Kitabı oku: «Invention: The Master-key to Progress», sayfa 6
CHAPTER IV
INVENTION IN ROME: ITS RISE AND FALL
We have noted, up to a time approximately that of Archimedes, a continual succession of inventions of many kinds, that formed stepping-stones to civilization so large and plain, that we can see them even from this distance.
We now come to a period lasting more than a thousand years, in the first half of which there was a gradually decreasing lack of inventiveness shown, and in the latter half a cessation almost complete.
The nation that followed Greece as the dominant nation of the world was Rome. She became more truly a dominant nation than Greece ever was; but her civilization was built on that of Greece, and her success even in war and government was due largely to following where Greece had led. That Rome in her early days should have followed the methods of Greece was natural of course; for the two countries were close together, and the methods of Greece had brought success. The early religion of Rome was so like that of Greece that even to this day the conceptions of most of us regarding Zeus and Jupiter, Poseidon and Neptune, Aphrodite and Venus are apt to become confused.
Like the Greeks, the Romans first were gathered in city-states that were governed by kings; and as with the Greeks, more republican forms were adopted later. In one important particular, the Roman practice diverged from the Greek, and that was in incorporating conquered states into the parent state, and granting their inhabitants the privileges of citizenship; instead of keeping them in the condition of mere subject states. The Roman system was somewhat like the system of provinces established by the Assyrians. It forms the basis of the "municipal system" of the free states of the present day, in which local self-government is carried on, under the paramount authority of the state.
It may be pointed out here that the conception of such an idea and its successful development into an effective machine of government by the Romans constituted an invention; though in view of what had been done before by Assyria and Greece, it cannot be called a basic invention.
The early Romans were very different in their mental characteristics from the Greeks; for they were stern, warlike, intensely practical, and possessed of an extraordinary talent for what we now call "team work." As a nation they were not so inventive as the Greeks; but the Roman, Cæsar, was the greatest military inventor who ever lived.
As might be expected, their early endeavors pertained to war, and their first improvements were in warlike things. One improvement that was marked by considerable inventiveness was in changing the phalanx into the legion. The phalanx, the historian Botsford tells us, was "invented by the Spartans, probably in the eighth century B. C.," and consisted of an unbroken line of warriors, several ranks deep. The Thebans improved on this; and from the Theban, Philip developed the Macedonian phalanx with which Alexander fought his way through Asia. The Romans under Servius Tullius developed this into the Roman phalanx, which was different only in detail. The essential characteristic of the phalanx was strength. This was gained by the close support given by each man to his neighbor, the personal strength of each man and the trained co-operation of all. A tremendous blow was given to an enemy's line when a phalanx struck it.
In the early wars among the hills of Italy, the Romans found the phalanx too rigid for such uneven country; and it was in endeavoring to invent a substitute that they finally developed the legion. This machine was much more flexible, the individual soldiers had more room for their movements, and yet the machine seemed to possess the necessary rigidity when the shock of impact came. The heavy infantry was in three lines, and each line was divided into ten companies, or "maniples." The burden of the first attack was borne by the first line. If unsuccessful, the first line withdrew through gaps in the second line, and the second line took up the task; – and then the third, composed of the most seasoned troops. The attack usually began with the hurling of javelins, and was followed at once by an assault with the Roman strong short swords.
Now the legion was just as truly an invented machine as a steam engine is; and it had a greater influence on history than the steam engine has ever had thus far. It was by means of their legions that the Romans passed outside of the walls of Rome, and conquered all of Italy. It was by means of their legions that the Romans conquered all the coast peoples that bordered the Mediterranean Sea, subdued Gaul, Europe and Egypt and Asia, and became the greatest masters of the world that the world has ever seen.
The first war of the Romans that history calls great was their war against the splendid and wealthy city of Carthage, situated on the opposite side of the Mediterranean, inhabited by descendants of the Phœnicians. They were an aggressive and energetic people, but only commercially. They were not of the warlike cast, and delegated the work of national defense to hired soldiers and sailors. They had one great advantage over the Romans in the possession of an excellent navy.
