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Though he had a great advantage in his forces, and in the consciousness of his superiority to his enemy, Cyrus omitted no means for securing the victory. He had experienced at Pteria the attack of the Lydian horse, their superiority to his own cavalry, in spite of the practice in riding which the Persians underwent from their youth up, and the excellence of the Median horse. To render useless the attack of these horsemen, Cyrus caused the camels which carried the baggage and supplies of his army to be mounted, and placed them in the first line. This arrangement is mentioned not only by Herodotus but also by Xenophon. No doubt the Lydian horse would be frightened by the noise and unwonted aspect of these animals. Though robbed of their best arm and mode of fighting, the Lydians nevertheless resolved to dismount and carry on the battle on foot. They pressed courageously on the Persians, and could only be driven into the gates of Sardis after a bloody battle. Crœsus was now limited to the walls of his city, and compelled to defend them. He hoped to be able to hold the city till his confederates should come, to whom on the approach of Cyrus he had sent with appeals for immediate assistance. But on the fourteenth day after the investment of the city, as Herodotus maintains, Cyrus brought matters to a decision. Then the Mardian climbed the steep rock on the Pactolus, on which the citadel lay, at a place where no guard was set, the citadel and city were taken, and Crœsus became a prisoner. A picture at Pompeii exhibits Cyrus before his tent, and Harpagus beside him, at the moment when Crœsus is brought forward.

Herodotus' narrative of the ascent of the citadel of Sardis is confirmed by a precisely analogous incident which took place more than three centuries later. Antiochus III. had besieged his brother-in-law Achæus for more than a year in Sardis, and in vain. All hope of taking the city except by starvation was given up, when Lagoras, a Cretan, observed that the walls must be left without a guard where the citadel and the city met. At this point the walls rose on steep rocks above a cleft into which the besieged threw from the towers their dead along with the carcasses of beasts of burden and horses. As the birds of prey when they had eaten the corpses settled on the walls, Lagoras concluded that no guards were stationed there. By night he examined whether it was quite impossible to climb up and plant scaling-ladders there. When he discovered a ravine by which this seemed practicable, he acquainted the king. The necessary preparations were made; in the night, towards morning, when the moon had set, Lagoras with sixteen companions climbed up the rocks; 2000 men were ready to support him. The spur on which the wall lay was so steep that even when the morning broke a jutting piece of rock prevented the garrison from seeing what was going on, and when Antiochus led his army against the Persian gate the garrison went to meet them. Meanwhile the assailants by means of two ladders scaled the walls close against the citadel and opened the nearest door; the confusion which ensued put the city in the hands of Antiochus after a short struggle. Yet Achæus maintained the citadel; by a secret steep and dangerous path in the rear he was able to keep up a communication with Ptolemy Philopator of Egypt, and finally he attempted to escape by this means, but he was betrayed and fell into the hands of Antiochus (213 B.C.).²⁵

