Kitabı oku: «Ethnic Entrepreneurs Unmasked», sayfa 3
1.2 A historical “autopsy”—explaining the demise of SFRY
The literature that embarks on the Sisyphean task to rationalize the violent dissolution of the Yugoslav federation46 is voluminous. There are several rival camps offering competing theories. The essentialist or primordial perspective stresses the importance of the “Balkan temperament” and the “ancient hatreds” which were unleashed by the collapse of the communist regime (Silber and Little 1991, Vodopivec 1992, Kaplan 1993, Mearsheimer and Pape 1993, Gligorov 1995). An alternative school of thought points at the international forces as the central causes (Cvii 1993, Higgins 1993, Nuttal 1994, Pavlowitch 1994, Rief 1994).47 Some scholars see the culprit in the processes of economic liberalization and global integration, which in their view undermined the institutions of the Yugoslav federal state (Woodward 1995). On their turn, the instrumentalists emphasize the role of political entrepreneurs such as Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman who exploited the ethnic cleavages and instigated ethnic hatred in order to mobilize supporters in their quest for power (Bookman 1994, Denitch 1994, Bose 1995, Zimmerman 1995). There are numerous objections to all of these approaches that cast a serious shadow on their heuristic value.48 I shall not discuss them further. Instead I shall examine the institutionalist analysis in Crawford and Lipschutz’s The Myth of Ethnic Conflict,49 which in my opinion offers a deeper insight.
Institutionalists highlight the very nature of the principle of ethnofederalism, around which Yugoslavia’s political system was built (which bears similarities to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union). Ethnofederalism, in general, is characterized by structures of accountability and opportunities for resource control that prompt officials at both central (federal) and local levels to privilege specific ethnic constituencies. As the federal system of Yugoslavia weakened and the local officials relied more and more on the support of their ethnic constituencies rather than the central government, the logic of identity politics strengthened. The creation of ethnic nationalist parties and the interethnic political rivalry was rooted in the institutional legacies. The effects of bandwagoning in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, on the eve of the violent ethnic conflicts, drastically reduced the chances of nonnationalist alternative parties (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 205–7).
The analysis must also take into account the traumatic heritage of the Second World War during which Croatian and Bosnian Muslim elites allied with the Nazis against the Serbs.50 President Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) believed that the federal polity, established as a system of six ethnic republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia), and enshrined in the Constitution of the SFRY promulgated on January 31, 1946, would provide better guarantees for the national equality than the previous unitary state51 (Christman 1970: 56). However, unlike the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and, especially, the Soviet Union, the federal system in Yugoslavia was noncentralized52 and the constituent units exercised a large degree of authority. The 1946 Constitution stipulated that all mineral wealth, power resources, means of communication, and foreign trade are under the control of the federal government. However, the latter could take decisions on a very limited number of issues without the approval of the constituent units (Koštunica 1988: 78–92).
La raison d'être of the institutions of ethnofederalism was to transform the politically charged ethnic identities into much safer cultural identities. The Constitution essentially differentiated between two types of national groupings that were in hierarchical relations (Peši 1996: 10). On the one hand, Serbs, Slovenes, Croats, Macedonians, and Montenegrins were territorially organized in republics in which they had the position of “constituent nations.” The census conducted in 1971 recognized Muslims as a separate nation and in 1974 it was declared (following the national principle) that Serbs, Croats, and Muslims are the constituent nations of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, there was, however, a significant number of “others” (Jews, Czechs, Romanians, Russians, Bulgarians, Romani, Vlachs, Albanians, and Hungarians) who were less represented in the political institutions. Nonetheless, after the legislative amendments in 1974, Kosovo (with a majority of Albanian population) and Vojvodina (with a Hungarian majority) gained increasing autonomy and enjoyed equal representation at the federal level with the six constituent nations.
