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The 1895 Sino-Japanese War
Ancient Japan devoted great attention to learning from China. In the 1860s, Japan started its own self-strengthening movement known as the Meiji Restoration. However, next to Japan’s national endeavor, China’s SSM paled in comparison. Although the two Asian counties stood on the same scratch line, Japan soon left China, its old teacher, far behind. Japan’s Meiji Restoration was based on economic growth, military advancement and cultural reconstruction, whereby Japanese society could be totally overhauled in light of Western modernity. In contrast, after three decades of SSM, China struggled to modernize, particularly where the powerful ultraconservatives were concerned.
Some said that in three decades (1860–1895) China invested, in total, 53,000,000 taels of silver in founding approximately 60 modern corporations. Each year, China set up two factories and invested 1,700,000 in each. Of these, 21 were for the military complex and accounted for almost 70%ercent of the total assets. For the rest, there were 120 capitalist enterprises with total assets of 58,000,000. Every year, four civil corporations were founded and each was worth less than 2,000,000.40 In Japan, it is estimated that more than 5,600 companies were created over more than two decades (1868–1892) and the total investment was 289,000,000 yen. Thus, Japan founded 225 enterprises every year and each was worth 11,000,000 yen or 7,000,000 taels of silver.41
Indeed, Japan developed much more rapidly than China at this time. The Japanese government redeveloped the whole of society on the model of Western capitalism. Japan had transformed itself into a laissez-faire capitalist constitutional state. Japan sold state-owned enterprises cheaply to private owners, revealing that capitalist Japan had already taken shape. Such actions were not possible in nineteenth-century China, which was still steeped in colonialist practices and semi-feudalism.42
As early as the sixteenth century, some Japanese politicians attempted expansion. Japan’s Meiji Emperor attempted to extend his territory to Ryukyu, Korea, and Taiwan. Yoshida Shoin 吉田松阴, who pioneered the Meiji Restoration, recommended that Japan take Manchuria (in northeast China), Taiwan, and Luzon (belonging to the Philippines). Fuzuzawa Yukichi 福泽谕吉, an educator renowned for his radical Datsu-A Ron (an editorial advocating that Japan completely abandon its Asian roots and fully integrate itself into European [Western] civilization), said Japan should treat China in the same manner as the West treated China and Korea.43 These politicians, thinkers, and educators advocated for the preparation for an aggressive war against China. At the same time, Japan did its best to develop a navy and an army, set up a general staff under the direct control of the emperor, as well as send a huge number of spies to China. In 1887, Ogawa Mataji 小川又次, a Japanese general, wrote The General Plan of Conquering China (征讨清国方略), analyzing in detail China’s economy, politics, and defense, recommending that Japan strike preemptively and deploy eight divisions to storm Beijing and capture the Chinese emperor.44
Three years later, Yamagata Aritomo 山县有朋, then Prime Minister of Japan, in the inaugural National Diet (1890) said that Korea was indispensable to Japan’s national interest and that Japan must capture China in order to protect itself. The Japanese Emperor at the fourth Diet (1892–1893) gave voice to Japan’s long-held dream and said, “thereafter the capital may be extended so as to embrace all the six cardinal points, and the eight cords may be covered so as to form a roof” (兼六合以开都掩八纮而为宇).45 Here lay Japan’s wild ambition to create a Pax Nipponica. In other words, the Japanese Emperor had given his approval for war and the invasion of China. In 1893, the Japanese government set up a war materials special committee and formulated the relevant regulations, an important step toward war. Meanwhile, a senior officer led a team of military spies to Korea and China, where they collected as much information as possible and prepared the details of the military operation. Spies concluded that Japan was sure to succeed in the coming war. Japan built a nationwide espionage network within China. By contrast, China was almost completely unaware of what was going on in Japan. When war broke out, Munakata Kotaro (宗方小太郎), a Japanese spy who had direct access to the Gunreibu (the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff) and the Gaimusho (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), was still spying on the Northern Fleet that was anchored in Weihai, a naval port. Revealed, the spy managed to escape using a false identity and returned to Japan safe and sound.46
In February, 1894, the Donghak Peasant Revolution broke out in the south of Korea. The peasant army aspired to annihilate all the Japanese invaders and wipe out the established aristocracy. Three months later, the rebels captured Jeonju. The Korean king begged Qing for help. Qing sent an army of 1,500 men to Korea and informed Japan of this operation. Japan took immediate action and set up the Daihonei (General Headquarters during war) sending 8,000 soldiers to Incheon, Korea. The Japanese troops occupied strategic garrisons and took full control of Seoul, Korea’s capital. It was here that the military confrontation between China and Japan began.47 War was near. However, Qing was looking for a way to achieve peace quickly. Li Hongzhang, the leading official of the imperial court, agreed to work toward seeking peace rather than engaging in war, and even suggested that the Korean government reform itself in exchange for Japan withdrawing its troops. Li decided not to send reinforcements to Korea, and ordered Qing’s army in Korea to stay where it was.
