Kitabı oku: «Villainage in England: Essays in English Mediaeval History», sayfa 24
APPENDIX
I
See p. 52, n. 2
[Y.B. Pasch. 1 Edw. II, pl. 4. f. 4.]
Trans.
Symon de Paris porta breve de transgression vers H. bailliffe sire Robert Tonny et plusours autres, et se pleint, qe W. et H. certein jour luy pristrent et emprisonerent etc. a tort encountre la pees etc. Pass respond pur toutz, forspris le bailliffe, qe riens nount fait encountre la pees, et pour le bailliff yl avowea le restreinement par la resoun qe lavantdit S. si est villeine lavandit R. qi bailliffe yl est, et fuist trove a N. en soun mes, le quel vint a lui tendist office de Provoist et il la refusa et ne se voilleit justicier etc. Tond. rehercea le avowery, et dit qe a cele avowery ne doit il estre resceve pur ceo qe S. est Fraunc Citizene de Londre, et ad este touz ceux diz anz, et ad este Vicounte le Roy en mesme la Citee, et rend accounts al Eschequer, et ceo voloms averrer par Record, et uncore huy ceo jour est Alderman et de la Ville de Londre, et demande jugement, sils puissent villenage en sa persone allegger. Herle. A ceo qil dient qil est citezen de Londre nous navoms qe faire, mes nous vous dioms, qil est villein R. de Eve et de Treve, et les Auncestres Ael et Besayel et toux ces Auncestres ses terres tennantz deinz le manoire de N. et ces Auncestres seisitz des villeins services des Auncestres S. come affaire Rechat de Char et de Sank et de fille marier, et de euz tailler haut et bas, etc., et uncore est seisi de ces freres de mesme le piere et de mesme la mere et demande Jugement si sour luy, come sour soun villein en soun mese trove, ne puisse avowere faire. Tond. Fraunc homme et de fraunc estat et eux nient seisi de luy, come de lour villein prest etc. Ber. Jeo ai oi dire qe un homme fuist prist en la bordel, et fuist prist et pendu, et sil eust demorre a lostiel, il neust en nul mal etc. auxient de ceste parte, sil eust este fraunc Citezen pur qe neust il demorre en la Citee? Ad alium diem; Tond. se tient qil ne fuist seisi de lui come de soun villein ne de ses villeins services etc. Pass. la ou il dit qe nous ne sumes pas seisis de lui come de nostre villein, il nasquit en nostre villeinage, ou commence nostre seisine, et nous lui trova mese en soun mes, et la nostre seisine continue, Jugement. Ber. Vous pledietz sour la seisine, et il pleident sour le droit issint naverrez james bon issue de plee. Herle. Seisi en la fourme qe nous avoms dit. Ber. La Court ne restreinera tiel travers sanz ceo qe vous dietz, que vous estez seisitz de lui come de vostre villein et de ses villeinz services, et sic fecit. Et alii e contra.
II
See p. 54, n. 1
[Y.B. Trin. 29 Edw. III, f. 41. I do not give a translation of this document because it has been explained with some detail in my text.]
Sur l'estatut de labourer.
Le servant suit par attorney, et le Master in propre persone. Que dit qe le servant fuit soun villein regardant al Manoire de C. et dit qil avoit mestre de ses services et de luy, pur qe nous luy prisoms come nostre viliein, come list a nous. Jugement si etc. tort in nostre party par tiel reteignement puit assigner. Et nota, qil fist protestacion, qil ne conust pas qil fuit in le service le plaintiffe etc. Et nota, qe le servant dit auxi, qil fuit le villein le Master qi plede, et dit qil fuit distreint, et auxi les amis pur luy tanqe qil convensist par cohercion venir a ses Seigneours. Burt. Le servant est par attorney, qe ne puit par soun ple faire sans Master villein. Purqe ceo ple ne gist in soun bouche. Et non allocatur par Wilb. qi dit qe le ple nest pas al breve: car mesqe il fuit icy in propre persone, et voillet conustre qil fuit villein ce nabat pas vostre breve (le quel qil fuit frank ou villein) si vous poies maintenir qil fuit in vostre service, si ce ne fuit par autiel mattier (come il ad plede) ou autre semblable. Et puis le servant weyva, et dit qil ne fist pas covenant etc. Et alii e contra. Et nota, qe l'opinion fuit, qe si villein fuit chace et distreint de venir a son Seignour propre, qe ce luy excusera del' penance del l'estatut. Sed Burt. negavit, eo qe ce vient de sa folie qil voilleit faire covenant dautre servir, qant il fuit appris qil fuit autry villein. Et ideo quere. Qant al' plea le Master Burt. challange ceo qil navoit pas alleger qil fuit seisi de luy come de soun villein. Et non allocator par Wilb. Qui dit, sil soit soun villein, soun plee est assez fort: car seisi et nient seisi ne fera pas issue.Op. Curiae. Et sic nota. Puis Burt. dit que l'on allege est quil est soun