Crœsus determined not to survive the great overthrow and sudden disaster which he had brought upon Lydia by his campaign. The Lydians had become the slaves of the Persians, but it might be possible to appease the wrath of Sandon, from whom all this misfortune must have come; it might be that the god would again show favour to his people, turn aside their misfortune and slavery, and raise up the kingdom from the depths. In vain had Crœsus attempted by lavish presents to win the favour of Sandon-Apollo; there still remained the last great sacrifice. So he resolved to offer himself as a peace-offering for his land and people. In this way he might succeed in laying the foundation of the future liberation and rise of Lydia, in conquering by his death his successful opponent. The sacrifice of the heir to the throne and of the king himself in his purple to avert the anger of the sun-god was not unknown in Semitic rites. Zimri of Israel had burnt himself with his citadel in Tirzah; Ahaz of Judah, when defeated by the Damascenes, had sacrificed his son as a burnt-offering; Manasses of Judah "caused his son to pass through the fire in the valley of Ben Hinnom" (III. 43, 209); the last king of Asshur had burnt himself with his palace in the year 607 B.C.; Hamilcar, the son of Hanno, threw himself into the flames of the sacrificial fire in order to turn the battle of Himera. Cyrus had no reason for preventing the death of his opponent, if he chose to die. Though he was offering himself as a sacrifice to his gods, these gods were false in the eyes of the Persians – they were evil spirits or demons. The Persian king could quite understand the resolution of Crœsus not to outlive the fall of a prosperous and mighty kingdom, and to escape a long imprisonment, and would probably look on it as worthy of a brave man. Still less could he object to the wish of a king to die in his royal robes. That the cremation was a sacrifice and not an execution is further proved by the circumstance that Crœsus is accompanied by twice seven youths. It could never have entered the mind of Cyrus to seize and execute fourteen youths, but they might be quite ready to sacrifice themselves with their king. The seventh planet belonged to Adar-Sandon, i. e. to the angry sun-god, and Crœsus had sat on the throne fourteen years. The gifts also which the Lydian women bring or send to the pyre (costly robes and ornaments of every kind, as was customary in the great sacrifices of Sandon), are a distinct proof of a peace-offering. In the picture at Pompeii Crœsus has laurel branches round his head, and a wand of laurel in his right hand, and this marks him out, though in the Greek manner, as dedicated to Sandon; a vase in the Louvre presents him seated on the pyre, in a royal robe, with a crown of laurel on his head. In his left hand he holds a sceptre, with the right he is pouring libations from a goblet, while a servant is sprinkling with water the already burning pyre.²⁶ But the sun-god would not accept the royal sacrifice and peace-offering. It was no favourable sign that the weather was gloomy (χειμών) on that day, as Nicolaus, who here, no doubt, follows Xanthus the Lydian, tells us, though no rain had fallen. The pyre was kindled; Crœsus prayed that Sandon would graciously accept the offering – the invocation of the god by Crœsus with tears Herodotus gives on the authority of the Lydians²⁷– but the prayer is not heard; a storm of rain descends, and the pyre is quenched. This was an unmistakable sign, the clearly-pronounced decision of the god, that he did not and would not accept the sacrifice. Crœsus must abandon his purpose.²⁸

At no time can Cyrus have had the intention of doing any further injury to the captive king of the Lvdians. Herodotus told us that before the battle at Sardis he bade his soldiers spare Crœsus. And he would be the more inclined to show favour and grace to a man whose death heaven had openly prevented. As Ctesias told us (p. 16), he allotted to Crœsus the city of Barene, near Ecbatana, as a residence or means of support. Ptolemy mentions the city of Uarna in the neighbourhood of Ragha, and the Avesta speaks of Varena in the same region.²⁹ After that day Crœsus submitted to his fate; we find him at the court of Cyrus as well as at that of Cambyses in an honourable position; both Cyrus and his successor at times apply to him for advice.

The convulsion which Cyrus had caused in the Median empire might have ended with placing the Persians at the summit instead of the Medes, and establishing the power of Cyrus within the old borders of the Median kingdom. Had Lydia and Babylonia resolved to recognise this change; had they reasons for the assumption that Cyrus would not go beyond these limits, the old relation of the three powers might have been renewed, though it would not have been confirmed by the bonds of alliance. But Lydia no less than Babylonia believed that they were threatened by the advance of Cyrus. At the time when Crœsus attacked him, Cyrus certainly did not intend to proceed to the West beyond the borders of Cappadocia. This is proved by the fact that he kept within the Halys after the conquest of that country. He must establish his power in the East before he could extend his views to the distant West and Asia Minor. It was Babylon which at that time was threatened, if not actually attacked, by Cyrus. The advance of the Persians to the West, which Crœsus intended to prevent by his attack, was really caused by it. He brought on the storm which he sought to allay before it burst upon him. By attempting to check the advance of Cyrus in the midst of Asia he invited him to Sardis. The dominion of the Mermnadæ was at an end; Crœsus had lost it 140 years after his ancestor Gyges had won it. It is seldom that a sovereign is hurled so suddenly as Crœsus from the summit of power and prosperity; that the splendour of a high and glorious position stands in such close and striking proximity to the deepest humiliation. There is hardly any instance of a warlike and brave nation passing so suddenly and utterly into obscurity as the Lydians; and never has so ancient, so flourishing, and powerful a kingdom, while yet in the period of its growth, been so swiftly overthrown, never to rise again.

