Kitabı oku: «Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)», sayfa 30
CHAPTER XVII.
PANTHEISM EXAMINED IN THE ORDER OF INTERNAL FACTS
124. The multiplicity of substances is no less attested by the consciousness of ourselves, or of the internal world. Our first reflex act reveals within us something which is one, indivisible, and remaining always the same through all the transformations of our being. This unity of the me is indispensable to the connection of all the phenomena in a point; without it all memory, all combination, and all consciousness are impossible; our own being disappears, and there remains only a series of unconnected phenomena. But this unity, which we must take as an internal fact which consciousness places beyond all doubt, and the conviction of which it is impossible for us to withstand, – this unity produces the knowledge of multiplicity. There is something which affects us and which is not ourselves. Our will, our activity, is impotent to resist other activities which act upon us; there is, then, something which is not ourselves, which is independent of us. There is something which is not a modification of ourselves, because very often it does not affect us, does not modify us. This something is a reality, for nothing cannot affect any thing. It is not inherent in us; it is, then, in itself, or in something which is not ourselves. There is, therefore, a substance which is not our substance; and the me and the not-me which have made so much noise in German philosophy, far from leading to the unity of the substance, lead to multiplicity; and destroy pantheism entrenched behind idealism.
125. At the very first we meet at least with duality, the me and the not-me; but carrying our observations a little farther, we find a striking multiplicity.
Our mind is not alone: the consciousness of what we daily experience proves our communication with other minds, which, like our own, have the consciousness of themselves – a sphere of activity of their own, and, like our own mind, are subjected to other activities without their will, and sometimes even against it. The me and the not-me existing for our consciousness, exists also for theirs; what in us alone was duality becomes a wonderful multiplicity by means of the repetition of the same fact which we have experienced in ourselves.
126. To attribute this variety of consciousnesses to the same being, to take them as modifications of the same substance, as revelations of itself to its own eyes, is a gratuitous assertion; and not only gratuitous but absurd.
With full confidence I can defy the greatest philosopher of the world to assign any reason, I do not say satisfactory, but even a specious reason, proving that two individual consciousnesses belong to a common consciousness, or are consciousnesses of the same being.
127. In the first place, this doctrine is in contradiction to common sense, and is rejected with irresistible force by the internal sense of every man. The sentiment of our existence is always accompanied by the sentiment of our distinction from other beings like us. We are not only certain that we exist, but that we are distinct from others; and if in any thing the sentiment of this distinction is profoundly marked, it is in what regards the phenomena of our consciousness. Never at any time, in any country or phase of society, could men be persuaded that the consciousness of all their acts and impressions belonged to one and the same being in which individual consciousnesses were united. It is a bad philosophy which begins by struggling against humanity, and placing itself in open contradiction to an irresistible sentiment of nature.
128. The very idea of consciousness excludes this monstrous absurdity, which attempts to transform individual consciousnesses into modifications of one universal consciousness. Consciousness, that is, the internal sentiment of what a being experiences, is essentially individual, it is, so to speak, incommunicable to every other. To others we communicate the knowledge of our consciousness, but not our consciousness itself. It is an intuition or a sentiment which is completed in the innermost recesses of our being, in that which is most our own. What, then, would that consciousness be which does not belong to us as individuals, which is not our own which is nothing of what we believe it to be, but only a property of an unknown being, – a being of which we have no knowledge, and of which we are only a phenomenon, a passing modification? Where would be the unity of consciousness in the midst of such diversity, opposition, and mutual exclusion? This being, modified by so many consciousnesses, would have no consciousness of its own, for it could give itself no account of what it experiences.
CHAPTER XVIII.
FICHTE'S PANTHEISTIC SYSTEM
129. I am going to fulfil a promise made in the beginning of this work,51 to explain and refute the system of Fichte. We have seen the cabalistic forms employed by the German philosopher to obtain a simple result, which amounted to neither more nor less than Descartes' principle, "I think, therefore, I am." The reader could never imagine that any one should attempt to found pantheism on this fact of consciousness, and that the human mind, because it finds itself, should have the arrogance to maintain that nothing exists beside itself, that whatever there is, proceeds from itself, and what is still more extraordinary, that it is itself produced by itself. In order to believe that such things have been written we have to see them, and therefore in explaining Fichte's system, I shall copy his own words.
Thus, although he may suffer a little from the foreign garb, and the reader may be fatigued with deciphering enigmas, he will have an idea of the matter and of the form of the system, which he could not have, if we should take from the philosopher his extravagant originality, which, however, relates to the form, rather than to the substance.
