-lane highway which leads to structural constraints in trade volume.
The main reason for creating this economic corridor and supporting this endeavor is because India’s ‘Act East’ Policy needs a transit corridor as well as port cooperation with Bangladesh. Bangladesh has facilitated the necessary transit linkages to help India connect its mainland to the Northeast. Unless the pre-partition transport linkages are re-established and India is able to integrate its road and rail infrastructure with Bangladesh, the Northeast cannot be easily accessed, and if that is not possible, there is no point for India to attempt to connect to Southeast Asia through the Northeastern Region (NER). The reality is that India first needs Bangladesh to help access its Northeast region and thereafter use the region to connect to Southeast Asia. So, it is important for the success of the Act East Policy to push ahead with the BCIM process because that involves both Bangladesh and Myanmar which are important to developing India’s overland connectivity to China and Southeast Asia. However, India wants BIMSTEC to be promoted instead of BCIM,. It invariably would merge BBIN, BIMSTEC together.
10. STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS AND BOTTLENECKS
The challenges that India has been facing with regard to the national infrastructure projects has been the financing of the project costs and also problems with regard to project execution and meeting the deadlines for the completion of the project. India has an infrastructure deficit and it has tried hard to get investment from Gulf countries for its USD 7.5 trillion worth of projects. However, the response from the Gulf countries has been lukewarm. Apart from the challenge of finance, the local population demands in terms of relocation, land acquisition and compensation issues, and political demands for provincial and regional priority for labor and employment in those projects, have been major causes of concern. Furthermore, the identification of core areas for development in terms of industrial projects and localized economic units supported by ancillary industries is being done with field reports and feasibility studies. Most of these studies are commissioned by the different ministers and also by private institutions such as PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) and other such institutions. The issues related to projects have been addressed through Special Purpose vehicles which are more project and outcome based and have been structured in such a way that their primary function is the completion of the project. The only aspect with regard to the infrastructure projects is that there has been very little foreign direct investment. Therefore, the course that the government and other institutions have taken has been to float infrastructure bonds, state and center financing of projects, long-term financing through financial institutions, tax benefits and also tax breaks to the early birds to the project. Once the projects are finished, then these loans need to be repaid and in case these projects become unviable then the escalating interest servicing and maintenance would be an issue.
The purpose of these economic corridors is to promote capital and labor flows in a seamless manner. This can have challenges given the demographic changes as well the concern with the local population about the employment destined for them being taken away by outsiders. As India already has provisions for state residency-based reservation in government jobs and therefore this might trickle down to the private sector also because of political preferences. The major challenge for a high-density population area is the land acquisition and also proper rehabilitation of the people. However, the government has taken utmost care not to disturb the populated areas and has given compensation which was much higher than the prevailing market rate. Likewise, with regard to inland waterway projects, there have been apprehensions that too much cargo movement would disturb the fish habitats and also due to shallowness in the river at certain places it would lead to problems in navigation and also affect the cargo carrying capacity of the boats or barges. Furthermore, the issue of finance has been addressed through public-private funding and also through institutions such as the World Bank. A few countries such as Japan have taken keen interest in developing the freight and transport corridors in India and also at easy interest rates, known as soft loans.
At the sub regional level, the issue emerges about economic dividends of the corridors and whether these would help capital and labor migration through seamless connectivity. This, because within Asia and particularly in Southern Asia the problem has been the issue of Mode-II and Mode IV migration, dealing with unskilled and skilled labor. Additionally, the one challenge which might become an issue in the sub regional construct is how the other economies would view the competition to their own industry. Also, whether the regional value chain would add or subtract the value of the respective products. At the sub-regional level, the infrastructure development can only pay dividends when there are free trade agreements, easy border custom procedures and simple documentation. India has made blueprints for the economic corridors, but the issue is fund generation and completion within accepted timelines. However, this has been the major challenge for most of the developing world. With growing economies and better procedures, the deadlines for better economic futures might be met.
While India has always faced problems with regard to project implementation and completion, there are challenges related to employment, corruption, labor laws and labor unrest which might lead to delays in projects. These are unforeseen circumstances which exist in any developing country. However, most of the Ministries in India work as per the blueprint and this has provided blueprints but then as those projects which have never started might face political axes as the opposition parties may wish to redraw the projects depending on their political stances.
CONCLUSION
The theoretical arguments in the context of economic corridors have stated that urban centers have created economic spaces for development while on the other hand, there are arguments that production and economic centers have helped in developing nodes of economic activity in most of the developing economies. The case in point has been Indonesia, Greater Mekong Sub region (GMS) and other such projects which have been undertaken with the help of international institutions as well as entrepreneurship. The theoretical arguments in such a context support that an economic ecosystem is created when the viability and utility of these economic corridors have been assessed and carefully planned so that financial hurdles can be overcome through international funding and public-private partnership. In developing countries such as India, demand is created because of high populations and need for employment sustains the economic corridors. Furthermore, domestic consumption and production also support these economic corridors.
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3. CHINESE CAPITAL FLOWS TO AFRICA IN A CONTEXT OF THE SILK ROAD 1
ALICIA GIRÓN
ABSTRACT
The geography of financial flows during the post-crisis period has gained importance because new actors are promoting alternative paths coming, mainly, from the financial circuits of emerging countries. The Belt Road Initiative (BRI) is an example since it has deepened Chinese banks and companies at a global level in places such as Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
The objective of this paper is to propose the expansion of financial flows within the context of the BRI initiative and its importance in the world’s hegemony. From describing the way in which capital expansion from China is taking place, three research questions will be posed: What is the behavior of the financial flows from Chinese banks and companies in Africa? How can the sustained growth of indebtedness of African countries to Chinese banks, since the post-crisis period, be explained? And, finally, what are the challenges for the regions located in the New Silk Road?
Key words: Financial flows, Belt Road Initiative (bri), Foreign Direct Investment, Africa.
RESUMEN
La geografía de los flujos financieros durante el período posterior a la crisis de 2008 ha ganado importancia porque los nuevos actores están promoviendo rutas alternativas provenientes, principalmente, de los circuitos financieros de los países emergentes. La Belt Road Iniciative (BRI) es un ejemplo porque ha profundizado la presencia de los bancos y las empresas chinas a nivel global: África, América Latina, Asia Central, el sudeste de Asia y el sur de Asia.
El objetivo de este documento es proponer la expansión de los flujos financieros en el contexto de la iniciativa BRI y su importancia en la hegemonía mundial. A partir de la descripción de la forma en que se está produciendo la expansión de capital de China, se plantearán tres preguntas de investigación: ¿Cuál es el comportamiento de los flujos financieros de los bancos y empresas chinas en África? ¿Cómo puede explicarse el crecimiento sostenido del endeudamiento de los países africanos con los bancos chinos desde el período posterior a la crisis? y, finalmente, ¿cuáles son los desafíos para las regiones ubicadas en la Nueva Ruta de la Seda?
Palabras clave: flujos financieros, Belt Road Initiative (bri), inversión extranjera directa, África.
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