Kitabı oku: «Trial of the Officers and Crew of the Privateer Savannah, on the Charge of Piracy, in the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York»
PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS
During the month of May, 1861, the schooner Savannah, of Charleston, of about fifty-three tons burden, and mounting one pivot gun, was fitted out as a privateer, in the City of Charleston; and on the second of June, under the authority of "a paper, purporting to be a letter of marque, signed by Jefferson Davis," she sailed from that port for the purpose of making captures among the commercial marine of the United States.
On the following day (Monday, June 3), after having captured the brig Joseph, laden with sugar, she was, in turn, herself taken by the United States brig-of-war Perry, Captain Parrott, and carried to the blockading squadron, off Charleston, to the commander of which (Commodore Stringham) she was surrendered by her captors.
On the fifth of June the officers and crew of the Savannah were transferred from the Perry to the United States steam-frigate Minnesota, while the prize was taken in charge by a prize crew from the Perry and sent to New York.
The Minnesota, with the prisoners on board, proceeded, on her way to New York, to Hampton Roads, where the prisoners were transferred to the steam-cutter Harriet Lane; and thence, on board that vessel, they were conveyed to New York, at which port they arrived in the course of the month of June.
On the arrival of the Harriet Lane at New York, the prisoners were given in charge to the United States Marshal; and, on application of the District Attorney of the United States, a warrant was issued, under which the prisoners were committed for trial.
On the 16th of July following, the Grand Jury of the Federal Court, then sitting in this city, came into court and presented a true bill against the prisoners, a copy of which Indictment is as follows:—
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT.1
At a stated Term of the Circuit Court of the United States of America for the Southern District of New York, in the Second Circuit, begun and held at the City of New York, within and for the District and Circuit aforesaid, on the first Monday of April, in the year of our Lord 1861, and continued by adjournments to the 26th day of June in the year last aforesaid:
Southern District of New York, ss.:—The Jurors of the United States of America, within and for the District and Circuit aforesaid, on their oath, present:
That Thomas Harrison Baker, late of the City and County of New York, in the District and Circuit aforesaid, mariner; and John Harleston, late of the same place, mariner; Charles Sidney Passalaigue, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Cashman Howard, late of the same place, mariner; Joseph Cruz del Carno, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Oman, late of the same place, mariner; Patrick Daly, late of the same place, mariner; William Charles Clark, late of the same place, mariner; Albert Gallatin Ferris, late of the same place, mariner; Richard Palmer, late of the same place, mariner; John Murphy, late of the same place, mariner; Alexander Carter Coid, late of the same place, mariner; and Martin Galvin, late of the same place, mariner, on the 3d day of June, A.D. 1861, upon the high seas, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the said United States of America, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did, with force and arms, piratically, feloniously, and violently set upon, board, break, and enter a certain vessel, to wit, a brig called the Joseph, the same being then and there owned in whole or in part, by a citizen or citizens of the United States of America, whose name or names are to the Jurors aforesaid unknown, and did then and there in and on board of the said brig, the Joseph, in and upon one Thies N. Meyer, then and there being a mariner, and then and there one of the ship's company of the said brig, the Joseph, and then and there master and commander thereof, and in and upon Horace W. Bridges, Albert Nash, William H. Clanning, John J. Merritt, John Quin, and Joseph H. Golden, each then and there being a mariner and one of the ship's company of the said brig, the Joseph, piratically, feloniously, and violently make an assault, and them did then and there piratically, feloniously, and violently, put in personal fear and danger of their lives, and did then and there, the brig, the said Joseph, of the value of $3,000, and the tackle, apparel, and furniture thereof, of the value of $500, and 250 hogsheads of sugar, of the value of $100 each hogshead, of the goods, chattels, and personal property of certain persons whose names are to the jurors aforesaid unknown, the said 250 hogsheads of sugar being then and there in and on board of the said brig, and being then and there the lading thereof, and the said brig, the tackle, apparel, and furniture thereof, and the said 250 hogsheads of sugar, being then and there in the care, custody, and possession of the said Thies N. Meyer, Horace W. Bridges, Albert Nash, William H. Clanning, John J. Merritt, John Quin, and Joseph H. Golden, from the said Thies N. Meyer, Horace W. Bridges, Albert Nash, William H. Clanning, John J. Merritt, John Quin, and Joseph H. Golden, and from their said possession, care, and custody, and in their presence and against their will, violently, piratically, and feloniously seize, rob, steal, take, and carry away against the form of the statute of the said United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the said United States and their dignity.
Second Count: And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present: That Thomas Harrison Baker, late of the City and County of New York, in the District and Circuit aforesaid, mariner; and John Harleston, late of the same place, mariner; Charles Sidney Passalaigue, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Cashman Howard, late of the same place, mariner; Joseph Cruz del Carno, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Oman, late of the same place, mariner; Patrick Daly, late of the same place, mariner; William Charles Clark, late of the same place, mariner; Albert Gallatin Ferris, late of the same place, mariner; Richard Palmer, late of the same place, mariner; John Murphy, late of the same place, mariner; Alexander Carter Coid, late of the same place, mariner; and Martin Galvin, late of the same place, mariner, on the third day of June, in the year of our Lord 1861, upon the high seas, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the said United States of America, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did, with force and arms, piratically, feloniously, and violently set upon, board, break, and enter a certain American vessel, to wit, a brig called the Joseph, the same then and there being owned, in part, by George H. Cables, John Cables, and Stephen Hatch, then citizens of the United State of America, and did then and there, in and on board of the said brig, the Joseph, in and upon one Thies N. Meyer, then and there being a mariner and one of the ship's company of the said brig, the Joseph, and master and commander thereof, and in and upon divers other persons, each then and there being a mariner and one of the ship's company of the said brig, the Joseph, whose names are to the jurors aforesaid unknown, piratically, feloniously, and violently make an assault, and them did then and there piratically, feloniously, and violently put in bodily fear and danger of their lives, and did then and there, the said brig, the said Joseph, of the value of three thousand dollars, and the tackle, apparel, and furniture of the same, of the value of five hundred dollars, of the goods, chattels, and personal property of George H. Cables, John Cables, and Stephen Hatch, citizens of the United States of America, and two hundred and fifty hogsheads of sugar, of the value of one hundred dollars each hogshead, of the goods, chattels, and personal property of one Morales, whose Christian name is to the jurors aforesaid unknown, the said sugar being then and there in and on board of the said brig, the Joseph, and being then and there the lading thereof, and the said brig and the tackle, apparel, and furniture thereof, and the said two hundred and fifty hogsheads of sugar then and there being in the care, custody, and possession of the said Thies N. Meyer, and the said divers other persons, mariners, as aforesaid, and of the ship's company of the said brig, the Joseph, and whose names are to the jurors aforesaid unknown, from the said Thies N. Meyer and the said divers other persons, mariners, aforesaid, and of the ship's company of the said brig, the Joseph, whose names are, as aforesaid, to the jurors aforesaid, unknown, and from their care, custody, and possession, and in their presence and against their will, piratically, feloniously, and violently, rob, seize, steal, take and carry away, against the form of the statute of the said United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the said United States and their dignity.
Third Count: And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present: That Thomas Harrison Baker, late of the City and County of New York, in the District and Circuit aforesaid, mariner; and John Harleston, late of the same place, mariner; Charles Sidney Passalaigue, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Cashman Howard, late of the same place, mariner; Joseph Cruz del Carno, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Oman, late of the same place, mariner; Patrick Daly, late of the same place, mariner; William Charles Clark, late of the same place, mariner; Albert Gallatin Ferris, late of the same place, mariner; Richard Palmer, late of the same place, mariner; John Murphy, late of the same place, mariner; Alexander Carter Coid, late of the same place, mariner; and Martin Galvin, late of the same place, mariner, on the 3d day of June, A.D. 1861, upon the high seas, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the said United States of America, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did, with force and arms, piratically, feloniously, and violently set upon, board, break, and enter a certain vessel, to wit: a brig called the Joseph, then and there being owned by certain persons, citizens of the United States of America, to wit: George H. Cables, John Cables, and Stephen Hatch, of Rockland, in the State of Maine, and in and upon certain divers persons whose names are to the jurors aforesaid unknown, the said last-mentioned persons each being then and there a mariner, and of the ship's company of the said brig called the Joseph, and then and there being in and on board of the said brig the Joseph, did then and there, piratically, feloniously, and violently make an assault, and them did then and there piratically, feloniously, and violently put in bodily fear, and the said brig, the Joseph, of the value of $3,000; the apparel, tackle, and furniture thereof, of the value of $500; of the goods, chattels, and personal property of the said George H. Cables, John Cables, and Stephen Hatch, and 250 hogsheads of sugar of the value of $100 each hogshead, of the goods, chattels, and personal property of one Thies N. Meyer, from the said divers persons, mariners, as aforesaid, whose names are to the jurors aforesaid unknown, in their presence, then and there, and against their will, did then and there piratically, feloniously, and violently seize, rob, steal, take, and carry away, against the form of the statute of the said United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the said United States and their dignity.
Fourth Count: And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present: That Thomas Harrison Baker, late of the City and County of New York, in the District and Circuit aforesaid, mariner; and John Harleston, late of the same place, mariner; Charles Sidney Passalaigue, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Cashman Howard, late of the same place, mariner; Joseph Cruz del Carno, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Oman, late of the same place, mariner; Patrick Daly, late of the same place, mariner; William Charles Clark, late of the same place, mariner; Albert Gallatin Ferris, late of the same place, mariner; Richard Palmer, late of the same place, mariner; John Murphy, late of the same place, mariner; Alexander Carter Coid, late of the same place, mariner; and Martin Galvin, late of the same place, mariner, on the third day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty one, upon the high seas, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the said United States of America, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did, with force and arms, piratically, feloniously, and violently set upon, board, break, and enter a certain vessel then and there being, to wit, a brig called the Joseph, and in and upon one Thies N. Meyer, then and there being in and on board of the said brig, and being a mariner and master and commander of the said brig, and the said Thies N. Meyer then and there being a citizen of the United States of America, did then and there piratically, feloniously, and violently make an assault, and him, the said Thies N. Meyer, did then and there piratically, feloniously, and violently put in great bodily fear, and the said brig, the Joseph, of the value of $3,000, and the tackle, apparel, and furniture thereof, of the value of $500, and 250 hogsheads of sugar, of the value of $100 each hogshead, the same then and there being of the lading of the said brig, of the goods, chattels, and personal property of the said Thies N. Meyer, in his presence and against his will, did violently, feloniously, and piratically rob, steal, seize, take, and carry away, against the form of the statute of the said United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the said United States and their dignity.
Fifth Count: And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present: That Thomas Harrison Baker, late of the City and County of Nev York, in the District and Circuit aforesaid, mariner; and John Harleston, late of the same place, mariner; Charles Sidney Passalaigue, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Cashman Howard, late of the same place, mariner; Joseph Cruz del Carno, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Oman, late of the same place, mariner; Patrick Daly, late of the same place, mariner; William Charles Clark, late of the same place, mariner; Albert Gallatin Ferris, late of the same place, mariner; Richard Palmer, late of the same place, mariner; John Murphy, late of the same place, mariner; Alexander Carter Coid, late of the same place, mariner; and Martin Galvin, late of the same place, mariner, each being a citizen of the United States of America, on the 3d day of June, in the year of our Lord 1861, upon the high seas, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States of America, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, in and upon one Thies N. Meyer, then and there being, the said Thies N. Meyer then and there being a citizen of the said United States, and he, the said Thies N. Meyer, then and there being in and on board of a certain American vessel of the United States of America, to wit, a brig called the Joseph, and the said brig then and there being on the high seas as aforesaid, did, piratically, feloniously and violently, make an assault, and him, the said Thies N. Meyer, did, piratically, feloniously and violently, then and there put in bodily fear, and the said brig, the Joseph, of the value of $3,000, the tackle, apparel and furniture of the same, of the value of $500, and 250 hogsheads of sugar, of the value of $100 each hogshead, of the goods, chattels and personal property of the said Thies N. Meyer, from the said Thies N. Meyer, and in his presence, and against his will, did, piratically, feloniously and violently, seize, rob, steal, take and carry away, against the form of the statute of the said United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the said United States and their dignity.
Sixth Count: And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present: That Thomas Harrison Baker, late of the City and County of New York, in the District and Circuit aforesaid, mariner; and John Harleston, late of the same place, mariner; Charles Sidney Passalaigue, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Cashman Howard, late of the same place, mariner; Joseph Cruz del Carno, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Oman, late-of the same place, mariner; Patrick Daly, late of the same place, mariner; William Charles Clark, late of the same place, mariner; Albert Gallatin Ferris, late of the same place, mariner; Richard Palmer, late of the same place, mariner; John Murphy, late of the same place, mariner; Alexander Carter Coid, late of the same place, mariner; and Martin Galvin, late of the same place, mariner, on the 3d day of June, in the year of our Lord 1861, upon the high seas, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the said United States of America, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, each then and there being a citizen of the said United States of America, did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, with force and arms, piratically, feloniously and violently set upon, board, break and enter, a certain vessel, to wit, a brig called the Joseph, the same being then and there owned, in whole or in part, by a citizen or citizens of the United States of America, whose name or names are to the Jurors aforesaid unknown, and did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, then and there in and on board of the said brig, the Joseph, in and upon one Thies N. Meyer, then and there being a mariner, and then and there one of the ship's company of the said brig, the Joseph, and then and there master and commander thereof, and in and upon Horace W. Bridges, Albert Nash, William H. Clanning, John J. Merritt, John Quin, and Joseph H. Golden, each then and there being a mariner and one of the ship's company of the said brig, the Joseph, piratically, feloniously and violently make an assault, and them did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, then and there piratically, feloniously and violently, put in personal fear and danger of their lives, and did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, then and there, the brig, the said Joseph, of the value of $3,000, and the tackle, apparel and furniture thereof, of the value of $500, and two hundred and fifty hogsheads of sugar, of the value of $100 each hogshead, of the goods, chattels and personal property of certain persons whose names are to the Jurors aforesaid unknown, the said two hundred and fifty hogsheads of sugar being then and there in and on board of the said brig, and being then and there the lading thereof, and the said brig, the tackle, apparel and furniture thereof and the said two hundred and fifty hogsheads of sugar, being then and there in the care, custody and possession of the said Thies N. Meyer, Horace W. Bridges, Albert Nash, William H. Clanning, John J. Merritt, John Quin and Joseph H. Golden, from the said Thies N. Meyer, Horace W. Bridges, Albert Nash, William H. Clanning, John J. Merritt, John Quin and Joseph H. Golden, and from their said possession, care and custody, and in their presence and against their will, violently, piratically and feloniously, seize, rob, steal, take and carry away, against the form of the statute of the said United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the said United States and their dignity.
