Kitabı oku: «A Brief Modern Chinese History», sayfa 8
32 Liu Danian, Zhongguo jindaishigao, p. 351.
33 Wang Lixin 王 立 新, Meiguo chuanjiaoshi yu wan Qing Zhongguo xiandaihua 美 国传教士与晚清中国现代化 [American missionaries and the late Qing’s pursuit of modernity] (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 1997), p. 18.
34 Gu Changsheng 顾长声, Chuanjiaoshi yu jindai Zhongguo 传教士与近代中国 [Missionaries and the modern China] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1981), p. 118.
35 Qi Qizhang 戚其章 and Wang Ruhui 王如绘, Wan Qing jiao’an jishi 晚清教案纪事 [Annals of incidents involving the Christian missionaries] (Beijing: The Oriental Press, 1990), p. 109.
36 For this letter, see: Vol. 5 of Qing mo jiao’an 清 末 教 案 [Incidents involving the Christian missionaries in the late Qing] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2000), p. 31.
37 See: Vol. 11 of Zeng Guofan quanji, p. 509.
38 See: Ibid., vol. 12, p. 83; vol, p. 31, p. 405.
39 See: Chapter 79 of Chouban yiwu shimo: Tongzhi chao, p. 3198.
40 For the statistics, see: Fan Baichuan 樊百川, Qing ji de yangwu xinzheng 清季的洋务 新 政 [The Self-Strengthening Movement in the late Qing] (Shanghai: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House, 2003), p. 22.
41 Ibid.
42 See: Zhang Haipeng, “Shijiu shiji Zhong Ri liangguo zaoqi xiandaihua bijiao yanjiu 19世纪中日两国早期现代化比较研究” (Tentatively pursuing modernity in nineteenth-century China and Japan: A comparative reexamination), in Zhang Haipeng, Zhongguo jindai-shi jiben wenti yanjiu 中国近代史基本问题研究 [Basic questions with respect to modern Chinese history] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2013), p. 355.
43 For a more detailed discussion about Yoshida Shoin and Fukuzawa Yukichi, see: Mizuno Akira 水野明, “Riben qinlue Zhongguo sixiang de yanzheng 日本侵略中国思想的验 证” (An investigation of Japan’s conceptions of invading China), Kang Ri zhanzheng yan-jiu 抗日战争研究 (Journal of China’s Resistance Against Japan), no. 1 (1995), pp. 195–204.
44 See: Ogawa Mataji 小川又次, Qing guo zhengtao fanglüe 清国征讨方略 (The general plan of conquering China), ibid., pp. 207–218.
45 Kiyoshi Inoue 井上清, trans. Institute of History (Tianjin), Riben lishi 日本历史 [History of Japan] (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 1974), vol. 3, p. 668. For the English translation of the Japanese Emperor’s words, see: Nihonggi 日 本 纪: Chronicles of Japan from the Earliest Times to A.D. 697, trans. William George Aston (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Limited, 1896), p. 131.
46 See: Qi Qizhang ed., Zhongguo jindaishi ziliao congkan xubian: Zhong Ri zhanzheng 中国近代史资料丛刊续编: 中日战争 [A sequel to Primary Sources regarding the Modern Chinese History: The First Sino-Japanese War] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1993), vol. 6, p. 123, p. 132. It is based on two pieces of Munakata Kotaro’s diary. A full Chinese translation of this spy’s diary is now available; see: Munakata Kotaro 宗方小太郎, trans. Gan Huijie 甘慧洁, Zongfang Xiaotailang riji 宗方小太郎日记 [The Diary of Munakata Kotaro: 1887–1923] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2017), vols, pp. 1–3.
47 For a detailed discussion of this embezzlement, see: Chen Xiansong 陈 先 松, “Xiujian Yihehuan nuoyong ‘haifang jingfei’ shiliao jiedu 修建颐和园挪用 ‘海防经费’ 史料解读” (Reexamining the primary sources regarding the embezzlement of naval funds for building the Summer Palace), in Zhang Haipeng et al., eds., Jiawu zhanzheng de bainian huigu—Jiawu zhanzheng 120 zhounian xueshu lunwen xuanbian 甲午战争的百年回顾—甲午战争120周年学术论文选编 [Rethinking the War: Symposium on the 120th Anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2014), p. 42.
