Kitabı oku: «Ethnic Entrepreneurs Unmasked», sayfa 2
Many scientists and human rights activists hold that integration policies of Bulgarian government targeting minorities, especially those that relate to the Roma, failed to produce any significant outcomes (Grekova 2008, Rechel 2008). In addition to that, the inability of the state to combat crime has direct repercussions on ethnopolitics. The minorities, Roma and Turks in particular, are most vulnerable when it comes to the practices of control over voting (Stoychev 2016: 16, 25). Many political parties attempt to coerce and/or to manipulate constituencies to give them their unreserved support in the elections, but the ethnic formation MRF is a sui generis leader in these illegal practices (ibid.: 51, 54). Political parties work together with organized crime in order to place voters under control (ibid.: 24).
The analysis of the relationship between political institutions and ethnicity reveals that the state cannot be a source of ethnicity (Dronzina 2004: 136). In ethnically heterogeneous Balkan societies “ethnicity is a source of legitimacy of the state and a power resource”22 (ibid.). The relatively stable proportions between the variables related to ethnicity23 are conducive to the better accommodation of ethnic communities, even when the institutions are severely weakened and damaged, as was the case between 1992 and the spring of 1997 (Dronzina 2004: 134, 136). This conclusion, however, has been disputed by the PRR. In 2016, the presidential nominee of the United Patriots and leader of Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO)—Krasimir Karakachanov—warned24 about the dangerous “Islamization of Bulgaria” and the potential for it to transform into a “Gipsy State” (Offnews.bg 2016). In response to such fears, skillfully ignited by politicians, scholars point to the fact that, for example, Bulgarian Turks have been loyal to Bulgarian state for decades (Arsenova and Kertikov 2002). The predominant majority of the ethnic Turks living in the country are Sunnis. Unlike Albanian Islamists in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania “most of them are not involved in large-scale criminal activities”; the MRF never had separatist ambitions nor it intended to make Bulgaria a “binational state”; Bulgarian Roma have relatively limited political claims—the problems and objectives that they voice are primarily economic (ibid.). For these reasons, the implementation of a “Kosovo scenario” on Bulgarian territory is highly unlikely (Arsenova and Kertikov 2002).
The beginning of the new millennium was marked by significant changes in Bulgaria’s party system that had repercussions on the ethnic relations (Smilov 2007, 2008). PRR parties such as Ataka, which entered the political scene in 2005, bluntly defied the unwritten rules of transition and started a fierce crusade against the “privileges” of minorities (Smilov 2008: 50). At present the party system is in the stage of cartel, a situation that can be observed in many European countries (ibid.: 39–40). Caught in an ideological vacuum, more parties may decide to mobilize the electorate through radicalization of their messages. An extreme radicalization can take the shape of an acute attack on “human rights and the rule of law, especially the protection of minorities” (Smilov 2008: 41). The contemporary Bulgarian nationalism, according to some scholars, is not aggressive (Nedelcheva 2007: 113). It does not rely on the condition that proponents must identify with the state—the individual vision for Bulgaria (i.e., what the country represents) is in fact mostly limited to family values, friends, and birthplace (ibid.). However a retreat in the family life, a barricading, or entrenchment in the home space pose the threat of re-ethnicizing of nationalism—such a trend is observed mostly among Bulgarians and Turks and, to a lesser extent, among Roma (Kabakchieva 2008: 94). From this perspective, under such circumstances, other ethnic groups may begin to look “foreign” and “dangerous,” and, ultimately, to become “enemies.” This process can lead to the resuscitation of “traumatic nationalism of survival,” which then will channel ethnic strife. Between 15% and 20% of Bulgarian citizens would support a patriotic party that bases its propaganda on constant reminders to the public of the glorious pages of Bulgarian history, the national ideals, and, possibly, a protectionist economic policy (ibid.: 94). Such a party would have to compete primarily with parties like GERB25 and Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), whose electorates share such values. It would neither endanger the niche of aggressive nationalism, occupied by parties like the Bulgarian National Union (BNU), nor threaten the existence of Ataka, since the latter is concerned mostly with a criticism of corrupt elites and the injustices brought by the transition to democracy rather than with purely nationalistic goals and values (Kabakchieva 2008: 94–5).
Several hypotheses lie at the heart of this work. The first is that the contemporary Bulgarian ethnic model is not a fixed political construct, as it is often perceived, but underwent significant developments in the last 27 years. Thus far the political system is able to prevent the occurrence of serious ethnic conflicts. The integration measures undertook by the government notwithstanding, various studies bespeak that the social distances between the main ethnicities in Bulgaria are increasing (Pamporov 2008, 2016).26 The second hypothesis reads that the political system reflects the interests of minority ethnic groups in a mostly superficial way that typically not only does not exceed but is below the minimal standards. Many of the Roma, for example, live in conditions that are often indistinguishable from modern forms of slavery. The political institutions are unwilling to commit to tangible, real integration measures due to the resistance toward distributive justice which the predominant part of Bulgarians display when the target or the beneficiaries of such measures are minorities.