The principle of federalism was implemented in two distinct ways (or at two different levels). The Federal Assembly consisted of a Federal Council (for which citizens voted as Yugoslavs) and a Chamber of Nationalities (in which citizens were represented as nations and nationalities). The objective of this system was to achieve a balance between the interests of all peoples of Yugoslavia. Tito realized that if even one of the constituent nations was favored by the masters of the political game, the hegemon could jeopardize the whole system.53 The constituent nations, in principle, had equal say. Since they were far from being homogenous,54 the territorial ethnofederalism was cemented with ethnic quotas for the allocation of resources. The appointments to public office followed “a formula for the proportional representation, or sometimes of the equal representation,” of individuals by constituent nation/nationality (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 210). The reforms created socioeconomic divisions that transcended ethnic cleavages and were potentially cross-cutting. This essentially meant that the various ethnic groups who belonged to the same socioeconomic class had more in common with each other than with their ethnic compatriots; thus ideological consensus and division could potentially overcome regional and cultural differences (ibid.: 216).
The integration policies initially relied on Marxist ideology and oppression. The public debates on ethnic issues were stifled and prosecuted.55 The demands of the ethnic groups had to be voiced in economic and social terms in order to be accepted as legitimate by the institutions.56 Although these restrictive measures were largely abandoned in the 1960s, the expression of nationalism continued to be illegal as was, for example, the incitement to discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, and ethnicity. Two political institutions—the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav National Army—as well as the allocative policies that privileged partisans from all national groups who fought against fascism had important roles in the integration processes. These helped to build new types of solidarity (mainly on the grounds of the Marxist ideology which corroborated the belief that one day all ethnic groups will become a single Yugoslav nation) and were, to a certain extent, successful in their attempt to mitigate the painful ethnic cleavages. In fact, there was an abundance of evidence, which suggested that the economic cleavages, mainly between the urban and rural population,57 were more important than the ethnic ones. In addition to that, the regional divisions became even deeply rooted than socioeconomic and ideological cleavages (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 220–2).
The entities in the Yugoslav federation were not equally developed economically. The two main objectives of the economic planners were to maintain a high rate of growth in conjunction with a reduction of the intraregional economic disparities. For these reasons, each five-year plan demanded the equalization of conditions in the regions. As a result of these policies, the republics fought bitterly over their share of the investment funds distributed by the federal government. Slovenia and Croatia were the richest and the most efficient and they demanded that resources be allocated by efficiency criteria. Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Montenegro were poorer. They fought for funds as development subsidies, because all funds were administered from a central General Investment Fund and the industrial development was regulated by the central government:
Divisions among the republics over investment took the form of centre-region controversies. The poorer republics were dependent on the centre for development funds, and the richer republics wanted autonomy from the centre to free them from subsidies and regulation. In addition […] partisan elites pressed for regional credit allocations based on political criteria rewarding partisan loyalty and punishing those who had opposed the partisans in the war. (Ibid.: 218)
In a nutshell, the policies of central economic planning and distribution of resources created discontent among all entities of the federation.58 The policies had two important consequences: first, the disputes that they instigated fueled constitutional debates which in turn exacerbated the conflicts between the regions as the attempts for their resolution weakened the administrative center of Yugoslavia; second, they led to the development of regional and republican loyalties that were stronger than the loyalty to the federation (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 220–1). The entrenchment of ethnofederalism, which politicized cultural identity, consolidated the power of the local elites and thus made cultural divisions even deeper. The legislative changes in 1953, 1963 (when a new constitution was drafted), and 1967, which were designed to appease the rivalries between the republics and to combat the deepening economic problems, favored the decentralization as a solution. Ironically, the result was further economic decline. The central government grew weaker and the disintegration of the market “into eight mercantilist and protectionist regional fiefdoms” hindered efficiency and growth59 (Rusinow 1985: 140–2). The strengthening of the Chamber of Nationalities, “at the expense” of the federal chamber which was downgraded, bolstered ethnic and regional political power and embittered ethnic tensions. Because representation in the Chamber of Nationalities was based on the principles of equality and proportionality, each of the six republics, regardless of the size of their population, had 20 delegates. This meant, essentially, that Serbs, who had about 40% of the total population of the federation, had only 14% of the votes in the Chamber—the same as the Slovenes, who represented merely 8.5%. This formula of representation benefitted the smaller and richer republics in order to compensate them for the disproportional burden in the regional development policy that they bore. However, the policy backfired because it channeled resentments and privileges “away from territorially defined republics and directed them toward specific ethnic groups”; thus, “Serbs began to resent Croats, not just Croatia” (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 225).