Li suggested China and Japan withdraw their troops simultaneously; however, this did not work. He called upon Russia and Britain to mediate. At that time, Russia was building the Trans-Siberian Railroad and was too busy to interfere. Russia demanded that Japan hold its hand. But Japan ignored it. Britain attempted to turn Japan into a counterweight to Russia. Meanwhile, Japan wanted to win support from Britain. Britain signed a new treaty with Japan and openly recognized Japan’s Korean policy. Qing’s government ordered its troops to march into Pyongyang. In late July, the impatient Japanese army occupied the imperial palace and imprisoned the Korean king. The Japanese then set up a puppet regime and began attacking Qing’s navy. A Chinese warship was sunk and 800 men were killed.
At the same time, the Japanese army was ferociously attacking Qing’s garrison. Terrified, the commanding general of Qing’s army fled shamefully. Japan then declared war on China in August, which resulted in the First Sino-Japanese War breaking out. Japan moved the Daihonei to Hiroshima where the Japanese Emperor visited as the Generalissimo. This revealed that the Japanese command system, wherein the whole nation acted in concert in war, had taken shape. As a consequence, all of Japan was enthusiastic about conquering China.
China was at war. Li Hongzhang had to abandon his pursuit of peace and instead turned to passive defense. He did not follow the Emperor Guangxu’s suggestion that the imperial court should send reinforcements to join Qing’s army in Korea and combine forces to attack Seoul, but instead ordered the Qing troops to defend Pyongyang and fight steadfastly. Li gave priority to protecting the warships rather than attacking the enemy. Li dreamed that his battleships anchored in the Bohai Gulf would prove to be the fiercest fighting ships. However, this involved giving up the command of the Yellow Sea, which would mean Japan could safely transport troops over water.
The land battle was fought in Pyongyang. The Qing army stationed there had 15,000 soldiers, 28 mountain guns, 4 field guns, and 6 machine cannons. The Japanese army had over 17,000 men in possession of 44 mountain artilleries. The Japanese vehemently attacked Pyongyang, resulting in a general from Qing’s army dying in battle and Qing army’s commander fleeing once again. Pyongyang fell into the hands of the enemy.
The Yellow Sea Battle then took place. Japan spent much time planning this battle. For this reason, the Japanese fleet was superior to China’s Northern Fleet (see table below).48
| Chinese Fleet | Japanese Fleet | |
| Number of warships | 10 | 12 |
| Total tonnage | 31,366 | 40,849 |
| Total strength | 2,000 | 3,500 |
| Average speed (nmi) | 15.5 | 16.5 |
| Number of artilleries | 173 | 171 |
| Number of quick-firing guns | 0 | 97 |
The Northern Fleet’s performance was clumsy in the face of the Japanese navy’s surprise attack49 and it suffered heavy losses. The Northern Fleet lost five battleships and a number of excellent naval officers. Fortunately, most of the capital ships were saved. The Chinese navy inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese, including five battleships being severely damaged and more than 300 soldiers and officers killed or injured. The Northern Fleet lost for a number of reasons. First, Li Hongzhang’s operational plan was too passive. Second, Qing’s navy lagged far behind Japan’s in terms of modernization. The Qing navy desperately lacked money, the leadership was inconsistent, and the navy itself was poorly commanded and poorly trained. The Zhiyuan 致 远, the fastest battleship of the Northern Fleet, vigorously pursued and fiercely mauled the Yoshino吉野, one of the largest Japanese warships. When realizing that it had run out of ammunition, the Zhiyuan decided to ram the Yoshino; however, it was sunk by the enemy.