villein regardant a soun manoire de C. nous dioms qe mesme le manoire fuit in le seisin un A. que infeffa le defendant de mesme le manoire; et dioms qe tout le temps que il fuit allant et walkant a large a sa frank volunte come frankhome, sans ce qil fuit unque seisi de luy in son temps, et cety qe ad l'estat A. ne fuit unques seisi de luy, tanques ore qil de soun tort demesne luy pris hors de nostre service. Purque nous nentendons pas que par tiel cause il nous puit ouster de nostre accord. Finch. Et nous Jugement, depuis qil ne dedit pas qil nest nostre villein de nostre manoire de C. et le quel nous fuit seisis de luy devant, ou non, ou nostre feffor seisi, etc. ou ce ne puit my estre a purpose: car il alast alarge, purtant ne fuit il enfranchy. Purque etc. Th. Si vostre feffor ne fuit unques seisi de luy, coment qil vous dona le manoire, jeo di que ce de que il navoit pas le possession ne puit pas vestir in vous. Purque etc. Jer. Villeins regardants al' manoires sont de droit al' Seignour de prendre les a sa volunte, et sil face don le manoire a un autre, a quel heur que l'autre les happa, il est asses bon. Th. Sir, uncre mesque il soit issint entre luy et le grantor ou le villein, nous qe sums estrange ne serrons pas ly purtant: car si home qi soit estrange veigne in pais, et demurges par xx ou xxx ans, et nul home met debat sur luy, ne luy claime come seruant, il list a moy de prendre soun service, et de luy recevoir in mon service pur le terme solonque nostre covenaunt: et il nest pas reason qe jeo soy perdant, depuis qe in moy default ne puit etre ajuge, causa ut supra. Gr. Per mesme le reason qe vous luy purrets retenir tanque al' fine de terme, si poit un autre: et sic de singulis, et sic in infinitum: issint le Seignour ouste de soun villein a toujours, et ce ne seroit pas reason. Puis Th. n'osa pas demurrer; mes dit qil ne fuit pas soun villein de soun manoire de C. Prest etc. Fiff. Ceo n'est pas respons:Op. Curiae. car coment qil nest pas soun villein del' manoire, etc. sil fuit soun villein in gros, asses suffist. Et non allocatur pur ce quel avoit traverse soun respons in le manere come ce fuit livere, etc.
Common Pleas Roll (Record Office)
[Trin. 29 E. III, r. 203, v. Oxon.]
Thomas Barentyn et Radulfus Crips Shephird attachiati fuerunt ad respondendum tam domino Regi quam Priori hospitalis Sancti Iohannis Ierusalem in Anglia quare, cum per ipsum dominum Regem et consilium suum pro communi utilitate regni Regis Anglie ordinatum sit, quod si aliquis seruiens in seruicio alicuius retentus ante finem termini concordati a dicto seruicio sine causa racionabili vel licencia recesserit, penam imprisonamenti subeat et nullus sub eadem pena talem in seruicio suo recipere vel retinere presumat, et predictus Thomas predictum Radulfum nuper seruientem predicti Prioris in seruicio suo apud Werpesgrave retentum qui ab eodem seruicio ante finem termini inter eos concordati sine causa racionabili et licencia predicti Prioris recessit, in seruicium predicti Thome quamquam memoratus Thomas de prefato Radulfo eidem Priori restituendo requisitus fuerit admisit et retinuit in Regis contemptum et predicti Prioris grave dampnum ac contra ordinacionem predictam. Et unde predictus Prior per Ricardum de Fifhide attornatum suum queritur quod cum per ipsum Regem et consilium suum etc. ordinatum sit quod si aliquis serviens in servicium alicuius retentus ante finem etc. a dicto seruicio sine causa etc. recesserit penam imprisonamenti subeat et nullus sub eadem pena talem in seruicio suo recipere vel retinere presumat, predictus Thomas predictum Radulfum nuper seruientem predicti Prioris in seruicio suo apud Werpesgrove retentum scilicet die Lune proxima post festum Sancti Laurentii anno regni domini Regis nunc Anglie vicesimo octavo ad deseruiendum ei in officio pastoris etc. scilicet die Lune in septimana Pentecostes a festo Sancti Michaelis Archangeli tunc proximo sequenti per unum annum proximum sequentem qui ab eodem seruicio ante finem termini … recessit, in seruicium predicti Thome quamquam idem Thomas de prefato Radulfo eidem Priori restituendo requisitus fuerit admisit et retinuit in Regis contemptum et predicti Prioris grave dampnum ac contra ordinacionem etc. et predictus Radulfus a seruicio predicti Prioris ante finem sine causa etc. videlicet predicto die Lune in septimana Pentecostes recessit in Regis contemptum ad predicti Prioris grave dampnum ac contra ordinacionem etc. unde dicit quod deteriorates est et dampnum habet ad valenciam viginti librorum. Et inde producit sectam.
