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Thus, sir, as we have conclusive evidence of a disposition on the part of the British Government, at one period at least, to advance considerable length towards an adjustment of this long-contested question; and as we have no evidence that different principles and claims are now asserted from those then advanced; I think it fair to conclude, that it is still in our power to put an end to this controversy with safety to our seamen, and advantage to the nation. Instead, then, of passing this bill, and spending the blood and treasure of our countrymen in the prosecution of this war, I conceive it our duty to make an effort for the sanction of our just rights, and the restoration of peace, without a further appeal to force. It is my decided opinion that such an effort, if fairly and liberally made by this House, and the Executive branch of the Government, would not fail in producing the desired effect.

The peculiar nature of the question, which now constitutes the sole object for continuing the war; the intimation given by the Executive in the correspondence with the British Government, since the declaration of war, together with the opinions stated by Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, in their letter to the Secretary of State of January 3, 1807, all tend to confirm me in the belief, that it is the duty of Congress to pass a law which would not only check desertions from the British service, by excluding persons of that description from employ in our service, but also deprive the British Government of the apology alleged for impressing American seamen, by excluding British subjects from the commercial and public service of the United States. Having alluded to the letter of Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney of the 3d of January, 1807, I will take the liberty of reading from it a short extract. After stating the opinion they had formerly expressed, that although the British Government did not feel itself at liberty to relinquish formally, by treaty, its claim to search our merchant vessels for British seamen, its practice would nevertheless be essentially, if not completely, abandoned, they observe: "That opinion has since been confirmed by frequent conferences on the subject with the British Commissioners, who have repeatedly assured us that, in their judgment, we were made as secure against the exercise of their pretension by the policy which their Government had adopted, in regard to that very delicate and important question, as we could have been made by treaty. It is proper to observe, however, that the good effect of this disposition, and its continuance, may depend, in a great measure, on the means which may be taken hereafter by the Congress to check desertions from the British service. If the treaty is ratified, and a perfect good understanding is produced by it between the two countries, it will be easy for their Governments, by friendly communications, to state to each other what they respectively desire, and in that mode to arrange the business as satisfactorily as it could be done by treaty."

Thus, sir, had the treaty of 1806 been ratified and a good understanding been produced between the two countries, Congress were warned, even in that event, that it was their duty to lend their aid in rendering effectual and perpetual any arrangement which might be made on this subject of impressment. As to the late communications from the Executive department, made to the British Government, since the declaration of war, it is not my intention at this time to enter into a particular examination of their merit or demerit. I will barely remark, that to me they present a novelty in the history of war and diplomacy. Propositions, alleged to be of a pacific nature, made in six days after the declaration of war! Such a procedure (much as I desire peace and much as I was opposed to the war) is to my mind, to say the least, extremely extraordinary, and its policy incomprehensible. It is the more so from the circumstance of a British Minister being on the spot at the moment of declaring the war and keeping up a continued correspondence with the Secretary of State to the last moment of the existence of peace. Under such circumstances I should conceive each nation ought to have known the ultimatum of the other and not waited for the form of a declaration of war, to resume the negotiation and give a new shape to their proposition. I confess that I am not surprised at the result of this war negotiation – every thing was demanded to be yielded by our enemy, for which the war was declared, even as a preliminary in the first instance to an armistice, and in the second instance as preliminary to a negotiation. The equivalent offered on our part was of a nature which it was not within the province of the Executive to confirm, and, of course, depended on what Congress might or might not do on the subject. In addition to this, our agent in London, through whom those propositions were made, did not possess regular and competent powers, and was considered by the British Government as incompetent to act with them on such a subject on equal terms of obligation and responsibility. Whatever, therefore, may be my opinion in relation to those late propositions, and however illy calculated they may have been to produce any desirable result, I am far from considering them unworthy the particular attention of this House. I allude particularly to the equivalent proposed as an inducement for the discontinuance of the practice of impressment. Here, for the first time in the whole history of the long-protracted discussion on this subject, it is intimated that something effectual will be done on our part to prevent the cause of the abuse of which we complain – a promise is given, in the event of obtaining the concessions demanded, that a law would be passed by Congress to prohibit the employment of British seamen in the public or commercial service of the United States. This, then, is what I ask you now to do – pass a law effectually to exclude all British subjects from the public and private maritime service of the United States; let the law be well guarded against the possibility of violation or evasion; and let us be determined rigidly to enforce it; place this law in the hands of your Executive; let him immediately appoint one or more honest, able, independent commissioners; men who neither have nor expect an office; men in whom the nation, without regard to party, would be willing to confide; give them ample powers to form a treaty or arrange the sole question which is now the pivot on which this war depends. Do all this; do it faithfully, and I venture to predict you will obtain a peace, and secure your just rights more speedily, more effectually, and more satisfactorily to the people of this country, than by all the military operations in the compass of your power.