130. "This act, namely X = I am, is founded on no higher principle."52
This is true to a certain extent, inasmuch as it affirms that in the series of the facts of consciousness, we come to our own existence as the last limit, and can go no farther. The reflex act, by which we perceive our existence, is expressed by the proposition, I am, or, I exist; but this proposition by itself alone, tells us nothing as to the nature of the me, and is very far from proving our absolute independence. On the contrary, from the moment that we begin to reflect, internal facts are presented to us which incline us to believe that our being is dependent on another; and in proportion as we continue to reflect, we acquire a deep conviction of this truth, arising from a rigorous demonstration.
In no way can we affirm that the act, I am, does not depend on any higher principle, if we mean by that, that the act does not spring from any principle of action, and that by itself alone, it produces existence. Besides plainly contradicting common sense, this assertion is without any proof, and is also opposed to the most fundamental notions of sound philosophy.
131. Fichte thinks differently, and without knowing why, he deduces from the above propositions these consequences: "Therefore it (the act, X = I am) is supposed absolutely, and founded on itself, as the principle of a certain (and, as will be seen by the whole Doctrine of Science, of every) act of the human mind, consequently, also of its pure character, – the pure character of activity in itself, abstracted from its particular empirical conditions." It is no great discovery that the character of act is activity; but this character is not pure, since in us no act is pure activity, but it is always a particular exercise of activity.
"Consequently," he continues, "the supposition of the me by itself is its pure activity. The me supposes itself, and it is, in virtue of this mere supposition by itself; and on the other hand, the me is and it supposes its being, by virtue of its mere being. It is at the same time the acting, and the product of the act; the active, and that which is brought about by the activity; act and fact are one and precisely the same thing; and, therefore, I am is the expression of an act, and also of the only one possible, as must be seen from the whole Doctrine of Science."
He that can, may understand what is the meaning of a being which is at the same time producing and produced, principle and term of the same action, cause and effect of the same thing. He that can, may understand the meaning of existing in virtue of a mere action, and exercising this action in virtue of existence. If these be not contradictions, I know not what is. In God, who is infinite being, essence, existence, and action are identical; but we cannot say that the action produces his being, that he supposes himself by his action; we say that he exists necessarily, and that it is therefore impossible that he should have been produced, that he should have passed from not-being to being.
132. There occurs to me here a rational explanation of Fichte's language, an explanation which even if admissible would not excuse the philosopher for expressing very simple things in contradictory terms. However, it is this. The soul is an activity; its essence consists in thought, by which it is manifested to its own eyes, and finds itself in the act of consciousness. In this sense we may say that the soul supposes itself, that is, knows itself, takes itself as subject of a proposition to which it applies the predicate of existence. The soul is the principle of its act of consciousness; and thus it is productive; it is also presented in the act of consciousness as object, hence it may also be said, though inexactly, that in the ideal order it is produced; in this way it is the principle and the term of the action, but under different respects. This explanation, whether more or less founded, is at least reasonable and even intelligible, and the basis on which it rests, that the essence of the soul consists in thought, has the name of Descartes in its favor. Thus although we do not defend the words of Fichte, we might at least defend his ideas. But unfortunately, the philosopher has taken good care to prevent even this; his words could not have been more opposed to it.
"We now consider once more," he says, "the proposition: me is me.
"The me is supposed absolutely. If it is admitted that the me which in the above proposition stands in the place of the formal subject is the me supposed absolutely; and that in the place of the predicate means the existing me; it is expressed in the judgment which is absolutely valid, that both are completely one, or supposed absolutely; that the me is, because it has supposed itself."
Every judgment implies identity of the predicate and the subject; but in the proposition: me is me, the identity is not only implied but explicitly asserted; for which reason, the proposition belongs to the class of what are termed identical propositions, because its predicate explains nothing concerning the idea of the subject, but only repeats it. Whence then does Fichte deduce that the me exists because it has supposed itself? So far we have only the me saying: me is me; it affirms itself and thus supposes itself as subject and predicate of a proposition: but it is clearer than day-light that to suppose by affirming is altogether different from supposing by producing: on the contrary, common sense and reason alike teach that the existence of the thing affirmed is necessary to the legitimacy of the affirmation. To confound these two ideas, to consider it the same thing to affirm as to suppose by producing, is an inconceivable absurdity.53
133. Explaining this in a note, Fichte adds what follows: "It is also certainly so according to the logical form of every proposition. In the proposition A = A, the first A is that which is supposed in the me either absolutely as the me itself, or on any other ground as every determined not-me. In this case the me represents the absolute subject, and hence the first A is called the subject. The second A denotes what the me, which takes itself as the object of reflection, finds as supposed in itself because it has first supposed it in itself. The judging me predicates something, not properly of A, but of itself, namely, that it finds an A in itself; and hence the second A is called the predicate. So in the proposition: A = B, A denotes that which is supposed now; B that which is found already supposed. It represents the transition of the me from the act of supposing to the reflection on that which is supposed."