48 Qi Qizhang, Jiawu zhanzheng shi 甲午战争史 [History of the First Sino-Japanese War] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1990), pp. 126–127.
49 For a much more detailed description of this battle, see: Ibid., revised edition (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2005), pp. 116–144.
50 See: Vol. 25 of Li Hongzhang quanji, p. 103.
51 For the Lüshun Massacre, see: Guan Jie 关捷, “Ri jun Lüshun tusha yanjiu 日军旅顺屠 杀 研 究” (An investigation of the Lüshun Massacre perpetrated by the Japanese army), in Zhang Haipeng et al., eds., Di’er jie jin bainian Zhong Ri guanxishi guoji yantao hui lunwen ji 第二届近百年中日关系史国际研讨会论文集 [Symposium on the Sino-Japanese relations in the last century] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1995), pp. 3–10.
52 Mutsu Munemitsu 陆奥宗光, trans. Yi Sheshi 伊舍石, Jianjian lu 蹇蹇录 [Kenkenroku] (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1963), p. 63.
53 For the appointment of Li Hongzhang, see: Zhongguo shixue hui and Shao Xunzheng 邵循正eds., Zhong Ri zhanzheng 中日战争 [The First Sino-Japanese War] (Shanghai: New Knowledge Press, 1956), vol. 3, p. 470.
54 See: Weng Tonghe 翁同龢, Weng Tonghe riji 翁同龢日记 [The diary of Weng Tonghe] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1997), vol. 5, p. 2782.
55 See: Vol. 16 of Li Hongzhang quanji, p. 31.
56 For the war indemnity, see: Qi Qizhang, Jiawu zhanzheng peikuan wenti kaoshi 甲午战争赔款问题考实” (A textual investigation of the war indemnity ensuing from the First Sino-Japanese War), in Jiawu zhanzheng de bainian huigu, p. 729; Jiang Liwen 蒋立文, “Jiawu zhanzheng peikuan shu’e wenti zai tantao 甲午战争赔款数额再探讨” (Reexamination of the amount of money paid by China to Japan as war reparations), ibid., pp. 730–754.
57 Shunpoko Tsuishokai 春亩公追颂会/Kaneko Kentaro 金子坚太郎 ed., Yiteng Bowen zhuan 伊藤博文传 [Ito Hirobumi den, or the life of Ito Hirobumi] (Tokyo: Shunpoko Tsuishokai 春亩公追颂会, 1940), pp. 136–137.
58 藤村道生 (Fujimura Michio), trans. Mi Qingyu 米庆余, Ri Qing zhanzheng日清战争 [Nisshin Senso, or The First Sino-Japanese War] (Shanghai: SH Translation Publishing House, 1981), pp. 133–134.
59 See: Dongxing sanlu东行三录 [Records of the journey to the east] (Shanghai: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House, 1982), p. 245.
60 Ibid., p. 238, p. 245, pp. 252–253.
61 Wu Yong 吴永, Gengzi xishou congtan 庚子西狩丛谈 [Cixi’s 1900 trip to the West] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2009), p. 120.
62 See: Mao Haijian 茅海建, “Gongche shangshu kaozheng bu yi ‘公车上书’考证补 (一)” (Supplement to the textual investigation of the 1895 Joint Petition Against the Treaty of Shimonoseki: Part One), Jindaishi yanjiu, no. 3 (2005), pp. 1–43.
63 For this joint statement, see: Vol. 10 of Qing Guangxu chao Zhong Ri jiaoshe shiliao, pp. 35–36.
64 See: Zhang Haipeng and Tao Wenzhao 陶文钊 eds., Taiwan shigao 台湾史稿 (A draft history of Taiwan) [Nanjing: Phoenix Publishing House, 2012], p. 159.