Frightened by the Yellow Sea Battle, Li Hongzhang prohibited Chinese warships from going to sea, arguing that the Northern Fleet should only be used for defense. Japan had naval supremacy and consequently began landing their army in China, an operation which took place over nine days. The Northern Fleet took no action when the Japanese army attacked bases in Lüshun and captured Jinzhou and Dalian. Li Hongzhang had spent tens of millions of taels of silver building the naval port of Lüshun, which was nicknamed the Iron Garrison. It was stocked with a huge number of powerful, advanced Western weapons and this was the reason why the Japanese troops did not risk a frontal attack. After taking Jinzhou and Dalian, the Japanese decided to launch an assault on Lüshun. Li resolved to defend Lüshun at all costs,50 and sent reinforcements of 20,000 men. At this time, Qing’s army turned and marched toward Jinzhou; however, the Japanese troops were caught in the crossfire between the two Qing armies. In 1894, Lüshun fell. The Japanese army massacred 20,000 civilians,51 which caused outrage throughout the world and condemnation of Japan. Mutsu Munemitsu 陆奥宗光, Japan’s foreign minister, later recalled that after this massacre, Japan was seen as no more than a brutal and cruel monster.52
On the same day the Japanese army landed at Huayuankou, some Japanese troops led by their commander-in-chief crossed the Yalu River and attacked the Chinese garrisons. The Japanese army had slightly more than 10,000 soldiers in contrast to Qing’s defending army of 70 camps and 20,000 soldiers in total. It took the Japanese merely two days to break Qing’s defense. On the first day of December, 1894, the Japanese army occupied the strategic city of Haicheng. Qing’s army of 60,000 men then attacked this city. The battle lasted until February, 1895, when Japan’s reinforcements arrived and helped to secure the city.
Japan’s next target was Weihai, another key naval port belonging to Qing. 20,000 Japanese soldiers arrived in Weihai, which was protected by eight batteries with more than one hundred powerful Western cannons. Weihai was the headquarters of Qing’s navy. After the Yellow Sea Battle, the rest of the Northern Fleet, which included seven battleships, six gunboats, 13 torpedo boats and two training vessels, lay at anchor in Weihai. Li Hongzhang did not allow any ships to leave this naval port, hoping that his fleet would avoid more losses. However, he repeated the same mistake as in Lüshun.
After several days, the Japanese destroyed the batteries and killed more than 1,000 defenders. The Japanese army then blocked all exit points and turned all the Chinese warships into sitting ducks. In spite of resisting fiercely, the entire Northern Army fleet was wiped out. Some foreign employees and Qing’s naval officers orchestrated a mutiny, forcing Ding Ruchang, the highest commander in the Qing navy, to surrender to the Japanese. Ding ordered them to desist; however, they would not listen. Finally, Ding and other senior officers chose to commit suicide rather than surrender. Japan seized the remaining Chinese warships and a large quantity of equipment in the naval base. The Northern Fleet, the symbol of China’s three-decade SSM, was erased from history. Disappointed at Li’s military inability, Qing’s imperial court placed its hopes in the Hunan Army, which played a pivotal role in putting down the Taiping Rebellion. However, the Hunan Army did not have success. The leader, the Governor General of both Jiangnan and Jiangxi, was not able to respond properly. The Japanese troops soon captured western Liaoning and the advancing army posed a great threat to Beijing.
Emperor Guangxu made concessions for peace; the conservatives, such as Cixi, did too. However, after Japan’s capture of Lüshun, the West started to worry that Japan could harm its own interests. Britain warned Japan that if they attacked Beijing and Qing collapsed, Japan would gain nothing. The United States warned Japan that if the war was continued, they would try to end it at the expense of Japan’s stability and prosperity. At this stage, Japan’s troops were almost exhausted. Ito Hirobumi, who was then heading the Japanese government, concluded that toppling Qing would lead to the Western powers’ intervention. Japan forced Qing to sign a peace treaty, which was to its own benefit. Japan however, refused to receive the Chinese delegation headed by several senior ministers, and said that only Li Hongzhang or Yixin (the leading prince) was qualified to negotiate. Thus, Li was sent to Japan.
The Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Cession of Taiwan
As part of the negotiations, Japan demanded that China cede several pieces of territory to Japan. China should also recognize Korea’s dependence on Japan and pay war reparations. Li Hongzhang was given the right to decide whether to agree to these terms.53 The Emperor and high ministers discussed giving up land, though they did not agree.54 They sent word to Qing’s de facto paramount leader, Cixi; however, they received no reply. Li was left to decide by himself.55 In March, 1895, the Chinese and Japanese delegates met in Shimonoseki. The Japanese said that their conditions included, 1) Japan’s occupation of Dagu, Tianjin, and Shanhaiguan; 2) Japan’s management of the railroad connecting Tianjin and Shanhaiguan; and 3) China’s commitment to pay all war expenses during the truce. Li argued that the Japanese were too greedy and decided not to go through with the negotiations. Unexpectedly, a ronin (i.e., an impoverished Japanese samurai) attempted to assassinate Li, which resulted in him being seriously wounded. The global media was in an uproar. Worrying about foreign powers intervening, the Japanese government approved a 21-day truce. However, the truce was not applicable to Taiwan and Penghu 澎 湖. In the beginning of April, Japan told Li, who was still injured, that peace was based on the fulfillment of China’s recognition of Japan’s full control of Korea; the cession of Taiwan, Penghu, and Liaodong Peninsula to Japan; and China’s payment of reparations of 200,000,000 taels of silver to Japan. Li wrote a long letter, attempting to persuade Japan to change its demands. However, he was unsuccessful and the Japanese repeatedly threatened to attack Beijing. On April 10, Japan issued an ultimatum to Li, demanding an answer to its demands. Li sent a telegram to Emperor Guangxu, telling him that he could not do anything about the situation. Seven days later, Li signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki giving Japan what it desired, land, money,56 and various privileges in China.
Japan had long since decided to take Taiwan from China. The Prime Minister, Ito Hirobumi, wanted Japan to occupy Taiwan by force and then compel China to cede it to Japan. He even prepared a detailed program whereby Japan would capture Weihai and destroy Qing’s Northern Fleet, while sending troops to Taiwan.57 The Japanese media went crazy, wanting China to permanently cede Taiwan to Japan. Fuzuzawa Yukichi, the father of Japan’s modern education system, said that Japan should annex the whole of northeast China and turn Lüshun into east Asia’s Gibraltar. They should make Dalian into China’s northern Hong Kong, occupy Shandong and Taiwan, and demand billions of silver dollars in compensation.58 Before the peace talks, Japan had already decided to seize Taiwan. During negotiations, Ito Hirobumi kept quiet about the Japanese troops advancing on Taiwan. Li Hongzhang however, said that Taiwanese residents would never bow to the Japanese invaders.59 The Japanese Prime Minister responded by saying that his government and, in particular, his army would be able to handle the situation.60
By coercing China into signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan inflicted much humiliation on China. Chinese society was taken aback and many called for Li Hongzhang, who signed this treaty, to be executed. Li returned to Tianjin, saying his life had been ruined.61 Emperor Guangxu was close to approving the treaty and a large number of members of the royal house, high governors, and imperial officials wrote memoranda to the throne in an attempt to stop him.62 Five imperial officials, all of whom were from Taiwan, issued a joint statement, expressing their strongest condemnation of the treaty, saying that Taiwanese residents would rather die rather than submit to the Japanese.63 They became known as the Five Righteous Men of Taiwan.64 Chinese media, such as Shanghai News (Shun Pao申报), also published a series of editorials denouncing the treaty. Kang Youwei 康有为 (1858–1927), who was later the architect of the 1898 Hundred Days’ Reform, mobilized 1,300 Examination candidates to protest against the treaty, and also recommended that Qing stop ceding territory, relocate its capital, and fight to the last.
Qiu Fengjia 丘逢甲 asked Tang Jingsong 唐景崧, then Qing’s Taiwan governor, to tell the throne, on behalf of Taiwan’s residents, that they would fight the Japanese invaders to the end. Qiu and others sincerely hoped that Tang would stay in Taiwan and lead the resistance to Japan. The Treaty of Shimonoseki came into effect on May 8, 1895. Taiwan decided to save itself by founding a government that was independent of the rising colonial Japanese empire; at same time, they remained loyal to Qing.65 17 days later, the People’s Republic of Taiwan (台湾民主国, PRT) was founded and called Yongqing 永清 (literally, perpetually loyal to Qing). Tang was chosen as the president; Liu Yongfu, the war hero of the Sino-French War, was the commander-in-chief; and Qiu was the leader of the militias. This new government expressed their loyalty to Emperor Guangxu. Considering, the fact that Taiwan would soon be colonized by the Japanese, the founding of PRT was a valiant effort to defend Taiwan and China’s national sovereignty. In this sense, PRT could be regarded as the starting point for modern China’s resistance to Japanese aggression. On June 2, Taiwan was formally handed over to Kabayama Sukenori 桦山资纪, the first Japanese governor of Taiwan. Taiwan continued to be one of Japan’s colonies until 1945. Japan sent its elite troops, the Konoe Shidan (the Imperial Guard), to suppress popular resistance.
This troop was divided into two groups. One was headed by the governor and the other by one of the princes.66 Soon the Japanese captured Taibei (Taipei), where the new colonial master of Taiwan received his inauguration.