Seventh Count: And the Jurors aforesaid upon their oath aforesaid, do further present: That Thomas Harrison Baker, late of the City and County of New York, in the District and Circuit aforesaid, mariner; and John Harleston, late of the same place, mariner; Charles Sidney Passalaigue, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Cashman Howard, late of the same place, mariner; Joseph Cruz del Carno, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Oman, late of the same place, mariner; Patrick Daly, late of the same place, mariner; William Charles Clark, late of the same place, mariner; Albert Gallatin Ferris, late of the same place, mariner; Richard Palmer, late of the same place, mariner; John Murphy, late of the same place, mariner; Alexander Carter Coid, late of the same place, mariner; and Martin Galvin, late of the same place, mariner, on the third day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, upon the high seas, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the said United States of America, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, each then and there being a citizen of the said United States of America, did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, with force and arms, piratically, feloniously and violently set upon, board, break and enter a certain American vessel, to wit, a brig called the Joseph, the same then and there being owned in part by George H. Cables, John Cables and Stephen Hatch, then citizens of the United States of America, and did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, then and there in and on board of the said brig, the Joseph, in and upon one Thies N. Meyer, then and there being a mariner and one of the ship's company of the said brig, the Joseph, and master and commander thereof, and in and upon divers other persons, each then and there being a mariner, and one of the ship's company of the said brig, the Joseph, whose names are to the Jurors aforesaid unknown, piratically, feloniously and violently make an assault, and them did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, then and there, piratically, feloniously and violently, put in bodily fear and danger of their lives, and did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, then and there, the said brig, the said Joseph, of the value of $3,000, and the tackle, apparel and furniture of the same, of the value of $500, of the goods, chattels and personal property of George H. Cables, John Cables and Stephen Hatch, citizens of the United States of America, and two hundred and fifty hogsheads of sugar, of the value of $100 each hogshead, of the goods, chattels and personal property of one Morales, whose Christian name is to the Jurors aforesaid unknown, the said sugar being then and there in and on board the said brig, the Joseph, and being then and there the lading thereof, and the said brig, and the tackle, apparel and furniture thereof, and the said two hundred and fifty hogsheads of sugar, then and there being in the care, custody and possession of the said Thies N. Meyer and the said divers other persons, mariners as aforesaid, and of the ship's company of the said brig, the Joseph, and whose names are to the Jurors aforesaid unknown, from the said Thies N. Meyer and the said divers other persons, mariners as aforesaid, and of the ship's company of the said brig, the Joseph, whose names are as aforesaid to the Jurors aforesaid unknown, and from their care, custody and possession, and in their presence and against their will, piratically, feloniously, and violently, rob, seize, steal, take and carry away, against the form of the statute of the said United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the said United States and their dignity.
Eighth Count: And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present: That Thomas Harrison Baker, late of the City and County of New York, in the District and Circuit aforesaid, mariner; and John Harleston, late of the same place, mariner; Charles Sidney Passalaigue, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Cashman Howard, late of the same place, mariner; Joseph Cruz del Carno, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Oman, late of the same place, mariner; Patrick Daly, late of the same place, mariner; William Charles Clark, late of the same place, mariner; Albert Gallatin Ferris, late of the same place, mariner; Richard Palmer, late of the same place, mariner; John Murphy, late of the same place, mariner; Alexander Carter Coid, late of the same place, mariner; and Martin Galvin, late of the same place, mariner, on the 3d day of June, in the year of our Lord, 1861, upon the high seas, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the said United States of America and within the jurisdiction of this Court, each then and there being a citizen of the said United States of America, did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, with force and arms, piratically, feloniously, and violently, set upon, board, break, and enter a certain vessel, to wit, a brig, called the Joseph, then and there being owned by certain persons, citizens of the United States of America, to wit, George H. Cables, John Cables, and Stephen Hatch, of Rockland, in the State of Maine, and in and upon certain divers persons whose names are to the Jurors aforesaid unknown, the said last-mentioned persons each being then and there a mariner, and of the ship's company of the said brig called the Joseph, and then and there being in and on board of the said brig, the Joseph, did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, then and there, piratically, feloniously, and violently, make an assault, and them did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, then and there, piratically, feloniously, and violently, put in bodily fear, and the said brig, the Joseph, of the value of $3,000, and the apparel, tackle, and furniture thereof, of the value of $500, of the goods, chattels, and personal property of the said George H. Cables, John Cables, and Stephen Hatch, and 250 hogsheads of sugar, of the value of $100 each hogshead, of the goods, chattels, and personal property of one Thies N. Meyer, from the said divers persons, mariners as aforesaid, whose names are to the Jurors aforesaid unknown, in their presence, then and there, and against their will, did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, then and there, piratically, feloniously, and violently, seize, rob, steal, take and carry away, against the form of the statute of the said United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the said United States and their dignity.
Ninth Count: And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present: That Thomas Harrison Baker, late of the City and County of New York, in the District and Circuit aforesaid, mariner; and John Harleston, late of the same place, mariner; Charles Sidney Passalaigue, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Cashman Howard, late of the same place, mariner; Joseph Cruz del Carno, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Oman, late of the same place, mariner; Patrick Daly, late of the same place, mariner; William Charles Clark, late of the same place, mariner; Albert Gallatin Ferris, late of the same place, mariner; Richard Palmer, late of the same place, mariner; John Murphy, late of the same place, mariner; Alexander Carter Coid, late of the same place, mariner; and Martin Galvin, late of the same place, mariner, on the 3d day of June, in the year of our Lord 1861, upon the high seas, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the said United States of America, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, each then and there being a citizen of the said United States of America, did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, with force and arms, piratically, feloniously, and violently set upon, board, break, and enter a certain vessel then and there being, to wit, a brig called the Joseph, and in and upon one Thies N. Meyer, then and there being in and on board of the said brig, and being a mariner and master and commander of the said brig, and the said Thies N. Meyer then and there being a citizen of the United States of America, did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, then and there, piratically, feloniously, and violently, make an assault, and him, the said Thies N. Meyer, did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, then and there, piratically, feloniously, and violently, put in great bodily fear, and the said brig, the Joseph, of the value of $3,000, and the tackle, apparel, and furniture thereof, of the value of $500, and 250 hogsheads of sugar, of the value of $100 each hogshead, the same then and there being of the lading of the said brig, of the goods, chattels, and personal property of the said Thies N. Meyer, in his presence and against his will, did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, violently, feloniously, and piratically, rob, steal, seize, take, and carry away, against the form of the statute of the said United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the said United States and their dignity.
Tenth Count: And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present: That Thomas Harrison Baker, late of the City and County of New York, in the District and Circuit aforesaid, mariner; and John Harleston, late of the same place, mariner; Charles Sidney Passalaigue, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Cashman Howard, late of the same place, mariner; Joseph Cruz del Carno, late of the same place, mariner; Henry Oman, late of the same place, mariner; Patrick Daly, late of the same place, mariner; William Charles Clark, late of the same place, mariner; Albert Gallatin Ferris, late of the same place, mariner; Richard Palmer, late of the same place, mariner; John Murphy, late of the same place, mariner; Alexander Carter Coid, late of the same place, mariner; and Martin Galvin, late of the same place, mariner, each being a citizen of the United States of America, on the 3d day of June, in the year of our Lord 1861, upon the high seas, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States of America, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, in and upon one Thies N. Meyer, then and there being, the said Thies N. Meyer, then and there being a citizen of the said United States, and he, the said Thies N. Meyer, then and there being in and on board of a certain American vessel, of the United States of America, to wit, a brig called the Joseph, and the said brig then and there being on the high seas as aforesaid, did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, piratically, feloniously and violently, make an assault, and him, the said Thies N. Meyer, did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, piratically, feloniously and violently, then and there put in bodily fear, and the said brig, the Joseph, of the value of $3,000, the tackle, apparel and furniture of the same, of the value of $500, and 250 hogsheads of sugar, of the value of $100 each hogshead, of the goods, chattels and personal property of the said Thies N. Meyer, from the said Thies N. Meyer, and in his presence, and against his will, did, on pretense of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis, piratically, feloniously and violently seize, rob, steal, take and carry away, against the form of the statute of the said United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the said United States and their dignity.
And the Jurors aforesaid, on their oath aforesaid, do further present: That the Southern District of New York, in the Second Circuit, is the district and circuit in which the said Thomas Harrison Baker, John Harleston, Charles Sidney Passalaigue, Henry Cashman Howard, Joseph Cruz del Carno, Henry Oman, Patrick Daly, William Charles Clark, Albert Gallatin Ferris, Richard Palmer, John Murphy, Alexander Carter Coid, and Martin Galvin, were brought and in which they were found, and is the district and circuit where they were apprehended, and into which they were first brought, for the said offense.
E. DELAFIELD SMITH,Attorney of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
On Wednesday, the seventeenth of July, the prisoners were brought into Court to plead to the Indictment, when Mr. E. Delafield Smith, United States District Attorney, said:
TRIALOF THEOFFICERS AND CREW OF THE SCHOONER SAVANNAH, ON THE CHARGE OF PIRACY
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Wednesday, Oct. 23, 1861.
The United States
against
Thomas Harrison Baker,
Charles Sydney Passalaigue,
John Harleston,
Joseph Cruse del Carno,
Patrick Daly,
John Murphy,
Martin Galvin,
Henry Cashman Howard,
Henry Oman,
William Charles Clarke,
Richard Palmer,
Alexander Carter Coid,
Albert G. Ferris.
Hon. Judges NELSON and SHIPMAN Presiding.
Counsel for the United States:
E. DELAFIELD SMITH, WM. M. EVARTS, SAML. BLATCHFORD, ETHAN ALLEN
Counsel for the Defendants:
BOWDOIN, LAROCQUES & BARLOW, DANIEL LORD, JAMES T. BRADY, ALGERNON S. SULLIVAN, JOSEPH H. DUKES, ISAAC DAVEGA, MAURICE MAYER.
E. Delafield Smith, Esq., United States District Attorney, stated that he desired to use Albert Gallatin Ferris, one of the prisoners indicted, as a witness, and would therefore enter a nolle prosequi in regard to him.
The Court: Are the prisoners to be tried jointly?
Mr. Lord: I believe so, sir.
The Clerk called over the names of the prisoners, directing them to challenge the Jurors as called.
Judge Nelson: Those of the prisoners who desire to do so may take seats by the side of their counsel.
The Clerk proceeded to call the panel.
Edward Werner called, and challenged for principal cause by Mr. Smith:
Q. Have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty, in a capital case, where the evidence was sufficient to convince you that the prisoner was guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque, for the prisoners:
Q. Have you read the account in the newspapers of the capture of the Savannah privateers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you ever formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of these prisoners?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever formed or expressed any opinion as to whether they were guilty of piracy, if the facts were as alleged?
A. No, sir.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
William H. Marshall called, and challenged for principal cause:
Q. Have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty in a capital case, where the evidence was sufficient to convince you that the prisoner was guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque, for the prisoners:
Q. You read the account of the privateer Savannah?
A. I believe I have.
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoners?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever formed or expressed any opinion as to whether they were guilty of piracy, if the facts were as alleged?
A. I have not formed any opinion as to these men.
Q. As to the general question, whether cruising under a commission from the Confederate States is piracy?
A. I do not think I have formed any opinion, or expressed one.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
William Powell called, and challenged for principal cause by Mr. Smith:
Q. Have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty, in a capital case, where the evidence was sufficient to convince you that the prisoner was guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque, for the prisoners:
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of these prisoners?
A. I have not formed any opinion that would prevent me from giving a verdict according to the facts of the case. I have read the account, and I presume have formed such an opinion as most men do from reading an account, if the facts be so and so.
Q. Have you formed any opinion as to whether cruising, under a commission from the Confederate States, is piracy?
A. Yes, sir, I have.
Mr. Evarts objected that this was purely a question of law, and one jurors should not be inquired of.
The Court sustained the objection.
Q. Did you believe the accounts which you read of this transaction?
A. Well, it is difficult to say. There is so much published in the papers now-a-days that is not correct, that I am hardly prepared to say I believe anything I see, without palpable evidence. I believe the fact of the capture of the Savannah.
Q. Did you read what had been done by the Savannah before she was captured?
A. Well, I formed no opinion with regard to that.
Q. Did you form an opinion of the character of the act with which the defendants were charged?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you entertain the settled opinion that acting under a commission from President Davis, or the Confederate Government, constitutes piracy?
Mr. Evarts objected that this was a question of law.
The Court: I doubt whether that is a question that would be proper.
Mr. Larocque: This is a very peculiar case, as your honor is well aware. It is a case of first impression in the courts of the United States. It is a case in which, probably, there will be very little difference between the prosecution and the defendants as to the mere facts which are charged in this indictment, and it is a case in which jurors who present themselves to be sworn, if they have any bias or prejudice whatever, have it rather in reference to the character of the acts than as to the acts themselves having been committed or not having been committed. Now, we all know, if your honor please, that in all criminal trials a great deal of discussion has always taken place with reference to the jurisdiction of the jury over questions of law. The Courts have held that they are bound to receive their instructions on the law from the Court; but, at the same time, if they do not act in pursuance of the instructions which they receive, it is a matter between them and their own consciences, and it is a matter which no form of review in these Courts will reach. Now, one of my associates has handed to me an authority upon this subject from 1st Baldwin's Reports—that on the trial of Handy, in 1832, for treason, Judge Grier held that a juror who had formed an opinion that the riots in question did not amount to treason, was incompetent; and, in the case of the United States v. Wilson, it was held that a juror was incompetent who stated, on being challenged, that he had read the newspaper account of the facts at the time, and had come to his own conclusion, and had made up his mind that the offence was treason, although he had not expressed that opinion, nor formed or expressed an opinion that the defendant was or was not engaged in the offence. It seems to me that these authorities cover precisely the case before the Court, the only difference being that this is a charge of piracy, and the other a charge of treason.
Judge Nelson: The only difference is that there the question was put to the juror as to the crime, after it appeared he had read the account of the transaction, which involved both the law and the facts—involved the whole case; but as we understand your question, you put a pure question of law, which we do not think belongs to the juror.
Mr. Larocque: I understand your honor to rule the question is not admissible.
Judge Nelson: Yes.
