Kitabı oku: «Ethnic Entrepreneurs Unmasked», sayfa 4

1.4 Contemporary challenges to ethnic relations

The first challenge is the demographic crisis. The population growth in Bulgaria is negative (−0.83% for 2014) and is the fifth lowest in the world. Only Syria, Cook Islands, Moldova, and Saint Pierre and Miquelon have lower population growth (CIA 2014). The death rate for 2014 is 14.3, the sixth highest in the world (ibid.). In 1990–2005 between 937,000 and 1,200,000 left Bulgaria due to the acute economic crisis.72 According to the 2011 census, the population of Bulgaria is 7,364,570 people. Bulgarians are the largest ethnic group and comprise 84.8% of the population. Turkish and Roma minorities comprise 8.8% and 4.9%, respectively73; some 40 smaller minorities comprise 0.7%, and 0.8% do not self-identify with an ethnic group (NSI 2011). However these data should be taken with a grain of salt because they are not calculated on the basis of 100% of the population. According to the CIA World Factbook for 2014, the population of Bulgaria is actually significantly smaller or 6,924,716 people (July 2014 estimate).74 The demographic crisis, combined with the fact that the Roma are subject to a number of measures of positive discrimination, while distinguished by criminal activity that exceeds many times that of the other groups, fuels the extremely negative ethnic stereotypes toward this ethnic group (Mantarova and Zaharieva 2007).

Therefore, a second challenge, intertwined with that outlined above, is the raise of discrimination on ethnic grounds, particularly against Roma (see Figure 1). According to a representative survey conducted in 2011 as part of the project “EU INCLUSIVE—data transfer and exchange of best practices between Romania, Bulgaria, Spain and Italy relating to the inclusion of the Roma population,” nearly 46% of Roma believe that nowadays discrimination against their community has increased significantly in the last 10 years (see Figure 1). The share of those who report no change is 24% (Petkova 2013). Research conducted by the “Open Society” Institute, which analyzed the Roma Inclusion (Metodieva et al. 2012) demonstrated that, in fact, a relatively small part of the members of this ethnic community live on state benefits. The data are contrary to the popular opinion that Roma do not work because they live on the money for child allowances. Only 4.3% of the representatives of this ethnic minority receive maternity benefits and child allowances for children up to one year, and 9.6% receive support for socially disadvantaged (see Table 2).

Figure 1. Discrimination against Roma

Source: Petkova (2013).

Today, compared to 10 years ago, the Roma are:

Table 2. Main sources of income for Roma households

Source: Metodieva et al. (2012: 46).

Wages or salaries	32.3%
Income from casual work	18.2%
Pension based on working experience and/or age	10.6%
Pension for disability or sickness	9.1%
Child allowance, for children up to the age of 18, if in school	6.0%
Monthly allowance for poor households	4.5%
Money transfers from people working abroad	3.7%
Profit from own business	3.1%
Monthly allowance for pregnancy, birth, child up to one year	2.8%
Unemployment benefits	2.5%
Monthly allowance for raising a child up to one year	1.5%
Social pension for old age	0.6%
Other social benefits	1.5%
Other pension	1.4%
Other income	2.3%

Third, various studies, based on the famous scale of Emory S. Bogardus, demonstrate the increase of social, interethnic distances that are an indicator of tolerance of a given society (Mantarova and Zaharieva 2007, Pamporov 2008, Pamporov 2016). As far as the two most significant minorities are concerned, these distances remain the largest vis-à-vis the Roma. Usually the respondents who “agree” that Turks should live in Bulgaria are in the range of 80–89%, regarding Pomaks—81–87%, and Roma—in the range of 66–76%. In 2007, 56.1% of Bulgarians “agreed” with Pomaks living in the country, while, regarding the Turks and the Roma, these figures were respectively 54.7% and 44.4% (Pamporov 2008: 107). It appears that the “new minorities”—Arabs, Vietnamese, and Chinese, who are often “invisible” to the state administration and the media—“are much more rejected by the Bulgarians and the population of the country as a whole” (ibid.: 109). As far as the other Balkan peoples are concerned, the social distances are largest in regard to Albanians. Other scholars provide more optimistic data (e.g., Nedelcheva 2011). While some distances indeed are increasing (there is, e.g., a greater confinement in the personal space, which makes it even more difficult to accept persons who have a different ethnicity), others are diminishing (Nedelcheva 2011). In 2009, for example, 37.8% of Bulgarians believe that the Turks are a threat to national security of Bulgaria, while in 1992 this percent was higher—51.1%. The share of Bulgarians and Turks, who perceive Roma as criminals, is decreasing (ibid.: 88–9). In 2009, in comparison to 1992, a smaller percentage of Turks (66.9% vs. 42.4%) and Roma (68.6% vs. 61.4%) believe that Bulgarians are a privileged ethnic group. There are signs, according to Nedelcheva, of an on-going crisis and destruction of national identity, but I think that this does not necessarily mean that Bulgarians “embrace European values” or that “their biographies are globalizing,” as this scholar claims (Nedelcheva 2011: 90–6).