The Romans resolved to create a navy. With characteristic energy and practical ability, they devoted themselves at once to both the acquisition of the personnel and the material, and the adequate training of the crews. It is stated that within two months from the time of starting, Rome possessed a hundred quinqueremes, the largest galleys of those days, having five tiers of rowers; though they had had none when the war broke out. The first naval battle took place near the promontory of Mylæ. Naturally, the Romans were at a great disadvantage as compared with the experienced officers and sailors in the Carthaginian fleet; for though the Roman soldier was far better than the Carthaginian, the Roman sailor was inexperienced and unskilful. To remedy the difficulty, the Romans made a simple but brilliant invention. They provided each quinquereme with a "corvus," that consisted essentially of a drawbridge that could be lowered quickly, and that carried a sharp spike at its outer end; and then arranged a plan whereby each quinquereme should get alongside of a Carthaginian, drop the drawbridge at such a time that the spike would hold the outer end of the drawbridge in place on the Carthaginian deck, and Roman soldiers should then rush across the drawbridge and attack the inferior Carthaginian soldiers.
Few more brilliant inventions have ever been made; few have been more successful and effective. The battle ended in a perfect victory for the Romans, and constituted the initial step in the subjugation of Carthage by Rome.
There were three wars in all, called Punic Wars. The great Carthaginian General, Hannibal, invaded Italy by land in the Second War, and after a campaign marked with a high order of daring and ability, threatened Rome herself after a brilliant victory near Lake Trasimene. Another victory followed at Cannæ, but a decisive disaster later on the Metaurus River. So the Second War was won by Rome. But Carthage still existed, and menaced the commercial, naval and military dominance of Rome. Therefore war was brought about at last by Rome, and Carthage destroyed completely.
The conduct of Rome toward Carthage cannot be justified on any grounds of any system of morality accepted at the present day; and yet it cannot reasonably be denied that it was better for human progress that Rome should prevail than Carthage. The Romans, harsh and ruthless as they were, were less so than the Carthaginians; and they had an element of strong manliness and a comprehensive grasp of things beyond mere commerce and money-getting and ease and comfort that the Semitic Carthaginians wholly lacked. The effect of the conquest of Carthage by Rome was a little like that of the conquest of Persia by Alexander.
During the same year (146 B. C.) when Rome destroyed Carthage, she also destroyed Corinth in Greece, and brought Greece and Macedonia under her sway. She had previously (190 B. C.) defeated Antiochus the Great, and taken from him nearly all his territory in Asia Minor.
By the year 58 B. C., Rome had become the most powerful nation in the world and still preserved a republican form of government. In that year, 58 B. C., the man who probably is the most generally regarded as the greatest man who has ever lived, appeared upon the stage of history. His name was Julius Cæsar.
He appeared in that year, because he went then from Rome to Gaul, and started on those brilliant and in many respects unprecedented campaigns which have had so profound an effect on history, and which for originality in conception and execution have had no rivals since.
At this time, Italy and the lands of Africa and Asia on which Alexander had impressed the civilization of Greece, were prosperous and well-governed; but beyond those countries only barbarous customs prevailed, and only a primitive civilization reigned. The lands that lay north and northwest of Italy, throughout all Gaul, were inhabited by savage tribes that were in a state of continual war with each other. In the southern and middle parts the effects of Roman civilization might be dimly seen; but in the southwestern part, and in the north, especially among the German tribes on the Rhine, and the Belgæ near the North Sea, a condition of virtually pure savagery prevailed.
Into such a country Cæsar marched, at the head of a body of men wholly inferior in numbers to those they were to meet, not superior to them in courage or physical strength, but considerably superior to them in discipline, and vastly superior in the weapons and methods that had gradually been invented, with the progress of civilization. Thus, while the Roman machine was superior as a machine to any that the Gauls could bring to bear, it was smaller; so that the question to be decided was whether the superior excellence of the Roman machine was great enough to balance its inferiority in size. Looking back from our vantage ground on the history of the campaigns that followed, we feel inclined to answer the question in the negative, unless we consider Cæsar himself a part of the machine. It is true that the campaigns were decided in favor of the Roman machine; but there seems little ground for doubting that they would not have been so decided, if the genius of Cæsar had not managed the Roman machine and made improvements from time to time.