With the exception of Liu Yongfu, many leaders of the resistance, such as Tang Jingsong and Qiu Fengjia, left Taiwan. The local militias constituted the main force fighting against the Japanese army. Wu Tangxing 吴汤兴, Jiang Shaozu 姜绍祖, and Xu Xiang 徐骧 (1858–1895) were the best-known fighters. Liu Yongfu was hailed as the leader of resistance. At that time, there were 26,000 or so fighters against Japan in Tainan 台 南.67 Japan took more than fifty days to take Xinzhu, a key city in northwestern Taiwan. Liu’s Seven-Star Corps, renowned for its combat effectiveness, ambushed the Japanese army when they were crossing a river and inflicted heavy casualties. The fiercest battle took place at Baguashan, Zhanghua 彰化, where the army fought hand to hand with the enemy. Finally, one of the Japanese generals was hacked to death and all the soldiers of the Seven-Star Corps died in battle. Xu Xiang fought his way out and retreated to Tainan. Liu brought in a huge number of troops to retake Zhanghua; however, because of lack of armaments, his plan failed. By the end of September, the number of Japanese troops increased to more than 40,000. In early October, Liu’s troops almost ran out of ammunition and food. Despite these privations, they fearlessly defended Jiayi 嘉义 and Tainan. During a battle, Liu’s troops annihilated more than 700 hundred of the enemy and seriously wounded a Japanese prince, who died soon afterwards. In defence of Tainan, Xu Xiang led troops composed mainly of the Gaoshan people. More than 20,000 soldiers all fought to the death against the Japanese army. Xu was the most experienced fighter against the Japanese and vowed to fight to the death for the land.68 Fulfilling his vow, Xu died a glorious death in Xinzhu. Japan spent half a year taking over Taiwan with a huge army of more than 50,000 men, including the elite Imperial Guard, 26,000 servants, and most of its warships. More than 10,841 Japanese lost their lives, four times the casualties of the nine-month war prior to the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
Japan brutally repressed the people of Taiwan and imposed colonial rule on them. The laws promulgated by the Japanese government allowed the governor of Taiwan to act as a tyrant. He was given a monopoly over the military, legislative, administrative, and judicial powers. In November, a draconian law was enacted, whereby the ruler could imprison and execute whoever resisted the colonial authorities. According to statistics, in four years, more than 11,900 Taiwanese were brutally executed by this regime.69 In 1911, Liang Qichao (1873–1929), visited Taiwan, still under Japanese colonial rule, and concluded that there was all was void but the god-like Sotoku (governor).70
Taiwan under Japanese rule was no more than a police state. Within a period of two months—September and October, 1895—795 Japanese police officers were sent to Taiwan and installed at all levels71 (see table below).72
| Number of Police Agencies | Number of Police Officers | Number of Patrolling Inspectors | |
| 1896 | 17 Police Departments 31 Sub-Departments 15 Police Stations | \ | \ |
| 1899 | \ | 228 | 4,061 |
| 1901 | \ | 173 296 alternate officers | 3,469 1,734 alternate inspectors |
Japan installed not only rigid laws put also sought to control the Taiwanese people’s thoughts. For the people, there was no distinction between the government and the police.73
It is generally believed that the Treaty of Shimonoseki marked China’s degeneration into a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society. Before the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War, the Western powers could not tell who would emerge the winner. China’s extremely poor performance in the war demonstrated its weakness and its proud status in Asia was gone forever. The rising Japanese empire overshadowed all others in Asia; however, it presented difficulties for the colonialists’ partition of China. A spokesperson of the Western colonialists said China was merely the “sick man of the Far East,”74 and on his deathbed, even openly discussing how to carve up China and grab its riches.75 The competition between the imperial powers for China lay at the core of Far Eastern internal relations and largely meant that China would not get the chance to rise again.
1 See: Chapter 71 of Chouban yiwu shimo: Xianfeng chao 筹办夷务始末 (咸丰朝) (The management of foreign affairs in its entirety: The Reign of Emperor Xianfeng), 18; Chapter 4 of Xianfeng chao chouban yiwu shimo buyi 咸丰朝筹办夷务始末补遗 (A supplement to Chouban yiwu shimo: Xianfeng chao), Part One, p. 680.
2 See: Chapter 71 of Chouban yiwu shimo: Xianfeng chao, p. 28.
3 See: Liu Danian, Zhongguo jindaishigao, p. 117.
4 See: Vol. 7 of Zeng Guofan quanji, pp. 84–85.
5 Zhao Erxun 赵 尔 巽 et al., Qing shi gao 清 史 稿 [A draft history of Qing] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1977), vol. 38, pp. 11686–11687.