The third hypothesis postulates that political populism thriving as a result of the impotence of the “old” ideologies and convergence of left and right can give birth to the greatest threat for ethnic peace. The low wages and pensions, especially compared to the EU average, strengthen even further the iron grip of populists and ethnic entrepreneurs. The radicalization of nationalist rhetoric and the policies influenced by it deepen the sclerosis of political system, clogging the channels of political participation—which is a ramification of, for example, the attempt to limit the social benefits for minorities. The result is that new, fervent outbreaks of interethnic tension emerge constantly.
This book has the following objectives: to verify the hypotheses and to promote a better understanding of the essence of the Bulgarian ethnic model, its mechanism, its building blocks, and its advantages and vulnerabilities. In order to achieve these objectives, I have used the following methods: legal and political analysis of laws and regulations, a secondary analysis of statistical information, party programs, slogans, political messages, etc. The project reveals the way the institutions function and interact in resolving or instigating ethnic conflicts. It provides an assessment of the performance of these institutions and helps to map the dynamics and outline the possible stages in the development of the Bulgarian ethnic model. On the basis of the findings I make recommendations and formulate future scenarios for the development of political institutions and ethnic relations.
1. An Institutional Approach to Ethnic Conflicts
1.1 The debate—institutionalists and their opponents
The contemporary violent conflicts have numerous idiosyncrasies, which distinguish them from their predecessors. Today they are more often based on cultural differences; most of the time, unlike their predominantly interstate character in the past, their fires are burning within the borders of political communities (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 5); they are marked with ferocity, which leads to a drastic increase in the number of victims of the civilian population.27 The interethnic conflicts occur more often in or between the states that once belonged to the Communist bloc (on the territories of the former Soviet Union and the Balkans)28 in comparison to the Western liberal polities,29 but also in juxtaposition to other states with predominantly Muslim population, as well as to other less developed but well-consolidated democracies. Nowadays, more than ever, it is imperative to identify the causes of ethnic conflicts, which often predetermine the fate of entire nations. The institutional approach to these issues is part of the toolbox of a plethora of different theories. In this work, I refer to concepts coined and supported by leading institutionalists (e.g., Crawford and Lipschutz 1998). It would not be possible to represent and submit to a critical analysis the institutional approach to the study of conflicts in its entirety. The answers, which this approach provides, might be best understood in the context of the debate with rival interpretations.
According to the primordialists30 (Geertz 1973, Van Den Berghe 1978, Vanhanen 1991, Grosby 1994), “the centuries of accumulated hatred” between ethnic groups are rooted within the very essence of humans (Grosby 1994: 168). Ethnocentrism and racism are forms of nepotism, which assumed monstrous proportions. They have a tendency to favor the blood relatives at the expense of the others, because altruism and cooperation are genetically programmed to be triggered by the biological code of the common origin.31 The moment the grip of government is weakened, people start to look for and find a mainstay in life in national identity or in what passes as such. Primordialism, however, fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the question why some ethnic groups manage to live together in a relative peace (e.g., Bulgarians and Turks after 1989, French and Germans in Alsace-Lorraine, and Muslim Malays and Chinese Christians in Malaysia). The main disadvantage of primordialism is that it ignores the fact that differences in cultural identity do not necessarily lead to conflict. For this reason, at the center of the institutional approach lies the understanding that the conflict potential of the cultural, in particular, ethnic identity is unlocked only when it is politicized, that is when it becomes a criterion for discrimination and privileges in the struggle for the distribution of political and economic resources (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 11). Primordialists do not recognize the role of state institutions in the management of conflicts: in fact, the government can appease the latter (e.g., it can channel groups’ interests by means of legislative changes), legitimize, instigate, or even create and cultivate them.