Cæsar had had little experience as a soldier, but his habits of life and traits of character were of the military kind. As the campaigns progressed, his courage, equanimity and rapidity of thought and action were continually displayed; – yet not to such a degree as to put him in a higher class than many other generals of history, or to account wholly for his marvellous successes. One peculiar ability, however, he possessed and exercised in a degree greater than any other general of history: and it was by the exercise of that ability that his most extraordinary victories were achieved, and his generalship especially distinguished from the generalship of others. That ability was inventiveness.
His first contact was with the Swiss (Helvetii), who were about to leave the barrenness of their mountain lands, and march west to the fertile lands beyond. As this would take them through Roman territory and tend to drive the Gauls into Italy, open Switzerland to occupation by the Germans, and point a road thence for them also into Italy, Cæsar hastened to the Rhône River, destroyed the bridge which they would naturally go over, and forbade the Swiss to attempt to cross the river. The Swiss pleaded with Cæsar to permit them to cross. As Cæsar realized that the Swiss were too greatly superior in force to be kept back, unless he could strengthen himself in some way, he asked time for reflection, and told them to return in two weeks. When the Swiss returned at the end of that time, their astonished eyes disclosed to them the fact that Cæsar had constructed walls and trenches and forts at every point where a passage could reasonably be attempted.
It may be objected that walls and trenches and forts were not new, and that therefore Cæsar invented nothing. This may be admitted as an academic proposition; but nevertheless, it was clearly the ingenious and wholly unexpected construction of certain appliances by Cæsar that opposed the barbarous Swiss with barriers which they could not pass. It may even be argued with much reason that the conception and successful execution of Cæsar's plan as a whole constituted an invention, even though the material used was old. Certain it is that a situation was created which did not exist before, and that it was the creation of this situation, and not the exercise of strength or courage, that was the determining factor in stopping the Swiss. Froude says of Cæsar, "He was never greater than in unlooked-for difficulties. He never rested. He was always inventing some new contrivance."
Cæsar realized fully the value in war of mechanical appliances, and took careful measures before he left Italy to supply his army adequately with them, and also with men trained to use them. Besides the fighting men strictly considered, Cæsar took a considerable number of engineers with him, and expert men for building bridges, and doing mechanical work of many kinds. The ingenious and frequent use that Cæsar made of these men and of mechanical appliances was the most powerful single factor that contributed to his success.
The Swiss departing from Switzerland by another route, Cæsar pursued them, and defeated a fourth of them in a battle on the banks of a river which the other three-fourths had crossed. He then built a bridge over the river and sent his army across. This feat alarmed the Swiss more than their defeat; because Cæsar had built the bridge and sent his army across in one day, whereas they had consumed twenty days in merely crossing. The Swiss pleaded to be allowed to proceed; but Cæsar was obdurate. A battle followed, in which the Swiss, though greatly superior in numbers and reinforced by 15,000 allies, were decisively beaten; not because of inferior courage or warlike skill, but by reason of inferior equipments, mechanical appliances and weapons.
Cæsar's next battle was with the Germans. It was won, if not precisely with inventiveness, at least with "brains." He learned that the German matrons had declared, after certain occult proceedings, that Heaven forbade them to fight before the new moon. Apprehending his opportunity, he advanced his forces right up to the German camp, thereby forcing them as valiant soldiers to come out and fight. Fight they did, but under an obvious psychological disadvantage, and with the natural result.
In this battle, as in others between the Romans and the barbarians, it was noticeable that although their first onslaught was fine, the barbarians seemed to be at a loss afterwards, – if anything unexpected occurred, or if any reverse was sustained; whereas the Romans – and especially Cæsar himself – never behaved so well as when threatened with disaster. This may be expressed by saying that the barbarians, as compared with the Romans, were wholly inferior in the inventiveness needed to devise a new plan quickly.