CHAPTER VII
THE SUBJUGATION OF ASIA MINOR

However unexpected the attack of the Lydians had been by the ruler of the Medes and Persians, however inconvenient the war with them, he had brought it to a rapid and prosperous decision. Though he had entertained no thought of conquests in the distant West before Crœsus took up arms against him, he resolved to maintain the advantage which the war had brought him to such a surprising extent. Great as was the distance between Sardis and Pasargadae, Lydia was to be embodied in his empire, and the Ægean was to form its western boundary. His army took up winter quarters in Lydia; from Sardis he arranged in person the new government of the land, and the fate of the nations which had been subject to the Lydians. We do not know whether the Phrygians, Bithynians, and Paphlagonians submitted to the change of dominion without resistance. Æschylus represents Cyrus as subjugating Phrygia. According to Xenophon, Phrygia was reduced by Cyrus as he returned from Sardis; the Paphlagonians submitted voluntarily, like the Cilicians; this was the reason why no satraps were sent there, yet the fortresses were occupied with Persian garrisons, and the Paphlagonians and Cilicians had to pay tribute and perform service in war.³⁰ Cilicia had not been subject to the Lydians; ever since the irruption of the Scyths had broken the cohesion of the Assyrian power, her princes were independent, though they had paid tribute to Assurbanipal (III. 166, 178), They bore the standing title of Syennesis. More than sixty years previously Nabopolassar of Babylon and Syennesis of Cilicia had brought about peace and alliance between Cyaxares of Media and Alyattes of Lydia (V. 295). That Cilicia now voluntarily submitted to Cyrus, if it had not done so previously, can be concluded with certainty from the fact that we subsequently find kings named Syennesis at the head of Cilicia, who are bound to pay tribute to the Persian empire and render service in war.³¹

Cyrus met more vigorous resistance in the west of Asia Minor. The Lycians, who maintained their independence against the Lydians in their mountains to the south, were not inclined to submit to the Persians, nor were their neighbours in the south-west, the Carians. The cities of the Greeks, who possessed the entire western coast, hesitated which course to take. After their ancestors had set foot on this coast, 400 years previously, they had succeeded in maintaining their ground for a century and a half against the rising power of the Lydians under the Mermnads; indeed it was during this period that they had extended their trade and colonisation, and risen to be a second naval power beside the Phenicians, – the centre of a commerce, which on the one hand included the Black Sea and the Maeotis, and on the other almost all the Mediterranean – which included in its empire Cyprus and Sicily and Corsica, Egypt and the mouths of the Po and Rhone, and even extended to the banks of the Bætis. Along with the trade and wealth of these cities, poetry had burst into a new bloom, plastic art and architecture were eagerly cultivated, the foundations were laid for Greek science, natural history, geography, history, and philosophy. Life was pleasant and luxurious; no doubt the morals of the Lydians had found their way into the cities, but the old vigour still remained in the inhabitants by sea and land. At last they had succumbed to Crœsus, not because they did not know how to fight, but because they had not followed the advice of Thales of Miletus, who urged them to carry on the war in common, and place at their head a council with dictatorial powers (III. 450). But the supremacy of Crœsus, to which they did not submit for much more than a decade, had not been of an oppressive character. It had left the cities unchanged in their internal trade, and in fact had increased rather than destroyed it. Crœsus had contented himself with yearly tributes from the cities, and we have seen to what a large extent Greek art and manners found protection, favour, and advancement at the court of Crœsus. Now these cities suddenly found themselves in the presence of a power of which they had hardly heard the name, and which had prostrated with a mighty blow the kingdom of Crœsus. As they were not pledged to provide soldiers for the king of the Lydians, they had looked on in irresolute neutrality during the war. And they had paid no heed to the request of Cyrus that they would join his side. Previously it might have been to their interest to weaken the power of Lydia, in order to regain their full independence, but when Cyrus marched upon Sardis it became much more imperative to prevent a stronger power from taking the place of the Lydians. A diversion on the part of the Greek cities when Cyrus was besieging Sardis, would have delayed the fate of the city, and might have rendered possible the arrival of the allies. But they had done nothing, and now found themselves alone in the presence of the conqueror. Their danger prompted them to offer submission to the king of the Persians on the same terms as those on which they had served Crœsus. Cyrus rejected the offer which the ambassadors of the Ionian and Aeolian cities brought to Sardis. Mere recognition of his supremacy and payment of tribute he did not consider sufficient to secure the obedience of cities so remote, and he was strong enough to insist on a more dependent relation without great efforts. But ever cautious and provident, he took means to separate the cities. To Miletus, the strongest, he offered a continuance of the relations in which she had stood to Lydia. When Miletus, "from fear," as Herodotus remarks, accepted these conditions, Cyrus had already won the victory. The cities were divided, robbed of their strongest power and natural head.