The devolution reached a climax in the constitution adopted in 1974, which virtually transformed Yugoslavia into confederation. The authority retained by the center was further restricted and confined mainly to the fields of foreign policy, defense, and the protection of national rights.60 The principle of proportional representation in federal appointments was abandoned in favor of complete equality between the constituent entities61 regardless of the population size. In short, the smaller subjects of the federation were highly overrepresented, while the larger ones were acutely underrepresented. The legacy of ethnofederalism thus had three main consequences: the demise of the authority of the center which effectively put an end to the federal protection of the rights of minorities and provided incentives for the local politicians to exploit ethnic resentments; it prevented the formation of coalitions across ideological lines that could help to consolidate the dissolving federation; and it also blocked the possibility of coalitions across regional lines (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 238–39). The gates were opened wide for ethnic violence to enter the political scene.
1.3 The Bulgarian ethnic models
We can distinguish between four models of ethnic relations,62 consolidated through the legislation, which existed in Bulgaria after its liberation in 1878 from the Ottoman yoke.63 The chief mark of the government policies toward minorities until 1989 was their highly contradictory character. One of the invaluable lessons from the analysis of the collapse of the Yugoslav federation is that, in general, the conflict potential of ethnic identity can be unlocked and storm out of control when it becomes a criterion that determines access to (power) resources, i.e., when identity is politicized. Such politicization was present in all three models before 1989. The first of them, “the archetype,” operated until 1944. Although some scholars claim that it was designed “to ensure the rights and freedoms of all ethnic groups and confessions” (Aresnova and Kertikov 2002), the reality was different.
As it is apparent from Table 1, the two largest minorities in the country since 1878 have always been the Turks and the Roma. As a whole the minorities did not have their own, significant presence in the political process until 1944, perhaps, even until 1989. Indeed, in the Constituent Assembly (February 10, 1878–April 18, 1879)—the first Bulgarian Parliament after 1878, there were 16 representatives of ethnic/religious minorities (12 Turks, 2 Greeks, 1 Jew, and 1 Bulgarian Protestant), or 6.9% of all members of the Assembly (Todorov 2010: 270). Nonetheless, this in fact was a confirmation of “the unwritten rule” that minorities might participate in politics but only as members of Bulgarian parties (Nazurska 1999: 19–22). After the term of the Constituent Assembly ended, the situation changed. There were no more Jewish or Greek members of the parliament.
Table 1. Main ethnic groups in Bulgaria since 1878
| Year | Bulgarians | % | Turks | % | Roma | % |
| 2011* | 5,664,624 | 84.8 | 588,318 | 8.8 | 325,343 | 4.9 |
| 2001 | 6,655,210 | 83.9 | 746,664 | 9.4 | 370,908 | 4.7 |
| 1992 | 7,271,185 | 85.7 | 800,052 | 9.4 | 313,396 | 3.7 |
| 1975 | 7,930,024 | 90.9 | 730,728 | 8.4 | ** | ** |
| 1946 | 5,903,580 | 84.0 | 675,500 | 9.6 | 170,011 | 2.4 |
| 1926 | 4,557,706 | 83.2 | 577,552 | 10.5 | 138,844 | 2.5 |
| 1900 | 2,888,219 | 77.1 | 531,240 | 14.2 | 89,549 | 2.4 |
Source: Miris (2001) and NSI (2011).
Note: *The data for 2011 are from the population census conducted in 2011 (see NSI 2011). The problem with these data is that they are not calculated on the basis of 100% of the population (the figures only reflect those who responded to the question regarding their ethnicity; 683,590 did not respond to this question). Therefore, it is hard to make comparisons with previous years.
