Kitabı oku: «Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)», sayfa 129

Saturday, January 2, 1813

Additional Military Force

The House resumed the consideration of the report of the Committee of the Whole on the bill in addition to the act for raising an additional military force.

The amendments made by the House having been agreed to, the question was stated, Shall the bill be engrossed, and read a third time?

Mr. Mosely said that, in stating concisely some of the reasons which would induce him to vote against the present bill, he should not attempt to enter into a consideration of the justice or expediency of the war, nor the policy of continuing it. War is declared, and it appears to be the determination of those who have the control of our public concerns to prosecute it with the utmost vigor; yes, sir, with a vigor that, within twelve months from the enlistment of the twenty thousand men to be raised by this bill, we are told must bring it to a successful termination. Really, Mr. Speaker, when I listened to the confident assurance of the honorable Chairman of the Military Committee, that with these twenty thousand men, in addition to the troops already raised, and voted to be raised, we should in a single campaign be able to conquer Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and that the object of all these conquests was to procure an honorable peace, I almost felt myself persuaded as a peace man to join the honorable gentleman in his project of fighting for peace one year, with such a certainty of obtaining it at the expiration of that period; but unfortunately I could not but recollect the fate of similar assurances made on former occasions. When we were about declaring war, I very well remember that we were told with equal confidence by gentlemen anxious to engage in it (and who would listen to no arguments, even for delay, against the measure) that we had only to declare war, and Canada would, in the course of a few months, at most, be ours; that the militia alone, with the aid of a very few regulars, would be competent to the conquest of the whole country, except the fortress of Quebec; and that that must very soon fall of course. An honorable gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Fisk) informed us that the people of those Provinces would almost conquer themselves; that they were at least pre-disposed to be conquered – to use his own expression, that they were "panting" to participate in our liberty.

Experience has now proved the fallacy of these predictions. Gentlemen must now be convinced that Canada is not to be conquered quite so easily as they had imagined – that it is not to be subdued with a few thousand militia, regulars, or volunteers, though aided by proclamations. I mention proclamations, because they seem to be considered as an indispensable auxiliary on all great emergencies. What can be done by proclamation, I will readily concede we are competent to do. No nation, I believe, ever arrived at greater perfection in the art of proclamation-making than we have done; and if history is faithful to record them, we shall in this particular at least bear the palm from all the world.

Sir, it can afford pleasure to no man, who feels as he ought for the honor and interest of his country, to dwell unnecessarily upon the disasters and disgrace which have everywhere attended our military operations from the commencement of the war to the present time. I mean upon land; for to our little Navy too much praise cannot be given. Our gallant seamen have not only afforded to their countrymen examples of valor worthy of imitation, but they have also taught us a lesson of wisdom, by which I am happy to find we have manifested a disposition to profit. But, sir, while gentlemen must feel mortified at the miserable termination of all our boasted military exploits thus far, and might wish to draw a veil over the disgraceful scenes which have taken place, it cannot be done; it would be unwise to attempt it. We ought rather to look at the causes which have produced our misfortunes, and pursue a course in future which may not expose us to similar evils.

Mr. Gold said the annals of this Government, the last six months, commencing with the declaration of war, would be found the most interesting, the most deplorable.

In that period, we have seen a war declared, precipitately and prematurely; for, notwithstanding all the arguments urged on that occasion, with so much zeal and eloquence, time has dissipated all; the illusion has vanished; your army, so confidently expected, did not, under the magic of that declaration, spring into existence; the condition of your enlistments would not, I apprehend, at this hour, justify the declaration of war. We have seen, sir, that war conducted in a manner well to comport with the spirit in which it was declared; disaster upon disaster in rapid succession have followed; the tone and heart of the country broken; universal disgust at the past, and deep concern and anxiety for the future, prevail everywhere.

And what, Mr. Speaker, is now proposed for the future – what is to retrieve our affairs – on what are our hopes to rest? An army of twelve-months' men! A broken reed! An army and term of service, which well nigh lost the country in the Revolutionary war; an army which in every step and stage of that war received the uniform and reiterated censure and condemnation of Washington, and every intelligent officer of that period; an army that stands recorded by every historian of that war with deep reproach and reprobation. Such is the foundation of our future hopes; shutting our eyes upon the lessons of experience, we live but to repeat former errors and renew our sufferings. Shall we never learn, that a soldier is not the creature of an hour; that he must be seasoned to the hardships of war; that to remove your recruit from his fireside, from his plentiful board, and all the comforts with which he is surrounded, to the theatre of service, there to sleep on the ground in tents, with two or three articles of subsistence only, is to give him up a victim to disease, to consign him to the grave? This precise result is presented to the mind by the melancholy review of the last campaign; disease and death have walked abroad in our armies on the frontier; they have been swept to the grave as by the besom of destruction. It has not stopped with your army; the frontier inhabitants, infected by the diseases of the camp, fly from the deadly theatre as from a destroying angel! Shall we never learn the difference between our situation, and that of nations who have a competent military establishment, sufficient at all times for both offensive and defensive operations?