Defendants' Counsel took exception.
Mr. Larocque: Permit me to put the question in two forms.
Q. Have you formed or expressed the opinion that the acts charged, if proved, constitute the offence of piracy?
The Court: That question is admissible.
A. I have not expressed the opinion, and I can hardly say I have formed an opinion, because I am not sufficiently informed on the law to do so.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
The Court: Then the other form of the question is withdrawn?
Mr. Larocque: Yes, sir; we are satisfied with the form of the question the Court allows us to put.
James Cassidy called. Challenged for principal cause, by Mr. Larocque, for the defendants.
Q. Did you read the account of the capture of the Savannah privateer?
A. I believe I did.
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion upon the guilt or innocence of these prisoners?
A. I believe not, sir. I may have made some mention of it at the time of reading the transaction, but not to express any opinion.
Q. Have you formed or expressed an opinion whether the facts, if proved, constitute the offence of piracy?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Smith:
Q. Have you any conscientious scruples on the subject of capital punishment that would interfere with your rendering a verdict of guilty, if the evidence proved the prisoners to be guilty?
A. No, sir.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
Joel W. Poor called. Challenged for principal cause by Mr. Smith:
Q. Have you any opinion on the subject of capital punishment which would prevent your rendering a verdict of guilty, if the evidence was such as to satisfy you?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque, for the prisoners:
Q. Have you read the account of the capture of the Savannah privateers?
A. I have.
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoners?
A. I think not, sir.
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion whether the facts charged, if proved, constitute the offence of piracy?
A. I have not.
Q. Have you never conversed on this subject?
A. I do not think I have.
Q. Have you no recollection of having conversed upon it at all?
A. I may have talked about it something at the time, but I do not recollect.
Q. Are you a stockholder, or connected with any marine insurance company?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you been engaged in Northern trade?
A. No, sir.
Challenged peremptorily, by prisoners.
Thomas Dugan called. Challenged for principal cause, by Mr. Smith:
Q. Have you any conscientious scruples that would interfere with your rendering a verdict of guilty, if you deemed the prisoners guilty upon the evidence?
A. I have strong conscientious scruples.
Mr. Smith asked that the juror stand aside.
Defendants' Counsel objected to the question, as not proper in form. Objection sustained.
Q. In a capital case, where the evidence is sufficient to satisfy your mind of the prisoner's guilt, have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty?
A. If I may explain, I would endeavor to find a verdict; but I believe my sympathy would control my judgment to that extent that I would not be able to do my duty between the people and the prisoner. I have been on a jury before, and I doubt that my judgment would be controlled by my sympathy.
Mr. Larocque: The witness has not said his sympathies would be of that strength that would prevent his finding a verdict of guilty, if the evidence was satisfactory. A juror that has doubts of himself is the most honest and reliable, according to all experience in criminal trials.
The Court: Examine him on that point.
By Mr. Larocque:
Q. Suppose that upon this trial the facts charged in this indictment were proved by clear and satisfactory evidence, and the Court should instruct you, upon that evidence, that those facts constitute the offence of piracy, would your conscientious scruples be so strong as to prevent your finding a verdict of guilty in such a case as that?
A. There must be not a shadow of doubt. It must be strong and conclusive in my mind before a verdict is rendered.
Q. But where there was strong, conclusive evidence, you would render a verdict of guilty?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Evarts: It is pretty apparent that the juror does not regard himself as in a position to deal impartially with this question, which involves human life. The intention of this cause of challenge is, that the juror should be in a position to yield to the evidence that just assent which its character is entitled to call for, unimpeded by his repugnance to the result when fatal to human life. Still, if your honor should not think that upon this ground he ought to be excluded absolutely, certainly it would be consistent with the course of practice, and with the just feeling of the juror, that he should stand aside until the panel be made up.
Mr. Brady: That practice I understand not to prevail any longer, since it has been provided that the empanneling of jurors in the United States Courts shall be the same as in the State Courts, and we do not consent to any such principle as the gentleman proposes. Your honor has decided that a juror, to disqualify him from serving in a capital case, must say that his conscientious scruples are of such a character that, though the evidence be clear and conclusive under the law, as stated by the Court, they would prevent his doing his duty and giving a verdict of guilty. To my mind, nothing can be more clear and satisfactory than the statement of the juror himself, which exhibits a state of mind that should be possessed by every juror; that is, that he must be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused before rendering a verdict of guilty; and when be speaks of his sympathy on behalf of human life, it is only that sympathy which the law recognizes where it gives the prisoner the benefit of every doubt. It is true he does use the expression that there must not be the shadow of a doubt; but when the Court comes to expound the law, he will be instructed that it must be a reasonable doubt. I do not see anything against the juror on the ground of conscientious scruples. Your honor knows that the prosecution have no peremptory challenge in cases of piracy or treason, and the old practice of setting aside jurors until the panel is exhausted, and then, if not able to make up twelve without the rejected jurors, requiring their acceptance, has passed. That is decided in the case of Shackleford, in 18 Howard's Reports.
The Court (to the Juror): We do not exactly comprehend the views you entertain upon this question; therefore we desire, for our own satisfaction, to put some questions to you, to ascertain, if we can, the state of your mind and opinions upon these questions, and see whether you are a competent juryman or not in a capital case. It is a very high duty, and a common duty, devolving upon every respectable citizen. The question is this—and we desire that there may be no delusion or misapprehension on your mind in respect to it—in a capital case, if the proof on behalf of the Government should be such as to satisfy your mind that the prisoner was guilty of the capital offence, whether or not you have any conscientious scruples as respects capital punishment, that would prevent your rendering a verdict of guilty?
A. In answer to that I would say that this is what troubles me: I want to do my duty; I want to render a verdict fairly and squarely as between the prisoner and the people; but I have this to contend with—I have read that people have been convicted upon the clearest testimony, and afterwards found to be innocent; and before I would have such feelings I would as soon go to the scaffold as send a person there who was not guilty. Therefore my sympathy is so strong that I am afraid to trust myself. I did serve on a former occasion, and I do not know that even then I did my duty.
Q. What do you mean by being afraid to trust yourself? Is it a conscientious feeling and opinion against the penalty of capital punishment?
A. Yes, sir, it is. I have a great abhorrence of it, if I may so express myself. Yet I should like to render a verdict, and do what is right; but I believe my feelings are too great to trust myself.
The Court: We think we are bound to set the juror aside.
Mr. Larocque: Permit me to put one question.
Q. It strikes me that you are a little at fault as to what the purport of this question is. It is not whether you have an abhorrence of convicting a prisoner of a capital offence. The question is, whether you have such conscientious scruples against capital punishment as would prevent your finding the prisoner guilty, if the facts were proved, and the Court instructed you that those facts constituted the offence?
A. I answered before. It places me in rather a peculiar position. As I said, I want it understood distinctly, I desire to do my duty; but there is a struggle between that and my sympathy, and I am afraid to trust myself.
Q. But you can draw a distinction between your sympathy and any conscientious scruples against the punishment of death, can you not?
A. Well, sir, where it comes to the point–
Q. Allow me to put the question in another way: If you are entirely satisfied, upon the evidence and instructions of the Court, that the prisoner was guilty, your conscience would not trouble you in finding him guilty?
A. Well, sir, there would be this: I would feel that persons, under the strongest kind of testimony, have been found guilty, wrongfully, and it would operate on me—the fear that I had judged wrong on the facts, and committed murder. That feeling is very strong.
Q. If the evidence satisfied you that the prisoner was guilty, would your conscience prevent your saying so?
A. It would not now. It might in the jury-room. When it comes to the point, and I feel that I hold the life of a human being, it is pretty hard to know what I would do then.
Q. Your conscience would only trouble you if you doubted that your judgment was right?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larocque: I submit that the juror is competent.
Juror: You must take your chances if you take me. I still think I am not fit to sit on a jury to represent the people.
The Court: I think we must take the opinion of the juror as against himself.
Set aside. [Defendants took exception.]
John Fife called, and challenged for principal cause:
Q. In a capital case, where the evidence is sufficient to convince you of the guilt of the prisoner, have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque, for the prisoners:
Q. Did you read the account of the capture of the privateer Savannah?
A. I did.
Q. Have you formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoners?
A. I believe not, sir.
Q. Have you formed or expressed an opinion whether the facts charged, if proved, constitute the offence of piracy?
A. I have not, sir.
Q. You think you have no bias or prejudice in this case?
A. No, sir.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
Thomas Costello called. Challenged for principal cause.
By Mr. Smith:
Q. In a capital case, where the evidence is sufficient to convince you of the guilt of the prisoner, have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque, for the prisoners:
Q. You know that this case is an indictment for piracy against the prisoners. Have you formed or expressed any opinion upon their guilt or innocence?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion whether the facts charged against them, if proved, constitute the offence of piracy?
A. I have not, sir.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
Tuganhold Kron called. Challenged for principal cause.
By Mr. Smith:
Q. In a capital case, where the evidence was sufficient to convince you of the guilt of the prisoner, have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty?
A. Yes, sir. (Question repeated.)
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you readily understand English?
A. Pretty well.
Q. You did not understand me when I asked the question the first time?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you understand English well?
A. Yes, pretty well. There may be some words I do not understand.
Q. Did you ever sit as a juror on a trial?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you understand all the witnesses said?
A. No, because I did not hear, sometimes.
Q. Do you think you understand English well enough, so that you can hear a trial intelligently?
A. I cannot say, sir.
Q. You are not sure?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque:
Q. What is your occupation?
A. A bookbinder.
Q. Have you an establishment of your own?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The men you employ—do they speak English or German?
A. Some English—the most of them German.
Q. And you transact your business with gentlemen who speak English?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long have you done so?
A. Eight years.
By the Court:
Q. How long have you been in this country?
A. Seventeen years.
Q. Have you been in business all that time?
A. I worked as journeyman ten years, and have been seven years in business of my own.
By Mr. Smith:
Q. Do you think you can understand English well enough so that you can, from the evidence, form an opinion of your own?
A. I think I will.
By Mr. Larocque:
Q. You read the account of the capture of the privateer Savannah in the newspapers?
A. Yes, sir; in some German paper.
Q. Did you form or express any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of these prisoners?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you form or express an opinion whether the facts charged against them, if proved, constitute the offence of piracy?
A. No, sir.
Mr. Evarts: We think the juror's knowledge of the language is shown, by his own examination, to be such as should at least entitle the Government to ask that he should stand aside until it is seen if the panel shall be filled from other jurors—if that right exists. Your honor held, in the case of the United States v. Douglass—a piracy case tried some ten years ago—that that right did exist.
The Court: I think we have since qualified that in the case of Shackleford. It was intended to settle that debatable question, and it was held that the Act of Congress, requiring the empanneling of jurors to be according to the practice in State Courts, did not necessarily draw after it this right of setting aside. We think the objection taken is not sustained.
Juror sworn.
Matthew P. Bogart called. Challenged for principal cause by Mr. Smith:
Q. In a capital case, where the evidence is sufficient to convince you of the guilt of the prisoner, have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your rendering a verdict of guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque, for the prisoners:
Q. Have you read the account of the capture of the privateer Savannah in the newspapers?
A. I recollect reading it at the time—not since.
Q. Have you ever formed or expressed an opinion upon the guilt or innocence of these prisoners?
A. Not to my recollection.
Q. Have you ever formed or expressed an opinion whether the facts charged against them, if proved, constitute the offence of piracy?
A. I have not.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
George Moeller called. Challenged for principal cause by Mr. Smith:
Q. In a capital case, where the evidence is sufficient to convince you of the guilt of the prisoner, have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque, for the prisoners:
Q. Have you read the account of the capture of the Savannah? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of these prisoners?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to whether, if the facts were proved, as alleged, it was piracy?
A. I do not know what the facts are, sir. I have only read an account of the capture.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
Robert Taylor called. Challenged for principal cause, by Mr. Smith:
Q. In a capital case, where the evidence is sufficient to convince you of the guilt of the prisoner, have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque, for the prisoners:
Q. You read of the capture of the privateer Savannah?
A. I think I have.
Q. Did you form or express any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoners?
A. Not that I know of, sir.
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion whether the facts, if proved, constitute the offence of piracy?
A. No, sir, not any.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
Daniel Bixby called. Challenged for principal cause, by Mr. Smith:
Q. In a capital case, where the evidence is sufficient to convince you of the guilt of the prisoner, have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty?
A. I have not.
By Mr. Larocque:
Q. Have you ever formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoners?
A. I have not.
Q. Or whether the facts, if proved, constitute the offence of piracy?
A. No, sir.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
Ira L. Cady called. Challenged for principal cause, by Mr. Smith:
Q. In a capital case, where the evidence is sufficient to convince you of the guilt of the prisoner, have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque:
Q. You know what this case is for?
A. I believe I understand it.
Q. An indictment of piracy against the privateersmen captured on the Savannah?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion upon the guilt or innocence of the prisoners?
A. I do not recollect that I have.
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion whether the facts, if proved, constitute piracy?
A. I do not think I have.
Q. Have you any opinion now upon either of these subjects?
A. I cannot say that I am entirely indifferent of opinion on the subject, but still I have not formed any definite opinion.
Q. Your mind, however, is not entirely unbiased upon the question?
A. Well, no, sir—not if I understand the question; that is, the question whether the facts, if proved, constitute the offence of piracy?
Mr. Larocque submitted that the juror was not indifferent.
Mr. Evarts: All that has been said by the juror is that, on the question of whether the facts charged constitute the offence of piracy, he has no fixed opinion; but he cannot say he has no opinion on the subject. He is ready to receive instruction from the Court.
Mr. Larocque contended that, as the question of whether the facts alleged constituted piracy, or not, was a most important one to be discussed, they were entitled to have the mind of the juror entirely blank and unbiased on that subject.
The Court: Let us see what the state of mind of the juror is.
Q. You mentioned, in response to a question put to you, that you had read an account in the newspapers of the capture of this vessel.
A. I was not asked that question. I have no mind made up in respect to the subject that would prevent my finding a verdict in accordance with the evidence; but I said I was not entirely devoid of an opinion in regard to the case—that is, the offence.
Q. Have you read an account of the capture of this vessel?
A. Yes, sir; I read it at the time.
Q. Is it from the account, thus read, of the transaction of the capture, that you found this opinion upon?
A. No, sir; it is not that. It is upon the general subject that I mean to be understood—not in reference to this case particularly.