A study of “Gallup International”—At the End of the Decade of Roma Inclusion: Symptoms of Permanent Exclusion, which was conducted between June 26–July 2, 2015—confirms that the social distances between Roma and the other large ethnic groups are increasing (Gallup 2015)75 in spite of state’s integration policies. Attitudes toward Roma do not differ significantly in between social groups. In fact, people “who are in a favorable life situation” are even more alienated against this ethnicity. In the public eye, politicians are to blame “for problems” with Roma communities (Gallup 2015). The survey was conducted in the immediate aftermath of the ethnic tension in Garmen and Orlandovtsi, which might have had an impact on results; however, according to the analysis, the data are unlikely to be significantly different “in a more relaxed atmosphere” (ibid.). In general, the attitude toward Roma is not noticeably affected by the level of education. For example, university graduates are no more tolerant than those with secondary education. A specific case is the group of respondents with primary or lower education where the negative attitudes also prevail, but not to the extent mentioned above. The reason is that many Roma fall in this educational group. Negative attitudes seem even more significant in the larger settlements where the Roma communities are isolated in ghettoes and slums. The latter create “a sense of privilege before the law,” which is an additional factor for the negative attitudes. More negative attitudes toward Roma are expressed in the private sphere/family life. For example, only 9% answered positively to the question whether they would marry Roma, while 85% gave a negative answer. Only 4% of ethnic Bulgarians and 6% of Turks state that they would marry a representative of the Roma minority (ibid.). In Part 2,76 I explore the way in which the increasing social distances affect the perspectives in front of the populist radical parties in Bulgaria.

Fourth, the radical antiestablishment attitudes and nationalism are further amplified by the repercussions of the civil war in Syria. Since 2013 we have witnessed an unprecedented growth of refugees who seek asylum in Bulgaria. In October 2013, the vast majority of Bulgarians (83%) expressed concern that the Syria refugee crisis is coupled with hidden security risks (Alpha Research 2013). Around this position is consolidated a majority encompassing all sociodemographic groups. Only 17% see no serious reason for concern (ibid.). A study published in January 2014, however, shows that the public is calming down regarding the refugee crisis (Gallup 2014a). Fifty-two percent believe that Bulgaria should help Syrian refugees; 28% think that the country should not accept them and expel those who have already entered. Strikingly, the PRR party Ataka, on the one hand, and political formations, which claim that they are representatives of Roma like DROM (Movement for an Equal Public Model), on the other, share a similar, negative stand toward the refugees. The refugee wave, which has been widely covered by the media, has been used by a number of political formations (e.g., by IMRO and the newly formed Nationalist Party of Bulgaria) in their xenophobic propaganda. The fears that a new, bigger “refugee wave” might sweep over Bulgaria are likely to draw even more water into the “mills” of ethnic entrepreneurs.

The fifth challenge is a complex one. The national security of any polity that is guided by the principle of popular sovereignty is dependent on the homeostasis of democratic political system. In theory, the differentia specifica of this system is shaped by three interlinked components. The first is the existence of active civil society, which by definition must be unrestricted by state interference (the latter could often be masked under the role of “benevolent” stewardship). The second is the presence of effective political intermediary institutions—political parties, movements, interest groups, media, etc. The main task of the intermediaries is to aggregate and express the interests arising in the civil society, which then receive the chance to be presented at the level of parliament, and central and local government. The third component consists of the institutions of the state, which are to be guided by the fundamental constitutional principles of liberal democracy (separation of powers, rule of law, popular sovereignty, freedom of speech, etc.). These interrelated components define the character of a democratic political system and are not only its greatest strength but also its paramount weakness. If only one of them deviates of its purpose or loses its legitimacy due to political malignancies like corruption and nepotism, the whole delicate mechanism becomes in danger. For example, the obstruction of the channels of political participation entails the sclerosis of the democratic political system. The symptoms for the latter are, for instance, the raise of political tensions, the increase of pressure from protests, and acts of civil disobedience.