Conscious that their submission on the conditions proposed had been refused, the cities of the Ionian tribe took counsel at their old common place of sacrifice on the shore of the sea, opposite Samos, under Mount Mycale. Miletus, it is true, was absent; but among the Ionians there was far too much pride, far too great a sense of freedom, to offer unconditional submission to Cyrus. The defection of Miletus seemed to be compensated when ambassadors of the cities of the Aeolian tribe appeared on the same day as the Ionians, which had never occurred before, and declared their common resolution "to follow the Ionians wherever they led."³² It was resolved to fortify the cities, to make a resistance to the Persians, and for this object to call as quickly as possible on the mother country for help. A common embassy of the Ionian and Aeolian cities went to Sparta, in order to ask aid of the Dorians there, the leading state in the peninsula. But in vain did Pythermus of Phocaea, the mouthpiece of the embassy, put on his purple robe in order to manifest the importance and wealth of the cities, when the ephors introduced the legation before the common assembly. Though the Spartans at that time were at the height of their power, and had promised help to Crœsus, though the ships had been equipped and the contingent was ready to embark when the news came of the capture of Sardis, Sparta now refused to send aid, regardless of the fate of her countrymen. She merely resolved to despatch ambassadors to Cyrus with the request that he would leave the Greek cities in peace. A ship of fifty oars carried the embassy to Asia, with the real object, as Herodotus supposes, of ascertaining the position of affairs in Ionia and with Cyrus. It landed at Phocaea. Lacrines, the spokesman of the ambassadors, found Cyrus in Sardis, and there warned him in Sparta's name, "to do no harm to any Hellenic city, for Sparta would not allow such conduct to go unpunished." Without the support of an army this warning was an empty and foolish threat, which Cyrus treated as it deserved.³³

There must have been some urgent necessity which summoned Cyrus to the East before he subjected the Lydians, Carians, and Greeks of the coast. Herodotus tells us that he intended to conquer Babylon, the Bactrian nation, the Sacæ and Egyptians. In the early spring he set out with the bulk of his army to Ecbatana.³⁴ Crœsus was in his train. He had given the government of Lydia to Tabalus, a Persian, but the management of the revenues to Pactyas, a Lydian.³⁵ He may have thought that Lydia was more peaceable than it really was, or more reconciled to its fate by his gentle treatment of Crœsus, and the nomination of a Lydian as manager of the taxes. The dominion of the Persians had come upon the Lydians suddenly; they refused to recognise the superior power of their rulers, and could not finally accept the rapid change which had so suddenly overthrown their ancient kingdom and their fame in arms. So far from being subdued, they hardly considered themselves seriously beaten. The rapid and decisive action, in which they had been defeated, might appear to them rather a fortunate surprise, than a victory won by the Persians. It was Pactyas, whom Cyrus had made manager of the revenues, who raised the standard of revolt. He collected the Lydians, and induced the inhabitants of the coast, i. e. the cities of the Greeks, to join him. Tabalus could not resist in the open field the sudden outburst of rebellion. When Pactyas marched against Sardis, he was compelled to shut himself up in the citadel, and was there besieged. While yet on his march Cyrus received the news of the revolt. Yet his presence in upper Asia was so necessary that he did not return in person; he sent Mazares, a Mede, with a part of the army, to bring the Lydians once more to obedience. The rebellion appears to have been undertaken in haste without sufficient preparations, and Pactyas was not the man to lead it with energy. He did not venture to await the arrival of Mazares; the citadel of Sardis was delivered; Tabalus was free; the rebellion was crushed; Pactyas fled to the Greeks on the coast, to Cyme, the leading city of the Aeolians. When Mazares demanded that he should be given up, the oracle of Apollo at Miletus twice ordered the Cymæans, in answer to their repeated inquiry, to surrender him. The priests of that temple, the Branchidæ, well knew that the arrangement which their city had made with Cyrus, pledged her to carry out the wishes of the Persians. The Cymæans did not obey even the second response, but first took Pactyas in safety to Mytilene in Lesbos, and when they found that the Mytileneans were ready to give him up, they took him to Chios. But the Chians, though, like the Lesbians, they had nothing to fear from the Persians in their island, nevertheless surrendered him.³⁶