Monday, January 4

Edward Hempstead, returned to serve as the Delegate in this House from the Territory of Missouri, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.

Additional Military Force

The House resumed the consideration of the bill for raising for one year an additional military force of twenty thousand men.

The question was stated on the engrossment of the bill for a third reading.

Mr. Brigham. – Mr. Speaker, the bill under consideration, if passed into a law, will deeply affect my constituents and the public in general. It provides for prosecuting this war on a more extensive scale – it is a kind of second declaration of war. The objects of conquest are multiplied; the field of operation is enlarged; the Army must be increased with the addition of 20,000 regular troops; and enlistments encouraged by additional bounty and wages. Sir, this is the system of arrangement to prosecute the scheme of foreign invasion. One error frequently prepares the way for another; we are now unhappily involved in the calamities of war, and the question is, how we shall prosecute and support it.

Mr. B. said he had been uniformly, and in principle, opposed to this war, and of course opposed to all the measures connected with it; that, in his opinion, this war was both politically and morally wrong; that it was declared without suitable preparation, without necessity, without an army, without adequate resources, and without unanimity; it has been prosecuted without success; we have also gained nothing but loss, defeat, and disgrace; the people are alarmed at the loss of their peace, distressed with the fruits of the war, and have serious apprehensions of what may be the future measures of Congress on this subject.

Sir, continued Mr. B., this war is of an offensive character; it is a war of conquest, totally inconsistent with the spirit and genius of our constitution, and, if prosecuted in the present divided state of the country, I fear it may be fatal to our most valuable institutions. Republics, sir, ought never to be engaged in a foreign, offensive war; they are calculated only for defensive war.

Sir, there is something unaccountable, that the disposition to prosecute this war should increase, as the causes of the war decrease, and the means and ability to carry it on lessen. The war which we now have on hand is predicated principally on the Orders in Council. The impressment of seamen, during the last session of Congress, was considered of minor importance and as a proper subject of negotiation between the two nations, and was so considered in the days of General Washington, in those of Mr. Jefferson, and why not now by Mr. Madison?

Sir, the Orders in Council which interfered with our neutral rights are revoked. The President, in his Message at the commencement of this session, declared the fact, and the war now rests solely on the subject of impressment. I do not believe that the prosecuting of this war will have a tendency to bring about an amicable and satisfactory adjustment on this subject, and at the end of the war, if it ever ceases, this question of impressment must be settled by treaty.

Sir, at this time, and under these circumstances, we are called on to augment our standing army to the number of 55,000 regular troops, to prosecute the war with vigor, and, as some say, for glory.

Sir, if this system of warfare is carried into effect, we shall unavoidably create an annual expense of forty millions of dollars; and where is your money to defray this expense? Why, you must take it from the pockets of our constituents, and from those who are opposed to this war; and if you fail of obtaining the necessary loans, you must stop payment; the nation will become bankrupt, and future generations will be loaded with an enormous debt.

Sir, can this be for the honor and interest of the American people; can it be for the satisfaction of our constituents; are they in love with this war? Are they prepared to barter away their property and their peace for the hazards and fatigue of a foreign war, which promises nothing but poverty and distress? It is impossible. Sir, it is said that we are now about to make one sublime military effort, which shall do honor to this nation; that with these troops we are to take, not only the Canadas, but Halifax and Nova Scotia, and, for aught I know, East Florida, follow up the Tippecanoe expedition, and exterminate the Indians. Mr. B. said that he never had known the incipient cause nor by what authority General Harrison made his incursion into the wilderness, beyond where the United States had extinguished the Indian titles, and destroyed the Prophet's town, but said that he hoped the time would come when he should know the merits of that enterprise.

Mr. B. said if the friends of this bill and of the war could accomplish their darling object, subdue and take possession of the Canadas, and all the other British provinces in North America, in his opinion it would be a great public misfortune – fatal to the civil liberties of the country, and change the character of our Government.

Sir, said Mr. B., with these impressions I deprecate the taking of the Canadas, or the other British provinces, as I do the loss of liberty and the ruin of this country. This war cannot be perpetuated and prosecuted without violating the laws of humanity and justice, the laws of religion and morality – and these laws are to be respected as well by nations as by individuals; and we have not only reason to believe, but do believe, that the God of Armies, who superintends the concerns of men, will give success to our arms, or blast our enterprise, according to its moral character. If the Canadas are subdued and conquered, it must be done by force of arms; and what have the inhabitants of those provinces been guilty of, which warrant this Government in putting them to the sword?