Et predicti Thomas et Radulfus per Stephanum Mebourum attornatum suum veniunt. Et defendunt vim et iniuriam quando etc. et quicquid etc. Et protestantur quod ipsi non cognoscunt quod predictus Radulfus fuit seruiens predicti Prioris nec retentus cum eodem Priore prout Prior superius versus eos narravit et predictus Thomas dicit quod predictus Radulfus est villanus suus ut de manerio suo de Chalgrave per quod ipse seisivit eundem Radulfum tanquam villanum suum prout ei bene licuit. Et hoc paratus est verificare unde petit iudicium si predictus Prior injuriam in persona sua assignare possit. Et predictus Radulfus dicit quod ipse est villanus predicti Thome ut de manerio predicto et quia idem Radulfus extra dominium predicti Thome morabatur parentes ipsius Radulfi districti fuerunt ad venire faciendum predictum Radulfum ad predictum Thomam dominum suum et ad eorum sectam et excitacionem idem Radulfus venit ad predictum Thomam absque hoc quod ipse retentus fuit cum predicto Priore ad deseruiendum ei per tempus predictum prout idem Prior superius versus eum narravit. Et de hoc ponit se super patriam. Et predictus Prior similiter. Et idem Prior quo ad placitum predicti Thome dicit quod predictus Radulfus non est villanus ipsius Thome ut de manerio suo predicto prout idem Thomas superius allegat. Et hoc petit quod inquiratur per patriam. Et predictus Thomas similiter. Preceptum etc.
III
See p. 66, n. 2., and p. 78, n. 2
The so-called Mirror of Justice is still in many respects an unsolved riddle, and a very interesting one, as it seems to me. The French edition of 1642 from which quotations are so frequently made presents a text perverted to such an extent, that the gentleman from Gray's Inn to whom we owe the English translation of 1648 took it upon himself to deal with his original very freely, and in fact composed a version of his own which turned out even less trustworthy than the French. Ancient MSS. of the work are very scarce indeed; the fourteenth century MS. at Corpus College, Cambridge, is the only one known to me; although there are also some transcripts of the seventeenth century. This means that the work had no circulation in its time. It is very unlike Bracton, or Britton in this respect, and indeed in every other. Instead of giving a more or less learned or practical exposition of the principles of Common Law it appears as a commentary written by a partisan, acrimonious in form, almost revolutionary in character, full of stray bits of information, but fanciful in its way of selecting and displaying this information. 'Wahrheit und Dichtung' would have been a proper title for this production, and no wonder that it has excited suspicion. It has commanded the attention of the present generation of scholars notwithstanding the odd way in which the author, Andrew Horne, or whoever he may be, cites as authority fictitious decisions given by King Alfred and by a number of legal worthies of Saxon times who never gave judgment save in his own fruitful imagination. This may be accounted for by peculiar medieval notions as to the manner in which legal discussion may be most efficiently conducted, but altogether the Mirror, as it stands, appears quite unique, quite unlike any other legal book of the feudal period. It must be examined carefully by itself before the information supplied by it can be produced as evidence on any point of English medieval history. Such an examination should lead to interesting results, but I must reserve it for another occasion. What I have said now may be taken simply as a reason for the omission in my text of those passages of the Mirror which bear on the question of villainage. I may be allowed to discuss these passages in the present Appendix without anticipating a general judgment on the character of the book and on its value.
The author of the Mirror shows in many places, that he is hostile not only to monarchical pretensions, but also to the encroachments of the aristocracy. He is a champion of the lower orders and gladly endorses every rule set up by the Courts 'in favour of liberty.' In this light he considers the action 'de nativitate' as conferring an advantage upon the defendant, the person claimed as a villain, but considered as free until the contrary has been proved854. Another boon consists in the fact, that the trial must be reserved for the decision of the Royal Courts and cannot be entertained in the County855. So far the Mirror falls in with the usual exposition of our Authorities—it takes notice of two facts which are generally recognised as important features in trying a question of status. But the Mirror does not stop there, but further formulates an assertion which cannot be considered as generally accepted in practice, though it may have emerged now and then in pleadings and even in decisions.