65 Huang Zhaotang 黄昭堂, Taiwan minzhu guo yanjiu 台湾民主国研究 [Exploring the history of the People’s Republic of Taiwan] (Taibei [Taipei]: Qianwei chubanshe, 2006), p. 61.
66 Qi Qizhang, Jiawu zhanzheng shi, p. 446.
67 Sanbo Honbu 参 谋 本 部 (General Staff Office of Imperial Japanese Army), trans Xu Peixian 许佩贤, Gongtai zhanji 攻台战纪 [Records of capturing Taiwan] (Taibei [Taipei]: Yuanlliu chubangongsi, 1995), p. 396.
68 Lü Shiqiang 吕 实 强, “Yiwei ge Tai qijian Taiwan shenmin suo biaoxian de minzu jingshen 乙未割台期间台湾绅民所表现的民族精神” (The national spirit embodied in the Taiwanese gentry and commoners’ resistance against in the 1895 cession of Taiwan to Japan), in Qi Qizhang and Wang Ruhui eds., Jiawu zhanzheng yu jindai Zhongguo he shi-jie 甲午战争与近代中国和世界 [The First Sino-Japanese War, modern China, and the world] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995), p. 716.
69 Institute of Modern Chinese History (CASS) ed., Riben qian Hua qishi nian 日本侵华 七 十 年 [A seven-decade crime: Japan’s aggression against China] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1992), p. 625.
70 See: Liang Qichao 梁启超, Yinbing shi heji 饮冰室合集 [Complete works of Liang Qichao] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1989), vol. 4, p. 200.
71 Li Li 李理, Ri ju shiqi Taiwan jinghcha zhidu yanjiu 日据时期台湾警察制度研究 (A study of the police system of Taiwan under the rule of Japan) [Nanjing: Phoenix Publishing House, 2013], p. 15.
72 For the numbers in the table, see: Ibid., p. 23, p. 34.
73 Chen Kongli 陈孔立ed., Taiwan lishi gangyao 台湾历史纲要 [Taiwan: An historical sketch] (Beijing: Kyushu Press, 1996), p. 340.
74 Valentine Chirol, The Far Eastern Question (London and New York: Macmillan, 1896), p. 66.
75 Ibid., pp. 150–151, p. 195.
4. Post-1895 China: Reform, Rebellion, and Revolution
Return of the Liao Dong Peninsula to China and the Imperialist Powers’ Rat Race in the Far East
The Treaty of Shimonoseki caused a political tsunami in the Far East. Russia and Germany, both of which were anxious to expand their power, together with France, formed an alliance to intervene in Japan’s annexation of China’s Liaodong Peninsula. This powerful alliance told Japan that it must immediately give up the Peninsula; otherwise, Japan would be faced with a coastal blockade. Six days after the signing of the Treaty, the Russian, German, and French ambassadors to Japan issued a formal memorandum to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The top Russian diplomat said openly that Japan’s occupation of Liaodong not only posed a threat to China’s capital but also made Korea’s independence merely nominal. Worst of all, he concluded, Japan’s aggression seriously damaged peace in the Far East; it would be much better for Japan to show restraint.1 Germany and France took a similar position. While this was taking place, Russian warships in Japanese ports were preparing for war. The German and French navies also took action. It was also rumored that a Russian army of 50,000 men was marching south. Japanese troops began to feel very nervous. They knew very well that they stood no chance if confronted with three European powers. Thus, this rising empire decided to make concessions to the alliance while also taking a tough stance with China.2 Japan tried to win support from Britain and the United States. However, taking into consideration the fact that Japan’s expansion in the region would harm Anglo-American interests in the Far East, Britain and the United States suggested that Japan accept the demands, rejected Japan’s attempt at bargaining, and told Japan that it must give up all of Liaodong. Japan had no alternative but to agree. Finally, in November, 1895, Japan and China signed a treaty. According to this treaty, Japan would return Liaodong to China and China would pay 30,000,000 taels of silver as compensation. After this incident, the imperial powers intensified their efforts.