Q. Do you say, upon the general question, that you have an opinion?
A. Well, not fully made up. I have the shadow of an opinion about it.
Q. Not a fixed opinion?
A. No, sir; I would be governed by the law and instructions of the Court.
Q. You are open to the control of your opinion upon the facts and law as developed in the course of the trial?
A. Certainly, sir.
The Court: We do not think the objection sustained.
Challenged peremptorily by the prisoners.
Samuel Mudget called. Challenged for principal cause.
By Mr. Smith:
Q. In a capital case, where the evidence is sufficient, in your opinion, to convict the prisoner, have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty?
A. I have not.
By Mr. Larocque:
Q. You have read the account of the capture of the privateer Savannah?
A. Yes, sir; at the time.
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion upon the guilt or innocence of these privateersmen?
A. I have not.
Q. Have you formed or expressed an opinion whether the acts charged upon them, if proved, constitute piracy?
A. No, sir; I have not formed any opinion with regard to the question whether it was piracy or not.
Challenged peremptorily by the prisoners.
George H. Hansell challenged for principal cause.
Q. In a capital case, where the evidence is sufficient to convince you that the prisoner was guilty, have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque:
Q. Have you read the account of the capture of the Savannah privateer?
A. I believe I read the account at the time. I have a very indistinct recollection of it.
Q. Have you formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoners?
A. I do not remember that I have, sir. I certainly do not have any opinion now; and certainly would not have until I have heard the evidence.
Q. Do you say you do not recollect whether you have formed or expressed any opinion?
A. I do not remember that I have, sir. I may, on reading the article, have expressed an opinion on it; but I am not positive of that.
Q. Have you formed or expressed an opinion whether the facts charged, if proved, amount to piracy?
A. I should not consider myself competent to form an opinion upon that until I have heard the law on the subject.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
Panel completed.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OPENING
Mr. E. Delafield Smith opened the case for the prosecution. He said:
May it please the Court, and you, Gentlemen of the Jury:
The Constitution of the United States, in the eighth section of the first article, authorized the Congress, among other things, to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations.
In pursuance of that authority, the Congress, on the 30th of April, 1790, made provisions contained in an act entitled "An Act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States." I refer to the 8th and 9th sections of that act, which is to be found in the first volume of the U.S. Statutes at Large, page 112.
In the State Courts, gentlemen, it is common to say that the jury is judge both of the law and the fact; but such is not the case in the United States Courts. The Court will state to you the law, which you are morally bound to follow. But in opening this case, I refer to the statutes for the purpose of showing you precisely what the law is supposed to be under which this indictment is found, and under which we shall ask you for a verdict.
The 8th section of the act of 1790, commonly called "The Crimes Act," and to which I have just referred, declares, that if any person or persons shall commit, upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, murder or robbery, or any other offence which, if committed within the body of a county, would, by the laws of the United States, be punishable with death; or if any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel shall piratically and feloniously run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandize to the value of fifty dollars, or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship or goods committed to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall be deemed, taken, and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and, being thereof convicted, shall suffer death; and the trial of crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought.
SECOND DAY
Thursday, Oct. 24, 1861.
The Court met at 11 o'clock A.M.
Judge Nelson, in deciding the question raised yesterday, said:
So far as regards the question heretofore under consideration of Judge Sprague, we do not think that at present involved in the case. We will confine ourselves to the decision of the admissibility of the question as it was put by the District Attorney and objected to, as respects the purpose with which the Minnesota, with the prisoners, was sent to Hampton Roads. We think that the fact of their being sent by the commanding officer of that place, with the prisoners, to Hampton Roads, is material and necessary; and, in order to appreciate fully the fact itself, the purpose is a part of the res gestæ that characterizes the fact. What effect it may have upon the more general question, involving the jurisdiction of the Court, is not material or necessary now to consider. We think the question is proper.
Counsel for defendants took exception to the ruling of the Court.
Commodore Stringham recalled. Direct examination resumed by Mr. Smith.
Q. What was your object in transferring the prisoners from the Perry to the Minnesota?
A. Sending them to a Northern port. The port of New York was the port I had in my mind. To send them by the first ship from the station, as soon as possible, to a Northern port, for trial. I could not send them to a Southern port for trial. The only way I could do so would be by guns. I could get no landing in those places otherwise; and I could get no judge or jury to give them a trial.
Mr. Larocque asked if, conceding the propriety of the inquiry, the statement of the witness was competent, viz.: that he had a port in his mind.
The Court: No; the question was not put in the shape I supposed. The question should have been—for what purpose or object did he send the prisoners in the Minnesota to Hampton Roads? That is the point in the case—the intent with which the vessel was sent to Hampton Roads?
A. I sent them there with the intention of sending them to a Northern port, for trial. The Harriet Lane being the first vessel that left, after my arrival there, they were sent in the Harriet Lane to the Northern port of New York.
Q. Why did you not take them in the Minnesota directly to New York, instead of taking them to Hampton Roads?
A. My station was at Hampton Roads, and I went there to arrange the squadron that might be there, and to get a supply of fuel for the ship. I do not think we had enough to go to New York, if we wished to go there. I had supplied vessels on the coast below, and had exhausted pretty nearly all the coal from the Minnesota when we arrived at Hampton Roads.
Q. What directions did you give to the officers of the Harriet Lane?
A. I gave no directions to the officers of the Harriet Lane. I gave directions to the commander of the Minnesota. I left on the day previous, I think, to their being transferred to the Harriet Lane,—giving directions that, as soon as she came down from Newport News, to send her to New York, with the prisoners. I had been called to Washington, by the Secretary of the Navy, the day before she sailed.
Q. Are you aware of any facts which rendered it impossible to land the prisoners in the Virginia District, or on the Virginia shore?
A. It was impossible to land without force of arms, and taking possession of any port. We could land them there, but not for trial, certainly. The Harriet Lane had been fired into but a short time previous; and that was one cause of sending her to New York.
Q. Fired into from the Virginia shore?
A. Yes, sir; from Field Point; I should judge, about 8 miles from Norfolk port, on the southern shore, nearly opposite Newport News. I was not there, but it was reported to me. She was fired into, and she was ordered to New York to change her armament.
Q. Was that fort in the way, proceeding to Norfolk?
A. Not on the direct way to Hampton Roads, but a little point on the left.
Q. Would a vessel, going the usual way to Norfolk, be in range of the guns that were fired at the Harriet Lane?
A. Not of these; but she would be in the range of four or five forts that it would be necessary to pass in order to land the prisoners at Norfolk.
Q. What was the nearest port to where the Minnesota went with the prisoners?
A. The nearest port of entry was Norfolk. Hampton Roads was a little higher up. We were not anchored exactly at the Roads, but off Old Point, which is not considered Hampton Roads.
[Map produced.] I have marked the position of the Minnesota on this map, in blue ink. [Exhibits the position to the Court.]
Q. State the position of the Minnesota?
A. That is as near as I can put it—between the Rip Raps and Fortress Monroe—a little outside of the Rip Raps.
Q. In what jurisdiction is the Fort?
A. In the United States.
(Objected to, as matter of law.)
Q. At what distance were you from Fortress Monroe?
A. About three-quarters of a mile, and nearly the same from the Rip Raps.
Q. What distance from Norfolk?
A. I think 14 miles, as near as I can judge; 12 or 14.
Q. Had you any instructions from the Government, in respect to any prisoners that might be arrested on the high seas, as to the place they were to be taken to?
A. Not previous to my arriving at Hampton Roads. After that, I had. Those instructions were in writing.
Q. You had no particular or general instructions previous to that?
A. No, sir; it was discretionary with me, previous to that, where to send the prisoners I had.
Q. When vessels are sent from one place to another, state whether it is not frequently the case that they take shelter in roadsteads?
(Objected to. Excluded.)
Q. Where did your duties, as flag-officer of the squadron, require you to be with your ship, the Minnesota?
(Objected to. Excluded.)
Q. Where do Hampton Roads commence on this map, and where end?
A. In my experience, I have always considered it higher up than where we were anchored. This is anchoring off Fortress Monroe, when anchoring there. When they go a little higher up, they go to Hampton Roads; and, before the war, small vessels anchored up in Newport News, in a gale of wind.
Q. Where did the Minnesota anchor, in respect to Hampton Roads?
A. We anchored outside, sir. I can only say this from the pilot. When commanding the Ohio, he asked me whether I wished to anchor inside the Roads. Baltimore pilots have permission to go into Hampton Roads, and no farther. That is considered as neutral ground for all vessels.
By the Court:
Q. What is the width of the entrance to the Hampton Roads?
A. I should judge about 3-1/2 miles, or 3-1/4, from Old Point over to Sewall's Point. I have not measured it accurately. It is from 3 to 4 miles.
By Mr. Smith:
Q. Was the Minnesota brought inside or outside of a line drawn from Old Point to the Rip Raps?
A. A little outside of the line, sir.
By a Juror:
Q. Would a person be subject to any port-charges where the Minnesota lay?
A. No, sir.
Defendants' counsel objected to the question and answer.
The Court:
Q. What do you mean by port dues?
A. I mean they do not have to enter into the custom-house to pay port-charges. It is not a port of entry, that compels them to carry their papers. The only port-charges I know of are the pilot-charges, in and out.
(The Court ruled it out as immaterial.)
Cross-examined by Mr. Brady.
Q. I want, for the purpose of preventing any misapprehension, to ask if there is any line that you know of, which you could draw upon that map, distinguishing the place at which Hampton Roads begins?
A. Nothing only among sea-faring men;—just as the lower bay of New York, which is considered to be down below the Southwest Spit. When anchored between this and that, it is called off a particular place, as Coney Island, &c. So, there, after you pass up from Fortress Monroe, it is called Hampton Roads.
Q. Is there any specific point you can draw a line from on the map that distinctly indicates where Hampton Roads begin? A. I cannot, sir.
Q. Designate where the Harriet Lane was?
A. I cannot say, sir. She was at Newport News when I left, and came down the next day, I believe, and took the prisoners on board and proceeded to New York.
Q. The Minnesota was anchored?
A. Yes, sir, but not moored; with a single anchor.
Q. How much cable was out?
A. From 65 to 70 fathoms, I think. I generally order 65 fathoms; but the captain gave her 5 fathoms more.
Q. Would she swing far enough to affect the question whether she was in or outside of Hampton Roads, as you understood it?
A. No, sir.
Q. Had you often been there before?
A. I had, sir, often. I was there 51 years ago. I started there.
Q. Did you ever have occasion, for any practical purposes, to locate where Hampton Roads began?
A. Yes, sir; several times I have anchored there with ships under my command, and the pilots have said, "Will you go up into the Roads?" and I said, "Yes;" and we never anchored within two or three miles of where we lay with the Minnesota.
Q. But it was not your object to get at any particular line which separated Hampton Roads?
A. No; we considered it a better anchorage. The only importance was a better anchorage.
Q. You had no instructions of any kind in regard to the prisoners before you left for Washington?
A. I would say I had not, before I arrived at Hampton Roads, or at Old Point.
Q. Did you receive any between the time of your arrival and your departure for Washington?
A. I cannot say, but I think not.
Q. The only instructions you gave were that, when the Harriet Lane came up, the prisoners should be removed, and sent to New York?
A. I gave orders that they should be sent to New York and delivered to the Marshal.
Q. There would be no difficulty to transfer prisoners to Fortress Monroe?
A. No, sir, no difficulty.
Q. Could they not have been taken to Hampton?
A. I think not. Our troops had abandoned Hampton and moved in, I think. There was nothing there to land at Hampton. We may have had possession at that time.
Q. Do you know of any obstacle whatever to these men having been taken ashore at Old Point Comfort and carried to Hampton?
A. I went up twice to Washington, with Colonel Baker, when he abandoned Hampton; but I think at the time the prisoners were on board we had the occupation of Hampton by our troops. My impression is, we occupied it partly with our troops at that time. I went to Washington at another time, when the troops had abandoned Hampton, and Colonel Baker took his soldiers up in the same boat.
Q. A college has been described on shore, and the locality described. Was it not occupied as an hospital?
A. Yes, sir, at the time the Minnesota arrived. It is not in Hampton.
Q. When the Minnesota arrived with the prisoners was not that building in possession of our Government?
A. It was, sir, I believe. I was not in it.
By Mr. Evarts: Is not the hospital at Old Point?
A. Near Old Point.
By Mr. Brady: Designate on the chart where it is?
A. I have done so,—the square mark, on the shore, in the rear of the fort, on the Virginia shore.
By the Court: How much of a town is Hampton?
A. There is none of it left now. I suppose it was a town of 4,000 or 5,000 inhabitants.
Q. Was it not formerly a port of entry?
A. No, sir, I believe not; not that I know of. That was 4 or 5 miles off from the vessel.
By Mr. Brady: How far was Hampton from Fortress Monroe?
A. I should judge 3 miles.
Q. I ask again, before you left the Minnesota, after the arrival of the prisoners, had you any instructions from Washington in regard to these prisoners?
A. I cannot bring to my mind whether I had any or not. I had instructions, subsequent to my arrival, about all prisoners, and that was the reason why I came here. There was some question as to why I came with 700 prisoners; but I had instructions to bring all prisoners taken, and turn them over to Colonel Burke, of New York.
Q. After you arrived at Washington did you receive any instructions in regard to these prisoners?
A. I do not know that I did. I had some discussion in Washington.
Q. Did you communicate from Washington, in any way, to Fortress Monroe, or the Minnesota, in regard to the prisoners? A. No, sir.
Q. They went forward under the directions you gave before leaving to go to Washington?
A. They did, sir; I gave the instructions. I did not know whether the Harriet Lane would be ready. She was waiting until the vessel arrived to relieve her from the station.
Q. Was General Butler at Fortress Monroe at the time of the arrival of the prisoners?
A. He was, sir.
Q. Did you confer with him about it?
A. No, sir.
Q. Neither then nor at Washington?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was there any conversation between you and him in regard to that?
A. I do not think there was until after my return and the prisoners had gone to New York.
Re-direct.
Q. How large a space is occupied by the hospital to which you have referred?
A. I cannot give the number of feet, but I think about 150 feet square. I never was in it but once, when I passed in for a moment, and right out of the hall.
David C. Constable called by the prosecution and sworn.
Examined by Mr. Smith.
Q. You are a Lieutenant in the United States Navy?
A. Not now; I am First Lieutenant of the Harriet Lane. We were then serving under the Navy; I am now in a revenue cutter.