The analysis reveals problems in all three components outlined above. These issues reflect on ethnic tensions and conflicts, crippling the possibilities for their peaceful transformation. The defects in the modus operandi of Bulgarian political system, most of which could be traced back to the dark history of the Bulgarian transition to a market economy and democracy, pose the most significant challenge to the ethnic model. As far as civil society is concerned, it should be pointed out that despite the active involvement of various NGOs that chivalrously take up the cause of ethnic minorities they are often not recognized as legitimate representatives of their interests. The capacity of these organizations to influence state institutions and polices remains very limited, while their weak contacts and representation at European level contribute further to their marginalization. The media, which should serve as a compass to civil society, continue to suffer from severe censorship in Bulgaria. The country was ranked 109 in the 2017 World Press Freedom Index.77 The Press in Bulgaria is the least free of all EU countries (Reporters Without Borders 2017).78 The significance of the other components (the party and the judicial system, as well as the integration policies of the Bulgarian state) for the ethnic relations will be analyzed in the following sections of this work. Here I would only make two important conclusions from the analysis of the SFRY which are directly related to the state of the components.

Although Bulgaria is a unitary state under the Constitution of 1991, the contemporary model of ethnic relations which was established in the 1990s bears similarities to some of the characteristic features of the ethnofederalism in the wretched Yugoslavia. Both political systems utilize the institutionalization of the ethnic cleavages as a safe valve through which the tensions between the ethnic groups could be peacefully channelized and defused. However, institutionalization, as we already established, is not without significant drawbacks. First, it politicizes ethnic identity and thus, ironically, vindicates the actions of ethnic entrepreneurs. The mere existence of the parties of ethnic minorities in Bulgaria, such as MRF, has become a justification for the existence of political formations such as Ataka and NFSB.79 The support for these parties, as well as the “nationalist” vote, in general, is boosted further by the allegations of corruption against some of the leaders and functionaries of the MRF. The latter suffers from opaque decision-making procedures and limited intraparty democracy (Karasimeonov 2010, Cholakov 2014b).80 It has to be emphasized that these negative traits are not limited to the MRF. Many of the political parties in the country are marked by them, although to a different extent.81 There are also the ominous signs of, if we use the well-known concept of Peter Mair, the cartelization of the political system (Katz and Mair 1995, Mair 1998). This leads to the second issue. As the analysis of SFRY has demonstrated, the politicized ethnicity, in itself, could become dangerous only when the institutions that are meant to channelize the ethnic conflicts are eroded and their legitimacy disputed. Unlike the federal institutions of Yugoslavia that initially were strong but were undermined by decentralization and devolution, the postcommunist political institutions in Bulgaria remain weak, underdeveloped, and fragile. They are plagued by sluggish bureaucratic procedures. The justice system,82 including the defense of the right of the minorities, is inefficient and prone to political influences (Cholakov 2014a).83

1.5 Strength of state institutions and ethnic conflicts

There is another problem in the paradigm of conflict analysis proposed by Beverly Crawford and her colleagues84 in The Myth of Ethnic Conflict, which is more imperious than the explanation of the precise mechanisms of politicization. As mentioned, that study postulates that the strength of state institutions in the management and control over ethnic conflicts can offset their illegitimacy. The term “strength of institutions” requires further examination. Following the classic definition of Max Weber, political scientists and sociologists often understand state as a “human community which exercises monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force [violence] within a certain territory” (Weber 2003: 310–11). The essence of “stateness,” according to this approach, is the enforcement (Fukuyama 2004a: 21). However, as Fukuyama points out, it is necessary to distinguish between the “strength” of state institutions and the “scope” of state functions (ibid.: 21–2). This distinction, which will help to better understand how a state deals with interethnic tensions, is lacking in the classic analyses in The Myth of Ethnic Conflict. The “strength” or the “capacity”85 of institutions is a testament to their quality and describes the ability:

to enact statutes and to frame and execute policies; to administer the public business with relative efficiency; to control graft, corruption, and bribery; to maintain high levels of transparency and accountability in governmental institutions; and most importantly, to enforce laws. (Fukuyama 2004a: 22)