The security dilemma approach (Butterfield 1951, Herz 1959, Jervis 1976) sometimes referred to also as “the spiral model,” developed by John Herz in his monograph Political Realism and Political Idealism (1951), offers an alternative explanation. Unlike primordialism, this approach accepts the importance of state institutions. When these institutions de facto cease to exist and anarchy prevails, security becomes a priority. Ironically, the measures that a group takes in this situation to ensure its safety (e.g., the development of new weapons and/or the modernization of the available arsenal and its expansion) provoke the fears of others. They now take similar actions, which are perceived as a threat by the first party. The result is, often, an arms race and a conflict escalation. In Herz’s own words, the security dilemma is a structural notion in which “the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening” (Herz 1950: 157). The security dilemma describes the mechanism of this vicious circle, which leads to a higher risk of using violence. The problem with this approach, according to institutionalists, is that, in the first place, it was developed originally for the needs of the theory of international relations and (tacitly and erroneously) puts on the same footing the interactions between countries with those between groups (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 12). In the second place, it accepts not unlike the primordialists that groups have a priori incompatible political interests and therefore the only question is under what conditions their clash will become of violent nature. Third, the security dilemma approach naively paints and supports a one-dimensional image of the role of institutions as a “good shepherd,” while their functions are much more complex. The institutions are guided by the “logic of the political game” (Levy et al. 1995) and, even if one of their tasks is to channel conflicts, they do not treat all conflicts equally. Institutions not only impose restrictions on the political actors, but can also provide incentives in order to influence political preferences. They could further prohibit discrimination and, instead, emphasize on competition between classes and ideologies or they could politicize ethnic identity. Fourth, Herz’s approach does not explain why interethnic strife and violence sometimes rage in political systems with strong and, in general, legitimate institutions neither it outlines the reasons for the failure or the demise of the latter.
The approach of liberal democracy and free market (Fukuyama 1992, Bhalla 1994, Whitehead 1995) affirms that they contribute to the aggregation and representation of all interests in society, by replacing conflicts based on ethnic identity with these, which stem from (economic) interests. The logic of this approach is that democratic polities and institutions are steered by individual rights rather than those of social collectivities. It is the individuals who are protected by the law and have the right of political participation. Wherever there are religious or ethnic conflicts, they can be successfully regulated and/or resolved, if the organizational principles of the political system recognize the necessity of tolerance and social cohesion. The theorists of consociational democracy32 (McGarry and O’Leary 1993, Lijphart 1968, 1977, 1994, 1999) and federalism (Stain 1968) support this view. Although this approach, which sees liberal democracy as a panacea for ethnic conflicts, is in its nature institutional, it is not unconditionally accepted even among the institutionalists.33 One well-known theory, which embraces this approach, is Francis Fukuyama’s concept of the “end of history” which was first formulated in an article for National Interest published in 1989.
Inspired by the “velvet revolutions” in Central and Eastern Europe, Fukuyama proclaims the triumph of liberal democracy. As an unlikely last stop in the “ideological evolution of mankind” and “last form of government,” it marks the “end of history” because it cultivates optimal conditions for the realization of human “desire for recognition,”34 scientific progress, and economic prosperity (Fukuyama 1992: xvii). It was, in a sense, “the VCRs [videocassette recorders] which actually won the Cold War” and led to the collapse of the communist regimes behind the Iron Curtain (Fukuyama 1992: xi, 98–108). One of the main arguments for the superiority of liberal democracy, according to the American political scientist, is that it forces the retreat of irrational forms of the desire for recognition such as nationalism; it soothes societies divided by ethnic cleavages and promotes consensus. The neoconservative project of Fukuyama was, however, met with considerable and, often, fierce criticisms. The “homogenizing,” “integrating,” and “pacifying” potential of the institutions of the liberal democracy is seen as particularly controversial. In response to Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington postulated the concept of the “clash of civilizations”35 (Huntington 2011), while immediately after the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, the American journalist Fareed Zakaria sarcastically declared “the end of the end of history.”
Following the Hegelian Alexandre Kojève,36 Fukuyama perceives the existence of the EU as compelling evidence that liberal democracies can overcome national, ethnic, or cultural differences, and build a working supranational political system. The Bulgarian case after 1989 seems to be particularly relevant for the viability of Fukuyama’s project. The country, which is an EU member, is often held up as an example of a stable multiethnic polity. The peaceful coexistence in close proximity in the center of the capital Sofia of four religious institutions (the Orthodox Church “St. Nedelya,” the Catholic cathedral “St. Joseph,” the mosque “Banya Bashi,” and the Sofia Synagogue) is even referred to as “a cliche of multiculturalism” (Detrez and Segaert 2008: 55). Notwithstanding, European leaders such as Chancellor Angela Merkel, Prime Minister David Cameron, and President Nicolas Sarkozy announced the fiasco of the policies and ideas of multiculturalism, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban defended the need to build an “illiberal state,” because liberalism is the god that failed (Traub 2015). Furthermore, the events in front of the same mosque “Banya Bashi” in 2011 unequivocally indicate that the interethnic tensions in Bulgaria are on the rise. I claim that the main thesis of Fukuyama cannot be supported because of its historicism and holistic zeal (in the sense of Karl Popper37). The institutions of liberal democracy in many cases are an effective means to control and overcome the tensions between ethnic groups. However, the economic inequalities caused by the policy of accelerated liberalization and the long-term effects of globalization can easily turn against the liberal political practices, undermining their foundations, while fanning and feeding the flames of ethnic conflict. This conclusion is supported by the analysis of the current Bulgarian ethnic model. In fact, Fukuyama himself, as we shall see, revised and reevaluated in his later writings the positions advocated in The End of History (Fukuyama 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2012, 2013).