**The asterisks in the table signify “no available data.”
The (Bulgarian) parties preferred “to work” with the “more compact” minorities of Turks and Pomaks, who were cautious and reluctant to express demands; this “formula” was continuously implemented until 1944 (Todorov 2010: 270). The Roma were almost completely excluded from the political process. For the most part (until 1934) the attitude of the authorities toward the Turks was tolerant. However the latter remained isolated politically. One of the reasons for that was their low literacy—only 6% of them were literate in 1910, 14.5% in 1934; among the Pomaks64 the respective numbers were 3.8% in 1910 and 8.6% in 1934 (Daskalov 2005: 36–8). Until 1944, Bulgarian Turks retained their religious autonomy, including the related Sharia traditional judicial system. Following the defeat in the First World War, Bulgaria signed an agreement on minority rights (1919). After 1934, however, began the policies of assimilation in the Rhodope Mountains. As far as other, smaller minorities are concerned, the Jews and Armenians were well integrated, at least until the beginning of 1940s (Todorov 2010: 270), when as an ally of the Nazi Third Reich, the Bulgarian government passed anti-Semitic laws (the Law on Protection of the Nation, 1941; the Law for the One-Off Tax on Property of Persons of Jewish Origin, 1941). Only the timely intervention of the monarch himself, members of the parliament, the Bulgarian Patriarchate, and the society as a whole saved from deportation to the concentration camps 48,000 Bulgarian Jews (Makariev 1999: 240).
Three other ethnic models have been established after the Second World War. Two of them operated under the totalitarian regime (1949–1989). The first one (until 1956), the “Dimitrov–Chervenkov” model, was characterized by the protectionist policy of cultural emancipation of ethnic communities through specifically designed for their (social) benefits. The second model (1956–1989) brought an abrupt change in the direction of “ethnic homogenization”65 (Kalinova and Baeva 2001). Still, some of the government measures had positive character, such as the rise of educational status of minorities, the formation of (minority) elites through special quotas in party-state apparatus, creating jobs, providing housing for the Turks and the Roma,66 etc. In December 1984, the government abandoned the policy of peaceful integration and began to forcefully change the Turkish-Arab names of Turks to Bulgarian (the official term used for this policy was “Revival Process” or “Process of Rebirth”). The process was not dissimilar to some of the previous policies of other Balkan countries toward their own minorities during the twentieth century, including the SFRY.
The third, currently operating in Bulgaria ethnic model, has been established after the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. This model provides much more significant means and possibilities for the protection of rights and the expression of the interests of the minorities, especially in comparison to its “predecessors” which operated in the conditions of ideological monism and one-party dominance. The model is supported, although not without problems, by the Constitution (1991), the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities ratified by the BNA (1995), the Act on Confessions (2002), the Protection against Discrimination Act (PADA, 2003), as well as, in general, the policies of the executive. At the heart of the model is the institutionalization of the ethnic cleavage. This has been achieved mainly through the party of the ethnic minorities—the MRF, founded in 1990—which has been represented in all Bulgarian parliaments after the democratic changes. The political support for the party comes predominantly from Bulgarian Turks (almost 90% of the electorate) followed by Roma and Pomaks.67 The movement has a prominent role in the postcommunist political system and has taken part in three governments. The party is also well represented at municipal level.68
There are several reasons why the politicization of ethnic identity during the totalitarian regime did not escalate to armed conflict or brought the collapse of government. First and foremost, unlike the entities of SFRY, the ethnic minorities in Bulgaria never enjoyed a territorial autonomy and thus avoided the potentially tormenting relationship with the administrative center which comes “bundled” with it, nor they had the history of independent (ethnically based) polities. Second, as opposed to the dying moments of SFRY, the Bulgarian totalitarian machine was, even during the final years of its existence and operation, powerful enough to suppress and keep within safe limits the fire of interethnic tensions, as well as to impose its public policies. Third, in general, the tolerant, political culture of the dominant ethnic group (Bulgarians) was a natural barrier to the political perversions and excesses of government. The Revival Process contributed to the delegitimization of the regime. Although the process embittered and deepened the ethnic cleavage, the actions of the establishment, who inspired the repressions, were not condoned by the majority of Bulgarians. Fourth, the very nature of the Orthodox Church (free of religious zeal or militantism) contributes to the relatively tolerant political culture of Bulgarian people. In general, the orthodox Christianity is characterized by deeply rooted passivity and contemplation. Perhaps these traits were further strengthened by mediaeval Hesychasm, which occupies an important place in Orthodox culture and spirituality. At the same time, the Islam which Bulgarian Turks profess has never been radical. Fifth, not without significance is the fact that a substantial part of the elite of the ethnic groups in this period was “created” and/or “recruited” by the state. Thus the ethnic tensions could be kept “under the hood.”
