Kitabı oku: «Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)», sayfa 12

CHAPTER X.
IDENTITY; DISTINCTION; UNITY; MULTIPLICITY

69. Let us examine how we may draw from the idea of not-being the explication of the ideas of identity and distinction, unity and multiplicity.

Let us conceive a being, and fix our attention solely on it, and compare it with nothing which is not it, nor permit any idea of not-being to come in; we shall then, with respect to it, have the ideas of identity and unity; or, to speak more exactly, these ideas of identity and unity will be nothing else than ideas of this same being. Ideas of unity and identity are for this reason inexplicable by themselves alone; they are simple, or are confounded with a simple idea in which can be no comparison, and into which if negation enter, it is not noted, nor can be made the object of reflection. Thus, for instance, the idea of not-being enters in some manner into the perception of every limited being; but we can abstract this negation, and consider what the object is, not what it is not.

70. If we perceive a being, and afterwards another being, the perception that one is not the other gives the idea of distinction, and consequently that also of multiplicity. There is, then, no distinction or number without perception of relative not-being combined with being; but this perception is all that is requisite to distinction and number.

71. The ideas of identity and unity are simple, those of distinction and number composite; the former involve no negation, the latter imply a negative judgment; "this is not that." It is impossible for A to be presented to us as distinct from B, if we do not perceive that B is not A; and on the other hand, we need only to know that B is not A, in order to enable us to say they are distinct. These expressions, "A is not B," or, "A and B are distinct," are perfectly identical.

72. From this we infer that the primary combination of our intelligence consists in the perception of being and not-being. By it we perceive identity and distinction, unity and number; by it we compare, affirm, or deny; without it we cannot even think. Without the perception of negation, we can have only the perception of being, that is, an intuition fixed upon an identical object, one and immutable, such as we conceive the Divine Intelligence to be, contemplating the infinity of being in the infinite essence.

73. Does God know negations? Certainly; for when a being ceases to exist, God knows this truth, in which there is a negation. He knows the truth of all negative propositions, whether it expresses substantive or relative being; therefore, he knows negation. But this is no imperfection, since it cannot be an imperfection to know truth; the imperfection is in the objects, which, by the very fact of being finite, include negation, being combined with not-being. Were God not to know negation, it would be because negation is in itself impossible; which would be equivalent to the impossibility of the existence of the finite, and would lead to the absolute and exclusive necessity of one sole infinite being.

CHAPTER XI.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF BEING

74. If it be impossible to think without the idea of being, it exists prior to any reflex act, and it cannot have sprung from reflection. The idea of being must therefore be innate. Let us investigate this question.

75. We have shown in the preceding chapter that we cannot think without the idea of being; let whoever doubts this consult his own experience, and make, if he can, a reflex act into which the idea of being will not enter. We have already seen that we cannot exclude it in the conception of first principles, and beyond these it is certain no one will go.

76. Can this idea have come to us from sensation? Sensation in itself offers us only determinate objects, whereas the idea of being is an indeterminate thing: sensation offers us only particular things, whereas the idea of being is the most general it is possible to have: sensation teaches us nothing, tells us nothing, except what it is, a simple affection of our soul, whereas the idea of being is a vast idea, extending to all, and, fecundating our mind in an admirable manner, is the element of all reflection and alone sufficient to found a science: sensation never leaves itself, nor extends to another sensation; the sense of touch has nothing to do with that of hearing; all belong to an instant of time, and only exist during it, whereas the idea of being guides the mind through every class of beings, the corporeal and the incorporeal, the real and the possible, the temporal and the eternal, the finite and the infinite.

If we discover any thing by sensations, if they produce any intellectual fruit, it is because we reflect upon them; but reflection is impossible without the idea of being.

77. Neither does it seem that the idea of being can be formed by abstraction. To abstract is of necessity to reflect; and reflection is impossible without this idea; therefore, it is necessary to abstraction, and consequently cannot have abstraction for its cause.

78. On the other hand, an exceedingly simple explication of the method in which abstraction is made, may be opposed to this argument apparently so conclusive. We see the paper upon which we write; this sensation involves two things, whiteness and extension. Were we limited to simple sensation, here we should stop, and receive only the impression, extension and whiteness. But having within ourselves a faculty distinct from that of feeling, which makes us capable of reflecting upon the very sensation we experience, we can consider that this sensation has some similarity to others which we recollect to have experienced. We can then consider extension and whiteness in themselves, abstracting the actual affection which they produce in us. Afterwards we can reflect upon the fact that these sensations have something in common with others, inasmuch as they all affect us in a certain manner, and then we have the idea of sensation in general. If, then, we consider that these sensations all have something in common with all that is in us, in so far as they modify us in a certain manner, we shall form an idea of a modification of the me, making abstraction, however, of its being a sensation, a thought, or an act of the will; and if, finally, we abstract from these things being in us, their being substances or modifications, and attend only to the fact that they are something, we shall have attained the idea of being. This idea may, therefore, be formed by abstraction. This explication, seductive as it is by reason of its simplicity, is open to grave objections.