The Scramble for China
It was a newly capitalist Japan that was able to beat the Chinese empire in the nine-month-long First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). The rising Japanese empire exposed China’s weakness by destroying their world-class Northern Fleet and crushing the Xiang and Huai armies, renowned for their modern equipment. The Treaty of Shimonoseki was far more unequal than all of the treaties imposed on China by the Western powers. Following the war, the imperialist countries poured into a weakened China, where they competed and colluded. Not only did the foreign powers rake in huge profits by exporting capital to China, but they also began to carve up China into several spheres of influence.
Germany, new to the imperial game, took a piece of coastal land. In November, 1897, German Christian missionaries began the capture of the strategic Jiaozhou Bay (in Shandong) by force. The following March, Qing’s government signed a treaty giving Germany a 99-year lease of the Bay. Afterwards, in December, 1897, Russian warships entered Lüshun and demanded that the ports be leased to them. Four months later, Russia successfully took possession of the port by forcing Qing to sign a lease agreement. It also coerced the Qing government to allow Russia to build railroads in northeast China, putting all of northeast China under its control. The following year, the Russian government renamed the leased territory Kvantunskaya oblast (关东州) and appointed a governor to supervise the region.
At this time, France was casting its eyes on southern Chinese provinces such as Yunnan, Guangdong, and Guangxi. In June, 1895, a special Sino-French treaty stipulated that Yunnan’s two border towns be administered by the colonial French government in Laos and that they be open to foreigners. Additionally, China would ask France for advice before mining and building railroads in Yunnan, Guangdong, and Guanxi. Two years later, France forced Qing’s government to promise that it would not allow any of the regions within China to be completely controlled by a single country. France’s own regions included the aforementioned three provinces as well as Hainan Island.
Although Japan had already occupied Taiwan, it tried to get more land under its control. In April, 1898, the Qing government pledged that Fujian, separated from Taiwan by only a strip of water, would be leased to any country except Japan.
At that time, the lion’s share of China was dominated by Britain. Not only were the British politically and economically influential in the entire Yangtze Valley but they also extended their tentacles into the south, southeast, and northeast of China. In February, 1897, Britain seized several pieces of land that originally belonged to China by forcing China to sign a treaty concerning the China-Myanmar border. One year later, under pressure from Britain, the Qing government had to recognize that the Yangtze Valley was exclusively under the control of Britain. After France declared that the Chinese provinces bordering Vietnam fell within their sphere of influence, the British government demanded that Qing promise that Yunnan and Guangdong would only be controlled by Britain. In June, 1898, Britain forced Qing to lease it more land and thus created Hong Kong’s New Territories (新界). They argued that Qing’s lease of Guangzhou Bay to France threatened the security of Hong Kong. The New Territories were eleven times the size of old Hong Kong, giving Britain much greater influence over the south of China. Britain went even further and leased Weihai (in Shandong) in the same year, arguing that it was necessary to counter Russia’s increasing influence in the northeast of China. According to this treaty, Britain had the right to build batteries and to station an army in certain parts of Weihai.
The conflicts over land in China continued. At the beginning of 1896, Britain and France reached an agreement that both would share Yunnan and Sichuan. In September, 1898, it was declared that Britain would control the Yangtze Valley and Germany would take Shandong. In April, 1899, Britain and Russia made a deal to build railroads in China. Russia would build a railroad north of the Great Wall and Britain’s would run through the Yangtze River Basin.
The United States, new to the imperialist consortium, became an active participant in the scramble for China. While in 1898, the Americans' attention was mostly on occupying the Philippines, after taking it from the Spanish, and so missed the opportunity to take land in China, they advocated for the Open Door Policy (ODP) at the end of the Spanish-American War. The ODP gave the United States an equal right to exploit China by creating a free, open Chinese market; in this way, their own immediate and long-term interests in China were protected. In this sense, the ODP was the pièce de résistance of the United States’ diplomatic endeavor.