Sir, they are now inoffensive, and quietly pursuing their own business; they are content under their own Administration; they are protected by their own Government, and are not panting for the liberties of this country, as was vainly supposed the last season, nor do they ask us to relieve them from the oppression of their own Government, which General Hull, in his tender mercy, promised them in his pompous proclamation, on the condition that they would revolt from their rightful Sovereign, and put themselves under his gracious protection; nor were they terrified by the threat of extermination, if found fighting in their own defence by the side of an Indian; nor were they to be seduced from their allegiance by promises which could not be performed. No, sir, nor do they ask any favor but that you cease from troubling. Sir, they will not submit, and they have told you, by their actual resistance, that they will defend themselves, their councils, their firesides, their wives, and their children, their rights and their property; and they are not to be subdued but at the price of blood. And where is your authority, where is your right to go home, invade, and break into a foreign territory, and there establish a slaughter-house for the brave sons of America; there spill your blood, and expend your treasure, destroy cities, and demolish houses, plunder the inhabitants, and waste the substance of the industrious and the innocent? Sir, there is no right but a Napoleon right, and that right is power, and not that which reason approves.

Mr. B. said that the war was becoming more and more unpopular in the Eastern States, especially in the State which he had the honor to represent; and they had, in their late elections, come forth and declared it in a voice and language which cannot be misunderstood. And whether there will be a majority in the next Congress in favor of this war was uncertain – he hoped not.

Mr. Ridgely said he claimed the patience of the House while he assigned the reasons that would influence him to vote against the bill now under consideration. He considered the force contemplated to be raised by the bill as unnecessary. The present Military Establishment of the United States consisted of various descriptions of troops; they were the regular army, the rangers, the volunteers, and the militia. The regular army was made up of the Peace Establishment, authorized by the acts of the 16th of March, 1802, and the 12th of April, 1808, containing about 10,000 men, including officers, and of the "additional military force," which was directed to be raised by the act of the 11th January, 1812; these different establishments were incorporated by an act passed on the 26th of June last; and the present regular army of the United States, as authorized by law, consisted of twenty-five regiments of infantry, three regiments of artillery, two of light dragoons, one of riflemen, and one of light artillery, containing in all about thirty-six thousand men, including company officers and privates; of these the President might have not exceeding fifteen thousand enlisted for eighteen months, and the residue enlisted for five years, unless sooner discharged. Of the rangers, there were seven companies by the acts of 27th January, and 1st July, 1812, and about four or five hundred men. By the act of the 6th February last, the President was authorized to accept of any company or companies of volunteers, either of artillery, cavalry, or infantry, who might offer their services to the number of fifty thousand men; their commissioned officers were to be appointed in the manner prescribed by law in the several States and Territories to which they might respectively belong, and they could only, according to the fair construction of this act, be considered as militia, liable to be called on to do military duty at any time within two years after they were accepted by the President, and bound to continue in service one year after arriving at the place of rendezvous. By the law of the 6th of July last, the President was empowered to appoint and commission the officers of the volunteers who had or should offer their services, and to form them into battalions, squadrons, &c., and they were thus converted from militia into a species of regular force. By the act of the 10th of April last, the President was authorized to call on the several States and Territories for their respective proportions of a detachment of one hundred thousand militia; and the call has been made, I believe, on every State and Territory. The present military force, then, of the United States, as authorized by existing laws, consists of upward of one hundred and eighty-six thousand men, all of whom, when in service, are subject to the rules and articles of war. Of these, the militia can only be used in the prosecution of this war for defensive purposes; the regulars and the volunteers may be ordered to act offensively against the enemy. They may amount, as we have seen, to eighty-six thousand men; and if Canada be as weak and badly defended as gentlemen seem to suppose, and the Administration should persist in their determination to conquer it, they should, I think, be satisfied with such a force to obtain an object so easily attainable. But, sir, said Mr. R., our present Military Establishment is certainly sufficient for all purposes of defence; and I wish to see no land forces raised for any other purpose. I have no hesitation in declaring that I should lament to see Canada or any of the British provinces on this continent in our possession, or forming a part of the American Republic. They will never be worth, to this nation, in any point of view, the blood and treasure that their acquisition will cost us. It has been said by the honorable chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, that there are now in Canada twelve thousand regular troops, and that the militia amount to six thousand. To any thing that gentleman should say, as matter of fact within his own knowledge, I should give the most implicit credit. But his estimate of the militia of Canada must be too low. His sources of information on this point must have been incorrect. The population of Canada (and when I speak of Canada, I mean both Upper and Lower Canada) has been variously stated, from three to five hundred thousand souls; according to no account, I believe, can it be less than three hundred thousand; and, I presume, no gentleman on this floor will say that estimate is too high. Take, then, the population of Canada to be 300,000 souls; what number of militia should this population furnish? We will take the State of New Jersey as a guide for our calculation; according to the census of 1810, the population of that State is 245,255, and its militia, by the return for the same year, 33,740, and the militia bears about the same proportion to the population in the States, generally, as it does in this State. If, then, the militia of Jersey, with its population, amounts to near thirty-four thousand, we may, I think, without danger of contradiction, estimate the militia of Canada (with a larger population) at between thirty and forty thousand; to these add the twelve thousand regular troops, and, in all probability, before we can act offensively against them in the Spring, the number of these troops will be greatly increased, and they may have an efficient force of about fifty thousand men to oppose an invading army. It ought to be recollected, also, that a generous people, contending in their own defence, are actuated by far different and more worthy motives than an army of soldiers can be who attempt their subjugation. The Canadians will contend for their homes, their wives, their children; for every thing that can or that ought to be dear to the human heart. They will be excited in such a cause to the boldest deeds. Instead of traitors, we shall find them true to their country and themselves, and able and ready to exert all their energies in their own defence. If we conquer them, it must be by great exertions, and with immense loss. To subdue a people acting under the impulse of such considerations as will operate on them, will require a force at least double to that which they can oppose to us. But can any man imagine that, if we invade the British colonies, the war will be there? Will the pride of Britain, powerful as she is at sea, and ready at any moment to meet every emergency, permit her tamely to look on and see her provinces wrested from her, without exerting herself with all her energies for their security? Will she make no diversions in their favor? Will she suffer us to carry the war into her territories, and not retort upon us? Does an unprotected seacoast of two thousand miles afford her no opportunities of attacking us? Do our rich and flourishing cities, exposed without defence on the seaboard, to the cannon of her ships of war, furnish her with no objects worthy her attention? Will the city of New York, laid in ashes, atone for the invasion of Canada; or, will the acquisition of Canada compensate to us for the loss of New York? Sir, said Mr. R., ten Canadas, ten times told, would not be worth to this nation that single city.