What does Fichte mean by this comparison of ideas and of language? Does he mean that in this proposition the me is subject and predicate according to the different aspects under which it is considered? Does he mean that the me, in so far as it occupies the place of subject, expresses simply existence, and that as predicate it is presented as an object of reflection? What does he mean by the word suppose? If he means by it to produce, how is it possible for a thing which is not to produce itself? If he means by it the manifestation of itself, so that the object manifested may serve as the logical term of a proposition, why does he tell us that the me exists because it supposes itself? But let us follow the German philosopher in his wandering deductions.
134. "The me in the first acceptation and that in the second must be absolutely the same. We can therefore invert the above proposition and say: the me supposes itself, absolutely because it is. It supposes itself by its mere being, and is by its mere supposition."
Without defining the sense of the word suppose, without saying any thing more than what all the world knows; that the me is the me; he infers that the me exists because it supposes itself, and supposes itself because it exists: he identifies existence with supposition without even noticing that at least some preliminary remarks were necessary before placing himself in direct opposition with common sense and the doctrines of all philosophers, including Descartes, who make existence necessary for action, and regard it as a contradiction for a thing to be active without existing. Leibnitz thought that there was nothing and could be nothing without a sufficient reason; but thanks to the author of the Doctrine of Science, we may henceforth people the world at pleasure with finite or infinite beings, and if asked whence they came, we may answer that they have been supposed; if we are further asked why they have been supposed, we may answer; because they exist; and if still again asked why they exist, we may say, because they have been supposed; thus we may pass from supposition to existence, and from existence to supposition, without any danger of refutation.
135. Although this philosophy is any thing but clear, it seems to have satisfied its author, who goes on with admirable gravity to say: "Thus, then, it is perfectly clear in what sense we here use the word me, and we are led to a determinate explanation of the me as absolute subject. Every thing whose being (existence) consists solely in its supposing itself as being, is the me, as absolute subject. So far as it supposes itself, it is; and so far as it is, it supposes itself; and the me is therefore absolute and necessary for the me. That which is not for itself is no me." Ideal pantheism could not be established more explicitly, and at the same time more gratuitously; one is astonished to find one's self seriously occupied with such extravagances. They have made a noise, because they have not been known; they ought therefore to be presented to the reader as they are, even at the risk of fatiguing him.
136. Fichte tries to make his ideas clearer, but we may be always sure that each explanation will add to their obscurity. Let us permit him to continue:
"Explanation! One often hears the question asked, what was I before I came to the consciousness of myself? The natural answer to this is: I was nothing at all; for I was not the me. The me is only in so far as it is conscious of itself. The possibility of this question is founded on a confusion of the me as subject, and the me as object of the reflection of the absolute subject, and is entirely inadmissible. The me represents itself, takes itself so far under the form of the representation, and is now for the first time something, an object; consciousness receives under this form a substratum which is, and although without actual consciousness, is here thought corporeally. Such a case is considered, and it is asked: what was then the me; that is, what is the substratum of consciousness? But even then we think the absolute subject as that which has intuition of this substratum, together with it, although we do not take note of it; we also, without taking note of it, at the same time think that which we pretended to abstract, and thus fall into a contradiction. We can think absolutely nothing without at the same time thinking the me as conscious of of itself; we can never abstract our own consciousness: hence all questions of this kind are unanswerable; for they would be, if well understood, unaskable."
That the me did not exist as the object of its reflection before it had consciousness of itself, is an evident truth; before thinking itself, it does not think itself; who ever doubted it? But the difficulty is, whether the me is any thing, independently of its own reflections or its objectiveness in relation to itself; that is, whether there is in the me any thing more than the being thought by itself. The question is not contradictory, but it is one which naturally presents itself to reason and to common sense; for reason as well as common sense resist the taking as identical, that which exists, and that which is known; that which knows itself, and that which produces itself. We are not now examining whether we have or have not a clear idea of the substratum of consciousness; but it is curious to hear the German philosopher remark that when we do not conceive the me as the object of reflection, we conceive it under a bodily form. This is to confound imagination with ideas, things, as I have elsewhere54 shown, which are very different.