Regardless of the many aspects of the institutional approach, we can outline several major points on which its proponents maintain relative consensus. They correspond to the questions raised in the debate with rival theories. First, as already mentioned, not the ethnic identity itself, but its politicization creates preconditions for conflict. Politicization traditionally became the path of colonization (as was, for example, in the Ottoman Empire through the institution of millet,38 or in India, as part of the British Empire) or it was engineered within political systems by their elites (e.g., in the United States such a role had the segregation laws known as “Jim Crow,” while in Russia similar function had the temporary regulations regarding Jews—also known as the “May” anti-Semitic laws, introduced by Emperor Alexander III, in 1882–1914). The political importance of cultural cleavages will be strengthened or even “invented”—artificially created where existing “faults” in society are legitimated by state institutions. In particular, economic discrimination and preferential status based on ascribed (ethnic, religious, etc.) signs make cultural identity politically significant (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 26). Conversely, second, the political relevance of identity may be reduced if it is sanctioned by those in power (ibid.: 18). The stronger and more legitimate the institutions, the greater their chances to weaken the political significance of differences or to transform the volatile tensions between groups into nonviolent competition (we observe this situation in Adjara, an autonomous republic within Georgia; Malaysia, where political parties operate on the basis of ethnicity; another example is South Africa after the abolition of apartheid).
Third, if the institutions are illegitimate in the eyes of groups deprived of access to resources, but still can, nonetheless, effectively exercise coercion, the discontent will be kept under control (e.g., the Georgians in Abkhazia, or South Africa before 1990). It follows that, fourth, when the repressive institutions are weakened or they collapse we can expect the eruption of interethnic strife (such as the violent conflicts that accompanied or followed the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia—in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, etc.). The collapse of institutions could be the result of the influence of internal or external factors, such as, in particular, the short-sighted economic policies or the negative effects of globalization.39 Fifth, ethnic entrepreneurs will be facilitated in their actions and have more chances to mobilize support for their “programs” when the ethnic card was previously used by the eroded or nonexisting state apparatus; when minorities are, comparably, more affected than the rest of population by unfavorable economic conditions or liberalization; and when these “entrepreneurs” can offer political resources to the affected by the crisis40 (e.g., Vladislav Ardzinba in Abkhazia, Slobodan Milošević in Serbia, and Franjo Tuđman in Croatia).
These guiding points in the interpretation of conflicts can be illustrated and confirmed by comparing the political institutions of Republic of South Africa (RSA) before and after 1991, when the system of racial segregation, the apartheid,41 was abolished and denounced by the South African politicians. Racial segregation in South Africa already existed during the period of the Dutch and British colonial rule. Its foundations were laid in the seventeenth century. Apartheid became official state policy after the elections in 1948. It was conducted through several laws passed by the National Party, which were headed by Protestant priest Daniel François Malan (1874–1959). Legislation classified inhabitants into four racial groups—“black,” “white,” “colored,” and “Indian.” The last two groups were divided into several subclassifications.42 On the basis of this “distinction,” the residential areas were segregated.43 Apart from the white the other racial groups were not represented politically. The “black people” were deprived of citizenship. The government segregated public transport, hospitals, schools, universities, etc. The marriages and sexual contacts between the races were prohibited. The apartheid was the subject of fierce resistance of the oppressed ethnic groups and placed South Africa in international isolation, but because of the effective power of the repressive state institutions, it was maintained for decades.
The analyses and evaluations of the contemporary political system of South Africa, after the abolition of apartheid, are contradictory. Thanks to the country’s liberal constitution and, in particular, the positive role of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, initiated by President Nelson Mandela, the re-politicization of ethnic identity has so far been avoided. The role of ethnic cleavages as main generator of conflicts has been replaced, however, by fierce class polarization.44 Although the RSA has been ranked fifth in Africa in terms of income per capita, nearly one-quarter of the population of 58.9 million is unemployed. The country, which has 11 official languages, is marked by growing xenophobia and violence against immigrants (Crush and Pendleton 2004). The political repressions have been resumed under the rule of the current president of South Africa and leader of the African National Congress—Jacob Zuma (Buccus 2011). These facts raise concerns for the future.
If the example of the apartheid in South Africa seems too distant or “exotic” compared to the situation in Bulgaria, one has to take a look at the Roma ghettoes and de facto segregated schools that continue to exist in the small Balkan state.45 The following section, which examines the reasons for the painful decay and violent decomposition of Yugoslavia, provides a further, more detailed illustration of the institutionalists’ approach to ethnic conflicts. The ethnic relations in this former neighbor of our country bare some striking similarities to the ethnic models operating in Bulgaria. I use the insights of the study of SFRY as a fundament of the analysis of the Bulgarian case.