After the First Sino-Japanese War, the imperialist powers exported a large amount of capital to China, which was dependent on the unequal treaties that the foreign powers imposed on it. Due to stipulations agreed upon regarding tariffs and extraterritoriality, the Qing government was not able to tax this foreign capital nor was it able to restrict the foreign powers in accordance with Chinese laws. Their capital helped the foreign powers reap huge profits from China and gave them more power to influence China and control the country. At that time, Qing, whose annual revenue was 80,000,000 taels of silver, was not able to pay the hundreds of millions of taels of sliver demanded by Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. This gave an opportunity for the Western powers to lend Qing the money in exchange of more political concessions. For example, in May, 1895, Russia offered to lend China the money.3 They even founded a loan syndication system that consisted of six French and four Russian banks. Two months later, the Chinese ambassador was forced to sign a loan contract with the Russia-backed loan syndicate and borrow 400,000,000 francs (roughly equivalent to 99,000,000 taels of silver). According to the contract, “the bonds of the present loan will bear interest at 4% per annum upon the nominal principal” and “the loan will be amortized in 36 years” and secured upon the Chinese customs revenue.4 The Declaration stipulated:
In consideration of this loan the Chinese Government declares its resolution not to grant to any Foreign Power any right or privilege under any name whatsoever concerning the supervision or administration of any of the revenues of the Chinese Empire. But in case the Chinese Government should grant to any one Power rights of this character, it is understood that from the mere fact of their being so granted, they should be extended to the Russian Government.5
In December, the Tsar approved of the founding of the Russo-Chinese Bank, which was headed by the Russian Minister of Finance and funded mostly by French money. This bank was actually “a hybrid politico-financial institution which in reality was but a slightly disguised branch of the Russian treasury.”6 The Russo-Chinese Bank from the start was a powerful tool which Tsarist Russia could use to politically and economically invade China. After signing this loan contract, Russia and France were given the right to send people to supervise Qing’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service. This caused a conflict with Britain, which had dominated the Customs Service for decades.
In 1896, Qing began to raise money to make the second round of compensation payments demanded by Japan. Britain resolved to seize the right to lend China the money at any cost. Germany, which was dumped by Russia and France in the previous year, joined Britain. Britain’s HSBC and Germany’s Deutsch-Asiatische Bank won the right and lent China 16,000,000 pounds (97,600,000 taels of silver) against the security of China’s customs revenue. The Agreement stipulated that “the administration of the Imperial Maritime Customs of China shall continue as at present constituted, during the currency of this loan.”7 In other words, no changes would be allowed, with the British fully controlling China’s Customs Service. In 1898, there was cut-throat competition between the Russo-French and Anglo-German syndicates over the third round of loans. Finally, with the help of Robert Hart, then Inspector General of Qing’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service, the Anglo-German syndicate beat its Russo-French adversary and gave a new loan of another 16,000,000 pounds, to China. This loan was secured not only upon China’s customs revenue but also on the lijin (a special commercial tax) collected from rich regions such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang. By doing so, Britain and Germany tightened their control of Chinese finances.
Contractually, China could get 309,000,000 taels of silver from the above-mentioned three loans. However, they were only given 262,000,000. After paying war reparations to Japan, there was little left over. Adding in the loan interest, we find that China actually paid approximately 600,000,000 or 700,000,000 taels of silver for the First Sino-Japanese War. Japan and the European countries pocketed this money, something which had a great impact on the growth of the economies of Japan and Europe. Following this, Japan robbed China of a total of 350,000,000 yen, which amounted to four times Japan’s national revenue. Japan invested 70% of these funds. Even the Japanese Emperor himself craved for this pork barrel, grabbing 20,000,000 yen. China, however, was not able to promote its modernization programs because of a lack of funds. China had to pay interest on 20,000,000 taels of silver, the equivalent of the Customs’ annual revenue. China found itself caught in an international web of financial capital.
After the war, the Chinese government decided to build a railroad and develop a mining industry. The State Administration of Railroads and Mining was set up in August, 1898. However, as China was heavily dependent on foreign technology and capital, the foreign powers took the opportunity to export more capital to China. The investment in China’s railroad-building work became a focus of competition. For the foreign powers, extending their tentacles into China’s railroad-building programs was not only economically profitable but also politically advantageous, as it would allow them to expand their influence. The foreign powers also tried to exploit China’s burgeoning mining industry. The competition over the railroad and mining industries turned fierce and characterized foreign power exploits in China at this time.