The question of mechanisms of politicization of ethnic identity is not sufficiently developed in the study edited by Crawford and Lipschutz (1998). In my view, depending on the subjects and objects of politicization, its intentional or rather inadvertent (unpremeditated) character, we can distinguish between several mechanisms serving this purpose. The first of them, as demonstrated above, is actually transforming ethnic identity “into an entry ticket” used to obtain political rights and economic resources. The subject of this politicization is the dominant ethnic group through the means of state institutions, including the repressive apparatus, which are controlled by it, while the objects are the subordinate ethnicities (examples from Bulgaria are the infamous attempts to assimilate Bulgarian Muslims in the 1930s, 1960s, and 1970s, as well as the Revival Process, 1984–1989). Second, the political mobilization, which tries to manipulate identity, can be directed to members of the own ethnic group. The mechanism often operates on the basis of invoked “existential” and “inevitable” “dilemma”—“it is either we or them.” In this fashion, “work” the slogans of Bulgarian PRR parties Ataka and National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB), which call for immediate action against the threat of “Osmanization” and “Turkish assimilation” of Bulgaria.69 The principal goal of this mechanism is to “awaken” or “activate” the ethnic group to which the political messages are targeted, by making it “aware” of its identity. Such messages, which are based on striking fears (of assimilation or even extermination—ethnocide, etc.), can also be directed toward the members of the ethnicity by its leaders. Ethnic minorities themselves (or their individual representatives) may decide or be forced by circumstances to politicize their identity in order to increase and optimize, if we use Ralf Dahrendorf’s dictum, their “life chances” (Dahrendorf 2007). The process can be aimed at inclusion into the dominant ethnic group (as was the objective of many of the founders of the organization “Rodina,” operating in the Rhodope Mountains during 1937–1947, who were in fact Bulgarian Muslims); or it can be led by duty to return to the “true fatherland” (as was during the emigration of thousands of Bulgarian Muslims to Turkey); it can further be an expression of political mobilization for the protection of the minority (e.g., the MRF rejects the claims that it is an ethnic party; in the same vein were the political messages and activities of Kamen Burov—the mayor of a village of Jyltusha, located in the eastern Rhodope Mountains, and the Democratic Labour Party,70 which he established in 1992). Third, the subject of politicization can be organizations, which are external to the country, while its objects are ethnicities that live in it. In this category belong the actions of Islamic missionaries among Bulgarian Muslims.
Fourth, the mechanism of, what I shall call, “involuntary politicization” must be studied separately. The measures of positive discrimination of state institutions to vulnerable ethnic groups, and the actions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in defense of these ethnicities often further enhance the negative stereotypes in the dominant ethnic group toward minorities. Thus, ironically, these measures politicize ethnic identity. For example, the need for desegregation in education and housing, which has been one of the chief causes of Bulgarian and foreign, international human rights organizations71 and activists promoting the rights of Roma, in general, is met by the cold shoulder of the dominant ethnicity, and (probably) further mobilizes public opinion against political minorities. Seventy-one percent of other ethnic groups believe that the segregated Roma neighborhoods (ghettos) should remain, while 57.6% of respondents reckon that “it will be better if Roma children do not attend the same school as Bulgarians” (Mantarova and Zaharieva 2007: 131–2). This taxonomy of mechanisms of politicization of ethnicity is by no means exhaustive. Different versions of these mechanisms operate in political practice and, almost always, work simultaneously.