137. It follows from Fichte's doctrine that the existence of the me consists in its supposing itself by means of consciousness; and that if consciousness should not exist, the me would not exist. In this case to be and to be known are the same thing. Although I might ask Fichte for his proofs of so extravagant an assertion, I shall confine myself to insisting on the difficulty which he proposes, and which he only eludes by a confusion of ideas. What would the me be, if it were not conscious of itself? If to exist is to have consciousness, when there is no consciousness there is no existence. Fichte answers that the me without consciousness is not the me, in which case, it does not exist; but that the question rests on an impossible supposition, the abstraction of consciousness. "We can think absolutely nothing," he says, "without at the same time thinking the me as conscious of itself; we can never abstract our own consciousness." I say again; these words do not solve the difficulty; they only elude it. I pass over his assertion that consciousness is the same as existence: but it is certain that we conceive an instant in which the me is not conscious of itself. Has this conception never been realized? Has there, or has there not, been an instant in which the me was not conscious of itself? If we admit this instant, we must admit that at this instant the me did not exist; therefore it never could have existed, unless Fichte will concede that the me depends on a superior being, and thus admit the doctrine of creation. If we do not admit this instant, the me has always existed, and with the consciousness of itself; therefore the me is an eternal and immutable intelligence; it is God. There is no way for Fichte to escape this dilemma. There is no room here for the distinction between the me as subject and the me as object: we are speaking of the me as having consciousness of itself, – that consciousness in which Fichte makes its existence consist, – and we ask whether this me has always existed or not; if the first, the me is God; if the second, you must either acknowledge creation, or hold that a being which does not exist can give itself existence.
138. Fichte does not retreat from the first consequence, and although he does not call me God, he gives it all the attributes of divinity. "If the me," he says, "is only in so far as it supposes itself, it is only for the supposing, and supposes only for being. The me is for the me, – but if it supposes itself absolutely as it is, it supposes itself necessary, and is necessary, for the me. I am only for myself; but I am necessary for myself– (in saying for myself I always suppose my being.)
"To suppose itself, and to be, are, speaking of the me, entirely the same. The proposition: I am, because I have supposed myself, can, therefore, be also expressed in this manner: I am absolutely, because I am.
"Moreover, the me which supposes itself, and the me which is, are entirely identical; they are one and the same thing. The me is for that which it supposes itself; and it supposes itself as that which it is. Therefore, I am absolutely, what I am.
"The immediate expression of the act which we have now developed would be the following formula: I am absolutely, that is, I am absolutely, because I am; and am absolutely, what I am; both for the me.
"But if the enunciation of this act is intended to be placed at the head of a doctrine of science, it should be expressed somewhat in the following manner: The me originally supposes its own being absolutely."55
There is only one fact which is clear in all this extravagance of expression; and that is, the pantheism openly professed by Fichte; the deification of the me, and, consequently, the absorption of all reality in the me. The me ceases to be a limited spirit; it is an infinite reality. Fichte does not deny it: "The me determines itself, the absolute totality of reality is ascribed to the me. The me can determine itself only as reality, for it is supposed absolutely as reality, and no negation whatever is supposed in it.56
"But reality is supposed in the me. Therefore the me must be supposed as the absolute totality of reality, (therefore as a quantity, which contains all quantities, and which may be a measure for them all;) and this, too, originally and absolutely, if the synthesis, which we have just explained problematically, be possible, and the contradiction is to be solved in a satisfactory manner. Therefore:
"The me supposes absolutely, without any foundation, and under no possible condition, the absolute totality of reality, as a quantity, than which, by virtue of this supposition, none greater is possible; and this absolute maximum of reality it supposes in itself. All that is supposed in the me is reality: and all reality that is, is supposed in the me…
… "The conception of reality is similar to the conception of activity. All reality is supposed in the me, is the same as: All activity is supposed in the me, and reversely; all in the me is reality, is the same as: The me is only active; it is the me only in so far as it is active; and in so far as it is not active, it is the not-me."57
"Only in the understanding is there reality; it is the faculty of the actual; in it the ideal first becomes real."58
"The me is only that which it supposes itself; it is infinite; that is, it supposes itself infinite…
"Without the infinity of the me, – without a productive faculty whose tendency is unlimited and illimitable, – it is impossible to explain the possibility of representation."