The slender Military Establishment of the United States, whilst it consults economy, and favors the genius of the Government, forbids a hasty resort to war, especially extra-territorial and offensive war; time for preparation, after the measure is resolved on, is indispensable; and a disregard of our situation in this respect cannot fail to induce defeat and disaster – to produce such a campaign as has just now closed.

But, Mr. Speaker, wherefore change the term of enlistment, from five years, or during the war, to one year? The sole avowed object of the war by land was the conquest of the Canadas. Are you at this hour nearer your object than on the day you declared war, or has that object, with a steady and sure pace, constantly receded from you as you have advanced in the war? Is Canada so far conquered that you can now reduce the term of enlistment? It is impossible to shut our eyes on the past; while all is disgust and despondency with our own citizens – sick of the past, and concerned for the future; while every post brings to the Cabinet fearful and alarming changes in the sentiments of the people under this ill-fated war; your enemy, the Canadians, take courage, their wavering sentiments have become resolved, and union in defence of their firesides, the land that gives them bread, is spreading and cementing all in the patriotic vow.

There was a time, sir, when you had friends in the Upper Province; there were many who wished well to your arms, and would have greeted your approach, but that ill-fated policy which precipitated every thing, which in zeal for the end overlooked the means, has blasted all our hopes from that quarter. The Canadian, while he knows your power, distrusts your wisdom and your capacity to conduct the war; he dares not commit himself, his all, to such auspices. Hence, sir, difficulties thicken on every side, and at least three times the force is now necessary to effect the conquest, which would have been required at the commencement of the war. Have we made an impression on the Prince Regent and his Ministry? are they now more disposed to succumb and accept your terms than before the war? How stand the people of the British Empire? Instead of their coercing the Government into our terms, which we fondly anticipated, the late election to Parliament shows them disposed to go hand in hand with the Government in resisting our claims and inflicting on us all the evils of war. "Maritime Rights" are echoed and re-echoed with applause throughout the Empire. Such, sir, are the bitter fruits of your policy, and to what farther point the same hand shall conduct the destinies of the country, remains to be seen.

I seek not to aggravate the misconduct of the war, nor to commend our enemies, but only wish, sir, that we may see things as they are, our actual situation, and thus look danger in the face. Do you persevere in the conquest of Canada? Pass not the barrier with an army of less than forty-five or fifty thousand men: if you do, in my apprehension, the defeats and disasters of the past campaign will be visited upon you; another army will be made to pass under the yoke, and at the end of the year, you will find yourself still further removed from your object. The tug of war is now placed fairly before us, we cannot advance without meeting it. Such, Mr. Speaker, are the grounds on which I object to this twelve-months' army; it is not adapted to the professed object of the war, the conquest of Canada. Is there, sir, any other object in contemplation of the Government; any other land of leeks and onions, which Heaven has given us, or to which our destinies lead? Is the South of easier access than the North, and is the circle of hostility to be extended to that quarter? We profess a pacific policy; moderation and justice are our boast; let us beware how we commit to the hazard this high and enviable character; how we yield, on specious grounds, to the mad and destructive policy which we reprobate in others; a policy which has in all periods overwhelmed nations with calamity, and swelled the tide of human misery.

I fear there are points in our neutral course, in our relative conduct towards Great Britain and France which will not bear examination. You proclaimed the Berlin and Milan decrees revoked, and put upon Great Britain the threatened alternative of non-intercourse. Was the fact so? You took a promise for the fact; you proclaimed the fact, while France herself, the author of the deed and party to be benefited, denies and disowns it as done at the time. Here was a fatal error, a departure from the straight line of justice; and when our error in this was palpable to all the world, we gave no explanation, no excuse, but persevered in a measure which led to war. It is this course, sir, this departure from even-handed neutrality between Great Britain and France, that has lost you the support of your own citizens to a great and alarming extent, and at this moment sustains the British Ministry in the hearts of Englishmen. It is this belief of our Government's leaning to France, that has carried that Ministry so triumphantly through the late elections to Parliament.