6 See: Vol. 3 of Taiping Tianguo shiliao congbian jianji 太平天国史料丛编简辑 [Selected primary sources in relation to Taiping Tianguo] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1962), p. 411.
7 See: Vol. 3 of Zeng Guofan quanji, p. 186.
8 See: Gu Tinglong 顾 廷 龙 and Dai Yi 戴 逸 eds., Li Hongzhang quanji [Complete works of Li Hongzhang] (Hefei: Anhui Educational Publishing House, 2007), vol. 29, p. 218.
9 See: Chapter 25 of Chouban yiwu shibo: Tongzhi Chao (The management of foreign affairs in its entirety: The Reign of Emperor Tongzhi), pp. 1–2.
10 See: Vol. 10 of Qing Guangxu chao Zhong Ri jiaoshe shiliao 清光绪朝中日交涉史料 [Primary sources in relation to the Sino-Japanese relations in the reign of Emperor Guangxu] (Beijing: The Palace Museum, 1932), p. 2.
11 Wang Tao 王韬, Taoyuan wenlu waibian 弢园文录外编 [Supplement to Collected Works of Wang Tao] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1959), p. 22, p. 23.
12 See: Zhongguo shixue hui, Wuxu bianfa 戊戌变法 [Hundred Days’ Reform] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1957), vol. 1, p. 40.
13 See: Ma Jianzhong 马建忠, Shike zhai jiyan 适可斋记言 [Writings in the Appropriateness Pavilion] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1960), p. 9.
14 See: Feng Guifen 冯桂芬 and Ma Jianzhong, Cai xixue yi—Feng Guifen Ma Jianzhong ji 采西学议——冯桂芬马建忠集 [On learning from the West: Selected writings of Feng Guifen and Ma Jianzhong] (Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Publishing House, 1994), p. 47.
15 See: Zhongguo shixue hui, Yangwu yundong 洋 务 运 动 [The Self-Strengthening Movement] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1961), vol. 1, p. 504.
16 Xue Fucheng 薛福成, Xu Fucheng xuanji 薛福成选集 [Selected writings of Xue Fucheng] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1987), p. 22.
17 See: Cai xixue yi—Feng Guifen Ma Jianzhong ji, p. 84.
18 Ibid., p. 125, p. 134.
19 Ma Jianzhong, Shike zhai jiyan, p. 77, p. 79.
20 See: Zhao Jing 赵婧 and Yi Menghong 易梦虹, eds., Zhongguo jindai jingji six-iang ziliao xuanji 中国近代经济思想资料选辑 [Economic thoughts in the modern China: A selection] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1982), vol. 2, p. 84.
21 See: Wang Tao, Taoyuan wenlu waibian, p. 301, p. 22.
22 Ma Jianzhong, Shike zhai jiyan, p. 31.
23 See: Xinjiang tuzhi 新疆图志 (An illustrated annals of Xinjiang), Chapter 54, the 2nd part of Jiaoshe 交涉 (Foreign relations), p. 2.
24 Zhang Haipeng and Li Guoqiang 李国强, “Lun Maguan tiaoyue yu Diaoyudao wenti 论《马关条约》与钓鱼岛问题” (The Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Diaoyudao Issue), Renmin ribao 人民日报 (The People’s Daily), 8 May, 2013, p. 9.
25 See: Zhang Zhiyong 张志勇, Hede yu wan Qing Zhong Ying guanxi 赫德与晚清中英关系 [Rober Hart and Sino-Britain relations in the late Qing] (Shanghai: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House, 2012), p. 76.
26 Ibid., p. 51.
27 For Li Hongzhang’s argument, see: Vol. 33 of Li Hongzhang quanji, p. 228.
28 See: Vol. 3 of Qing ji waijiao shiliao 清季外交史料 [Primary resources in relation to the late Qing’s foreign policies] (Changsha: Hunan Normal University Press, 2015), p. 809.
29 Ibid., vol. 45, p. 14.
30 “Shelun: Lun Zhongguo muxia qingxing weiyou yizhan 社论: 论中国目下情形惟有一 战” (China has no alternative but to fight under such circumstances), Shun Pao 申 报 (Shen Pao, or Shanghai News), 17 July, 1884.
31 See: “Sir H. Parkes to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Dowell,” in Correspondence Respecting the State of Affairs in China, p. 38.