Not long afterward, Cæsar advanced against the town of Noviodunum. He soon saw that he could not take it by storm; and so he brought forward his mechanical siege appliances. The psychological effect of these on the barbarians was so tremendous that they at once pleaded for terms of surrender.
After a battle with the Nervii, in which Cæsar defeated them disastrously, largely because of his resourcefulness in emergency and their lack of it, he advanced against a great barbarian stronghold that looked down on steep rocks on three sides, and was protected by a thick, high double wall on the fourth side. Cæsar made a fortified rampart around the town, pushed his mantlets (large shields on wheels protected on the sides and top) close up to the wall, and built a tower. The barbarians laughed at this tower; seeing it so far away that, they thought, no darts thrown from it could reach them. But when they saw the tower actually moving toward them they were struck with terror and began at once to sue for peace.
During the following winter the Veneti, a large tribe on the northwestern coast, the most skilful seamen and navigators of Gaul, stirred up a revolt that quickly and widely spread. The situation at once became serious for Cæsar, for the reason that the Veneti could not be subdued, except on the sea; and neither the Roman sailors nor the Roman vessels were as good as were those of the Veneti. Nevertheless, Cæsar ordered war-vessels to be built on the Loire River, and seamen and rowers to be drafted from the Roman Province.
When the improvised fleet of the Romans and the thoroughly prepared fleet of the Veneti came together, the latter was superior even in numbers. Furthermore, the Romans were at a great disadvantage in the matter of throwing projectiles, from the fact that the Veneti's decks were higher than theirs.
But Cæsar had prepared a scheme that gave him victory. In accordance with it, the Roman galleys rowed smartly against the Veneti ships, and Roman sailors raised long poles on which were sharp hooks which they put over the halliards that held up the sails. Then each Roman galley rowed rapidly away, the halliards were cut, and down came the sails. The Veneti ships became helpless at once and were immediately boarded; with the result that, of all the number, only a few made their escape.
Somewhat later, Cæsar decided to cross the Rhine into the country of the Sueves, and to impress them with the power of Rome by building a bridge and marching his army across. This bridge and the quickness and thoroughness with which it was built are still models for engineers; for in ten days after he had decided to build it, at which time the material was still standing in the forest, a bridge 40 feet wide had been constructed. Across this Cæsar at once marched his legions. The effect on the barbarous Germans can be imagined. It made them realize that the Romans were a race superior to themselves in ways that they could not measure or even understand; and it impressed them with that fear which is the most depressing of all fears, the fear of the unknown.
Did Cæsar make an invention? This depends on the meaning of the word invention. Cæsar did not invent the bridge; but he did conceive and carry into execution a highly original, concrete and successful scheme. By it he accomplished as much as a victorious campaign would have accomplished, and without shedding any blood. He devised means which created a state of thought in the minds of his enemies that destroyed their will to fight. Therein lay his invention.
Cæsar then conceived the idea of going across the water to the island of Britain, about which little was known. After having a survey made of the coast, he took his legions across in about eighty vessels. He had to fight to make a landing, of course; but he succeeded, and then formed his camp. A Roman camp, we may now remind ourselves, was so distinctly a Roman conception, and so distinctly a part of the Roman system of conducting war, that it almost constituted an invention. Whenever a Roman army halted, even for one night, they intrenched themselves within a square enclosure, surrounded with a ditch and a palisade of stakes, and made a temporary little city, laid with streets. In such a camp they were reasonably safe against any attack that barbarians could make.
But a storm arose that drove some of Cæsar's ships ashore and some out to sea. In this emergency, Cæsar's resourcefulness and energy directed the work of recovery and repair, and enabled the Romans to collect and put into good condition nearly all their ships. Cæsar returned shortly afterward to Gaul; arrived there, he gave directions for building and equipping another and larger fleet.
In the following July (54 B. C.), he started again for Britain. This time he took five legions and some cavalry and had about 800 vessels. He landed and formed his camp, and then advanced inland; – but another storm arose that scattered his ships. He returned at once to the coast, and instituted such prompt and resourceful measures that in ten days he was able to resume his march. On this march, which took him far inland, he was able to overcome all opposition; largely because, after the first onset, the barbarians seemed to be without any plan of action, while Cæsar was at his best.