79. From the very beginning of this process we make use, without adverting to it, of the idea of being; we therefore deceive ourselves when we imagine that we form it. We cannot reflect upon extension and whiteness without remarking that they exist, that they are something similar to other sensations. When we think upon what affects us, we know that we are, that that which affects us is, and we speak of its being or not being, of its having or not having something common; and finally, when we abstract the modifications of our mind as being this or that, and regard them only as thing, as something, as a being, we evidently cannot so consider them if there does not exist in us the idea of something in general, that is, of being. Thus being is a predicate which we apply to things; we do, therefore, know this predicate. We only collect in one general and indeterminate idea, particular and determinate things, already existing in our understanding. The successive operations made by means of abstraction are only a decomposition of the object, a classification of it in various general ideas so as to attain to the superior idea of being.

80. It is difficult in view of these reasons, which are all strong, to decide without danger of erring for either of the opinions advanced. Nevertheless, we shall give our own in accordance with the principles we have laid down in different parts of this work. We hold that the idea of being is not innate, in the sense that it pre-exists in our understanding as a type anterior to all sensation and to all intellectual acts;²³ but we see no impropriety in calling it innate, if nothing more be meant than the innate faculty of our understanding to perceive objects under the general reason of being or existence, so often as it reflects upon them. Thus the idea does not flow from sensations; it is recognized as a primary element of pure understanding; but it is not formed by abstraction, which separates it from others, and purifies it, so to speak, itself contributing to this purification. In this sense it may exist before reflection, and yet be the fruit of reflection, according to the various stages in which we consider it. Inasmuch as it is mixed and confused with other ideas, it exists before reflection; but inasmuch as it has been separated and purified, it is the fruit of the same reflection.

81. We must, in order to give a complete solution of the difficulties proposed, give our ideas precision and exactness.

The idea of being is not only general but also indeterminate; it offers to the mind nothing real or even possible, since we do not conceive that a being, which is only being, does or can exist, if no property besides that of being can be affirmed of it. In God is the plenitude of being; he is his own being; with reason does he call himself, I am, who am; but we also affirm of him, with all truth, that he is intelligent, that he is free, and that he possesses other perfections not expressed in the pure and general idea of being.

From this we infer that we ought not to regard the idea of being as a type representing to us something determinate, even something in general.

82. The act by which we perceive being, existence, reality, is necessary to our understanding, but it is confounded with all other intellectual acts, as a condition sine qua non of them all, until reflection comes to separate it from them, purifying it, and making it the object of our perception.

Since, when we perceive, we perceive something, it is evident that the reason of being is always involved in all our perceptions; by the simple fact of knowing we know being, that is, we know a thing. But as we do not always, when we fix our perception upon an object, distinguish the various reasons into which it may be decomposed, although the idea of being is contained in every object perceived, it is not directly perceived by our understanding until reflection separates it from all else.

83. If we reflect upon an azure object, evidently the idea of color enters into that of azure; but without reflection we shall not distinguish the genus, color, and the difference, azure. These two things are not really distinguished in the object perceived; for it would be ridiculous to pretend that in a particular azure-colored object, color is one thing and azure another. Nevertheless we can, when we reflect upon the object, very easily distinguish between the two ideas of color and azure, and we can discuss one without paying attention to the other. Must we say we have the idea of color in general, prior to the sensible representation? Most certainly not: it is only necessary to recognize an innate force of the mind to generalize what is presented to it in particular, and to decompose a simple object into various ideas or aspects.

84. Our understanding is endowed with an intellectual force, by virtue of which it can conceive unity under the idea of multiplicity, and multiplicity under the idea of unity. We discover an example of the latter when we unite what is really multiple in a single conception. Our understanding may be compared to a prism which decomposes a ray of light into many colors; hence different conceptions relating to one simple object. When multiplicity is to be reduced to unity, the intellectual force operates in an altogether contrary manner; instead of dispersing, it unites; the variety of colors disappears, and the ray of light is restored in all its purity and simplicity.

85. Our mind, from the fact that it is limited to know many things by conceptions only, and not by intuitions, requires the faculty of composing and decomposing, of seeing a simple thing under distinct aspects, and of joining different things under a common reason.

We must not fail to observe that the power of generalizing and of dividing, given to our understanding, is a great help to it, indicating, however, its weakness in the intellectual order, and continually warning it to proceed with due circumspection, when it has to decide upon the intimate nature of things.

86. According to this doctrine, general, and more particularly indeterminate ideas result from the exercise of reflection upon our own perceptive acts; and there is in the general idea nothing more than is seen in the particular perception, excepting its own generality produced by the elimination of all individuating conditions. This is especially verified in the idea of being, which, as we have seen, enters as a necessary condition into all our perceptions, and is, moreover, requisite to all operations as well of composition as of decomposition.

We cannot conceive, without conceiving some thing, a being; and this is substantive being. We cannot affirm or deny without saying, is, or is not; and this is copulative being. The idea of being is, therefore, less an idea than a condition necessary to enable our understanding to exercise its functions; it is not a type representing nothing determinate; it is rather the very condition of its life, without which it cannot possibly exercise its activity.