Q. Were you on board the Harriet Lane when she received the prisoners from the Minnesota?
A. I was, sir.
Q. Who did you receive your orders from on the subject?
A. Captain Van Brunt, of the Minnesota.
Q. Was that a verbal order?
A. No; a written one, sir.
Q. Was it an order to bring the prisoners to New York?
A. To proceed with the prisoners to New York, and deliver them to the civil authorities, I think.
Q. Where was the Harriet Lane, in respect to the Rip Raps and fort at Old Point Comfort, when the prisoners were taken on board from the Minnesota?
A. We were about half a mile, I should judge, from the Minnesota; a little nearer in shore.
Q. Where had the Harriet Lane come from?
A. From Newport News.
Q. Did she, or not, come from Newport News in pursuance of the object to go to New York?
A. Yes, sir; although at the time we had received no orders in regard to any prisoners. We were coming on for a change of armament and for repairs.
Q. The Harriet Lane had been fired into?
A. She had, sir.
Q. Where was she when fired into?
(Objected to. Offered to show the impossibility of landing. Ruled out as immaterial.)
Q. How was the transfer made from the Minnesota to the Harriet Lane?
A. By boats.
Q. Show on this map where the Harriet Lane was when the transfer was made of the prisoners from the Minnesota, and also where the Minnesota lay?
[Witness marked the place on map.]
Q. State the relative position of the vessels as you have marked it?
A. I should judge we were about a mile from Old Point, in about eleven fathoms of water, and probably about a mile from the Rip Raps. I do not remember exactly.
Q. The Harriet Lane was about half a mile further up?
A. Yes, a little west of the Minnesota, but farther in shore.
Q. What is your understanding in respect to where Hampton Roads commence, in reference to the position of these vessels?
A. I had always supposed it was inside of Old Point and the Rip Raps, after passing through them,—taking Old Point as the Northern extremity, and out to Sewall's Point.
Q. How in respect to where the Harriet Lane lay?
A. I consider she was off Old Point, and not, properly speaking, in Hampton Roads.
Q. The Minnesota was still further out?
A. Yes, sir, a very little.
Q. You brought the prisoners to New York in the Harriet Lane and delivered them to the United States Marshal at New York?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You delivered them from your vessel to the United States Marshal?
A. Yes, sir; the United States Marshal came alongside our ship, while in the Navy Yard, in a tug, and they were delivered to him.
Q. Do you remember the day they arrived at New York?
A. On the 25th of June, in the afternoon.
Q. In what service was the Harriet Lane?
A. In the naval service of the United States.
Cross-examined by Mr. Brady.
Q. As has already been stated, there was no difficulty about landing the prisoners from the Minnesota at Fortress Monroe, or at the College Hospital, or at Hampton. Was there any difficulty in taking them to Newport News?
A. No, sir; I suppose they might have been taken to Newport News.
Q. Who was in possession of Newport News at that time?
A. The United States troops, sir. Our vessel had been stationed there for six weeks preceding.
Re-direct.
Q. What occupation had the United States of Fortress Monroe, and of this hospital building, and of Newport News? Was it other than a military possession?
(Objected to by defendants' counsel.)
The Court: It is not relevant.
Mr. Evarts: We know there was no physical difficulty in landing them; we want to know whether there was any other.
The Court: We need not go into any other. Practically, they could have been landed there. That is all about it. As to being a military fort, and under military authority, that is not of consequence.
Mr. Evarts: As to military forts receiving prisoners at all times?
The Court: We do not care about that. It is not important to go into that. We know it is a military fort, altogether under military officers. Civil justice is not administered there, I take it.
Daniel T. Tompkins called by the Government; sworn.
Examined by Mr. Smith.
Q. You were Second Lieutenant on the Harriet Lane?
A. I was, sir.
Q. You were present at the transfer of these prisoners from the Minnesota to the Harriet Lane?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You were with them to New York?
A. Yes; but I was ashore when they were delivered here.
Q. You accompanied the prisoners on the voyage?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did the Harriet Lane lie at Hampton Roads, in relation to the Fort and Rip Raps?
A. I should think we were about a mile from the Rip Raps, and probably three-fourths of a mile from the Fort.
Q. At the time of the transhipment?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The transhipment was made in boats?
A. Yes, sir,—in a boat from the Minnesota. I believe all came in one boat.
Q. Where do Hampton Roads commence, as you understand, in respect to where the Harriet Lane was?
A. I think they commence astern of where we lay; a little to the westward, as we were lying off of Old Point.
Q. Look upon that map and indicate, by a pencil, where the vessels lay, without any reference to the marks already made there—in the first place the Minnesota and then the Harriet Lane—when the transhipment was made, taken in relation to the Fort and the Rip Raps?
Witness marks the positions, and adds: We were about half a mile from the Minnesota, I should say.
J. Buchanan Henry called by the prosecution; sworn. Examined by Mr. Smith.
Q. In June and July last you were United States Commissioner? A. From the 15th of June.
Q. [Producing warrant.] Is that your signature?
A. It is.
Counsel for prosecution reads warrant, issued by J. Buchanan Henry, in the name of the President, addressed to the Marshal, dated June 26, 1861.
(Objected to as irrelevant. Objection overruled.)
Q. This warrant was issued by you?
A. It was, sir.
Q. On an affidavit filed with you?
A. Yes, sir.
Cross-examined.
Q. Against all these prisoners?
A. Yes, sir.
Defendants take exception to the admission of the testimony.
The U.S. District Attorney was about to call the Marshal, to prove that he arrested the prisoners.
Defendants' counsel admitted the prisoners were arrested, under this warrant, by the Marshal, in this district.
Mr. Brady: Perhaps you can state, Mr. Smith, where they were when arrested under that warrant?
Mr. Smith: They had been brought to the Marshal's office, I think.
Mr. Brady: They were in the Marshal's office when arrested?
Mr. Smith: They were brought to the Marshal's office before the writ was served.
Ethan Allen called by the prosecution; sworn. Examined by Mr. Smith.
Q. You are Assistant District Attorney?
A. I am, sir.
Q. And were in June last?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you remember, at my request, calling upon the prisoners now in Court?
A. I do, sir.
Q. Did you call upon every one?
A. I called upon all the prisoners at the Tombs.
Q. Upon each one separately?
A. I called upon them in the different cells. They were confined two by two.
Q. Had you previously attended, as Assistant District Attorney, upon the examination of these prisoners?
A. I had, upon one or two occasions.
Q. Were the prisoners all present on those occasions?
A. They were present once, I distinctly recollect.
Q. Did you then talk with them?
A. No, sir; I addressed myself to the Commissioner in adjourning the case.
Q. Was there any examination proceeded with?
A. There was no examination.
Q. State what you said to the prisoners, the object of your calling, and what their reply was. I ask, first, did you make a memorandum at the time?
A. I did, sir.
Q. Was it made at the very time you asked the questions?
A. I took paper and pencil in hand, and asked the questions which you requested, and took a note of it.
Q. What was the object of your calling upon them?
A. To ask them where they were born; and, if born elsewhere, were they naturalized.
Q. Did you state for what purpose you made this inquiry?
A. I do not recollect that I made any statement to the prisoners for what purpose I wanted the information. I told them I wanted it. They seemed to recognize me as Assistant District Attorney; and as to those that did not recognize me, I told them I was Assistant District Attorney. The memorandum produced is the one I made at the time.
Q. Referring to that, give the statements that were made by each of the prisoners in reply to your questions?
A. Henry Cashman Howard said he was born in Beaufort, North Carolina.
Charles Sydney Passalaigue said he was born in Charleston, South Carolina.
Joseph Cruse del Carno said he was born in Manilla, in the Chinese Seas, and was never naturalized.
Thomas Harrison Baker said he was born in Philadelphia.
John Harleston said he was born in Anderson District, or County, in South Carolina.
Patrick Daly was born in Belfast, Ireland. Has never been naturalized.
William C. Clarke born in Hamburg, Germany. Never naturalized.
Henry Oman born in Canton. Never was naturalized.
Martin Galvin born in the County Clare, Ireland. Not naturalized.
Richard Palmer born in Edinburgh. Never naturalized.
Alexander C. Coid was born in Galloway, Scotland. Was naturalized in Charleston,—about 1854 or 1855, he thinks.
John Murphy born in Ireland. Never naturalized.
Mr. Brady: We will insist, hereafter, that this admission of naturalization cannot be used at all.
Mr. Evarts: We will concede that.
By Mr. Smith: Do you remember asking the prisoners for their full names?
A. I asked them particularly for their full names.
Q. Are they correctly stated in the indictment?
A. They are stated from the memorandum which I then took; that is my only means of recollection.
Mr. Smith: The Assistant District Attorney desires me to state that he did not know that he was to be called as a witness in the case; that if he had had any idea that he would be called as a witness, he would not have made the visit. Yesterday, for the first time, he ascertained that he would be called. I would also state that I did not send him there for the purpose of making him a witness, but with the object of obtaining particulars which might render the allegations in the indictment entirely accurate in respect to every detail.
Mr. Smith added: I now close the case for the prosecution.
OPENING FOR THE DEFENCE
Mr. Larocque opened the case for the defence. He said:
May it please the Court, and you, Gentlemen of the Jury:
We have now reached that stage in this interesting trial where the duty has been assigned to me, by my associates in this defence, of presenting to you the state of facts and the rules of law on which we expect to ask from you an acquittal of these prisoners. I could wish that it had been assigned to some one more able to present it to you than myself, for I feel the weight of this case pressing upon me, from various considerations connected with it, in a manner almost overpowering. I think that we have proceeded far enough in this case for you to have perceived that it is one of the most interesting trials that ever took place on the continent of America, if not in the civilized world. For the first time, certainly in this controversy, twelve men are put on trial for their lives, before twelve other men, as pirates and—as has been well expressed to you by the learned District Attorney who opened this case on behalf of the prosecution—as enemies of the human race. If you have had time, in the exciting progress of this trial, to reflect in your own minds as to what the import of these words was, it must certainly, ere this, have occurred to you that, in regard to these prisoners, whatever may be the legal consequences of the acts charged upon them, it was a misapplication of the term. Look for a moment, gentlemen, first, at the position of things in our country under which this trial takes place. All these prisoners come before you from a far distant section of the country. Some of them were not born there—some of them were. At the time when these events occurred all of the prisoners lived there, and were identified with that country, with its welfare, with its Government, whatever it was. They had there their homes, their families, everything which attaches a man to the spot in which he lives. Those of them who had not been born in America had sought it as an asylum. They had come from distant regions of the earth—some from the Chinese Sea and the remote East—because they had been taught there that America was the freest land on the globe. They had lived there for years. Suddenly they had seen the country convulsed from one end to the other. They had seen hostile armies arrayed against each other, the combatants being for the most part divided by geographical lines as to the place where they were born or as to the State in which they lived. This very morning a newspaper in the city of New York estimates the numbers thus arrayed in hostility against each other at no less than seven hundred thousand souls. These prisoners have the misfortune, as I say, of being placed on their trial far from their homes. They have been now in confinement and under arrest on this charge for some four or five months. During that whole period they have had no opportunity whatever of communicating with their friends or relatives. Intercourse has been cut off. They have had no opportunity of procuring means to meet their necessary expenses, or even to fee counsel in their defence. Without the solace of the company of their families, immured in a prison among those who, unfortunately, from friends and fellow-countrymen have become enemies, they are now placed in this Court on trial for their lives. You will certainly reflect, gentlemen, that it was not for a case of this kind that any statute punishing the crime of piracy was ever intended to be enacted. You will reflect, when you come to consider this case, after the evidence shall have been laid before you, and after you have received instructions from the Court, that however by technical construction our ingenious friends on the other side may endeavor to force on your minds the conviction that this was a case intended to be provided for by statutes passed in the year 1790, and by statutes passed in the year 1820,—it is a monstrous stretch of the provisions of those statutes to ask for a conviction in a case of this kind. And I may be permitted, with very great respect for the constitutional authorities of our Government, to which we all owe our allegiance and respect, to wonder that this case has been brought for trial before you. I cannot help, under the circumstances surrounding these trials—for while you are sitting here, another jury is passing on a similar case in the neighboring City of Philadelphia—attributing the determination of the Government to submit these cases to the judicial tribunals at this time to a desire to satisfy the mind of the community itself, which has been naturally excited on this subject, that these men are not pirates within the meaning of the law. And I do most sincerely hope, for the credit of our Government, that that is the object which it has in view, and that the heart of every officer of the Government, at Washington or elsewhere, will be most rejoiced at the verdict of acquittal, which, I trust, on every consideration, you will pronounce. We all know that in a time of civil commotion and civil war like this, the minds of the people, particularly at the incipient stages of the controversy, become terribly excited and aroused. We could not listen, at the outbreak of these commotions, to any other name but that of pirate or traitor, as connected with those arrayed against our Government and countrymen. One of the misfortunes of a time of popular excitement like this is, that it pervades not only the minds of the community, but reaches the public halls of legislation, and the executive and administrative departments of the Government. And it is no disrespect, even to the Chief Magistrate of the country to say, that he might, in a time like this, put forward proclamations and announce a determination to do what his more sober judgment would tell him it was imprudent to announce his intention of doing. You will all probably recollect that when this outbreak occurred the Government at Washington announced the determination of treating those who might be captured on board of privateers fitted out in the Confederate States as pirates. Such an announcement once made, it is difficult to depart from. And therefore I do most sincerely hope that the administration in Washington, as my heart tells me must be the case, are looking at these trials in progress here and in Philadelphia, with an earnest desire that the voice of the Juries shall be the voice of acquittal,—thus disembarrassing the Government of the trammels of a proclamation which it were better, perhaps, had never been issued. This civil war had at that time reached no such proportions as those which it has since acquired. It was then a mere beginning of a revolution. The cry was, that Washington was in danger. There were no hostile forces arrayed on the opposite sides of the Potomac. There was a fear that they would soon make their appearance; and there was also an earnest hope—which I lament most deeply has not been realized—that that outbreak would be stopped in its commencement, and that no armies approaching to the proportions of those which have since been in hostile conflict would be arrayed on the field of battle. Look at the state of things now. Scarcely a day elapses on which battles are not taking place, from one end to the other of this broad continent—in Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, and other States—and where the opposing forces are not larger than those that met in any battle of the Revolution which gave this country its independence. Does humanity, which rules war as well as peace, permit that while whole States, forming almost one half of the Confederacy; have arrayed themselves as one man—for aught we know to the contrary—while they think, no matter how mistakenly, that they have grievances to be redressed, and that they have a right to exercise that privilege of electing their own Government, which we claimed for ourselves in the day of our own Revolution—does humanity, I say, permit, in such a state of things, one side or the other to treat its opponents as pirates and robbers, as enemies of the human race? Gentlemen, our brave men who are fighting our battles on land and sea have a deep interest in this question; and if the votes of our whole army could be taken on the question of whether, as a matter of State policy, these men should be treated as pirates and robbers, I believe, in my heart, that an almost unanimous vote would go up from its ranks not to permit such a state of things to take place.