Cæsar had the ability to invent under circumstances of the utmost danger and excitement.
Cæsar's remaining campaigns in Gaul were marked with the same resourcefulness and originality on his part, and the same lack of resourcefulness and originality on the part of the barbarians. Cæsar would continually do something that the barbarians had not expected him to do. True, they gradually learned some of his schemes and methods from him; but only to find that he had then some newer schemes and methods.
Cæsar at one time remarked that wise men anticipate possible difficulties, and decide beforehand what they will do, if certain possible occasions arise. Does not this process involve invention, in cases where the possible occasions are not of the ordinary and expectable kind? In such cases, does it not require imagination to foresee the possible occasions, and form a correct picture on the mind of the resulting situations? This being done, does it not require the exercise of the constructive faculty afterwards, to make a concrete and effective plan to meet them?
If it be so, then we may reasonably declare that, of all the factors that contributed to the successes in Gaul of Cæsar, the most powerful single factor was his inventiveness.
The final crisis came when Cæsar besieged Alesia, and Vercingetorix, who had taken refuge in it, sent out a call for succor, that was eagerly and promptly responded to; for it was plain to the barbarians that Cæsar, being held in position fronting a fortress that he could not successfully storm, would be in a precarious condition if attacked vigorously in his rear. Attacked vigorously he was; for the barbarians came in his rear with about 250,000 men; Cæsar having only 50,000, and the enemy in front having 80,000.
But it required somewhat more than a month for the barbarians to unite and reach Alesia. With his wonted energy and resourcefulness, Cæsar had by this time cast up siege works all around the fortress, placed camps at strategic points, and constructed twenty-three block-houses. He dug a trench twenty feet deep around the place, and back of this began his other siege works. These included two parallel trenches fifteen feet broad and fifteen feet deep. Behind these he built a palisade twelve feet high, and to this he added a breastwork of pointed stakes; while at intervals of eighty feet he constructed turrets. In addition, he had branches cut from trees and sharpened on the ends; and these he fastened at the bottom of the trenches, so that the points projected just above the ground. In front of these he dug shallow pits, into which tapering stakes hardened in the fire were driven, projecting four inches above the ground. These pits were hidden with twigs and brushwood. Eight rows of these pits were dug, three feet apart; and in front of all stakes with iron hooks were buried in the ground at irregular intervals. When all this had been done on the side toward the fortress, Cæsar constructed parallel entrenchments of the same kind, to protect his rear; the two sets being so arranged with respect to each other that the same men could man both. Having constructed all these material appliances, he instituted a comprehensive system of drills, so that his men would know exactly how to utilize them under all probable contingencies.
In the battle that followed the barbarians showed their wonted courage and dash; but an unexpected situation arose when Cæsar attacked a separated part in their rear. Then they were seized with panic, and the natural rout and disaster followed.
This battle decided the fate of Gaul; though its actual subduing, especially in the southwestern part was not accomplished immediately. The last major act was taking a strong fortress. This was accomplished by cutting a tunnel, by which the spring was tapped that supplied the garrison with water. As Vercingetorix said, the Romans won their victories, not by superior courage, but by superior science.
Cæsar's later passage across the Rubicon, the flight of the Senate, and his later operations by land and sea against Marseilles (Massilia) and hostile forces in northern Spain, are well known, and were characterized by the same high order of inventiveness. His later operations against Pompey, and later still against Pharnaces and Scipio, were conducted under conditions that gave him less opportunity to utilize the quality of inventiveness in such clear ways; but they were marked with the kindred qualities of foresight, skilful adaptation of means to ends, and presence of mind in emergencies.
In the minds of some, Cæsar's greatest influence on history has been due to his improvement of the Calendar, and especially his reforms of the public morals and the laws of Rome, after his campaign against Pharnaces. This subject has been the theme of jurists and scholars to such a degree that it might seem presumptuous in a navy officer to do more than mention it. At the same time it may be pointed out that Cæsar's work was not in any matters of detail, or in contributing any legal or juridical skill or knowledge, but in conceiving the idea of creating the Leges Juliæ, and then creating them.