If any thing could add to the gloom and sicken the mind under the prospect before us, it is the inauspicious conjunction of events. America and France both making war at the same time on Great Britain; we making the enemy of France our enemy, and this at the ill-fated moment when the all-grasping Emperor of that country is rolling a baleful cloud, charged with destruction, north upon the Russian Empire; upon a power always just to America; upon our truest and best friend in the European theatre. Against such a friend, at such a period, we have beheld the march of the Corsican through rivers of blood; his footsteps are traced over the ashes of the proudest cities, and he sits himself down, at length, at Moscow, like Marius over the ruins of Carthage.

The question was then taken on Mr. Clay's motion, and negatived.

Mr. Macon moved to strike out one, and insert five years as the term of enlistment. He regretted as much as any one the disasters which had befallen the country; and there was but one way to obviate their effects, and that was by rising superior to them, as a part of the nation had already done – he meant the Western country, where a patriotism had been exhibited equal to that which might have distinguished Rome in its best days. Their zeal was equal to their bravery – and the only drawback on their enterprise was the difficulty of finding something to eat in the wilderness. We must rise after reverses. What, sir, said Mr. M., would have become of Rome, had she desponded when Hannibal defeated her armies? She rose upon it and became the mistress of the world. What would have been the situation of our cause in the Revolution, if, after the British successes in Jersey, we had desponded? But the men of Pennsylvania and New Jersey rose on it, and victory and triumph followed. Our object now ought to be to recover the ground we have lost, and meet the enemy with troops that will insure success. We are told, sir, this war has united England to a man. Sir, I never expected aid from our enemies. Let us follow so good an example, and unite to a man; let us remember the old Continental maxim – "United we stand, divided we fall." If we were as united in defence of our rights, as England is in her usurpations, this war would not last a single campaign – and I hope in this respect we shall, at least, learn wisdom from an enemy. The calculations about one or two campaigns, however, in present circumstances, are visionary. We have engaged an enemy not in the habit of yielding very soon. But, if we were to unite, the question would soon be settled. The cause and object of this war has been more concisely stated by one of those actively engaged in it, than by any other person – I mean Captain Porter's motto – "Free trade and sailors' rights;" no man could have given a better definition of it. It appears to me that one part of this continent ought to be zealous for the rights of seamen – another part for a free export trade; and, if we were, as we ought to be, united, the war would be carried on with energy and with success. I agree with the gentleman from New Jersey, that this thing is not to be done by paper men. My opinion is, that the best thing we can do, is to raise men for five years. Let the Legislature of the country do its duty. If the thirty-five thousand men, now authorized, be not enough, let us get as many as will be adequate to the end we propose. Gentlemen have thought proper to review former transactions. I would be willing to pass them over. I believe almost every measure adopted by the General Government would have had its destined effect if adhered to. You have always got the better of the argument; you have better proclamations; but what avails all this? Britain has impressed your seamen, and given you blows for good words. You have been heretofore told your paper measures were worth nothing: now that it is proposed to give blow for blow, what is said? That you are departing from the pacific system, which the same persons before reprobated, and to which they have become friendly only after every attempt at pacification has failed. Sir, we are now engaged in war, and we must succeed or we must yield the rights of sailors and free trade. Does any man doubt that the war is justly undertaken? Is there a man in the nation – I care not of what political sect, many as there are – who believes that the war is not undertaken on just grounds – that we had not borne with their indignities till we could have borne them no longer? After plundering your property and impressing your seamen on the ocean, their agents have been sent into this nation to sow divisions among us, who ought to be but one family. What crime has been left undone? what injury have we not suffered? Could one be added to the catalogue? It seems to me not. No man loves peace more than I do, and if it had not been for Great Britain sending her agents to our firesides, I do not know but I should have voted against the war. It seemed to me like an attempt on a man's daughter. Not content with vexing and harassing you whenever you went from home, they came here to put strife into your family. You have been told that the Prince Regent and his Ministers are firm. Sir, we never calculated on their receding, but on the energies and force of the nation to obtain redress, and if we had been united, we should have equalled our most sanguine expectations. Let us follow their example, and determine to maintain our national rights, as they do to maintain their usurpations on them.