THIRD DAY
Friday, Oct. 25, 1861.
The Court met at 11 o'clock A.M.
Mr. Brady stated to the Court that two of the prisoners—Richard Palmer and Alexander Coid—were exceedingly ill, suffering from pulmonary consumption, and requested that they might be permitted to leave the court-room when they wished. It was not necessary that they should be present during all the proceedings.
Mr. Smith: It would be proper that the prisoners make the application.
Mr. Brady: They will remain in Court as long as they can; and will, of course, be present when the Court charges the Jury.
The Court directed the Marshal to provide a room for the prisoners to retire to, when they desired.
Mr. Sullivan: Before adjourning yesterday it was stated that the different ordinances of the seceded States were all considered in evidence without being read.
Mr. Smith: Are any of them later in date than the commission to the Savannah?
Mr. Sullivan: No, sir. Some States have seceded since the date of the commission, and have been received into the Confederacy.
Mr. Evarts: We will assume, until the contrary appears, that there are no documents of date later than the supposed authorization of the privateer.
Mr. Larocque: With this qualification,—that there are a great many documents from our own Government which recognize a state of facts existing anterior to those documents.
Mr. Sullivan read in evidence from page 10 of Putnam's Rebellion Record:
Letter from Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, to President James Buchanan, dated December 29, 1860.
President Buchanan's reply, dated December 31, 1860.
Also, from page 11 of Rebellion Record:
The Correspondence between the South Carolina Commissioners and the President of the United States.
[Considered as read.]
Also, referred to page 19 of Rebellion Record, for the Correspondence between Major Anderson and Governor Pickens, with reference to firing on the Star of the West.
Read Major Anderson's first letter (without date), copied from Charleston Courier, of Jan. 10, 1861. (See Appendix.)
Governor Pickens' reply, and second communication from Major Anderson. (See Appendix.)
Also, from page 29 of Rebellion Record, containing the sections of the Constitution of the Confederate States which differ from the Constitution of the United States.
Also, from page 31 of Rebellion Record: Inaugural of Jefferson Davis, as President of the Confederate States.
Also, page 36 of Rebellion Record: Inaugural of Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, (for the passages, see Appendix.)
Also, page 61 of Rebellion Record: The President's Speech to the Virginia Commissioners. (See Appendix.)
Also, page 71 of Rebellion Record: Proclamation of Jefferson Davis, with reference to the letters of marque, dated 17th April, 1861.
Also, page 195 of Rebellion Record: An Act recognizing a state of war, by the Confederate Congress,—published May 6, 1861.
[Read Section 5.]
Mr. Lord read from pages 17, 19, and 20, of Diary of Rebellion Record, to give the date of certain events:

Mr. Sullivan: We propose now to introduce the papers found on board the Savannah when she was captured. The history of these papers is, that they were captured by the United States officers, taken from the Savannah, and come into our hands now, in Court, through the hands of the United States District Attorney, in whose possession they have been;—and they have been proceeded upon in the prize-court, for the condemnation of the Savannah. The first I read, is—
The Commission to the Savannah, dated 18th May, 1861.
Also, put in evidence, copy of Act recognizing the existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States, and concerning letters of marque,—approved May 6, 1861.
Also, read President Davis' Instructions to Private Armed Vessels,—appended to the Act.
Also, an Act regulating the sale of prizes, dated May 6, 1861,—approved May 14, 1861.
Also, an Act relative to prisoners of war, dated May 21, 1861.
Mr. Sullivan also read in evidence three extracts from the Message of President Lincoln to Congress, at Special Session of July 4, 1861. (See Appendix.)
Also, extracts from the Message of President Buchanan, at the opening of regular Session of Congress, December 3d, 1860. (See Appendix.)
Also, from page 245 of Rebellion Record: Proclamation of the Queen of Great Britain, dated May 13, 1861.
Mr. Evarts objected to this, on the ground that it could not have been received here prior to the date of the commission.
Objection overruled.
Also, from page 170 of Rebellion Record: Proclamation of the Emperor of France,—published June 11, 1861.
Also, the Articles of Capitulation of the Forts at the Hatteras Inlet, dated August 29th, on board the United States flagship Minnesota, off Hatteras Inlet.
Mr. Evarts remarked that this latter document was not within any propositions hitherto passed upon; but he did not desire to arrest the matter by any discussion, if their honors thought it should be received.
Judge Nelson: It may be received provisionally.
Mr. Brady also put in evidence the Charleston Daily Courier, of 11th June, 1861, containing a Judicial Advertisement,—a monition on the filing of a libel in the Admiralty Court of the Confederate States of America, for the South Carolina District, and an advertisement of the sale of the Joseph, she having been captured on the high seas by the armed schooner Savannah, under the command of T. Harrison Baker,—attested in the name of Judge Magrath, 6th June, 1861.
And containing, also, a judicial Act, relating to the administration of an estate in due course of law.
Mr. Brady stated that the reference was to show that they had a judicial system established under their own Government.
Lieutenant D. D. Tompkins recalled for the defence, and examined by Mr. Sullivan.
Q. State your knowledge as to the sending of any flags of truce while your vessel, the Harriet Lane, was lying at Fortress Monroe?
(Same objection; received provisionally.)
A. I have seen flags of truce come down from the direction of Norfolk.
Q. Did your vessel have any communication with the officer bearing the flag of truce?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did they come with the Confederate flag flying on the same vessel with the flag of truce?
A. Yes. One vessel came down with the Confederate flag flying, and a flag of truce, also.
Q. Where was it received, and by what officer?
A. I am not positive whether it was received by the Cumberland or the Minnesota. They communicated with either of those vessels.
Q. Were any vessels or boats, with flags of truce, ever sent from Fort Monroe toward the Confederate forces?
A. I have seen vessels go up the Roads with a flag of truce.
Q. And the United States flag on the same vessels?
A. Yes.
Q. You saw Captain Baker and the other prisoners—were they uniformed?
A. No, sir; I do not think they had any regular uniform. Captain Baker had a uniform, with metal buttons on his coat. I did not notice what was on the buttons.
Q. He had on such a dress as he wears to-day?
A. Something similar to that. He was the only one who had a uniform.
Q. Do you know anything as to the exchange of prisoners between the forces of the United States and of the Confederate States on any station where you have been?
A. No, sir.
The defence here closed.
The District Attorney stated that the prosecution had no rebutting evidence to offer.
Judge Nelson: Before counsel commence summing up the case to the Jury, they will please present the propositions of law on both sides.
Mr. Lord: I was going to ask my friends on the other side to give us their authorities, so that we shall know what we are to go to the Jury upon. We would then be able to lay our views before the Court and to divide the labor of summing up—some of us addressing ourselves entirely to the Court.
Mr. Evarts: I would have no objection to taking that course if I had been prepared for it. In the presentation of the case, we rely on the statute of the United States—on the fact that the defendants are within the terms of the statute; and that the affirmative defence, growing out of the state of things in this country, does not apply in a Court of the United States, and under a statute of the United States, which still covers the condition of the persons brought in. Whether they are citizens or aliens, nothing has been shown which takes them out of the general operation of our laws. On the question of the ingredients of the crime of piracy—which is a particular inquiry, irrespective of the considerations connected with the state of war—I do not know that we need refer to anything which is not quite familiar. The cases referred to by the learned counsel for the prisoners—the United States vs. Jones, the United States vs. Palmer, and the United States vs. Tully—contain all the views in reference to the ingredients of the crime of piracy, or to the construction of the statutes, that we need to present. In the general elementary books to which the learned counsel have referred—the various books on the Pleas of the Crown—there are passages to which we shall have occasion to refer.
Judge Nelson: The counsel for the Government should give to the counsel on the other side, before the summing up is commenced, all the authorities on which they intend to rely.
Mr. Evarts: That we shall do, of course.
Judge Nelson: We will take them now.
Mr. Evarts: I refer to 1st East's Pleas of the Crown, 70-1.
It is under the title of Treason, but it is on the point of the character of the crime as qualified by the influence on the party, of force, or of the state of the population by which the accused was surrounded. I read from page 70:
"Joining with rebels freely and voluntarily in any act of rebellion is levying war against the King; and this, too, though the party was not privy to their intent. This was holden in the case of the Earl of Southampton, and again in Purchase's case, in 1710. But yet it seems necessary, in this case, either that the party joining with rebels, and ignorant of their intent at the time, should do some deliberate act towards the execution of their design, or else should be found to have aided and assisted those who did.* * * But if the joining with rebels be from fear of present death, and while the party is under actual force, such fear and compulsion will excuse him. It is incumbent, however, on the party setting up this defence, to give satisfactory proof that the compulsion continued during all the time that he stayed with the rebels."
The case of Axtell, one of the regicides, is referred to. The defense was set up for him that he acted by command of his superior officer; but that was ruled to be no defence. I now read from page 104:
"One species of treason, namely, that of committing hostilities at sea, under color of a foreign commission, or any other species of adherence to the King's enemies there, may be indicted and tried as piracy, by virtue of the statutes."
That is, that although being guilty of treason, in its general character of adhering to the enemy, yet it also falls within the description of piracy, and may be proceeded against as such. On the question of the element of force or intimidation as entering into the crime of robbery, I refer to 1st Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, page 235:
"Wherever a person assaults another with such circumstances of terror as put him into fear, and cause him, by reason of such fear, to part with his money, the taking thereof is adjudged robbery, whether there were any weapon drawn, or not, or whether the person assaulted delivered his money upon the other's command, or afterwards gave it him upon his ceasing to use force, and begging an alms; for he was put into fear by his assault, and gives him his money to get rid of him.
"But it is not necessary that the fact of actual fear should either be laid in the indictment or be proved upon the trial; it is sufficient if the offence be charged to be done violenter et contra voluntatem. And if it appear upon the evidence to have been attended with those circumstances of violence or terror which in common experience are likely to induce a man to part with his property against his consent, either for the safety of his person or for the preservation of his character and good name, it will amount to a robbery."
I refer to Hale's Pleas of the Crown, vol. I., p. 68, on the question of double or doubtful allegiance:
"Though there may be due from the same person subordinate allegiances, which, though they are not without an exception of the fidelity due to the superior Prince, yet are in their kind sacramenta ligea fidelitatis, or subordinate allegiances, yet there can not, or at least should not, be two or more co-ordinate allegiances by one person to several independent or absolute Princes; for that lawful Prince that hath the prior obligation of allegiance from his subject can not lose that interest without his own consent, by his subject's resigning himself to the subjection of another."
I refer to the case of the United States against Tully, 1st Gallison's Reports, p. 253-5, to show that the statute does not, in terms, require that there shall be any personal violence or putting in fear to constitute robbery, provided the offence is committed animo furandi.
I also refer to the case of the United States vs. Jones, 3 Washington C.C.R., p. 219, on the point of the justification given by a commission; to the case of United States vs. Hayward, 2 Gallison, 501; to the observations of Chancellor Kent, vol. I., p. 200, marginal page 191; to the United States vs. Palmer, 3 Wheaton, p. 634, as to the manner in which our Courts deal with international questions respecting the recognition of nationalities; to the case of the Santissima Trinidad, Kent's Commentaries, vol. I., p. 27, marginal page 25; to the case of Rose vs. Hinely, 4 Cranch, 241. I refer to the latter case for the general doctrines therein contained on the proposition that although a parent or original Government may find the magnitude and power of the rebellion such as to induce or compel it to resort to warlike means of suppression, so as that toward neutral nations there will grow up such a state of authority as will compel the recognition by neutral nations of the rights of war and belligerents, that is not inconsistent with or in derogation of the general proposition that the parent Government still maintains the sovereignty, and can enforce its municipal laws, by all those sanctions, against its rebellious subjects. In other words, that the flagrancy of civil war, which gives rise to the aspect and draws after it the consequences of war, does not destroy either the duty of allegiance or the power of punishing any infraction of law which the rebels may be guilty of, either in reference to the principal crime of treason, or in reference to any other violation of municipal rights.
I also ask your honors' attention to a recent charge of Judge Sprague, to the Grand Jury in the Massachusetts District, in reference to the crime of piracy.
On the question of jurisdiction, I refer to the case of the United States vs. Hicks, decided in this Court.
I refer to the case of the Mariana Flora, to show that the arrest of a pirate at sea arises under a general principle of the law of nations, which authorizes either a public or a private vessel to make the arrest. It is analogous to the common-law arrest of a felon. The point in the case of the Mariana Flora is, that any public or private vessel has a right to arrest a piratical vessel at sea and bring it in. It differs in that respect from the authority to arrest a slaver.
On the general question of the ingredients of robbery, I refer to Archbold's Criminal Practice and Pleadings, 2 vol., p. 507, marginal pages 417, 510, 526.
In political connections I shall have occasion to refer to the Constitution of the United States and to the Articles of the Confederation, to the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, and the answers of the other States of the Union, which will be found collected in Ellett's Debates, vol. 4, pages 528 to 545.
I may refer also to Mr. Pinckney's speech in the Convention of South Carolina which adopted the Constitution, same volume, p. 331; to the formal ratifications of the Constitution by the different States of the Union, same volume, p. 318; and I may have occasion to refer to Grotius in connection with the discussion of the general state of war. The citations will be—book 1st, chap. 1, secs. 1 and 2; chap. 3, secs. 1 and 4; and chap. 4, sec. 1.
MR. LORD'S ARGUMENT
Mr. Lord, of counsel for the defence, said:
May it please your honors,—The distribution of duties which counsel for the defence have made among themselves is, that I shall briefly present the propositions of law, somewhat irrespective of the wide political range which my friends seem to think is to be involved. I shall not pursue even the field which Mr. Larocque has opened, knowing that he has cultivated it to a far greater degree than I have, and therefore I will leave it to him to till. My friend, Mr. Brady, will address the Jury on any questions of fact that may be supposed to be involved.
Before I enter upon the discussion, and with the view that this case may be relieved from one prejudice which probably every man has felt on first hearing of it, I beg leave to set ourselves all right on the idea that there is something different in a private armed ship from a public armed vessel, in the law, and in the view of the people of the country. I desire to read on that subject a letter from Mr. Marcy to the Count de Sartiges.