Julius Cæsar was murdered in the year 44 B. C. He was followed in power by his grandnephew Octavius, one of the most fortunate occurrences in history; for Octavius possessed the ability and the character to carry on the constructive work that Julius Cæsar had begun. Under Octavius and his successors, the Roman Empire became increasingly large and strong, until the reign of Trajan in the second century, A. D., when it acquired its greatest territorial extent.
During the time when Rome was increasing in extent and power, the wealth of cities and of individuals increased also, and enormous public works of all kinds were constructed, many of which are still the admiration of the world. Material prosperity reached its highest point.
But the creative period had passed. Youth, with its dreams and vigor of doing had gone, and maturity, with the luxury of prosperity and the consequent dulling of the imagination, had assumed its place. Senescence followed in due course. Then the empire was divided into two parts, the Empire of the West and the Empire of the East. Finally, in 476 A. D., Rome died and with it the Empire of the West.
But the Eastern Empire stood, and Constantinople was its capital. And it stood, alone and unassisted, as the sole bulwark of Christianity and civilization for nearly 1000 years, until it finally fell before the Ottoman Turks in 1543. It could not have done this, if in the latter part of the seventh century when it was beleaguered by a Turkish fleet, much greater than its own, it had not suddenly received unexpected aid in the shape of a new invention. This was "Greek fire," which seems to have been a pasty mixture of sulphur, nitre, pitch, and other substances, which when squirted against wood set it on fire with a flame that water could not quench. In the very first attack, the Turks were so demoralized by the Greek fire that they fled in panic. They never learned the secret and were never able to stand up against it. On one occasion, fifteen Christian ships, using Greek fire, actually put to rout a Turkish fleet numbering several hundred.
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During all the countless centuries before the dawn of recorded history, and during the approximately forty centuries that elapsed from the beginning of recorded history until the fall of Rome, we have observed the coming of many inventions of both material and immaterial kinds, and noted the influence of those inventions in causing civilization, and therefore in directing the line that history has followed.
It may be objected that a perfectly natural inference from what has been written would be that the only thing which had influenced the direction of movement of history was invention. To this, the answer may very reasonably be made that this book does not pretend to be a history, or to point out what have been the greatest factors that have influenced its line of movement; it attempts merely to emphasize the influence of one factor, invention, and to suggest that maybe its influence has not hitherto been estimated at its proper value.
Another objection like that just indicated might be made to the effect that all the progress of the world up to the fall of Rome is attributed in this book to inventors only; that all the work of statesmen, scientists, generals, admirals, explorers, jurists, men of business, etc., etc., is ignored.
Such an objection would be natural and reasonable; but to it an answer like the previous one may be made, to the effect that the purpose of this book is not to compare the benefits conferred by any one class of men with those conferred by any other, but merely to point out, in a very general way, what inventors have done.
Nevertheless, it does seem clear that inventors did more to map out the direction of the progress just traced than any other single class of men. If we will fix our attention on any one invention about which we know enough – say, the water-clock – we can see that the original inventor of the water-clock (no matter who he was) had more influence on the history of the clock than any other man has had; and that the inventors of clocks who followed him had more influence on the clock than any other equal number of men had. This does not mean that the men who risked their money in making novel clocks did not influence the history of the clock materially; and it does not mean that the men who made good materials for them did not influence the history of the clock greatly; and it does not mean that the engineers and mechanics who operated them successfully did not influence its history. It would be absurd to pretend that each one of these men did not influence the history of the clock; for without them there would have been no successful clock. Nevertheless, in the nature of things, the original inventors must be credited with influencing the history of the clock more than any other equal number of men did, just as a father must be credited with influencing the history of his children more than any other man can, from the mere fact of his having caused them to be born. The inventors of clocks were the fathers of the clocks that they invented, and also the forefathers of all the inventions that proceed directly or indirectly from them.