87. But we can, by reflection, perceive this condition of all our thoughts; the idea of being, standing, as it does, involved with the others, is then presented purified to our eyes, and we conceive that general reason of being, or thing, which enters into all our perceptions, but which we had not previously distinguished with sufficient clearness.

CHAPTER XII.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE

88. It has been much disputed in the schools whether existence is distinct from essence. At first sight, this seems an indifferent question; but such it is not, if we attend to the consequences which, in the opinion of respectable authors, flow from it; for they pretend to no less than establishing upon the distinction between essence and existence a characteristic note of the finite, attributing to infinite being alone, the identity of its essence with its existence.

89. That we distinguish between the essence and the existence of things is beyond all doubt; for inasmuch as we know an object realized, we conceive its existence; and inasmuch as we know that this object exists with this or that determination, constituting it in such or such a species, we conceive its essence. The idea of existence represents to us pure reality; the idea of essence offers us the determination of this reality. The schools, however, not satisfied with this, have endeavored to transfer to things that distinction which we discover in our conceptions; but their opinion seems to be subtle rather than solid.

90. The essence of a thing is that which makes it what it is, and distinguishes it from all else; and existence is the act which gives being to essence, or that by which essence exists. It would appear, from these definitions, that there really is no distinction between essence and existence. To render two things distinct, it is requisite that one be not the other; but since essence, abstracted from existence, is nothing, we cannot say that there is a real distinction between them. To what is the essence of a man, if we abstract his existence, reduced? To nothing; and therefore, no relation between them is admissible. We grant that when we abstract the existence of man, we do yet conceive the essence of man; but the question is not whether we distinguish between the idea of man and his existence, but whether there is a real distinction between his own essence and existence.

91. In God are the essences of all things, and in this sense they may be said to be distinguished from finite existence; this does not, however, if we consider it well, at all affect the present question. When things exist in God, they are not any thing distinct from him; they are represented in the Infinite Intelligence, which is, with all its representations, the infinite essence itself. To compare, therefore, the finite existence of things with their essence, as this is in God, is entirely to change the state of the question, and to seek the relation of things, not with their particular essences, but with the representations of the Divine understanding.

92. It may be objected that, if the existence of finite beings is the same as their essence, it will follow that existence will be essential to these beings; for, since nothing is more essential than essence itself, finite beings would exist of necessity, as all that pertains to essence is necessary. The radii of a circle are all equal, for equality is contained in the essence of the circle; and in like manner, if existence belong to the essence of things, they must exist, and non-existence would be a veritable contradiction.

This difficulty rests upon the ambiguous meaning of the word essence, and the want of exactness in joining the ideas of essential and necessary. The relation of essential properties is necessary, for we cannot destroy it without falling into contradiction. The radii of a circle are equal, because equality is involved in the very idea of the circle; consequently, if this be denied, it would be affirmed and denied at one and the same time. There is, however, no contradiction when some properties are not compared with others; but this comparison is not made when there is question of essence and existence, for in this case one thing is not compared with another, but with itself; if the distinction be introduced, it does not refer to two things, but to one and the same thing considered under two aspects, or in two different states, in the ideal order and in the real.

When we consider essence abstracted from existence, the object is the union of the properties which give to beings such or such a nature; we abstract their existence or non-existence, and attend only to what they would be were they to exist. The condition of existence is either expressly or impliedly involved in all that we affirm or deny of properties; but when we consider essence realized or existing, we do not compare property with property but the thing with itself. In this case, non-existence does not imply contradiction; for when existence disappears, the essence also disappears, with all that it included. There would be a contradiction were we to assert that essence implies existence, and to endeavor, while the former remains, to make the latter disappear, which is not verified in this supposition. The equality of the radii of a circle cannot fail, so long as the circle does not fail; and the contradiction would be to make the radii unequal while the circle continues to be a circle; but were the circle to cease to be a circle, there would be no reason why the radii should not be unequal. Essence is the same as existence; so long as there is essence, so long will there be existence; if the essence fail the existence will likewise fail; where, then, is the contradiction? Life is of the essence of man, and yet man dies; we may then say man is destroyed, and therefore there is in this no contradiction. If the essence cease to exist, it also will be destroyed, and existence, which is identified with it, may fail without any contradiction.

93. The scholastics taught that the being whose essence was the same as its existence would be infinite and absolutely immutable, because, since existence is the complement in the line of being or of act, it could receive nothing more. This difficulty also originates in the equivocal sense of words. What is meant by complement in the line of being or act? If it mean that nothing can supervene to essence identified with existence, here is a begging of the question, since what was to be proved is asserted. If it mean that existence is the complement in the line of being or act in the sense that, given it, nothing more is wanted to make the things, whose existence it is, really existing, an indubitable truth is advanced, but not one from which what was to be demonstrated can be inferred.

94. It would seem, therefore, that there is no real distinction in things corresponding to the distinction between essence and existence in our conceptions. Essence is not distinguished from existence, but it does not therefore cease to be finite, nor existence to be contingent. In God existence is identified with essence; but in such a manner, that his non-existence implies contradiction, and his essence is infinite.