Mr. Lord read the letter, and continued:
Therefore in this discussion, so far from a private armed vessel being regarded with disfavor, it is regarded, and has to be regarded, with all the favor which would belong to it as a regularly commissioned cruiser, belonging to the State, and not to the individual.
I now approach, with all the brevity due to your valuable time, the question of jurisdiction. It seems to me to be very clear indeed that after Harleston and the crew, of the Savannah were taken by the Perry, he was confined as a prisoner, as one of a crew of a piratical vessel, for an act charged as piratical, on board the United States ship-of-war Minnesota, by order of its commander. That Harleston was taken by the said commander into the District of Virginia, within a marine league of its shores, where the said ship remained; and the said Harleston and the other prisoners could have been there landed and detained for trial. If the facts are so, the Circuit Court of this District has no jurisdiction, and the prisoners should be acquitted.
The evidence of our friend, Commodore Stringham, on that subject, leaves us no doubt as to the character of the arrest. After seeing the Perry close in to Charleston, she having been ordered by him to cruise further off, and he, wondering what she was doing there—he says:
"She hailed us and informed us she had captured a piratical vessel. The vessel was half a mile astern. Captain Parrot, of the Perry, came and made to me a report of what had taken place. I ordered him to send the prisoners on board, and I sent a few men on board the Savannah to take charge of her during the night. The vessels were then anchored. Next morning I made arrangements to put a prize crew on board the Savannah and send her to New York, and I directed the Captain of the Joseph to take passage in her. I took the prisoners from the Perry, and directed the Perry to proceed," &c.
Again he testifies:
"Q. What was your object in transferring the prisoners from the Perry to the Minnesota?
"A. Sending them to a Northern port. The port of New York was the port I had in my mind to send them to, in the first ship from the station."
The prisoners, thus taken from a piratical vessel, he determined to carry to Norfolk, and to send them thence to the North for trial.
Now, if your honors please, my learned friend (Mr. Evarts) seems to say that there is no authority in law for a United States vessel to arrest pirates at sea; but if you will read the President's proclamation of 19th June you will find that he speaks of dealing with the persons who may be taken on board private armed ships as pirates. I will then ask to direct your attention to the Act of 1819 (3d Vol. Statutes, p. 510), where the President is authorized to employ public armed vessels to arrest offenders against that law. Therefore the capture of the prize was not only a part of the general law of nations, but it was particularly a thing which the commanders of ships of the United States were charged by the proclamation of the President, and by Act of Congress, to do.
I now approach the other question, as to where these prisoners were apprehended, or into what District they were first brought. That they were apprehended by a warrant from the United States Commissioner in New York, is not in dispute. The question, however, is, where they were first brought. If an officer having them in charge could anchor his vessel at Baltimore, and then at Philadelphia, and then bring his prisoners to New York, it would be putting the law entirely in his hands and dissipating all its force. In ordinary cases of crime the jurisdiction is local; and that for many reasons. One is, that a man is to be tried by his peers—meaning those of his own neighborhood,—and that it is easier to procure evidence at the place where the crime is committed. The law does not give to any man the power of assigning the place of trial. In the case of offences committed on the high seas, the law declares that the accused shall be tried in the District into which he is first brought.
Now, that tnese men were held by Capt. Stringham for the purpose of being tried as pirates, the evidence is clear. They were transferred from the Perry to the Minnesota, taken to the Norfolk station, and there kept in irons on board the Minnesota till they were transferred to the Harriet Lane. Could they have been detained there for trial? It might be an inconvenience if there was no Court. They might have had to be detained for a long time, or Congress might pass some law varying the jurisdiction. But as the law stood, if these men could have been landed and detained for trial, then that was the District in which they were necessarily to be tried. Can any one say that it was not as easy to have landed these men at Fortress Monroe, or at Hampton, as to transfer them to the Harriet Lane? And could they not have been detained there? You did not need a Court to detain them. They were taken by force, and might have been detained in the fortress till a trial should be had. There was no difficulty in their being landed in Virginia; and, moreover, there were in Western Virginia loyal Courts, where they could be tried.
Now, what is there that takes away the jurisdiction which belongs to that part of the country and not to this? "Why," says Captain Stringham, "I wanted to send them to New York." But had he any right to do so, when he had actually brought them to that station where his ship belonged, and where he was bound to keep her unless he returned her to the cruising ground? Remember that his ship remained there some time before the transfer was made. They were detained as prisoners there, and might as well have been detained on shore. Therefore, it seems to me, that unless the capturing officer, and not Congress, has the right to determine the place where the trial shall be had, these men were to be tried in the District of Virginia.
Now, it is no answer to this to say that, where a vessel is sailing along the shores of a District, a prisoner on board is not brought there in the proper sense of the word. The ship is not bound to stop and break up her voyage in order to have the Court designated where he is to be tried; but where the ship comes into port—where she stops at a port—I submit to your honors that this is the bringing contemplated by the statute.
I now approach, if your honors please, the merits of this case. The indictment is founded on two sections of the Crimes Act, originally two separate and very distinct statutes. It is the eighth section which makes robbery on the high seas piracy. That embraces the first five counts of the indictment, which are varied in mere circumstances. The remaining counts rest on the transcript into the legislation of this country, from the Act of 11 and 12 William III., to the effect, substantially, that if any citizen of the United States shall, under color of a commission from any foreign Prince or State, or under pretence of authority from any other person, commit acts of hostility against the United States, or the citizens thereof, that shall be piracy. In the argument which I shall address to your honors I will beg leave to characterize the first as piracy by the laws of nations, and the second as statutory piracy. But, before I discuss that subject, permit me to say that, as to eight of these prisoners, it is conceded that they do not come under that section, as the evidence for the prosecution shows that they were not citizens of the United States. So that, as to these eight, unless they are adjudged pirates under the eighth section, they must be acquitted, if they can justify themselves under the commission.
Judge Nelson: Then the other four, you say, can only be convicted under the ninth section?
Mr. Lord: Yes; that is the statutory process, if I may be permitted to give it that name.
The act is charged as an act of robbery, not as an act of treason. It is not alleged to have been done treasonably. If the prosecution wanted to give it that character, they must have alleged it to be treason. They must have alleged that this act, done on the high seas, was done treasonably, traitorously, and therefore piratically. They have alleged no such thing. I take pleasure in saying that the District Attorney, in opening this case, did it with great fairness, and disavowed any idea of introducing treason into the case. There are many reasons why, if that were pretended, this whole trial should stop. The requisites of a prosecution for treason have not been, in any degree, complied with. The charge is robbery. It may be charged as done piratically, involving animus furandi. Let us see, for an instant, what piratical is. Piracy is, by all definitions, a crime against all nations. It enters into every description of a pirate that he is hostis humani generis. That is the common-law idea of piracy. It is not a political heresy that will make piracy. It is not a political conformity that will always exempt from the charge of piracy. For instance, if the officer of a Government vessel, with the most full and complete commission, such as my friend Commodore Stringham had, should invade a ship at sea, and should, under pretence of capture, take jewels and secrete them, not bringing them in for adjudication, he would be a pirate, because, though he held a commission, he did the act animo furandi,—did it out of the jurisdiction of any particular country,—did it against the great principles of civilization and humanity.
Again, if a commissioned vessel hails a private ship, and, on the idea that she is a subject of prize, captures her, and it turns out that that capture is illegal and unwarranted, that fact does not make the act piracy. Although the act might be ever so irregular—although it might subject the officer to the severest damages for trespass—yet it is not piratical, and the officer is not to be hung at the yard-arm because he mistakes a question of law. Your honors therefore see how utterly it enters into the whole subject that the thing shall be done animo furandi, piratically, as against the general law of nations and the sense of right of the civilized world.
Well, now, we are at once struck with this consideration: Suppose the act is regarded as not piratical by millions of people having civilized institutions, having Courts of Justice, giving every opportunity for a trial of the question of forfeiture or no forfeiture—why, it shocks the moral sense to say that that is done animo furandi, that it is a theft and a robbery, and that the man who does it is an enemy to the human race. Carry the idea a little further, and you find that the commission under which a man acts in seizing a vessel with a view of bringing it in as a prize is regarded by all the great commercial nations of the world as regular, and that the act is regarded not as a piratical, but as a belligerent act. Does it not shock the very elements of justice to have it supposed that in such a case the man acting under the commission, and within its powers, is to be deemed an enemy of the whole human race, while all the human race, except the power which seeks to subject him to punishment, says the act is not piratical?
Now, upon this subject my learned friends have cited many authorities, which all bear on the effect of what should give validity to the transfer of captured property under the circumstances of rebellions in States. Now I beg leave, at the outset of the consideration of this case, to say that the question of passing title to property is a thing entirely different from the question of hanging a man for committing a crime. In the first place, look at the numerous acts of trespass which are committed on the high seas by vessels of every nation. The books are full of cases of marine trespass, and of damages against captors for their irregularities; but are the authorities which bear upon that subject, which is a mere question of property—a question of title—of the mere transfer of title—are they authorities which decide the question that a man should be hanged if he mistakes the law, or if he acts under the impulse of a wrong judgment as to the sovereign which he should serve? I would call your attention to the case of Klintock, reported in the 5th of Wheaton, where the Court say that they will not regard the commission of General Aubrey as sufficient to give title to the property, "although it might be sufficient to defend him from a charge of piracy." I also refer to Phillimore on International Law, vol. 3, p. 319. [Counsel read from the authority.]
And with regard to that proposition I would cite Vattel, Book I., chap. 1, sec. 2, upon the proposition that jurisdiction to determine such a mixed question of law and fact has been ceded equally to the State as to the Federal Government. Vattel says:
"It is evident that, by the very act of the civil or political association, each citizen subjects himself to the authority of the entire body in everything that relates to the common welfare. The authority of all over each member therefore essentially belongs to the body politic or State; but the exercise of that authority may be placed in different hands, according as the society may have ordained."
I refer, also, to the Federalist, No. 40, by Madison. He uses this language:
"Will it be said that the fundamental principles of the Confederation were not within the purview of the Convention, and ought not to have been varied? I ask, what are those principles? Do they require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the Constitution proposed.* * * Do they require that the powers of the Government should act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new Government will act on the States in their collective character. In some instances, also, those of the existing Government act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture, of piracy, of the post-office, of coins, weights and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of land by different States; and, above all, in the cases of trial by Courts Martial, in the Army and Navy, by which death may be inflicted without the intervention of a Jury, or even of a Civil Magistrate,—in all these cases the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens."
I would also refer your honors to the Report of the Committee of the General Assembly of Connecticut, on a call for the militia, by the General Government, in 1812. The Report reads:
"The people of this State were among the first to adopt that Constitution; they have been among the most prompt to satisfy all its lawful demands, and to give facility to its fair operations; they have enjoyed the benefits resulting from the Union of the States; they have loved, and still love and cherish that Union, and will deeply regret if any events shall occur to alienate their affection from it. They have a deep interest in its preservation, and are still disposed to yield a willing and prompt obedience to all the legitimate requirements of the Constitution of the United States.
"But it must not be forgotten that the State of Connecticut is a free, sovereign and independent State,—that the United States are a Confederacy of States,—that we are a confederated and not a consolidated Republic. The Governor of this State is under a high and solemn obligation 'to maintain the lawful rights and privileges thereof as a sovereign, free and independent State,' as he is 'to support the Constitution of the United States,' and the obligation to support the latter imposes an additional obligation to support the former. The building cannot stand if the pillars upon which it rests are impaired or destroyed. The same Constitution which delegates powers to the General Government, forbids the exercise of powers not delegated, and reserves those powers to the States respectively."
And that was "approved by both Houses," and the following resolution passed:
"Resolved, That the conduct of His Excellency, the Governor, in refusing to order the militia of this State into the service of the United States, on the requisition of the Secretary of War and Major-General Dearborn, meets with the entire approbation of this Assembly."
I would also refer to the second speech of Mr. Webster on Mr. Foot's resolution, in reply to Mr. Hayne, in the Senate of the United States, where he thus expresses himself:
"The States are unquestionably sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not affected by this supreme law (the Constitution). * * * The General Government and the State governments derive their authority from the same source. Neither can, in relation to the other, be called primary; though one is definite and restricted, and the other general and residuary."
Also, to the case of Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard, 1—one of the Dorr rebellion cases. The Supreme Court of the United States there decided that the government of a State, by its Legislature, has the power to protect itself from destruction by armed rebellion by declaring martial law, and that the Legislature is the judge of the necessary exigency.
At this point the Court intimated that they would adjourn to the following day.
The District Attorney, Mr. E. Delafield Smith, stated that the case of the United States vs. William Smith, one of the ship's company of the privateer Jefferson Davis, the trial of which had been proceeding in Philadelphia, had terminated in a verdict. That case involved the main questions, and also the question of jurisdiction involved here. Mr. Smith further stated that he had sent for a copy of the charge of Mr. Justice Grier in that case, and expected to receive it by telegraph, and he desired to reserve the right to refer to that charge as one of his authorities in this case.
The Court assented.
Adjourned to Saturday, October 26th, at 11 A.M.
FOURTH DAY
Saturday, Oct. 26, 1861.
The Court met at 11 o'clock, when—
Mr. Larocque resumed:
I will proceed very briefly, if your honors please, to close what I was submitting to the Court upon the propositions which, as I maintain, tend to show a colorable authority in the State government, in possible cases that might arise, to authorize the issuing of letters of marque. I will state them in their connection, in order that your honors may see what they are. The first is the one I considered yesterday, viz., that the Federal Executive Government and the executive governments of the States, under the Constitution of the United States, each possess the jurisdiction to decide whether their respective acts are within or exceed the limits of their respective constitutional powers in cases of collision between them in their administrative acts operating upon the public domain, or upon the State, or its citizens as a body politic.
I had concluded what I intended to submit upon that, and proceed to the others, which are—
2. That in such cases, the Constitution having erected no common arbiter between them, the right of forcible resistance to the exercise of unlawful power, which, by the law of nature, resides in the people, has been delegated by them, by the Federal and State Constitutions respectively, to the Federal and State Governments respectively, and each having the jurisdiction to judge whether its acts are within the constitutional limit of its own powers, has also necessarily the right to employ force in their assertion or defence, if needed.
3. That in such cases the citizen of a State which, in its political capacity, has come into forcible collision with the Federal Government, owing allegiance to both within the limits of their respective constitutional powers, and each possessing the jurisdiction to determine for him the compound question of law and fact, whether the constitutional limit of those powers has been exceeded by itself or the other in the particular case, is protected from all criminal liability for any act done by him, in good faith, in adhering to and under the authority of either Government.