But of what value would these provinces be to us, if they could be easily acquired? Shall we, by their conquest, obtain the objects for which this war is waged? Shall we thereby secure our commercial rights? Not at all, sir. On the other hand, if the British Government would offer them to us, it would be our true policy to refuse to accept them. It is known to everybody that the population of several of the Eastern States is now full, and that great numbers of their citizens are constantly emigrating. The direction this emigration takes, it is also well known, is South and West. This surplus of population of the Eastern States settles on the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi, and carries with it its Eastern habits, and, if you please, its Eastern prejudices. They become connected and united with the people of the South and West. This union and intercourse will tend to render as the brothers of one family the citizens of this extended Empire. The prejudices of the South against the North, and the North against the South, are weakened daily and will be destroyed. The course this emigration takes is just as it should be. The currents flow from the extremities into the centre of the country. The operation is most beneficial to the nation, and tends constantly to strengthen and cement the union of the States. But if the British provinces should be conquered and become incorporated into the Republic, the direction of the emigration from the Northern and Eastern States will be at once changed. It will take a North instead of a South course. It will go just where it ought not to go. The strength of the nation, already too much scattered, will be still more weakened by a further expansion of its territory and population. The Northern and Eastern States, at present possessing more than their proper proportion of wealth, population, and strength, and having different habits, pursuits, and interests, from the Middle and Southern States, will, by the addition of these provinces, and the settlement of their surplus of population in them, acquire a weight and influence that this Union cannot control. It will exist only at their pleasure, and, in a few years, the destruction of this Government and a separation of the States will be the inevitable consequence.