The hopes which the Greek cities might have built upon the rebellion of the Lydians were quickly broken. The mother country had refused any help. Sparta would not come to their assistance, and Athens, torn as she was by internal dissensions, could not. No one in the cantons of the Greek peninsula roused themselves to give aid to an important section of the Greek nation, to the colonies which had outstripped the mother country in their development, or strove to save the most vigorous centres of Greek nationality from subjection to a foreign people, which had come out of the remote part of Asia. If the voice of a common blood and the sense of nationality failed to warn the Greeks beyond the sea against giving over to strangers for plunder such rich and flourishing cities, was there no one in Hellas who foresaw that if the establishment of the Persian dominion on the coasts of Asia Minor were not prevented, and the cities of the coast with their navy were allowed to fall into the hands of the Persians, Greece itself would not be safe from their attack, and they would be able to visit the coasts of Hellas in Greek ships? Yet even without assistance the power of the Hellenic cities would have sufficed for a considerable resistance to the Persians – for the position of affairs in Asia did not allow Cyrus to bring any great force against these distant coasts – if they had been able to understand and take to heart the lessons of their own past. If they had neglected to unite their forces against the Lydians, such union was now doubly necessary. They had learned from experience the evil of delay, and the danger was now greater than ever. The Greek cities were in uncontested possession of the sea,³⁷ and thus in a position to give help in common to any city which the Persians might attack. An organisation which permitted the whole force of the city to be used for the benefit of each one, would have given a prospect of successful resistance. But no step whatever was taken in this direction. Each city turned its attention to strengthening its own walls, and awaiting the attack of the Persians.

After the subjugation of the Lydians, Mazares, as Herodotus tells us, turned his arms against "those who had besieged Tabalus along with Pactyas." He invested Priene, took the city, and reduced the inhabitants to slavery; then the plain of the Maeander was laid waste, the city of Magnesia taken, and its inhabitants enslaved. After the capture of Magnesia Mazares fell sick and died. Cyrus sent Harpagus the Mede as his successor. He marched northwards from the valley of the Maeander; in the first instance against Phocaea, which appeared to have taken the leading part in resistance, or at any rate had done most to gain the help of Sparta; after Miletus it was the most powerful city of the Ionians. The trade in the Adriatic and the Tyrrhene sea, on the coasts of Gallia and Iberia, was in the hands of the Phocaeans. A strong and magnificent wall, well built of large stones, surrounded the city, the circuit of which, as Herodotus says, reached "not a few stadia." Harpagus invested Phocaea, and threw up works round the walls; he then sent intelligence to the Phocaeans that he should be content if they would pull down but one tower, and solemnly give up to him the possession of one dwelling. The Phocaeans must have thought that they could no longer hold the city or repulse an attack. According to Herodotus, they answered the offer of Harpagus with a request that he would allow them a day for consideration, and for that day would lead his army from the wall. Harpagus replied that he knew very well what their intentions were, but he would give them time for consideration. When Harpagus led his forces from the wall, the Phocaeans drew their ships to the sea, put upon them their wives and children, and everything that they could carry away, even the images of the gods and the votive offerings, and then embarked and sailed to Chios. It was their intention to purchase from the Chians the Oenussæ, islands lying off Chios, and to settle there. But the Chians refused to sell them, fearing that their trade would go there. Then the Phocaeans turned their course back to Phocaea; Harpagus had taken possession of the empty city and left a garrison in it. This the Phocaeans cut down; then they sunk a large mass of iron in the sea, with an oath that they would not return again to the city till the iron should float, and shaped their course to the distant Western sea, for the island of Cyrnus (Corsica), where twenty years previously they had founded the colony of Alalia. Harpagus is said to have burnt Phocaea, thus punishing the houses and temples for the attack on the garrison.³⁸ After the capture of this city, he besieged Teos, and gained possession of the walls by means of the works which he threw up. The Teians then went on board their ships, one and all, sailed to the north, and settled on the coast of Thrace opposite Thasos, where they founded Abdera.³⁹ "So all the Ionians," says Herodotus, "with the exception of the Milesians, who had come to terms with Cyrus, fought against Harpagus, and showed themselves brave warriors, each for his own city; but Harpagus took them one after the other by investing them and throwing up works against the walls. Thus conquered they remained in their cities, with the exception of those exiles, and did what they were bid." After the subjugation of the Ionians, Harpagus turned to the North, reduced the cities of the Aeolians, and bade their military forces join his army.