There is no commonly accepted mechanism to measure institutional capacity. Furthermore, the process of making comparisons between political systems is greatly complicated by the fact that the performance of state’s agencies can fluctuate significantly. A given country can simultaneously have, for example, efficient repressive apparatus and extremely cumbersome bureaucratic procedures.86 The Worldwide Governance Indicators87 (WGI) and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International can be used as criteria to assess the strength of institutions and place them in a comparative, international perspective.88 The “scope” of state functions refers to the extent of prerogatives or the catalogue of actions and goals that are taken on by the government (Fukuyama 2004a: 21). The 1997 World Development Report: The State in a Changing World, which Fukuyama uses as a basis of his analysis,89 classifies government functions along a continuum,90 and divides them into three groups: minimalist, intermediate, and activist (World Bank 1997: 27). Regarding “scope,” Fukuyama postulates that it is best to array states “according to the most ambitious functions which they seek to perform, even if they fail at or do not care much about the more basic ones” (Fukuyama 2004a: 22). The further to the right on the axis depicted in Figure 2 belong “the most ambitious” functions, the broader the scope, and vice versa. There is, however, an issue with this method to measure scope, which I shall address below.

Figure 2. The scope of state functions

Source: Fukuyama (2004a: 23).

Figure 3. Strength of state institutions and scope of state functions

Source: The figure builds on the discussion of these issues in Fukuyama (2004a: 23).

The four quadrants of Figure 3, which is based on the famous analysis of Fukuyama (Fukuyama 2004a: 23), represent different combinations of “strength” and “scope.” The purpose of the figure is to serve as a general orientation without claiming statistical or other precision. The American political scientist does not indicate the specific criteria that were used in order to position the countries in the appropriate quadrants.91 Bulgaria is not part of the original analysis. In Figure 3, I have compared the Balkan state with three of the countries in the analysis of Fukuyama—the United States, France, and Sierra Leone.92 In order to do that, I reconstructed the figure through the help of data describing the welfare regimes in the states in question (Fenger 2007) and the WGI for 2013. The study of welfare regimes essentially describes how the state performs regarding the most “ambitious functions” (if we use Fukuyama’s term) such as social security and income redistribution. Therefore, it allows us to “gauge” and compare scope. This criterion is particularly appropriate, because, as we have already seen, the ethnic minorities in Bulgaria are perceived as heavily dependent on the social security policies of the state.

In his classic work on social policy Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen93 distinguishes between three ideal types of welfare regimes94: liberal, conservative-corporatist, and social-democratic. This distinction is based on the degree of decommodification and the type of stratification, which they produce in given society95 (Esping-Andersen 1993). The liberal welfare states are characterized by means-tested assistance and modest social-insurance plans. Benefits cater predominantly to a clientele of low-income state dependents. If we apply this analysis to Fukuyama’s four quadrants (see Figure 3), we can conclude that, in comparison to the other two types, the states that favor this regime must embrace the ideal of limited scope. It is typical for countries like the United States, which are distinguished by parsimonious social security policies and a strong drive toward economic deregulation, based on the liberal faith in the “invisible hand” and, in general, animosity toward income redistribution. The conservative-corporatist regimes in France and Germany have moderate levels of decommodification. The state provides income maintenance benefits related to occupational status. The social-democratic regimes in Sweden and Norway are characterized by high levels of decommodification and redistribution. The generous benefits do not depend on any individual contributions (Esping Andersen 1993, Arts and Gelissen 2002).