Mr. Pitkin rose and said: – Before, Mr. Speaker, we give our sanction to this bill; before we agree to add so large a force to our present army, making the whole number fifty-five thousand men, is it not a duty we owe to ourselves and to our constituents, seriously to inquire into the policy, into the necessity of the measure, as well as into the present state of our relations with that nation against which we have declared war? Almost at the very instant when Congress declared war against Great Britain, the Orders in Council, and the blockade of May, 1806, the most prominent causes of the war, were removed. I have always, sir, considered the Orders in Council as the greatest obstacle to the restoration of harmony and free intercourse between the two countries. Had this obstacle been removed before the declaration of war, no one can believe that the Executive would have recommended, or that a majority in either House of Congress would have adopted a measure always fraught with evils in all governments, and which, in a Government like ours, ought never to be resorted to but in the last extremity. I cannot believe that the President, in that case, would have recommended it, when, on the 26th of July, 1811, through the Secretary of State, he informed the British Minister that, on the revocation of the Orders in Council, the non-importation law would be removed, and, of consequence, commercial intercourse would be restored between the two nations. It would be strange, indeed, if the President should, in one moment, restore a free intercourse between the two countries, and, in the next, recommend to Congress a declaration of war, solely on account of another topic remaining in dispute. And, in case such recommendation had been made, if any confidence is to be placed in the declared opinions of gentlemen, many who voted for the war would not, under such circumstances, have given it their support. Unfortunately for the country, the President did not embrace the opportunity, presented by the repeal of the Orders in Council, to remove the non-importation law, and thereby smooth the way for a complete restoration of harmony between Great Britain and the United States. Sir, this would have been done, and the remaining subject of dispute been left in the same situation as before the declaration of war, to be adjusted by amicable arrangements. But, sir, as this was not done, it remains for us, it remains for the people of the United States, to determine whether they will encounter all the evils, all the calamities of war; whether they will sacrifice the fairest prospects, and the best interests of this rising country, on the point now in dispute with Great Britain.

In the few remarks I shall submit to you, sir, and to the House, it is not my intention to go into the consideration of all the original avowed causes of the war; but to confine myself to the new aspect of affairs, presented to us since the declaration of war by the removal of the Orders in Council and blockades.

On the subject of impressments, for which alone the war is now to be continued, what, let me ask, is the principle for which our Government contends? It is this, sir: that the flag of the merchant vessel shall cover all who sail under it; or, in other words, that our flag shall protect all the foreigners our merchants may think proper to employ in their service, whether naturalized or not. Before we raise immense armies, before we sacrifice any more of the lives of American citizens, let us inquire —

1st. Whether the principle, if yielded to us to-morrow, would benefit our native seamen, or would promote the real permanent interests of their country.

2d. Whether there is a probability of obtaining a recognition of this principle by a continuance of the war.

The foreigners employed in our service are those who have not been naturalized, and those who have taken the benefit of our naturalization laws. The former constitute nearly the whole: the latter class is very inconsiderable. The foreigners of the first description, of course, were in competition with our native seamen, and either exclude them from employment, or lessen the rate of their wages. In this way, then, the employment of foreign seamen is an injury to our native seamen; and, in a national point of view, it may well be questioned, whether their employment subserves the permanent and solid interest of the country.

Is it not, sir, of the first importance to us, as a commercial and maritime nation, especially when it may be engaged in a war with a great naval power, to be able to have a sufficient number of native seamen employed in our service? Seamen, who shall be attached by every tie to this country, and on whom we can depend for its defence in time of danger?

This, sir, it is presumed, cannot be denied. If so, is it not the dictate of wisdom and of sound policy for us to give encouragement to our native seamen in preference to those of any foreign country?

The situation in which we now are proves the correctness, as well as the importance, of the position. We are now at war with Great Britain. And, at the very time when this war was declared, thousands of British seamen who had not been naturalized in this country, were, and they still continue in our employment. These seamen (I am speaking, sir, of those not naturalized) are now claimed as British subjects, and, indeed, by our own laws, are now considered as alien enemies. Will gentlemen suffer me to turn their attention to this last fact?

By a law passed the 6th of July, 1798, it is enacted, that "whenever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or Government, &c., all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects, of the hostile nation or Government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed, as alien enemies." Ought we, sir, to depend upon these men to man our fleets, or to defend our ports and harbors? So far as foreigners of this description are concerned, I do not hesitate to say that it is not for the interest of this country that our flag should protect them, and that I will never consent to continue this war for the maintenance of this principle on their account. It is well known, sir, that not only Great Britain, but that France, and all the nations of Europe, claim a right to the services of all their subjects in time of war. In the exercise of this right, the history of Europe shows that, at the commencement of almost all wars, proclamations have been issued by the belligerent powers, recalling their subjects to aid in the defence of their respective countries. During the present war in Europe, this has been done by Great Britain, by France, and the other belligerent powers. With respect to this claim of allegiance, it is not my intention to enter into the discussion whether, in the abstract, it is well or ill founded. This would lead me too far, and would tend to no practical good. I will, however, observe, that it is a right, a claim, which has been long exercised in Europe, and has been sanctioned and acknowledged by the most able and distinguished European writers on public law.