The line of conquest had now reached the Dorian cities of the coast, the Carians and Lycians. The Dorians and Carians made but little resistance.⁴⁰ The Greeks of Asia had not only been abandoned by their kinsmen beyond the sea, but also by their gods, or at any rate by their oracles. As Apollo of Miletus had bidden the Cymaeans to give up Pactyas, so Apollo of Delphi bade the Cnidians to desist from making their city impregnable. Cnidus lay on the western edge of a long and narrow promontory. The inhabitants had begun to cut a channel through the land with a view of securing themselves against the attack of the Persians. But though a large number of hands were engaged, the work did not make progress in the hard rock; and as many of the workmen were injured the city sent to Delphi to inquire the cause of their misfortunes. The priestess answered, according to the Cnidian account: "Ye must not fortify the Isthmus, nor cut through it; Zeus would have made it an island if he had wished."⁴¹ The Cnidians desisted, and surrendered without a struggle to Harpagus on his approach. Among the Carians, the Pedasians alone, who had fortified Mount Lida, made a vigorous resistance; it cost Harpagus much trouble to take this fortification. The Lycians, who had never been subject to the kings of the Lydians, marched out against Harpagus. In the open field they fought bravely, though few against many. When conquered and driven into their city Xanthus (Arna, I. 577), they brought their wives and children, their servants, and their goods into the citadel and set them on fire; then they bound themselves by an oath, fell upon the Persian army, and maintained the conflict to the last man. Then the remaining towns of the Lycians, being robbed of their best defenders, submitted. The Caunians alone, as Herodotus tells us, followed almost exactly the example of the city of Xanthus.⁴² Even the sea put no limit to the supremacy of the Persians. The Greeks of the islands of Chios and Lesbos voluntarily submitted to them, though, as Herodotus assures us, "they had nothing to fear," "for the Persians were not mariners, and the Phenicians were not their subjects at that time."⁴³ The two islands would not give up all hope of the possession of the districts on the coasts opposite.

About three years after Cyrus had left Sardis in the spring of the year 548 B.C. his power in Lydia was not only firmly founded, but the whole western coast, with all its harbours and landing-places, together with two considerable islands, was subject to him. As Aeschylus tells us, he had reduced Ionia by force. The East had again overpowered the colonists of the West on its western edge. Asia Minor, beyond the Halys, was subjugated to Cyrus in even greater extent than to Crœsus; in fact it was wholly in his power.⁴⁴ He placed two viceroys over it. One, the viceroy of Phrygia, was to govern the north-eastern; the other, the viceroy of Lydia, was to govern the south-western half of this wide region. The first took up his position at Dascyleum, not far from the shore of the Propontis; the other in the citadel at Sardis.⁴⁵ Among the cities of the Greeks, Priene and Magnesia on the Maeander had been destroyed, and their inhabitants enslaved; Phocaea had been burned. The rest had not been injured by Harpagus after their capture; he had not placed any Persian governors over them, nor introduced garrisons. It was not intended in any way to destroy their nationality or their religious worship. Their social life, their forms of government, their autonomy remained; even the common sacrifices and assemblies of the Ionian cities at Mycale were permitted to continue. They had only to recognise the supreme authority of the king of the Persians and his viceroys, to pay yearly tribute to the king, the amount of which each city fixed for itself, and furnish a contingent to the army when called upon by the viceroy to do so. When the Ionians again met at the common place of sacrifice for the first time after their subjugation, Bias of Priene, who had escaped the destruction of his country, proposed that all the Ionian cities should follow the example of the Phocaeans and Teians; that there should be a general emigration to Sardinia, in order that all might obtain a new country there. They were then to form one great community; one city was to be founded by all in common. Had this proposal been carried out, the achievements of Cyrus would have exercised a far deeper influence over the distant West, than the mere settlement of the Phocaeans in Alalia, who moreover were not able to maintain themselves in their new settlement. The centre of Hellenic colonisation would have been transplanted from East to West, and the fate of Italy would have been changed; the Greeks would have retired before the supremacy of the East in order to establish a strong insular power among the weak communities of the West. But the Ionians could not rise to the height of such a revolution. Among the Greeks, the attachment to their ancient soil, their homes and temples, was peculiarly strong. If men could and would forget independence, the supremacy of the Persians did not seem very oppressive. It limited the trade of the Greeks as little as it repressed their social life; on the contrary, it rather advanced commerce, which now received the protection of the Persian king throughout the whole of his wide dominions. The ruin of Phocaea also aided the trade of Miletus which had suffered neither war nor siege.