Mr. M. Clay seconded the motion of Mr. Macon to strike out "one year" and insert "five," as the term of enlistment. He said an army ought to be seasoned before it was carried into the field. We have heard much said, observed he, about sickness in your army; much of the sickness, some time ago, at New Orleans, and much lately of the sickness at Plattsburg. Have you ever heard of an army on earth that was carried into the field before it had been seasoned in the camp? It must, to be good for any thing, be first disciplined in camp, and become inured to the mode of living and the fare of soldiers. It will take some time to season men to the change in their mode of living which must take place on going into camp. It will take a year to prepare them for the field. Without discipline they will be useless. Your seamen are brave and successful because they know what they go to sea for. Take a landsman on board a ship, and what sort of a sailor will he make? Such as the French have on board their vessels. We take no man into the Navy but who understands his business and the purpose for which he goes there, and we see the effects of it. I do not wish it understood, sir, if I vote against the bill, that I am opposed to the war. No, sir. It is a righteous war, into which I go with hand and heart. We may differ about the mode, but that is all. I speak from experience more than from any thing else. Let us raise a sufficient army to serve during the war, be it long or short. It is absurd to suppose that we shall not succeed in our enterprise against the enemy's provinces. We have the Canadas as much under our command as she has the ocean; and the way to conquer her on the ocean is to drive her from the land. I am not for stopping at Quebec or anywhere else; but I would take the whole continent from them, and ask them no favors. Her fleets cannot then rendezvous at Halifax as now, and having no place of resort in the North, cannot infest our coast as they have lately done. It is as easy to conquer them on the land as their whole navy could conquer ours on the ocean. As to coping with them at sea, we cannot do it. We can annoy them, but not meet them on the open sea. I would meet them and hurt them, however, where we can. We must take the continent from them. I wish never to see a peace till we do. God has given us the power and the means; we are to blame if we do not use them. If we get the continent, she must allow us the freedom of the sea. I hope, sir, the amendment of my friend from North Carolina, going to make this army more efficient, may be adopted.

Mr. Pleasants said, before the question was taken, he wished to submit a few of the reasons why he was opposed to the amendment. The question before the House, if he correctly understood it, was not, what were the best materials of which to make an army; whether men for the war, for five years, or for twelve months; but the question was, what is the kind of force, and for what length of time can you raise an army to take the field at the earliest period? I hesitate not a moment, Mr. P. said, to declare, that if it were within the compass of our ability to raise an army for five years by voting it, I would authorize it. Not a moment should I doubt on the subject. The history of the world is strongly in favor of such an army. But we perfectly know, from the progress of the recruiting service, that we have already authorized as many men of that description as we shall probably be able to raise. This force is wanted to render the next campaign efficient. I consider the bill merely as a substitute for the volunteer system heretofore pursued. Of what materials will this army be composed? Of young men ready to volunteer their services for one year in the form of regulars; and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, men will enlist in this corps who would not enlist for five years, or for the war. I am sanguine in the opinion, that this measure, if now adopted, will do away the defects of the present volunteer system, and I am fully of opinion, that under it, a force may be drawn into the field ready to act efficiently in the next campaign. I am not one of those, sir, notwithstanding the accounts we have heard of our disasters, who despair of the Republic. If we turn to history we shall find that we have never engaged in any war in which we have come out better in the first campaign than we have in this. Look at the war undertaken under the auspices of Gen. Washington against the Indians. What was the history of it? We all recollect the campaign under Harmar, and its bloody scenes. The campaign under St. Clair cannot be forgotten. We then suffered defeat upon defeat, disaster upon disaster, in the course of the war, which was not terminated till the treaty of Greenville, in 1795, though it may be said to have virtually terminated by the defeat of the Indians by General Wayne, which occurred previous to the treaty. If this country be willing to go into the contest heart and hand, we shall in a very short time demonstrate to the enemy all we want to convince her of, that it is in reality her interest to be at peace with this country. I hope, sir, the motion to amend the bill will not prevail. I am perfectly convinced that the bill as it is will enable us to call a valuable force into service, and I am sanguine in the hope, that, with its aid, together with the other force we shall have, we may clear the continent of the enemy's dominion in one campaign, though I do not undertake to predict that we shall.

The question was then taken on Mr. Macon's proposed amendment, and lost.

The question recurred on the passage of the bill to a third reading.

Mr. Pearson said, not unfrequently it happens, Mr. Speaker, both in private and political life, that men of the clearest perceptions and most correct motives, experience much difficulty and embarrassment in determining on the course best to be pursued, or the application of means best calculated to produce a given object. The object most devoutly wished for by myself, and, no doubt, equally desired by every honest and honorable man in this community, is, that my country should once more be restored to the enjoyment of peace. Under the pressure of existing circumstances, involved in a war with a powerful nation – a war now prosecuted for a doubtful, or, at least, strongly controverted question of national right – a war, the prosecution of which, so far as relates to our military operations, has everywhere, and on all occasions, been attended with disgrace, defeat, or disaster; under such circumstances, I confess, sir, I am not free from embarrassment in determining on the course demanded by genuine patriotism, or best calculated to restore the blessings of peace to the country. I rejoiced to hear the honorable Chairman of the Military Committee (Mr. D. R. Williams) declare, the other day, that his object was also peace. It must be a source of gratification to the country to learn that some of the strongest advocates for the declaration of war begin now to think and talk of peace.