This classification triggered a heated discussion, a plethora of new typologies, and received both prize and criticisms. What is important, from our perspective, is that two of the countries in question—the United States and France—“fit” relatively well into these ideal welfare regime types, which allows us to measure and compare their scope. However, neither Bulgaria nor Sierra Leone is part of Esping-Andersen’s classification. The Bulgarian case96 has been described as a mixture between the social-democratic and conservative-corporatist regimes (Todorova 2008). The hierarchical cluster analysis of Fenger97 which builds upon and expands the work of Esping-Andresen in order to classify the states in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrates that Bulgaria is a part of a separate postcommunist European type (to which belong as well Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia).98 If we use the total government expenditures99 as a leading indicator, this cluster in fact must be positioned somewhat between the conservative and the liberal regimes. It should be noted, however, that according to Fenger’s analysis, the societies in the postcommunist European welfare regimes are more egalitarian than the conservative regimes.100 As to Bulgaria, this conclusion is apparently based on old data. The country’s Gini index measuring the distribution of family income and inequality is higher (rank 38, Gini index for 2007—45.3101) than any other state in the EU (e.g., France has rank 114, and Gini index for 2011—30.9102) and higher than the United States (rank 41, Gini index for 2007—45).103 The negative trends regarding some of the other social situation variables (such as inflation, life expectancy, infant mortality, and unemployment), as well as the main political participation variable (level of trust in the institutions) which Fenger takes into account104 in his analysis, pose significant challenges in front of operation of the welfare states of this type.

Regarding the institutional scope of Sierra Leone, the fourth country in our comparative analysis, it suffices to say that it is characterized by a permanent emergency welfare regime in transition (Cerami and Wagué 2013: 252–7). The latter is typical for the most of sub-Saharan Africa and has specific features, which make it very different from the welfare regimes that we examined above: a low impact of the state in welfare promotion due to limited budget capacity; political and bureaucratic clientelism in order to obtain access to benefits and services; high production of vertical and horizontal inequalities; vital importance of the family as well as the local and religious communities in social protection; strong reliance of the informal economy and informal networks in welfare production; welfare goals aiming at securing “basic services in provisions”; and survival-oriented skill production regime characterized by low human capital formation (Cerami 2013: 9–10). In a nutshell, the scope of state institutions in Sierra Leone is extremely limited.

Using the WGIs for 2013 (see Table 3 and), I compared the strength of state institutions in Bulgaria to these in France, Sierra Leone, and United States, as well as in Brazil and Turkey. Although the last two countries are not represented in Figure 3, they are given as examples of quadrant two countries in Fukuyama’s analysis105 and it makes sense to see how Bulgaria stands in juxtaposition to them. The indicators fluctuate in the range between −2.5 and 2.5; higher numbers indicate better performance. On the grounds of the indicators for 2013 we can conclude that, as far as “political stability and absence of violence/terrorism” and “regulatory quality” are concerned, Bulgarian institutions are doing a relatively good job (see Table 3 and Figure 4). The country follows the lead of the United States and France; it is ahead of Brazil, Turkey, and Sierra Leone. However, regarding the indicator “voice and accountability” Bulgaria lags behind France, United States, and Brazil. Bulgaria also runs behind the United States, France, and Turkey in the domain of “government effectiveness.” In addition to that, with respect to “control of corruption” and “rule of law” Bulgaria is at the bottom of the chart. The state capacity measured by these indicators is weaker only in Sierra Leone.

Table 3. Comparison between six states in 2013, based on WGI Source: Kaufman et al. (2010) and World Bank (2015).
Indicator	Country	Governance score (from −2.5 to +2.5)
Voice and accountability	Brazil	0.37
	Bulgaria	0.32
	France	1.20
	Sierra Leone	−0.39
	Turkey	−0.26
	United States	1.08
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism	Brazil	−0.28
	Bulgaria	0.18
	France	0.42
	Sierra Leone	−0.15
	Turkey	−1.19
	United States	0.61
Government effectiveness	Brazil	−0.08
	Bulgaria	0.15
	France	1.47
	Sierra Leone	−1.14
	Turkey	0.37
	United States	1.50
Regulatory quality	Brazil	0.07
	Bulgaria	0.52
	France	1.15
	Sierra Leone	−0.69
	Turkey	0.42
	United States	1.26
Rule of law	Brazil	−0.12
	Bulgaria	−0.14
	France	1.40
	Sierra Leone	−0.88
	Turkey	0.08
	United States	1.54
Control of corruption	Brazil	−0.12
	Bulgaria	−0.29
	France	1.30
	Sierra Leone	−0.90
	Turkey	0.11
	United States	1.28