It is well known, that the main argument in a trial of villainage turned on the question of kinship. As Britton (pp. 205, 206, ed. Nichols) states the matter, we are led to suppose that the plaintiff had to produce the villain kinsmen of the person claimed, and the defendant could except against them. Glanville (v. 4) says, that both parties had the right to produce the kindred and in case of doubt or collision a jury had to decide. If the fact of relationship were established on both sides, it was necessary to see on which side the nearer relatives stood. Legal practice, so far as we can judge from the extant plea rolls, followed Glanville, although questions arising from these suits were much more varied and complicated than his statement implied. (See, for instance, Bracton's Note Book, 1041, 1167.) But in the Mirror we find the distinct assertion, that if the defendant in a case of 'nativity' succeeded in proving a free stem in any generation of his ascendants, this was sufficient to prove him free856. This connects itself with the view, that there can be no prescription against free blood, a view which, as we have seen in the text, was in opposition to the usual conception that people may fall into servitude in the course of several generations of debasement. The notion embodied in the Mirror was lingering, as it were, in the background.
In accordance with this liberal treatment of procedure, we find our author all in favour of liberty when treating of the ways by which bondage may be dissolved. He gives a very detailed enumeration of all such modes of enfranchisement, and at least one of his points appears unusual in English law. I mean his doctrine that a serf ejected from his holding by the lord becomes free, if no means of existence are afforded to him857.
The motive adduced is worthy of notice by itself. 'Servus dicitur a servando,' a serf is a man under guardianship, like a woman in this respect858, and so, if the guardian forgets his duty of taking care of his subject, he forfeits his rights. The Roman derivation 'a servando' is often met elsewhere, but instead of being applied to the bondman as a captive who has been kept alive instead of being slain, it is here made the starting point of a new conception and one very favourable to the bondman. It is not the only indication that the author of the Mirror had been speculating about the origin of servitude. By the law of nature all men are free, of course, but yet, says he, there exists by human law a class of men to whom nothing belongs, and who are considered as the property of other people: an anomaly which he guesses may possibly come from the time when Noah pronounced his malediction against Canaan, the son of Cham, or else from the defeat of Goliath by David859.
It is curious too, and at first sight rather inconsistent, that our author sometimes speaks against those very serfs towards whom he seems, as a rule, so favourably disposed. He dwells on their disability, marks as an abuse that they are admitted to act in the courts without the help of their lords, although nothing can be owned by them860, and, what is more, he insists on the necessity of their being excluded from the system of frank-pledge, which ought to be restricted entirely to free men861. All this seems rather strange at first, and certainly not in favour of liberty. It turns out, however, that these very qualifications are prompted by the same liberal spirit which we noticed from the first; they are suggested by a most characteristic attempt to draw a definite line between the serf and the villain.
The villain is no serf, in any sense of the word. He is a free man862, his tenure is a free tenure863. He is enfeoffed of his land, with the obligation to till it, as the knight is enfeoffed of his fee in return for military service; the burgess enfeoffed of his freehold in the borough for a rent864. The right of ownership on the part of the villain is clearly recognised in the Great Charter, which prescribes the mode and extent of amercing villains, and thereby supposes their independent right of property, while the serf has nothing of his own, and could not be amerced in his own865. The author undoubtedly hits here on a point where the usual feudal theory had been discountenanced by statute: it was certainly difficult to maintain at the same time that the villain, as serf, had nothing but what had been precariously entrusted to him by the lord, and at the same time that he must suffer for misdeeds in the character of an owner. Strained in one sense the article of the Charter could be made to mean that, at the time of the Great Charter, there was no such thing as the civil disability of servitude in England. Strained in another sense suggested by the Mirror, it would lead to a standing distinction between villains, as owners, and serfs, as people devoid of civil rights. We know that legal practice preferred a compromise which was anything but consistent in point of doctrine, but, as I have said in my text, the notion of the civil right of the villain, and especially in his so-called wainage, seems to have been deep-rooted enough to counterbalance in some respects the current feudal doctrine.
It would have been difficult for the author of the Mirror to maintain that practice was in accordance with his theory; and he falls out of his part now and then, as, for instance, when he speaks of the enfranchisement of the serf from whom the lord had received homage in addition to fealty—this is a case clearly applying to villains as well as to those whom he calls serfs, and it is not the only time that he forgets the distinction866. But when his attention is not distracted by details he takes his ground on the assumption that the original rights of the villains were gradually falling into disuse through the encroachments of the stronger people. We even find in the Mirror that the villains ought to have the assise of novel disseisin as a remedy in case of dispossession. If they were oppressively made to render other than the accustomed services they had to resort to the writ, 'ne injuste vexes,' and it is a sign of bad times that they are getting deprived of it. Edward the Confessor took good care that the legal rights of the villains should not be curtailed867. It is needless again to point out that this view of villainage is well in keeping with the fundamental notion which I tried to bring out in my text, the notion, namely, that the law of villainage contained heterogeneous elements, and had been derived partly from the status of free ceorls.