139. Let us give a glance at these ravings. Psychology starts from a fundamental fact – the testimony of consciousness. The human mind cannot think without finding itself; the starting-point of its psychological investigations is the proposition, I think; in this is found the identity of which Fichte speaks – the me is the me. All thought, from the first moment that it exists, perceives itself subject to a law; the perception of every thing involves the perception, either explicit or implicit, of the identity of the thing perceived. In this sense, the most simple formula in which we can express the first law of our perception is: A is A; but this formula is as sterile as it is simple; and it is impossible to conceive how any one could pretend to raise upon it a system of philosophy. This formula, supposing it to be enunciated, involves the existence of the me which enunciates it. It cannot be said that A is A, if there is not a being in which the relation of identity is supposed. If the proposition A = A is true, it is necessary to suppose an A, or a being in which it exists. A purely ideal truth, without any foundation in a real truth, is an absurdity, as we have elsewhere proved and explained at great length.59
140. But the existence of an ideal truth, in so far as it is represented in us, that is to say, in so far as it is a fact of our consciousness, is not necessary, but hypothetical, it exists when it exists; but when it exists it may not exist, or when it does not exist it may exist. Necessity cannot be inferred from existence: the testimony of consciousness assures us of the fact; but in this consciousness we find no proof that the fact is necessary, that it has not depended on a higher agent; quite the contrary, the sentiment of our weakness, the shortness of the time to which the recollections of our consciousness extend, the natural and periodical interruptions of them which we experience during sleep, every thing shows that the fact of consciousness is not necessary, and that the being which experiences it has but a little while ago commenced its existence, and might lose it again as soon as the infinite being should cease to preserve it. The me which we perceive within us knows itself, affirms itself; the word supposes itself has no reasonable meaning, unless it mean that the me affirms its existence; but this knowing itself is not producing itself; whoever asserts such an absurdity is under obligation to prove it.
141. In truth it requires all the gravity of Fichte to pretend to connect such a collection of extravagant absurdities into science. It was reserved for modern times to see a man seriously occupied with a system whose existence will, with difficulty, be believed by those who read the history of the aberrations of the human mind. The system of Fichte is already judged by all thinking men, and there is no surer means to make it forgotten than to expose it to the eyes of the judicious reader.
142. Having established the necessary and absolute existence of the me, Fichte proposes to demonstrate that from the me proceeds the not-me, that is to say; all that is not the me. "But the not-me can only be supposed in so far as a me, to which it is opposed, is supposed in the me (in the identical consciousness).
"But the not-me must be supposed in the identical consciousness.
"Therefore the me must also be supposed in it in so far as the not-me is supposed in it."
… "If me = me, all is supposed which is supposed in the me… "The me and the not-me are both products of original acts of the me, and the consciousness itself is a product of the first original act of the me, of the supposition of the me by itself."60
This, then, is how according to Fichte, the not-me, that is to say; this which we call the external world, and all that is not the me, is born of the me; the distinction of one thing from another is a pure illusion, a play of relations by which the me conceives itself as not-me in so far as it limits itself; but the me and the not-me are absolutely identical. "The me and the not-me inasmuch as they are supposed identical and opposed by the conception of mutual limitation, are something in the me (accidents) as divisible substances, supposed by the me, the absolute and illimitable subject, to which nothing is identical and nothing opposed. There all judgments, the logical subject of which is the limitable or determinable me, or something which defines the me, must be limited or defined by something higher; but all judgments, the logical subject of which is the absolutely illimitable me, cannot be determined by any thing higher, because the absolute me is not determined by any thing they are founded on, and defined absolutely by themselves." This is the last result of Fichte's system, the me converted into an absolute being, which is determined by nothing above itself, into an unlimited and illimitable subject, an infinite being, into God. Every thing emanates from this absolute subject. "In so far as the me supposes itself as infinite, its activity (that of supposing itself) is spent on the me itself, and on nothing else than the me. Its whole activity is spent on the me, and this activity is the ground and the compass of all being. The me is therefore infinite in so far as its activity returns to itself, and consequently so far also is its activity infinite as its product, the me, is infinite. (Infinite product, infinite activity; infinite activity, infinite product; this is a circle, but not a vicious one, for it is one from which reason escapes, for it expresses that which is absolutely certain by itself, and for its own sake. Product, activity, and active are here one and the same thing, and we separate them only in order to express ourselves.) The pure activity of the me alone, and the pure me alone are infinite. But pure activity is that which has no object, but returns to itself."
"In so far as the me supposes limits, and, according to what we have said, supposes itself in these limits, its activity is not spent immediately on itself, but on a not-me which is to be opposed to it."61
How shall we sum up this doctrine? In the words of Fichte: "In so far as the me is absolute, it is infinite and unlimited. It supposes all that is; and that which is not supposed, is not (for it; and out of it there is nothing). But all that it supposes, it supposes as me; and it supposes the me as all that it supposes. Hence in this respect the me contains in itself all, that is, an infinite, unlimited reality.