I wish very briefly to refer your honors to a few authorities, which, I hold, sustain these propositions. I say, in the first place, that this right bears no analogy whatever to the right, once claimed and most successfully refuted, of the inhabitants of a State, in Convention, to decide by ordinance upon the unconstitutionally of a law of the Union, and to prevent by force its operation within the limits of the State, in a case legitimately falling within the cognizance of the Courts. The claim to collect duties under an Act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional was strictly an instance of this latter class. The citizen from whom the duties were claimed could simply refuse to pay, and thereby refer the question of constitutionality of the law to the judicial tribunals to which it properly belonged, and which must necessarily pass upon the question before the duties could be collected. On the other hand, the claim to hold or retake forts or other public places within the limits of a State, as property of the United States, is one against which, if unauthorized, the State could not by possibility defend itself through the agency of the Courts.
Now, if your honors please, I have stated most distinctly, and admitted most fully, that, in whatever cases the judicial power of the United States extends to, it is supreme. That is to say, if a collision takes place in a suit in a State Court between the Federal and State laws, and the decision of the State Court is against the right, privilege, or exemption, as it is called in the judiciary Act, claimed under the authority of the Union, the Supreme Court of the United States can redress the error. But I am now speaking of that class of cases where the judiciary have nothing whatever to do, and in which, I contend, the Federal and State authorities are each supreme and sovereign, within the limits of their respective power, and neither has any right or authority beyond the lines which bound their respective jurisdiction. And, if your honors please, I refer to the Inaugural Address of Mr. Lincoln, not only for the proposition that the judicial authority has nothing to do whatever in a case such as that I am now supposing, but that, even in cases where the judiciary is competent to act, its decisions do not form precedents, do not form rules for the government of the co-ordinate departments of the Union, in future cases of State policy, and that the executive and the legislative departments are still left at liberty to act as if no decision had been made. I do not mean to be understood as acquiescing in that claim; I consider it as a doctrine infinitely more dangerous and destructive than the doctrine of constitutional secession; but it comes to us as the claim set up on the part of the President; and if that is at all correct, there is an end of all pretence that the judiciary is competent to afford any relief or protection in the other class of cases referred to.
He says:
"I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that such decision must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government; and while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it being limited to that particular case, with the chances that it may be overruled, and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess that, if the policy of the Government upon the vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by the decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigations between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own masters, having to that extent practically resigned the Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal. Nor is there, in this view, any assault upon the Court or the Judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink, to decide cases properly brought before them, and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes."
I have not the document at this moment; but your honors will probably bear in mind that the Executive also lately consulted the law-officer of the Government upon the question of suspending the privilege of habeas corpus, and I well remember the clause in the opinion which was delivered by that eminent legal gentleman and high officer of the Government on that occasion, and which was afterwards communicated by the President to Congress as the basis of his action. In that opinion the present learned Attorney-General used this language: "To say that the departments of our Government are co-ordinate, is to say that the judgment of one of them is not binding upon the other two, as to the arguments and principles involved in the judgment. It binds only the parties to the case decided." And your honors will recollect that, acting upon that enunciation of the law of the land and of the construction of the Constitution, although he admitted that the Supreme Court of the United States had decided that the privilege of habeas corpus could not be suspended by the Executive, without the interposition of Congress, the legal adviser of the Government held, at the same time, that that decision of the Supreme Court was not binding upon the Executive.
Now, for the purpose of showing what I mean by the right of resistance reserved to the people by the law of nature, which, as I say, is delegated by them to these two sovereigns, for the purpose that each may maintain its own authority and prevent encroachment by the other, I beg to refer your honors to Rutherforth's Institutes of Natural Law, vol. 1, page 391, commencing with section 10. And as a proof than I broach no novel or revolutionary doctrine, your honors will bear in mind that these Institutes of Natural Law were a course of lectures delivered in one of the great seminaries of learning of England, and their doctrines thought fit and proper to be instilled into the minds of the youth of that Kingdom, the loyalty of whose people to their Government has become proverbial among all the nations of the world.
The author says:
"It is a question of some importance, and has been thought a question not easily to be determined, whether the members of a civil society have, upon any event, or in any circumstances whatsoever, a right to resist their governors, or rather the persons who are invested with the civil power of that society."
Then he states several cases in which the civil governors, as he calls them, lose their power over their subjects, and continues:
"Fourthly, Though the governors of a society should be invested by the constitution with all civil power in the highest degree and to the greatest extent that the nature of a civil power will admit of, yet this does not imply that the people are in a state of perfect subjection. Civil power is, in its own nature, a limited power; as it arose at first from social union, so it is limited by the ends and purposes of such union, whether it is exercised, as it is in democracies, by the body of the people, or, as it is in monarchies, by one single person. But if the power of a Monarch, when he is considered as a civil governor, is thus limited by the ends of social union, whatever obedience and submission the people may owe him whilst he keeps within these limits, he has no power at all, and consequently the people owe him no subjection, when he goes beyond them.
"Having thus taken a short view of the several ways in which the authority of the governors of a society fails, and the subjection of the people ceases, we may now return to the question which was before us.
"If you ask whether the members of a civil society have a right to resist the civil governors of it by force? your question is too general to admit of a determinate answer.
"As far as the just authority of the civil governors and the subjection of the people extend, resistance by force is rebellion.
"Subjection consists in an obligation to obey; as far, therefore, as the people are in subjection, they can have no right to resist; because an obligation to obey, and a right to resist, are inconsistent with one another.
"But the power of civil governors is neither necessarily connected with their persons, nor infinite whilst it is in their possession.
"It ceases by abdication; it is overruled by the laws of nature and of God; and it does not extend beyond the limits which either the civil constitution or the ends of social union have set to it.
"Where their power thus fails in right, and they have no just authority, the subjection of the people ceases; that is, as far as of right they have no power, or no just authority, the people are not obliged to obey them; so that any force which they make use of, either to compel obedience or to punish disobedience, is unjust force; the people may perhaps be at liberty to submit to it, if they please; but, because it is unjust force, the law of nature does not oblige them to submit to it.
"But this law, if it does not oblige the people to submit to such force, allows them to have recourse to the necessary means of relieving themselves from it, and of securing themselves against it, to the means of resistance by opposing force to force, if they cannot be relieved from it and secured against it by any other means."
I continue my citation at—
"Sec. XV. In the general questions concerning the right of resistance, it is usually objected that there is no common judge who is vested with authority to determine, between the supreme governors and the people, where the right of resistance begins; and the want of such a judge is supposed to leave the people room to abuse this right; they may possibly pretend that they are unjustly oppressed, and, upon this pretence, may causelessly and rebelliously take up arms against their governors, although they are laid under no other restraints, and no other compulsion is made use of, but what the general nature of civil society or the particular circumstances of their own society require.
"But, be this as it may, the possibility that the right may be abused, does not prove that no such right subsists.
"If we would conclude, on the one hand, that the people have no right of resistance, because this right is capable of being abused, we might, for the same reason, conclude, on the other hand, that supreme governors have no authority.
"Whatever authority these governors have in any civil society, it was given them for the common benefit of the society; and it is possible that, under the color of this authority, they may oppress the people in order to promote their own separate benefit.
"Sec. XVI. It is a groundless suggestion, that a right of resistance in the people will occasion treason and rebellion, and that it will weaken the authority of civil government, and will render the office of those who are invested with it precarious and unsafe, even though they administer it with the utmost prudence and with all due regard to the common benefit.
"The right of resistance will indeed render the general notion of rebellion less extensive in its application to particular facts.
"All use of force against such persons as are invested with supreme power, would come under the notion of rebellion, if the people have no right of this sort; whereas, if they have such a right, the use of force to repel tyranical and unsocial oppression, when it cannot be removed by any other means, must have some other name given to it. So that, however true it may be that, in consequence of this right of resistance, supreme government will be liable, of right, to some external checks, arising out of the law of nature, to which they would otherwise not be liable, yet it cannot properly be said to expose them to rebellion."
I beg, in the next place, to read to your honors, from the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, a short paragraph. It is to be found in 1st Wheaton, 363, in the case of Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee. I believe a paragraph from that has been already read, on the other side, and I wish to give you, in connection with it, what he says, speaking of the power of the judiciary, and the consequences that would result in any case to which that power did not reach. He says:
"On the other hand, so firmly am I persuaded that the American people no longer can enjoy the blessings of a free Government, whenever the State sovereignties shall be prostrated at the feet of the General Government, nor the proud consciousness of equality and security, any longer than the independence of judicial power shall be maintained consecrated and intangible, that I could borrow the language of a celebrated orator, and exclaim, 'I rejoice that Virginia has resisted.'"
I also wish to read a sentence from the case of Moore vs. The State of Illinois, in 14 Howard, p. 20—the opinion by Mr. Justice Grier. He says:
"Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or Territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either."
And Mr. Justice McLean, in speaking of the same subject, in the same case, at page 22, says:
"It is true the criminal laws of the Federal and State Governments emanated from different sovereignties; but they operate on the same people, and should have the same end in view. In this respect the Federal Government, though sovereign within the limitation of its powers, may, in some sense, be considered as the agent of the States, to provide for the general welfare by punishing offences under its own laws within its jurisdiction."
I wish also to refer to the case of the United States vs. Booth, in 21 Howard—the opinion of Chief Justice Taney—in connection with the question of what the result is where the judiciary has not power to act. He says:
"The importance which the framers of the Constitution attached to such a tribunal, for the purpose of preserving internal tranquillity, is strikingly manifested by the clause which gives this Court jurisdiction over the sovereign States which compose this Union, when a controversy arises between them. Instead of reserving the right to seek redress for injustice from another State by their sovereign powers, they have bound themselves to submit to the decision of this Court, and to abide by its judgment. And it is not out of place to say, here, that experience has demonstrated that this power was not unwisely surrendered by the States; for, in the time that has already elapsed since this Government came into existence, several irritating and angry controversies have taken place between adjoining States, in relation to their respective boundaries, and which have sometimes threatened to end in force and violence, but for the power vested in this Court to hear them and decide between them.
"The same purposes are clearly indicated by the different language employed when conferring supremacy upon the laws of the United States and jurisdiction upon its Courts. In the first case, it provides that 'this Constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, and obligatory upon the Judges in every State.' The words in italics show the precision and foresight which marks every clause in the instrument. The sovereignty to be created was to be limited in its powers of legislation; and, if it passed a law not authorized by its enumerated powers, it was not to be regarded as the supreme law of the land, nor were the State Judges bound to carry it into execution."
And further on, speaking of the claimed right of the State of Wisconsin to discharge a prisoner convicted in the United States Court upon a criminal conviction, and to refuse afterwards to obey a writ of error issued out of the Supreme Court of the United States to review that judgment, he uses language of this kind:
"This right to inquire by process of habeas corpus, and the duty of the officer to make a return, grows necessarily out of the complex character of our Government, and the existence of two distinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial space, each of them restricted in its powers, and each, within its sphere of action prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, independent of the other."
Now, if your honors please, upon that question still further—that where there is no possibility of the power of the judiciary being exercised, there being, as the learned Chief Justice expresses it in his own language, "two distinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial space" exercising jurisdiction, the right of forcible resistance exists in the State governments. I beg to refer to the Federalist, No. 28, by Alexander Hamilton, p. 126. He says:
"It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State governments will in all possible contingencies afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the federal authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretences so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men as of the people at large. The Legislatures will have better means of information; they can discover the danger at a distance, and, possessing all the organs of civil power and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition; they can combine all the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty."
I refer also to the Federalist, No. 46, by James Madison, where he uses this language:
"Were it admitted, however, that the Federal Government may feel an equal disposition with the State governments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If the act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the National Government, be generally popular in that State, and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately, and of course by means on the spot, and depending on the State alone. * * * On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the Federal Government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are at hand. * * *
"But ambitious encroachments of the Federal Government on the authority of the State governments would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause; a correspondence would be opened; plans of resistance would be concerted; one spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same combination, in short, would result from an apprehension of the federal as was produced by the dread of a foreign yoke; and, unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the other. But what degree of madness would ever drive the Federal Government to such an extremity?* * * But what would be the contest in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few Representatives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves; or, rather, one set of Representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of Representatives, with the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter. The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the Federal Government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition.* * * Extravagant as the supposition is, let it, however, be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed, and let it be entirely at the devotion of the Federal Government; still it would not be going too far to say that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed 1/100th of the whole number of souls, or 1/25th part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield to the United States an army of more than 25 or 30,000 men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near 500,000 citizens, with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence."
I shall not spend the time of your honors by reading the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions—the one the production of James Madison, and the other of Thomas Jefferson—with which you are so familiar. They fully bear out the doctrine for which I contend, and much more than I contend for. I wish, however, to read, from the American State Papers, vol. 21, p. 6, a series of resolutions adopted by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, on the 3d April, 1809. They are as follows:
"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:
"That, as a member of the Federal Union, the Legislature of Pennsylvania acknowledges the supremacy, and will cheerfully submit to the authority, of the General Government, as far as that authority is delegated by the Constitution of the United States. But while they yield to this authority, when exerted within constitutional limits, they trust they will not be considered as acting hostile to the General Government when, as the guardians of the State rights, they cannot permit an infringement of those rights by an unconstitutional exercise of power in the United States Courts.
"Resolved, That in a Government like that of the United States, where there are powers granted to the General Government and rights reserved to the States, it is impossible, from the imperfection of language, so to define the limits of each that difficulties should not sometimes arise from a collision of powers; and it is to be lamented that no provision is made in the Constitution for determining disputes between the General and State Governments by an impartial tribunal, when such cases occur.
"Resolved, That, from the construction which the United States Courts give to their powers, the harmony of the States, if they resist the encroachments on their rights, will frequently be interrupted; and if, to prevent this evil, they should on all occasions yield to stretches of power, the reserved rights of the States will depend on the arbitrary powers of the Courts.
"Resolved, That should the independence of the States, as secured by the Constitution, be destroyed, the liberties of the people in so extensive a country cannot long survive. To suffer the United States Courts to decide on State rights, will, from a bias in favor of power, necessarily destroy the federal part of our Government; and, whenever the Government of the United States becomes consolidated we may learn from the history of nations what will be the event."
To prevent the balance between the General and State Governments from being destroyed, and the harmony of the States from being interrupted—