In 1896, Li Hongzhang was invited to attend the coronation of Tsar Nicholas II. Li arrived in Petersburg, where he was treated warmly and entertained affably. In early May, the Tsar secretly granted an audience to Li in which they discussed the idea of building a railroad in China. One month later, Li and the Russian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance signed a secret treaty, which stipulated that China would allow Russia to build a railroad in Jilin and Heilongjiang. The contract was to be drawn up collaboratively by the Chinese Ambassador to Russia and the Russo-Chinese Bank. Russian archives reveal that Li took a bribe of 2,000,000 rubles from the Russian Ministry of Finance.8 Soon thereafter Russia started building the Eastern Railway (中东铁路), which ran eastwards and connected Manzhouli, Harbin, and Sunfeihe. Apart from building the railroad, the Russians had the right to appoint police officers, to excavate coal, and to develop industries in areas along the railroad. Li hoped that the secret treaty with an expansionist Russia would ensure two decades of peace for China. This was, however, just a dream.
Russia, Germany, and France forced China to allow them to build the Eastern Railway (plus the branch known as the South Manchuria Railway [南满铁路]), the Qingdao-Ji’nan Railway (胶济铁路) and the Yunnan-Haiphong Railway (滇越铁路). In 1896, Qing planned to build a long railroad stretching from Beijing south to Wuhan at an estimated cost of 50,000,000 taels of silver. The Qing government did not have the funds for this ambitious plan; thus, it decided to borrow money from the foreign powers which would be secured by the railroad itself. Upon learning of this, companies in Britain, Germany, and the United States rushed to become involved.
However, as there was a lack of trust toward these three states, Qing finally picked a Belgian railroad company. However, the major stockholders in this Belgian company were actually from Russia and France, meaning that the construction and management rights of the railroad fell right into the hands of the Russo-French bloc. This provoked a strong reaction from London, on the grounds that the railroad would extend southwards toward the Yangtze Valley, Britain’s traditional sphere of influence in China. Wanting to stop Russia’s expansion into the south, Britain forced Qing to borrow the money from Britain to build the railroad connecting Shanhaiguan and Niuzhuang (present-day Yingkou, Liaoning), while at the same time demanding that Qing propose another five railroads in the north, center, southeast and south of China. Fearing that Britain’s ambitious plan would harm their territory, Shandong, Germany stood up against the leading European power’s expansion. Qing could not afford to offend any powers and finally awarded the Tianjin-Zhenjiang Railway (津镇铁路) to Britain and Germany; the other four railroads were awarded to Britain alone. Britain and German reached an agreement over the Tianjin-Zhenjiang Railway. The railroad stretching from Tianjin to southern Shandong was built by Germany; the remaining part, extending down to Zhenjiang, was built by Britain. After the completion of the construction work, both Britain and Germany would jointly manage the railroad. Envious of the gains made by Britain and Germany, the United States refused to be pushed aside and forced Qing to sign a contract to build the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway (粤汉铁路). According to statistics, by 1914, foreign powers had coerced Qing into signing 59 railroad contracts that proposed a huge railway network of roughly 30,000 km extending through almost all of China.
The foreign powers were also in a mad rush to exploit China’s mineral resources. Russia, Germany, and France all seized the opportunity to open mines along the railroads they were building. In 1896, the United States signed contracts with the Qing government, obtaining a permit to mine in Beijing, Shanxi, Sichuan, and Hebei. Britain had a mining monopoly in five prefectures in Shanxi, as well as being allowed to mine in all of Sichuan and parts of Henan. In Xinjiang, the Russians controlled the gold mines. France mined iron ore and gold in Sichuan. By 1912, Qing was forced to sign 42 mining contracts and agreements resulting in the mining industry expanding throughout the country.
The SSM’s three-decade endeavor to modernize China was a total failure, one which could best be represented by the First Sino-Japanese War. The Chinese had to rethink their country’s fate and future.