The honorable gentleman, however, urges the passage of the bill under consideration, (which authorizes the enlistment of twenty thousand additional regular troops for one year; and provides for the appointment of proportionally an unusual number of officers, with all the accompanying paraphernalia of an army,) as the means best calculated to produce the end in view. Did I believe, sir, that the passage of this bill, or (what is more difficult and less likely to happen) the actual enlistment of the proposed additional force would secure to us our object, I would not only consent to give this force, but ten times the number, if it were by force alone to be obtained; but when I reflect on the special and sole cause for which it is avowed the war is now prosecuted; when I consider the relative strength, situation, and disposable force, by sea and land, of the two nations, and especially when my recollection is assailed (for we cannot, nor ought we to close our senses against such damning facts) with the heretofore scanty enlistments; the confusion and insubordination which has pervaded many parts of your army; the extraordinary expense already incurred, and the uniform disasters which have marked all your military operations, I cannot bring my mind to the belief that the force now proposed can produce any desirable effect.

Mr. Speaker: As much as I was opposed to the declaration of war, and as much as subsequent events have convinced me of the correctness of the vote I gave on that momentous question, it is not my purpose on this occasion to question the policy of that unfortunate act. My mind is bent on peace; to that object my efforts are directed. The impression is strongly fixed on my understanding, that this war can be terminated with honor and advantage to this nation, without the further effusion of human blood. If so, surely no Christian will deny but justice, humanity, and sound policy demand that nothing should remain undone, on our part, to stop this career of carnage and bloodshed. I have said, sir, that it is my impression that this war can be terminated with honor and advantage to this nation, without a further appeal to arms. In stating this opinion, I do not mean to be understood as identifying the honor of the nation with the honor of those by whom the war was declared; or, in other words, I do not admit that the national honor rests solely in the hands of those who may happen to be in the Administration, or who may happen to constitute a majority in Congress. No, sir, this is an elective Government – the power and ultimate responsibility rest with the people; they cannot be dishonored unless they pertinaciously approve of unwise or wicked measures, and continue to support the authors of such measures. It is, therefore, not with me a primary consideration, in the suggestions I am about to make, how far the honor or reputation, for political wisdom, of any individuals may be affected by the adoption of the plan for peace which has occurred to my mind. I do not know that any honorable gentleman will be affected by it, should it be adopted. I hope he will not; to me it is perfectly indifferent who are in power, so that the affairs of the nation are well conducted.

Mr. Speaker: Whatever may have been the original causes for the declaration of this war, we are now taught to believe that the question in contest is reduced to a single point. The British Orders in Council were repealed on the 21st of June, three days after our declaration of war; and, of course, without a knowledge of that event, the blockade of May, 1806, had long ceased to exist. The sole avowed cause, therefore, remaining, and for which the war is now carried on, is the practice of impressment from on board our merchant vessels. This subject has for many years engaged the attention of both nations; it has been a fruitful theme of execration and declamation for almost every editor and orator of the age. Great as our cause of complaint may have been, (and I am not disposed to palliate it,) it must be admitted by all who understand the nature and true bearing of the question, that it had been subjected to much exaggeration. Permit me, sir, to remark, that notwithstanding the importance, the difficulty, and delicacy which have been justly attributed to this subject, and the unwillingness at all times manifested on the part of the British Government to abandon or derogate from the abstract right of impressing her own seamen from on board neutral merchant vessels, it is very far from being certain that she has not been willing to enter into such arrangement with this Government, as would place the question of impressment on a basis both safe and honorable to this nation. By a reference to the correspondence of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney with the British Commissioners, which preceded the treaty concluded by those gentlemen in the year 1806, but which was unfortunately rejected by the then President, it is evident that the interest of impressment was, in the opinion of those gentlemen, placed on a footing well calculated to secure our own seamen from the abuse against which we had complained, and against which it was our duty to protect them. This opinion was not only expressed in forcible and decisive language at the time of entering into the arrangement, but repeated by Mr. Monroe more than a year after, in a formal letter to the Secretary of State. The language of that gentleman, now your Secretary of State, is peculiarly emphatic, and must be within the recollection of every gentleman in this House. Without troubling the House with the reading of the documents referred to, it is sufficient for me to state, that your present Secretary of State did, in a letter addressed to Mr. Madison, dated February 28, 1808, declare "that he always believed, and did still believe, that the ground on which the interest of impressment was placed by the paper of the British Commissioners of the 8th of November, 1806, and the explanations which accompanied it, was both honorable and advantageous to the United States."